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Post by montrose on Aug 19, 2015 15:55:56 GMT -6
Welshofficer,
I am developing an argument that the 7th Cavalry made very poor use of scouts as compared to the other 34 regiments of the US Army. 25 Jun 76 was not an "off" day for managing scouts, but reflected the management and leadership of the 7th Cav over a period of years.
I am also leading into a discussion of Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR). This is a massive issue I my community, and I want to keep out of 21st century topics. Mainly because I was thoroughly sick of this topic when I was medically discharged. The simplest way I can explain the issue: When does the scout element purely scout? When does the scout element fight?
My comments are routinely ignored on the other board as applying modern methods to 19th century problems. This drives me crazy, as I go to great lengths to compare what the 7th did to what their peers were doing at the very same time.
Am I making sense?
Montrose
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Post by montrose on Aug 19, 2015 16:14:12 GMT -6
Ladies and Gentlemen (and Fred), Posters and Lurkers;
I have learned when I want a complicated discussion, that we all have different backgrounds. I have short term jargon to speed along discussions of a battle analysis. I find when I jump right in, the discussion fails because we lack a common language.
The Center for Military History has a very detailed format for how to analyze battles. My computer and/or internet provider is bad today, I keep lagging out when I try to open it. I have posted it before. Happy to do so again, if anyone cares.
What I have learned, primarily from the dearly (?) departed Darkcloud, is to explain terms and concepts prior to making an argument.
So my plan for this thread is to explain the art and science of scouting, as it was understood in 1876. I have been posting the military manuals of the time, and various books and articles written in that era on this topic.
Here is the joy of copyright laws in the USA. I can link ebooks written more than 50 years ago, unless someone renews a copyright.
My intent is not to blindside anyone with an argument. None of this vben nonsense where my argument is superior to your due to super secret 700 sources that I will not tell you about. Any poster on this board should be able to jump in at any time to join the discussion. These boards seem to intimidate many readers who never post. I want more lurkers to jump out of the electronic shadows and join the discussion.
I will be happy when some day someone disagrees with me, but needs help finding references from that time, or use of modern military terms and concepts, to explain their views. I am happy to help someone argue against my own theories. I learn from these discussions. If you can not provide a cogent argument to counter your own theories, you need to join the other board.
So help me out here. How do I provide background data to have a reasonable discussion?. And for all the folks who look at these posts, but never participate, how do we get you to join the discussion?
I am sick of the focus on the straw man arguments. Custer was insane, Reno was drunk, Benteen dawdled. It would be nice to have a mature, well reasoned discussion, between adults, on this battle.
(Though Little Big Man is still a favorite movie of mine, and probably to anyone who served in the military after Vietnam, and before the great reform movement). For reasons that have nothing to do with LBH.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by benteen on Aug 19, 2015 17:47:50 GMT -6
Montrose, Colonel, good thread. I have read your posts and they are all informative. Although you seem to stress the training aspect, what jumped out at me is when you brought up the differences in the officers, Custer, Gibbons, Crook, etc which leads me to the following opinion. For the sake of understanding my opinion I am going to call recon not a function or action but rather a process, the most important part of this process is the Officer receiving this data. The Officer receiving this raw data must be able to collect it, analyze it and make it into usable intel in which to formulate a course of action. If he is unable to do that, or worse in Custers case ignore it, then it doesnt matter if the recon troops are Special Forces, Marine recon, or any other elite group, the process fails. All you have left are additional firepower, not a bad thing but a waste of expertise and a valuable asset. Another words as to their training.....So What Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Aug 19, 2015 19:31:04 GMT -6
Will,
You know how jammed-up I am right now: except for brief break excursions on these and the other boards, I am absolutely out of my mind for time... and tomorrow I have to go to the Apple store to buy a new power cord... yikes!
This appears to have the makings of a great thread and I hope people will keep it going until I have a chance to clean up these current projects and jump in, both feet kicking and one loud mouth screaming.
Please keep it going. It has all the hallmarks of being great fun....
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on Aug 19, 2015 20:18:27 GMT -6
Montrose You requested that I compare and contrast the use Crook made of scouts as compared to Terry and Custer. 3 significant differences. Name them or at least 2 of the 3.
1)
Crook made use of Indians against Indians. At the Rosebud he had over 200 Crow and Shoshone leading the fight against their old enemies the Sioux and Cheyenne.
Custer used his Arikara scouts to steal horses and made little use of his Crow scouts other than disagree with them on the morning of the 25th as to the size of the Sioux pony herd.
2)
Crook would send his Indian scouts 1 to 2 days ahead and to the sides of his intended march.
Custer held his Indian scouts closer to his command and did not avail himself of their expertise and local knowledge.
3)
Crook would send a column of troops with their own scouts and pack train and allow them to operate independently.
Custer preferred maintaining overall control of his forces and micromanaged his force.
Extra Credit Crook took great interest in his pack trains to the point he personally inspected them and used trained packers. He would insure they were properly rigged and located where needed. Very professional.
Custer could not be bothered with such mundane concerns he had a war to win.
Regards Dave PS I hope you grade on the curve
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alanw
Junior Member
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Post by alanw on Aug 20, 2015 3:05:04 GMT -6
1) Crook made use of Indians against Indians. At the Rosebud he had over 200 Crow and Shoshone leading the fight against their old enemies the Sioux and Cheyenne. 2) Crook would send his Indian scouts 1 to 2 days ahead and to the sides of his intended march. Despite Crook sending his Indian scouts 1 to 2 days ahead and to the sides, Crook's command was still surprised in camp taking coffee and may have been overrun if the Indian scouts hadn't screened them till they could get combat ready. So credit is due for the scouts saving Crook's skin, but how was Crazy Horse allowed to get so close undetected? Crook's command was twice the size of Custer's, and Crook was facing a force smaller than his own, yet could not beat them decisively, at best, by most accounts, he got away with a draw.
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 20, 2015 4:36:36 GMT -6
1) Crook made use of Indians against Indians. At the Rosebud he had over 200 Crow and Shoshone leading the fight against their old enemies the Sioux and Cheyenne. 2) Crook would send his Indian scouts 1 to 2 days ahead and to the sides of his intended march. Despite Crook sending his Indian scouts 1 to 2 days ahead and to the sides, Crook's command was still surprised in camp taking coffee and may have been overrun if the Indian scouts hadn't screened them till they could get combat ready. So credit is due for the scouts saving Crook's skin, but how was Crazy Horse allowed to get so close undetected?
Crook's command was twice the size of Custer's, and Crook was facing a force smaller than his own, yet could not beat them decisively, at best, by most accounts, he got away with a draw. alanw,
* Sometime you have to give the other team their due. * Terrain can play a large part in ease of detection. * Remember Crook had just fallen back to correct his direction, the majority of these scouts had just joined him.
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alanw
Junior Member
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Post by alanw on Aug 20, 2015 4:57:04 GMT -6
* Sometime you have to give the other team their due. * Terrain can play a large part in ease of detection. * Remember Crook had just fallen back to correct his direction, the majority of these scouts had just joined him.
* Sometime you have to give the other team their due. Not if your name is Custer it seems. * Terrain can play a large part in ease of detection. Or non-detection - Custer isn't cut any slack here either.* Remember Crook had just fallen back to correct his direction, the majority of these scouts had just joined him. Maybe Crook was just unlucky with the timing, but if he was re-organising his command, then all the more reason to be extra alert.
A very interesting discussion . I hope other casual posters/lurkers contribute too. I have been a member here for nearly 9 years, but as you can see rarely post. I'm no expert, and only seek the truth, i.e. I have no agenda. I'm certainly no Custerphile - in my opinion he was to blame for the disaster at LBH. And while no fan of Reno either, I have in the past defended his decision to retreat/breakout from the timber.
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Post by montrose on Aug 20, 2015 8:05:37 GMT -6
Alan,
I have not seen you post in a long time. I am glad you have joined in the discussion.
This thread is focused on scouting and the use of indigenous forces. Using this lens for analysis, I would think no one would argue that Crook was superior to Custer in this area. It is the same as comparing the mule trains, Crook was better.
Your points illustrate other differences between the two officers and their commands beyond scouting, and this argument has merit.
A critical concept is how do you link the scout data collection plan with your decision making process.
I plan to make the argument that LTC Custer had far better IPB and data available to him than Crook. Not because of his scouts, by his own personal leader's recon at 3411 and after. His decisions do not line up with the information and intelligence he had.
Information is raw data. Intelligence is processed data, where you apply the "So what" test into what that data means.
I intend to continue to focus on scouting, data collection and its links to the military decision making process.
I also intend to look at the concept of using Indians to fight Indians. What if Terry/Custer had recruited 2-400 Sioux or other tribes to campaign as a combat element? Would that have made a difference at LBH?
Respectfully,
William
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alanw
Junior Member
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Post by alanw on Aug 20, 2015 9:09:43 GMT -6
I also intend to look at the concept of using Indians to fight Indians. What if Terry/Custer had recruited 2-400 Sioux or other tribes to campaign as a combat element? Would that have made a difference at LBH?
Thanks for the response montrose. I too wondered what Custer might have done if he had 200 Indian scouts as a combat element at LBH. He maybe could have ordered them to scatter the pony herd and, or cause general mayhem. It would have been a good diversionary move if the whole regiment had remained intact and attacked in unison up the valley. With regard to Crook assigning pack mules to separate elements of his command. I'm not sure this would have worked well on say Benteen's scout when you consider the terrain he had to cross. It may have helped Reno in the timber as he would have had more ammunition at hand and conceivably could have held out longer there. However, would the mules have been captured/incapacitated if Reno still chose to retreat to the bluffs?
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Post by dave on Aug 20, 2015 9:18:13 GMT -6
alanw Alan nice to meet you and thank your observation regarding Crook's preparedness and failure to defeat a smaller force than what Custer faced. I need to study the Rosebud more obviously and in particular how Crook failed to defeat a smaller Indian force. Regards Dave
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alanw
Junior Member
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Post by alanw on Aug 20, 2015 9:29:59 GMT -6
Dave,
I found the Rosebud battle fascinating, and even managed to visit the site on my trip back in 2004. I still wonder if Crook had inflicted more casualties would Custer have had an easier ride at LBH. The Indians seem to have gained great confidence from the Rosebud encounter, whereas if they suffered say 150-200 casualties at the Rosebud, would that have made a difference? I'm sure I read somewhere that Crook's force fired 20,000 rounds of ammo without hitting much.
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Post by dave on Aug 20, 2015 11:34:31 GMT -6
Alan Great question. I too wonder what would the effect on the LBH be if Crook had inflicted 150 + casualties on the Sioux. If they did lose that many braves would they have broken up into tribal bands and either gone to Canada or back to the reservations? Regards Dave
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Post by bc on Aug 20, 2015 11:54:55 GMT -6
Hello Will. I am not aware of any practice back then of any marching columns in the west using scouts more than a day's ride out that operated as an independent scouting unit permanently ahead of the column. When I was in the army during the Vietnam War we used LRP (Long Range Patrol pronounced "lurp") units. They were small patrols operating on their own well out in front of any operating groups. They camped by themselves and if discovered faced being overwhelmed. They utilized radios for contact so they didn't need to send couriers back.
From what I have seen, Crook, Custer, Gibbon, Terry, and any of the other units did not extend their scouts out more than what they could ride ahead and still make it back to the camp each night. They did not send out groups of scouts equipped with extra rations to make an extended scout and then report back by courier. Granted that a typical days march at the time averaged around 20 miles they never kept any scouts out at a constant 20 mile or whatever mileage you want to use in their front and on their flanks nor did they leave any scouts following up their rear in case NAs would slip in behind them. Each camp did have camp guards/pickets/videttes set out quite a ways to protect the camp from sneak attack at night but that wasn't very far.
With Crook, his column had already moved out from the night camp starting with well grazed animals and as was the custom at the time stopped for breakfast later on which was also used as a rest stop for the horses and mules. The soldiers marched on empty stomachs except for some coffee. As usual the scouts left the night camp in the morning and then fanned out on their scout which did not give them much time to get too far ahead of the column. The problem with the scouting in that fight was even if they did scout Crazy Horse's and other NA travel routes from Reno Creek the day before they wouldn't have found anything because Crazy Horse made a long forced march at night and without any lrp units camped ahead of his column Crook was not set up to see them.
As a matter of fact even the NA villages/camps did not typically station encamped NAs around them set up to give a days notice. Those would be subject to attack and raiding and be very vulnerable. They also typically operated whereby NA raiding parties would travel a long distance at night to attack other NAs and any lrp type units set up around the camps wouldn't help that much anyway since they didn't have radios but would have to outride the attackers and in the end wouldn't give much more advance notice than camp guards/pickets stationed within signaling distance of the camp.
bc
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shaw
Full Member
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Post by shaw on Aug 20, 2015 18:40:41 GMT -6
In the 1876 Campaign (leading to Rosebud and LBH) the most effective scout was Reno's scout in force. Yeah, he may have gone too far but he came back with some valuable information. Terry IMHO valued it but GAC blew a gasket because Reno got to lead part of the 7th without GAC around to control his every action. That alone should have been a warning to Terry about what the danger was of letting GAC go off by himself. GAC was too busy trying to make sure than any battle with the NA's was an all 7th show.
Anyway, Terry ordered that scout. GAC was opposed to it. I'm sure he would have been okay with a scout in force as long as either he led the 7th in that scout or someone else led non 7th elements.
Crook was a train wreck. Not only was he surprised by the NA's but then he pulled back his whole force after Rosebud and failed to communicate to anyone that he was out of the campaign.
Yeah, I know that one hand didn't know where the other was. There was no real communication between Crook and Terry. They all just assumed that they'd trap the NA's between them.
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