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Post by wild on Aug 25, 2015 8:46:16 GMT -6
Montroes This greatly fatigued officers and men, but it perplexed the enemy and prevented them from calculating accurately upon the place and moment for an ambuscade. The long treks were actually a tactic by the Indians;usually over the roughtest terrain.The purpose was to wreck the horses and it succeeded;the wastage of mounts was very high. Must dig out the figures. Cheers
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Post by montrose on Aug 25, 2015 9:13:21 GMT -6
Richard,
Not in the campaign I am quoting. Crook had a plan, and executed it, regardless of Indian deceptions.
Now look at LBH. GAC's decision to move his main body into the badlands also had nothing to do with Indian deception plans. It speaks more to his incompetence than any reaction to enemy actions.
Understand me here?
Very Respectfully,
M
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Post by wild on Aug 25, 2015 9:17:12 GMT -6
Montrose
These boards have been crippled by arguments based on emotion and intimidation. We need an environment where we can discuss opposite viewpoints, without emotional reactions to the poster. Wild and myself are an example. I rarely agree with him, we go back and forth. But I vastly appreciate his efforts to expand the discussion on LBH. We have never, and will never, meet; but I like the guy, and his contributions here. Still does not mean I will not trash his views. Good on ya Will. Anyway just in passing . I think there are 3 subliminal biases at work on the majority side of the equation;to wit , nationalism ,race and professional pride. Not saying it is malicious in any way , just unencumbered as I am with this natural baggage I see things somewhat differently . A discussion for another day perhaps. Best Regards
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Post by wild on Aug 25, 2015 9:28:11 GMT -6
Will
Now look at LBH. GAC's decision to move his main body into the badlands also had nothing to do with Indian deception plans. It speaks more to his incompetence than any reaction to enemy actions. Not sure if I do . If you mean his turning away from MTC ford . He could not perform a U turn in the face of the enemy .He had to break contact and exit the area as quick as possible.The high ground to the North was his best chance. I think he just could not break contact and it was "devil take the hind most." Cheers
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Post by wild on Aug 25, 2015 9:44:48 GMT -6
Montrose
The 7th could have won LBH. If you don't agree, I think all will agree they could have achieved a better outcome. This means more damage to the Indians, either through more casualties or damage to the pony herds, or damage to the supplies in the village to allow survival in the winter. And, of course, less US KIA. They were not mobile or trained or armed to a standard which would have achieved the goals you suggest. They could have taken a large portion of the village and held it until rescued. And I mean rescued. If the performance of the Reno/Benteen force on Reno hill is anything to go by they would have suffered a very high rate of casualties with wholesale slaughter of their mounts. [but then again the Indians would not have got their hands on 220 army carbines.] Cheers
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Post by bc on Aug 25, 2015 9:46:42 GMT -6
In looking for information on the Rosebud battle, I have Jerome Green's book he compiled and edited on Battles and skirmishes of the Great Sioux War. The chapter on the Rosebud battle was written by a newspaperman, Reuben Davenport, who was in the battle and contains a lot of information. It was in the New York Herald on July 6, 1876.
At the time the scouts believed the Sioux village was on the Yellowstone. Their plan was to approach within 30 miles of the Sioux village and then to advance on it during the night to attack at dawn. The day before the battle they marched 35 miles. On June 17 they marched at 5 a.m. and by 7:30 a.m. they made about 10 miles. He states that when then left the Crow scouts went in front and on the flanks but they had omitted to send forward their spies during the night even though they found signs the day before of the Sioux buffalo hunting. Note: I am not sure what he means by spies or if they regularly sent scouts ahead at night to get ahead of the column.
At 7:30 the leader of the crows signaled the other crows and they began their battle preparations, gathering ponies, putting on makeup, etc. A halt was ordered and the order was given to unsaddle believing they just spotted a few Sioux in the hills. Somewhere in this fight, Crook thought the Sioux village was probably about 10 miles ahead on the Rosebud which is why he sent Mill's battalion with another battalion of cavalry to attack it during the battle. Mills made it 5 miles before he was turned around to come back and help Royall and Crook in their battle. After sending Mills, a Crow reported to Crook that the village was in the opposite direction (whatever opposite means, perhaps opposite side of the Wolf mountains) so Crook sent his assistant adjutant to bring Mills back.
The account had a lot of detail and helped explain how Royall had advanced to the east across the big hollow/swale where the Sioux orginally began their attack and none of the infantry behind him advanced to fill in the gap in the big swale between Royall and Crook's HQ so the Sioux managed to move around their flank and get back in the swale between them. The Snakes/Shoshone attacked in the swale along with the infantry driving the Sioux out allowing Royall to move back.
One of the main reasons Crook went back was because the Crow scouts refused to go forward from there. Crook started to go after the Sioux but the Crows remained on a hill having a pow-wow. The were worried that their village may have been attacked since it contained a captured Sioux pony, they had two wounded to take back, and a Snake member of their tribe was killed and they needed to console his squaw. So Crook went back to the camp and waited for the day to see if they would change their minds. They talked at length but the Crows insisted that they must go back to their village to have a war dance over the the scalps they had won.
Crook then figured the Sioux village had moved by then and he couldn't go forward without his Crow scouts. Davenport puts the blame for the battle and the expedition on the failure of the Crows to properly scout.
bc
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Post by bc on Aug 25, 2015 10:01:22 GMT -6
Shaw, sometime I will find Sheridan's original order and post it so we can see the actual wording. After the LBH battle, Sheridan did order Crook and Terry to join forces. The hooked up on August 10 and roamed around for 15 days in the Rosebud-Powder-Tongue River area with 4000 men. Crook broke away on August 25 saying he wanted to go to the Black Hills to protect the settlers but in reality wanted to get free from Terry's command who was ranking officer. During that movement to the Black Hills, he found NAs at Slim Buttes.
bc
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 25, 2015 10:22:58 GMT -6
Just started reading The Art of Reconnaissance by Brigadiers General David Henderson. Written in 1905 and the examples are from 1860s and 1870s.
"There are three types of reconnaissance of the enemy, which differ from essentially each other in the methods by which the same object -- information -- is obtained; these may be called protective, contact and independent reconnaissance."
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Aug 25, 2015 15:53:08 GMT -6
Just started reading The Art of Reconnaissance by Brigadiers General David Henderson. Written in 1905 and the examples are from 1860s and 1870s. "There are three types of reconnaissance of the enemy, which differ from essentially from each other in the methods by which the same object -- information -- is obtained; these may be called protective, contact and independent reconnaissance." Regards AZ Ranger babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101023486085;view=1up;seq=5CH 4 covers the importance of training, orders and management; especially pp64-6. Ch 5 addresses fieldcraft and training Ch 6 addresses communication. No Martini confusion here.
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shaw
Full Member
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Post by shaw on Aug 26, 2015 21:28:07 GMT -6
Shaw, sometime I will find Sheridan's original order and post it so we can see the actual wording. After the LBH battle, Sheridan did order Crook and Terry to join forces. The hooked up on August 10 and roamed around for 15 days in the Rosebud-Powder-Tongue River area with 4000 men. Crook broke away on August 25 saying he wanted to go to the Black Hills to protect the settlers but in reality wanted to get free from Terry's command who was ranking officer. During that movement to the Black Hills, he found NAs at Slim Buttes. bc bc, That would be appreciated. The Wiki page on the campaign said the goal was similar to what I first stated. It was a general statement and I shouldn't have counted on it as a source. I am appreciative of the clarification plus if you just look at the way the campaign was conducted strategically I can see that the statement is not accurate. Here is the Wiki statement never the less. "The plan was for all three columns to converge simultaneously on the Lakota hunting grounds and pin down the Indians between the approaching troops." en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Sioux_War_of_1876#Launching_the_war
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Post by bc on Aug 27, 2015 2:54:16 GMT -6
Shaw, sometime I will find Sheridan's original order and post it so we can see the actual wording. After the LBH battle, Sheridan did order Crook and Terry to join forces. The hooked up on August 10 and roamed around for 15 days in the Rosebud-Powder-Tongue River area with 4000 men. Crook broke away on August 25 saying he wanted to go to the Black Hills to protect the settlers but in reality wanted to get free from Terry's command who was ranking officer. During that movement to the Black Hills, he found NAs at Slim Buttes. bc bc, That would be appreciated. The Wiki page on the campaign said the goal was similar to what I first stated. It was a general statement and I shouldn't have counted on it as a source. I am appreciative of the clarification plus if you just look at the way the campaign was conducted strategically I can see that the statement is not accurate. Here is the Wiki statement never the less. "The plan was for all three columns to converge simultaneously on the Lakota hunting grounds and pin down the Indians between the approaching troops." en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Sioux_War_of_1876#Launching_the_warI'm still looking but I found this from a master's study done by a Major at the Marine Corps academy. "Sheridan’s specific campaign design was to: Have in the field a number of columns, so that the moving Indian villages cannot avoid all of them, and have these columns cooperate under some common head (his command in Chicago). Each of them being strong enough to take care of itself, the Indians, if successful in eluding one, will in all probability be encountered by one of the others.15 In a later message to General Alfred Terry, Custer’s superior, he ensured his subordinate understood that the two departments, while participating in the same campaign, were operating independent of each other. The lack of coordinated command and control of the columns in the field, and that fact that he would attempt to command from his headquarters in Chicago, did not seem to concern him. His main concern was finding and striking a concentrated group of Indians as he passed his intent to General Terry: "I will hurry up Crook, but you must rely on the ability of your own column for best success. I believe it to be fully equal to all the Sioux that can be brought to bear against it, and only hope they will hold fast to meet it. You know the impossibility of any large number of Indians keeping together as a hostile body for even one week.16"" 25 APRIL 2001 United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The Military Decision Making Process and the Battle of the Little Bighorn Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Military Studies. By Jonathan T. Neumann Major, U.S. Army CSC Class 2001 The decision to go after the Sioux was made in November. Originally Sheridan planned a winter campaign but no one could move that quick. bc
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Aug 27, 2015 13:21:47 GMT -6
bc,
It's pretty obvious that Sheridan felt that any of the columns was strong enough to take on the NA's without support from the other columns. I hazarding a guess that Gibbon, Terry and Crook each felt that way too. Where it breaks down is that Custer felt that way too. He felt the 7th by itself was enough.
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Post by bc on Aug 27, 2015 17:20:21 GMT -6
bc, It's pretty obvious that Sheridan felt that any of the columns was strong enough to take on the NA's without support from the other columns. I hazarding a guess that Gibbon, Terry and Crook each felt that way too. Where it breaks down is that Custer felt that way too. He felt the 7th by itself was enough. Yep. And Terry's dispatch to Sheridan requesting the three companies in the south be transferred states that Terry wasn't sure that his nine companies could not attack without great risk of defeat. Here is a little more background. The decision to let the miners into the Black Hills and go after the NAs was made at a White House meeting on Nov 3, 1875 by Grant. Sheridan was there as well as Terry and others. Custer returned from leave on Feb. 15, 1876 and reported to Terry at St. Paul on that day and spent two weeks with Terry in St. Paul before going on to FAL where his train later was stuck for a long time in a blizzard. The next day Custer requested from Terry that he secure the return of his three companies from the south. Here is the letter Terry sent to Sheridan I believe around Feb. 16, 1876: "I earnestly request that the three companies of the 7th Cavalry now serving in the Department of the Gulf may be ordered to rejoin their regiment in this department. The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies of the 7th now in the department. These nine companies comprise but six hundred and twenty men all told, and of these not over five hundred and fifty could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder Rivers country should be found gathered in one camp, or in contiguous camps (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat." Alfred Howe Terry Custer was there and knew of this message and they would have discussed as they probably worked out their plan during this two weeks. They also requested more recruits, scouts, and other necessities. They knew they were facing an enemy that could defeat them so I don't think there was any over-confidence, over-exuberance, hubrist, or rashness exhibited here, just a rational analysis. By February 21, 1876 Terry and Custer had formulated their plan. You will note that it does not involve a battle plan that included combining Custer's Cavalry with Terry's infantry or with Gibbon either. Here is Terry's February 21, 1876 letter from Terry to Sheridan: "I think my only plan will be to give Custer a secure base well up on the Yellowstone from which he can operate, at which he can find supplies, and to which he can retire at any time the Indians gather in too great numbers for the small force he will have. Several companies of infantry would accompany the Seventh to man the supply depots while Custer searched for the enemy, and steamers would freight supplies up the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers. The Dakota column would leave Fort Lincoln on April 5." It is clear from this letter to Sheridan, that Terry was going to give Custer free rein to do what he wanted to do. Have to keep this in mind when analyzing his later letter of instructions on June 22, 1876. bc
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Post by wild on Aug 28, 2015 1:31:26 GMT -6
Well done BC Throws a whole new understanding[well for me]on what was expected of Custer . And shows up Terry's after battle report as a piece of ass saving treachery . Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 28, 2015 8:15:46 GMT -6
"I earnestly request that the three companies of the 7th Cavalry now serving in the Department of the Gulf may be ordered to rejoin their regiment in this department. The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies of the 7th now in the department. These nine companies comprise but six hundred and twenty men all told, and of these not over five hundred and fifty could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder Rivers country should be found gathered in one camp, or in contiguous camps (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat." Alfred Howe Terry
I read the above and form a different opinion wild. The number of companies is of less importance than the number of troopers. Notice that Terry states that they could not be attacked by that number without risk of great defeat.
Terry describes what happened and Custer fed the 7th cavalry to those Indians a few companies at a time.
The numbers
9 companies 620 men = 68 men per company
9 companies 550 men in the field for active duty = 61 men per company
So pick whatever number for the average of the actual company strength of the 12 companies and then take that total and compare it to the 620 Terry stated all or the 550 in the field for active service.
Crook had the pack train run independent of the active operation companies men. The Terry/Custer pack train reduced the total mounted strength of the 12 companies and the remaining total numbers are close to the number that Terry wrote is not sufficient for the end in view.
"They could be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat."
Sound like that prediction was right
Regards
AZ Ranger
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