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Post by wild on Aug 22, 2015 12:30:49 GMT -6
Hi Ed
As mentioned above I believe the results of LBH were primarily due to the N/A being able to "outeverything" the 7th Cavalry that day. Agreed. A day when the numerically stronger combined individuals out performed the rigid slow formations of the regimental system. Cheers
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Post by dave on Aug 22, 2015 13:11:28 GMT -6
Montrose Interesting post regarding the quality of the messengers. I had not given the selection the first thought. Now I know better. Regards Dave
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Aug 22, 2015 16:49:45 GMT -6
In the 1876 Campaign (leading to Rosebud and LBH) the most effective scout was Reno's scout in force. Yeah, he may have gone too far but he came back with some valuable information. Terry IMHO valued it but GAC blew a gasket because Reno got to lead part of the 7th without GAC around to control his every action. That alone should have been a warning to Terry about what the danger was of letting GAC go off by himself. GAC was too busy trying to make sure than any battle with the NA's was an all 7th show. Anyway, Terry ordered that scout. GAC was opposed to it. I'm sure he would have been okay with a scout in force as long as either he led the 7th in that scout or someone else led non 7th elements. Crook was a train wreck. Not only was he surprised by the NA's but then he pulled back his whole force after Rosebud and failed to communicate to anyone that he was out of the campaign. Yeah, I know that one hand didn't know where the other was. There was no real communication between Crook and Terry. They all just assumed that they'd trap the NA's between them. Shaw, there was no real plan to trap the NAs between Crook, Terry, or Gibbon. Crook was on his own going north and if the villages were in his area of travel then he was expected to handle them. However if he wasn't attacked, it is likely that he would have found their trail from the Rosebud to the LBH before Custer ever got there. Now Terry and Gibbon did have orders from Sheridan that involved their linkup should they not find the NAs before the linkup on the Jellystone. The original belief when the Terry column left FAL was that the NAs were over on the Little Missouri and Terry would have them all by themselves. Then we have the timing issue because Gibbon left on time and Terry left late and I think Crook was a little late too. If I recall right, I think Sheridan's original plan would have had Terry and Gibbon meeting around the Bighorn area of the Jellystone. Gibbon marched right past it but the big NA villages weren't there when Bradley conducted his scout. bc Read more: lbha.proboards.com/thread/5052/art-science-scouting?page=3#ixzz3jaQTMCbrThanks BC. I have to admit, I know more about the battle of LBH than the campaign. I always assumed there was a strategy in place to trap the NA's. I never thought there would be a great joining of the forces in a single battle but more of herding or pushing the NA's towards one force or the other once contact was made. Shaw
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Post by bc on Aug 23, 2015 2:44:14 GMT -6
In the 1876 Campaign (leading to Rosebud and LBH) the most effective scout was Reno's scout in force. Yeah, he may have gone too far but he came back with some valuable information. Terry IMHO valued it but GAC blew a gasket because Reno got to lead part of the 7th without GAC around to control his every action. That alone should have been a warning to Terry about what the danger was of letting GAC go off by himself. GAC was too busy trying to make sure than any battle with the NA's was an all 7th show. Anyway, Terry ordered that scout. GAC was opposed to it. I'm sure he would have been okay with a scout in force as long as either he led the 7th in that scout or someone else led non 7th elements. Crook was a train wreck. Not only was he surprised by the NA's but then he pulled back his whole force after Rosebud and failed to communicate to anyone that he was out of the campaign. Yeah, I know that one hand didn't know where the other was. There was no real communication between Crook and Terry. They all just assumed that they'd trap the NA's between them. Shaw, there was no real plan to trap the NAs between Crook, Terry, or Gibbon. Crook was on his own going north and if the villages were in his area of travel then he was expected to handle them. However if he wasn't attacked, it is likely that he would have found their trail from the Rosebud to the LBH before Custer ever got there. Now Terry and Gibbon did have orders from Sheridan that involved their linkup should they not find the NAs before the linkup on the Jellystone. The original belief when the Terry column left FAL was that the NAs were over on the Little Missouri and Terry would have them all by themselves. Then we have the timing issue because Gibbon left on time and Terry left late and I think Crook was a little late too. If I recall right, I think Sheridan's original plan would have had Terry and Gibbon meeting around the Bighorn area of the Jellystone. Gibbon marched right past it but the big NA villages weren't there when Bradley conducted his scout. bc Read more: lbha.proboards.com/thread/5052/art-science-scouting?page=3#ixzz3jaQTMCbrThanks BC. I have to admit, I know more about the battle of LBH than the campaign. I always assumed there was a strategy in place to trap the NA's. I never thought there would be a great joining of the forces in a single battle but more of herding or pushing the NA's towards one force or the other once contact was made. Shaw Sheridan basically used the same strategy he used at the Washita only at the Washita he had a smaller area where they thought the NAs were. At the Washita Sheridan had three converging columns going to the hills in the Oklahoma/Indian Territory & Texas panhandle area, I forget the name of the hills. With the Sioux war of 76, Sheridan again had three columns who would converge but they had a much larger territory to cover and no good idea on where they were or they could have been spread around with bands all over the place. Unlike the Washita, there was no specific place to converge on. They were assigned certain areas to cover. Crook was given the Tongue, Powder, and Rosebud rivers area moving north. Terry and Gibbon were specifically supposed to head down the Jellystone and link up but they had a dual goal. One goal was to make sure no NAs moved north of the Jellystone. Their other goal was to scout and look for the NAs on any of the tributaries that were south of the Jellystone. When Terry left FAL, the basic intel then was that the NAs were on the Little Missouri but they didn't find any there. Now they did know that the NAs like to run and that if they run from one column then with three converging columns, they would bring them to battle. So there was a couple differences between the Washita and the Sioux War because they really had no good idea where the NAs were in a very large area and they had no particular point to diverge on. Crook was going north looking for NAs and Terry and Gibbon were moving from opposite ends of the Jellystone with the object to keep south of the river and between the columns. Bringing them to battle as a punitive action against the hostiles was the main goal but if they ran then at least run them towards another column. In a way they were herding and trapping but not as a primary goal of the three columns. They really had no way to communicate with Crook anyway and at the Washita the converging units had no good way to communicate either. The other problem Sheridan had was that Gibbon was the only one who left close to on time and Terry and Crook were delayed a long time so any plan to diverge anywhere would have failed. They all knew very well what happened in 67 when Custer came to Kansas with Hancock and then chased NAs all over western Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska and never really brought them to battle except when the NAs wanted to launch their own attack. bc
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 23, 2015 21:29:18 GMT -6
This could get interesting. If the scouts ride out 20 miles ahead and the regiment moves 20 miles they don't have to ride back do they?
So my question is when would they start out and how far ahead were they?
Once the regiment starts moving do they close on the scouts or do the scouts attempt to stay a fixed distance ahead?
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Aug 24, 2015 6:58:07 GMT -6
AZ,
Scout management is one of several areas where LBH creates false impressions. Maybe I am too obtuse. My theory is there are several areas where the 7th Cav was significantly behind their peers in combat operations in this era. Four specific areas I have been discussing are pack trains, command and control, training, and scouting (both the function, and the use of indigenous personnel).
Now if I try to address this in a single thread, everything falls apart because we all have different backgrounds, different understanding, and we lack a common operational picture. Just as an example, I was just going to say COP for common operational picture, which is common in my former job. But no one would understand this. COP means all elements understanding the friendly and enemy situation. This means understanding where are guys are, and where bad guys are. This concept is distinct from understanding the unit plan. Basically, the distinction between the terms what and so what.
SO my new approach is to state a topic I intend to explore and link the military concepts I use for analysis, and as much background data as I can to lead to a common picture on how to discuss a topic. I bend over backwards to provide data to disprove my analysis.
In a way, I have to thank vben for opening my eyes. He claims he has superior knowledge of LBH because of 700 super secret sources that he never names. My reading of his posts since Feb shows he is vastly ignorant on LBH. Yet I believe he likely did read a book or two. He just did not understand them. A reminder, he did serve in the military, as an Air Force mechanic.
Here is my pledge. If you disagree with me, or anyone, and have trouble with military frameworks for analysis, facts, assumptions, whatever, just ask for help. I am happy to help anyone frame an argument proving me a muttonhead.
I am annoyed with the vben/Rini argument that I am smarter than you, therefore my theories are better than yours. Make an argument, participate.
These boards have been crippled by arguments based on emotion and intimidation. We need an environment where we can discuss opposite viewpoints, without emotional reactions to the poster. Wild and myself are an example. I rarely agree with him, we go back and forth. But I vastly appreciate his efforts to expand the discussion on LBH. We have never, and will never, meet; but I like the guy, and his contributions here. Still does not mean I will not trash his views.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 24, 2015 9:33:56 GMT -6
So the question for scouting is what was the state of the art and science of scouting in regards to engaging Indians.
I concur on your selection of lack of minimum standards as compared to other regiments. My simple viewpoint with officers is to build skills that you don't have to think about under stress. The pack train is an example. The state of the art was demonstrated by Crook. Custer appears to me to be on the opposite end with the first day packing for troopers and mules was at the beginning of the movement up the Rosebud. Godfrey's account is funny but points out the effort Custer put into having the 7th operate with basic skills.
To me it points to a larger picture of how he went about getting the 7th battle ready or not.
Regards
Steve
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Post by bc on Aug 24, 2015 10:52:26 GMT -6
This could get interesting. If the scouts ride out 20 miles ahead and the regiment moves 20 miles they don't have to ride back do they? So my question is when would they start out and how far ahead were they? Once the regiment starts moving do they close on the scouts or do the scouts attempt to stay a fixed distance ahead? Regards AZ Ranger Steve, I think the 20 miles I used was conceptual and related to a day's movement. There isn't much written on the scouts but we do know a couple things. 1. On June 16 Crook began his march early in the morning and later stopped at the battle site on the Rosebud about 8 am for breakfast. By a mathmatical guestimate, I think he moved about 5 miles, more or less. From looking at the battle site it appears that the NAs were within 3 or 4 miles of the breakfast camp before being found by the scouts. So the command and scouts had been marching for a few hours or whatever it was and yet they are only a few miles ahead of the command. We also know that Crook sent 4 companies of cavalry up the Rosebud to attack where he was guessing their camp was which couldn't have been too far away or he wouldn't send them if it was to great of distance. Apparently the scouts haven't been that far up the Rosebud or they would have provided some solid intel on this. All this suggests to me that Crook's NA scout screen was operating no more than 5 miles, more or less, in front of the column. 2. Custer's column turned and moved up Davis Creek on the 24th following a trail. At some point, the scouts move ahead to the Crow's Nest. A movement I would estimate at about 8 miles give or take a couple without getting out a map. Since they knew the Crow's Nest and divide was ahead, I think this was more than a typical movement for the scouts. The scouts who knew the territory probably knew of the Davis Creek divide when they left on the 22nd. The fact that they didn't go to it until late on the 24th suggests to me that Custer's scouting screen probably didn't normally operate anymore that up to 5 miles in advance of the column. It is just my opinion that the scouts of both columns should have been farther ahead and then Custer's scouts should have found the trail up Davis Creek at least back on the 23rd or even the 22nd at which point the troops could have quickened their pace. The scouts should have been viewing the Crow's Nest perhaps 24 hours earlier than they did. Maybe being too far in front of the column was a risk that the scouts wouldn't take. bc
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 24, 2015 14:44:26 GMT -6
bc
Its interesting at what distance from Custer did the scouts stop moving up the Rosebud.
steve
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Post by montrose on Aug 24, 2015 15:31:49 GMT -6
The management of the scouts is the function of the Chief of Scouts. I intend to compare Varnum's performance to other Chief of Scouts. This list will include LT Bradley, MAJ George Randall, William Clark, and others. frontierpartisans.com/773/al-sieber-chief-of-scouts/ A very fawning view of Al Sieber. Look at LT Bradley and the scouting for Gibbon. He led several long distance patrols back in April/May. Look at LT Clark in 1877. www.friendslittlebighorn.com/crazyhorsedeath.htmLook at the multiple tasks Indian scout companies were given. Please note who is the 1SG for Company C.
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Post by montrose on Aug 24, 2015 16:12:06 GMT -6
CPT Bourke wrote about Crook's 1866-8 campaigns.Extract Starts: He lost not a moment, but set out with his troops from the Dalles in Oregon, in the dreary winter of 1866, and moved with several converging columns, each able to take care of itself under any and all circumstances, upon the center of the zone of operations--old Camp Warner, in southeastern Oregon. His plans were simple and comprehensible: to get into the center of operations, and thence to move out, as necessity dictated, in any and every direction, securing the advantage of operating on interior lines, and of conducting movements which would allow the enemy no rest. Friendly Scout Signaling the Column by Frederic RemingtonEach column was provided with an effective train of pack-mules, and with a corps of Indian guides, selected first from among the Wascoes and Warm Springs (allied to the Modocs) and latterly from the Bannocks and the Shoshones. The first results of this campaign were more important in disciplining and hardening Crook's officers and men, in teaching them that military operations could be conducted in the severest of seasons, and that, with the aid of Indian scouts, the wiliest of savages could eventually be brought to bay and forced to a fight, than productive of decisive results ... The Indian scouts were kept from one to two days in advance, and covered not only the front of the columns, but fifty miles of the country on each flank. All marching was made by night, and the general direction was towards the lava beds of northern California. The bronco mules and horses were the source of great anxiety, as they were likely at any moment to stampede or to make off into the brush: a number of them did break away, and, with the rations they carried, were never again found. Skirmishes occurred each day between the advance of the Indian scouts and the hostiles, Crook being careful not to march the same distance on two consecutive days. Some days, or nights rather, he would advance so far, and the next march would be twice as far. On one occasion the march began at sundown and lasted through the night and all the next day until close on to sunset, the command halting only to tighten cinches. This greatly fatigued officers and men, but it perplexed the enemy and prevented them from calculating accurately upon the place and moment for an ambuscade. Extract ends. discoverseaz.com/History/General_Crook.html contains source.
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Post by montrose on Aug 24, 2015 17:40:51 GMT -6
I am leaning towards a case study of differing chiefs of scouts in campaigns within 10 years of LBH. I am wrestling with case study methodology.
I am open to suggestions on how to develop the argument, with a goal of maximum participation.
Are the links I have been posting useful? I am trying to explain where my theories come from, by linking data to allow everyone to weigh in.
Here is a new theory, I developed today. The more I look at Crook, the more impressed I am by his coaching tree. Coaching tree is a term we use in American Football, to look at head coaches who develop and train subordinate coaches who go on to success (or failure for Belichick) in follow on assignments.
Crook shows a strong coaching tree in 3 areas: US officers, scout leaders (Army, civilian and Indian), and pack train leaders. All but the second is off topic for this thread. I may go further at some point in the future.
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 24, 2015 18:00:56 GMT -6
At the risk of further repetition, GAC failed to throw his "scouts" out far enough.
And I don't mean by a little bit.
WO
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Post by montrose on Aug 24, 2015 19:03:35 GMT -6
At the risk of further repetition, GAC failed to throw his "scouts" out far enough. And I don't mean by a little bit. WO I think you oversimplify the problem. Just a reminder, majority of folks here are not graduates of officer basic and advanced courses and whatever staff courses UK teaches. LTC Custer was the column commander. It was his duty and responsibility to delegate command and control of the scouting effort to a subordinate officer. In general terms, the subordinate maneuver element commanders are one rank below the boss, your scout commander two ranks down. I have issues with the "failed to deploy scouts out far enough" argument. The vast majority of Indian scouts were Ree. The Ree interpreter was the coward Gerard, who placed himself miles behind the Rees. The chief of scouts could not communicate with the Rees, since he had no translator. The Arikara narratives show that the scouts received assignments from Bob Tailed Bull and Bloody Knife. But for important decisions they could get nothing out of Varnum, they had to send messengers back to GAC and their coward interpreter, several miles back. On a two way trip. So the scouting effort was, by LTC Custer's design and intent, limited to a tactical bound or two from the US force. I have a theory that the 7th Cavalry regiment lost this battle in the decade prior to LBH. This is due to developing an incompetent regiment, with poor leaders and incompetent training. If you compare the 7th to the other 34 regiments this theory has much truth. But not completely. The 7th could have won LBH. If you don't agree, I think all will agree they could have achieved a better outcome. This means more damage to the Indians, either through more casualties or damage to the pony herds, or damage to the supplies in the village to allow survival in the winter. And, of course, less US KIA. I regard it as impossible for any US commander in 1876 from the grade of CPT to COL to take as many friendly KIA as GAC. The decisions GAC made on 25 Jun 76 contributed to the outcome. But the decisions he made 1866-76 were causal, they determined the outcome.
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Post by welshofficer on Aug 25, 2015 1:05:41 GMT -6
Will,
GAC not creating the scouting function to operate far ahead doesn't change the fact that the scouts were not far enough ahead...
At the risk of yet further repetition of my arguments, there was no need for the 7th to be massacred for all its shortcomings. That was due to the so-called death spiral in decision taking from the moment GAC decided to take 5 companies out of the valley.
WO
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