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Post by bc on Aug 20, 2015 19:59:17 GMT -6
In the 1876 Campaign (leading to Rosebud and LBH) the most effective scout was Reno's scout in force. Yeah, he may have gone too far but he came back with some valuable information. Terry IMHO valued it but GAC blew a gasket because Reno got to lead part of the 7th without GAC around to control his every action. That alone should have been a warning to Terry about what the danger was of letting GAC go off by himself. GAC was too busy trying to make sure than any battle with the NA's was an all 7th show. Anyway, Terry ordered that scout. GAC was opposed to it. I'm sure he would have been okay with a scout in force as long as either he led the 7th in that scout or someone else led non 7th elements. Crook was a train wreck. Not only was he surprised by the NA's but then he pulled back his whole force after Rosebud and failed to communicate to anyone that he was out of the campaign. Yeah, I know that one hand didn't know where the other was. There was no real communication between Crook and Terry. They all just assumed that they'd trap the NA's between them. Shaw, there was no real plan to trap the NAs between Crook, Terry, or Gibbon. Crook was on his own going north and if the villages were in his area of travel then he was expected to handle them. However if he wasn't attacked, it is likely that he would have found their trail from the Rosebud to the LBH before Custer ever got there. Now Terry and Gibbon did have orders from Sheridan that involved their linkup should they not find the NAs before the linkup on the Jellystone. The original belief when the Terry column left FAL was that the NAs were over on the Little Missouri and Terry would have them all by themselves. Then we have the timing issue because Gibbon left on time and Terry left late and I think Crook was a little late too. If I recall right, I think Sheridan's original plan would have had Terry and Gibbon meeting around the Bighorn area of the Jellystone. Gibbon marched right past it but the big NA villages weren't there when Bradley conducted his scout. bc
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Post by montrose on Aug 21, 2015 15:14:29 GMT -6
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Post by montrose on Aug 21, 2015 15:24:07 GMT -6
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Post by montrose on Aug 21, 2015 17:24:53 GMT -6
I am currently researching the use of interpreters with respect to (WRT) For McKeen/FAL over the period 1867-76.
Gerard helped recruit for the Fort McKeen Scouting Detachment throughout this period. He helped recruit, and translated as required at the Fort, from his trading post. But field translators were other white men or halfbreeds, with no real continuity. For some reason, none of the men who had been doing the field work were available in 1876, so they had to use Gerard. Gerard was 46, had rheumatism, and no experience or background in military campaigning.
Remember Saving Private Ryan? Tom Hanks had had his own interpreter killed so he went and grabbed a rear echelon headquarters clerk who jumped from division rear to working with the Ranger Regiment. In GWOT we called these guys FOBbits).
What I do not understand is why the 7th Cav (Fort Lincoln elements) did not find an officer or NCO who could learn Ree and work with the Indians constantly 1872-6. This is common practice for this era. I posted examples from Crook and Mackenzie. This practices is also common in Washington State, Oregon, Idaho.
A major problem the 7th had in 1876 was weak command and control of their Indian scouts. A significant factor in this is Gerard. Gerard stayed far in the rear from 17 May on. He probably was too out of shape, and too inexperienced in field work, to be able to keep up with the scouts. Or he had intestinal fortitude issues. But the main cause is not Gerard, it is Varnum. He should have put a leash on Gerard, 10 feet long.
So Varnum had to rely on Dorman, and later Dorman and Bouyer, to interact with the scouts.
Reading surviving scout reports, they took their daily orders from Bob Tailed Bull (who was the designated leader for the Scout Det) and Bloody Knife (who was not even a member of the scout Det, he was a QM guide). After Bob Tailed Bull was killed, look at who took over. Soldier was the designated second in command. But Stabbed was the one who took over and gave out assignments. I plan to explain this at length, with quotes and citations, just waiting on some research materials to arrive. (I have the secondary sources to support this, but I have learned through painful experience on the other board to read the primary accounts).
My point is that the 7th had a communication issue, that contributed to a scout command and control (C2) issue during operations 17 May to 25 Jun. They should have worked this out weeks before combat. Instead, on the day of battle, they realized their C2 was broken. How broken?
Varnum ended up trying to scout by himself, with only his US orderly following him. In disgust LTC Custer appointed LT Hare to command the scouts on the right front of the regiment, meaning where they knew the village and enemy forces were, while Varnum could continue to be an Army of One on the left, where all evidence showed this was empty space. Meanwhile the Indian scouts continued to gather intelligence, but with the US C2 collapse, there was no way to transmit data to the US chain of command.
You really can not just go and screw up this badly on random chaos theory. You really have to put in some work to be this bad.
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Post by edavids on Aug 21, 2015 18:24:06 GMT -6
Good evening from Colorado. Montrose has challenged us "Lurkers" to make ourselves known so estoy aqui. I've had an interest in LBH off and on for a number of years, really starting to dig in about 1-2 years ago. So far have read Donovan, Philbrick & Connell, reviewed numerous video documentaries, read the RCOI transcript and followed this board and t'other. If I want military analysis I come here. If I want to be entertained and occasionally pick up a fact or two, I read the other. There are some good people over there but often I feel like I'm reading a broken record if that's possible. I never served in the military but was a "Navy Junior" from 1956-68 when Pop retired. I am more familiar with "crossing T's", submarines "going long" and broadsides than I am with land force maneuvers.
At this time I am of the opinion that the N/A's were victorious at LBH because they outnumbered, outmaneuvered and outfought the 7th Cavalry that day. Not really qualified to discuss Scouting in any detail except that, IMHO, scouts look for something (someone, some place, some thing or how to get there), and guides already know in general about such things and lead the way. Will continue to review and participate when possible. Thank you and this board has been a pleasure to follow.
David
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Post by montrose on Aug 21, 2015 18:39:29 GMT -6
Edavids,
Welcome aboard.
At the end of the day, LBH is a hobby. It is better for all of us to have many folks participate in the discussion as is possible. I mean, as long as we treat each other with dignity and respect, and avoid the flame wars so typical of internet boards.
So state a pet theory on this battle. You must have formed some opinions by now. I am happy to discuss a view, in a rational, and non emotional way.
There is an old joke about Custer's last words, that ends with, "Where did all these God Damned Indians come from?" Quantity has a Quality all of its own.
A total victory over the Indians on 25 Jun 76 was not in the realm of the possible. So we can quibble on GAC was insane, Reno drunk, Benteen dawdled. Could US forces have achieved a better outcome? I am convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt that the answer is yes.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by dave on Aug 21, 2015 18:48:33 GMT -6
Montrose Outstanding information regarding the Arikara. This is the first I have read anything that offered any praise to the braves of this tribe. I have read the info twice and will reread again tomorrow. "preciate" the source. Regards Dave
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Post by fred on Aug 21, 2015 20:21:48 GMT -6
Montrose has challenged us "Lurkers" to make ourselves known so estoy aqui. David, Please allow me to welcome you here; I am extremely pleased to see Montrose's challenge has worked. Please jump in; ask away; contribute whatever you wish. I hope it is tons. And please don't be afraid to be part of this group. Nothing is necessary here but an interest and an open mind. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on Aug 21, 2015 20:30:49 GMT -6
Montrose has challenged us "Lurkers" to make ourselves known so estoy aqui. David, Please allow me to welcome you here; I am extremely pleased to see Montrose's challenge has worked. Please jump in; ask away; contribute whatever you wish. I hope it is tons. And please don't be afraid to be part of this group. Nothing is necessary here but an interest and an open mind. Very best wishes, Fred. And a good book or two would be helpful. The Strategy of Defeat at the Little Big Horn is a highly recommended good read for a serious student. If you decide to order this fine tome be sure and get a paper copy and no the e-book version. You will want to make notes and hi light facts and figures. Welcome David to the board Regards Dave
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Post by montrose on Aug 22, 2015 7:35:50 GMT -6
One of the challenges of scouting is linking the data collection with the unit decision making. www.youtube.com/watch?v=Et1SkVldiHIThis video clip illustrates when the view of what is happening at the front is misinterpreted by commanders farther back. Note they are using radios, so same data is received by all at the same time. Consider the problems at data collection at the front, and then using messengers. There is a time gap for data collectors to send data back to unit decision makers. Now consider what happens if the commander changes his plan, that requires a changes to the collection plan, like the radical decision to move into the badlands. It takes time to send this data forward, more time to move assets and mre time for the new collection plan to deed data back. I think modern technology has obscured the pain in the ass of using runners. It takes time, and you have to be sure the message you want to send is understood. The process, both 1876 and now, is you tell the messenger the message. Then you have him repeat it back. If he can't restate your message, time for another messenger, or you write the message. The other problem, a major issue for me, is thinking the messenger is a passenger pigeon, or a tweet. The soldier has a brain. He has situational awareness of what you are seeing, and what your intent is. So he can answer questions and provide situational awareness to your message target. Further, he is gaining data from what is going on at the other end. Look at LTC Custer's actions during his attack on the estimated enemy village located at intersection Reno Creek and South Fork Reno Creek. CPT Benteen was sent to scout the flank of this enemy village and attack any outliers. LTC Custer used senior messengers (is Chief Trumpeter and Command Sergeant Major) to send messages making micro adjustments to Benteen's route. So why did he not send low quality messengers like Martini, Goldin, or Old Barnum? Because he wanted his quality messengers to gain an understanding of the intelligence estimate of the situation and bring this data back to him. Messenger selection speaks volumes to understanding the commander's intent, and his situational awareness. Respectfully, William
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Post by wild on Aug 22, 2015 7:49:50 GMT -6
Interesting to note that the cavalry were employed as pack escort while the Apache did most of the tracking and fighting.
WO Hi I owe you a reply ......watch the other space Cheers
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Post by wild on Aug 22, 2015 7:51:41 GMT -6
oops missed a page
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Post by montrose on Aug 22, 2015 7:53:57 GMT -6
Wild,
I would suggest that that is the entire reason behind hiring Indians. Use natives to find and kill other natives.
Right?
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Post by wild on Aug 22, 2015 8:11:42 GMT -6
Hi Montrose It seems that the US military eventually realised that you could not fight the Indians by the numbers. Your regimental soldier was trained to work as a team looking for leadership . The Indian and the Apache was a superb individual fighter . I took issue with your description [somewhere]of the LBH battle being a single regiment action. We IMHO ignore the dynamic effect of those thousands of Indians on Custer's options ;allowing as we do an excursion Northwise in full view of these natural soldiers. Regards
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Post by edavids on Aug 22, 2015 8:55:08 GMT -6
I appreciate everyone's kind greetings. Montrose has again challenged me, this time with a pet theory. I haven't been at this long enough or deep dived into it to the extent that I have a "model". I also do not wish to take away from the discussion on scouting.
As mentioned above I believe the results of LBH were primarily due to the N/A being able to "outeverything" the 7th Cavalry that day.
I have zero interest in the Blame Game, do not identify with any of the decision makers and have no ego invested in this battle. I am more interested in what happened, why it happened and the always fun, what could have happened if... Accountabilities are always interesting in lieu of blaming.
Thank you again and I am going to follow your always interesting posts on the topic of this thread.
David
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