|
Post by montrose on Aug 9, 2015 4:46:22 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Start a discussion on the art and science of scouting, as practiced by the post ACW US Army.
2. Background. Discussions on scouting have been very confused on this board. This thread will look at the theory and doctrine of scouting, and the way in which the US Army manned, trained and equipped for this mission.
3. Scouting. The term scouting encompasses several tasks that have led to confusion. Remember that many campaigns involved operations in unmapped and poorly known terrain. So the challenges faced by the Army included both finding a path through unfamiliar terrain and finding enemy elements with this terrain. At times, but not consistently, there is a distinction made between the tasks of scouting and guiding. There are campaigns where individuals are hired specifically as a scout or a guide. Note I am deliberately separating the tasks scouting and guiding, from individuals hired as scouts and guide. The actual operations constantly blur concepts.
Summary of tasks:
a. Pathfinding. Finding a path through the terrain. This includes finding campsites that provide water, forage, shelter and finding paths that provide the most efficient and effective passage. Separate paths may be required when you add in the mix of mounted, unmounted and wheeled elements of the column. b. Detecting enemy forces. Finding enemy elements includes the subtask of tracking. But it also includes detailed knowledge of the enemy elements being tracked. Very detailed examples are given in numerous writings from this era. c. The Human Terrain. Another task is detailed knowledge of the personalities and behaviors of the tribes and subtribes. This task is one of those unique LBH items. LBH was a very unique failure at this task. Even the follow on operations that followed LBH showed better use of this task.
4. Manning. Manning the scout force was a complicated mess. Congress authorized various numbers of scouts, up to 1,000 The wording of the authorization is based on task, hire what you need for a campaign, and release them after. This leads to continuity issues, and lessons learned and training to improve capability over time.
a. The Who problem. Scouts and/or guides consisted of Indians, Seminoles, civilians and military personnel. The Indians came from dozens of tribes, with dozens of languages or dialects.
b. Command. The general procedure was to appoint a chief of scouts. This person could be military or civilian. The chief of scouts commanded all scouts and guides, and provided supervision of all scouts and guides.
c. Control was a serious problem. Interpreters were vital, due to the numerous languages involved. Authority was also complicated, generally, but not always, making members subject to the articles of war.
More to follow.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Aug 9, 2015 4:49:11 GMT -6
Dakota Wind wrote an article about LBH scouting. thefirstscout.blogspot.com/2011/06/us-scouts-on-campaign.htmlExtract follows: The scouts who served at Fort Abraham Lincoln were called the Fort McKeen Detachment of Scouts. Most of them were Indian scouts in service in the United States military defending their way of life, that is, that their people could live. Other scouts were contracted civilians, holdovers from the last days of the fur trade era, who could speak the native languages fluently or knew the lay of the land like the back of their hand. It wasn't until the Civil War that Congress took note of the thousands of Indians who were already fighting for both the North and South, entire companies and commands made up of Indians, including battles fought by Indians, and against Indians (ex. Cabin’s Creek) that Congress recognized the Indians' service by forming an official branch for them, the US Scouts. This new branch of the Army included an official insignia and crossed sabers accompanied by the letters “USS.” The Indian scouts who served at Fort Abraham Lincoln began their service at Fort McKeen, a two company infantry post constructed in 1872. Fort Abraham Lincoln, a six company cavalry post, was built a year later on the plains below the infantry post and the new name encompassed both forts. The only thing to retain the name “Fort McKeen” was the detachment of Indian Scouts. On July 6, 1872, Fred Gerard was hired as an interpreter at Fort McKeen. He held his position until 1882. During his first year he recruited several Arikara scouts from Fort Buford where activity was primarily running down deserters, to Fort McKeen where they engaged the Sioux in several hit-and-run raids. That first year seven Arikara Scouts died. The Post Surgeon remarked “The Indian scouts in the several skirmishes with the Sioux in Oct. and Nov. exhibited instances of the greatest personal bravery and fearlessness.” Forty Arikara scouts were brought on to guide the military from Fort Abraham Lincoln to the Yellowstone in 1873. Only three civilians joined the Indian scouts to escort twenty companies of the 6th, 8th, 9th, 17th, and 22nd infantry regiments, and ten companies of the 7th Cavalry (about 1500), about 350 Northern Pacific Railway survey crew employees, four scientists, and two members of the British nobility, to Yellowstone country. General Custer often accompanied the Indian scouts. On August 4, 1873, the Yellowstone Expedition reached the Powder River. About 90 men, including the scouts, explored the Tongue River. There they were surprised when six Sioux men attempted to stampede their horses. The Sioux were driven off and pursued to a heavy stand of trees, when an estimated 300 mounted Sioux warriors led by Chief Gall, burst forth to fight. Bloody Knife was the quickest draw, remarked General Custer, having shot and killed the first antagonist, from horseback. The scouts' bravery and guidance spared all the soldiers' lives but for three. The Arikara scouts were a conservative lot, who often complained to the chief of scouts, a non- Indian second lieutenant who served as liaison to the commanding officer, about the traffic in flesh the enlisted soldiers partook in. The scouts also had zero tolerance for domestic abuse, and any soldier who was found beating women was arrested immediately. In his yearly report of 1873, Post Surgeon Middleton praised the service of the scouts, saying, “There have been no successful desertions during the year, although many have attempted it…deserters are easily overtaken by the scouts and [accompanying] detachments.” At some forts, the desertion rate was as high as 30% after many newly enlisted soldiers realized life in the army in the frontier wasn't what they expected. Middleton's acclaim for the scouts pulling military police duty was mirrored throughout Dakota Territory. Simply put, the scouts were at home in a land they were born and raised in, and could read the features of friend or foe in a glance. The Black Hills Expedition of 1874, led by General Custer, a journey intended to confirm the discovery of gold in the hills, left Fort Abraham Lincoln guided by a detachment of scouts that consisted of 22 Arikara and 38 Santee Dakota Sioux up from Nebraska. There is no written record if the groups socialized, but together they led about 1,200 men to the hills and back, covering nearly 1,200 miles. Professor Donaldson, a geologist on the expedition, remarked, “The scouts are invaluable. Where they scour the country, no ambush could be successfully laid.” On May 17, 1876, the Centennial Campaign left Fort Abraham Lincoln with the scouts in lead, guiding about 1200 men to meet their destiny at the Little Big Horn. Twenty-one scouts were left behind at Fort Abraham Lincoln, twelve at Fort Stevenson, and six at Fort Buford to maintain open lines of communication. In all, a total of fifty-one Indian scouts from the Arikara, the Crow, the Sioux, and the Pikuni (also called Piegan or Blackfoot) escorted and safeguarded the 7th Cavalry. Surgeon DeWolf wrote of the scouts, “…we cannot be surprised very easily. The Indian Scouts are all camped tonight outside us…Scouts working ten miles out.” Indeed, no ambush or raid could be laid.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Aug 9, 2015 7:11:13 GMT -6
Montrose,
Above, understood, excellent overview. Questions.
* How would you classify the likes of "Captain Jack Crawford"(John Wallace Crawford), "California Joe"(Moses Milner), and Charlie Reynolds? These guys often fought and were tasked with responsibilities over and above scouting and guiding. * Cheyenne Scouts with Miles, in the Nez Perce war were not only asked guide, find, but also were part of the attack plan. Likewise the Apache scouts in the southwest. So what was the deal, was use up to each commander? * Close up scouting was done on a number of occasions, by Chief of Scouts and NCO in conjunction with civilian scouts and NA's. Is this not similar what you might do today, using indigenes peoples? * Why in your opinion would GAC disregard warnings of his native scouts, basically calling them cowards?
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Aug 9, 2015 7:13:34 GMT -6
Montrose,
Interesting background information, and I will revert substantively.
You know that the scouting function, especially 22-25 June 1876, considerably bothers me.
I digress, but I did laugh at "and two members of the British nobility". Reminded me of that Sean Connery western movie!
WO
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Aug 9, 2015 8:45:23 GMT -6
Res, WO, in conjunction with the Richard Harris(King Arthur)western flicks, which I enjoyed.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Aug 9, 2015 17:53:09 GMT -6
Montrose,
I would like to throw into this debate a passage from Lt Godfrey (commanding Company K of Cpt Benteen's battalion, in the absence of Cpt Hale) in his book, and quoted by Fred Wagner in his recent book:
"It is a rare occurrence...that gives a commander the opportunity to reconnoiter the enemy's position in daylight. This is particularly true if the Indians have a knowledge of the presence of troops...When following an Indian trail, the "signs" indicate the length of time elapsed since the presence of the Indians. When the "signs" indicate a "hot trail", i.e., near approach, the commander judges his distance, and by a forced march, usually in night time, tries to reach the Indian village at night and make his disposition for a surprise attack at daylight. At all events, his attack must be made with celerity, and generally without other knowledge of the numbers of the opposing force...that discovered or conjectured while following the trail. The dispositions for the attack may be said to be "made in the dark", and successful surprise to depend upon luck. If the advance to the attack to be made in daylight, it is next to impossible that a near approach can be made without discovery. In all of our previous experiences, when the immediate presence of the troops was once known to them, the warriors swarmed to the attack [this is what happened to Crook], and resorted to all kinds of ruses to mislead the troops, to delay the advance toward their camp or village while the squaws and children secured what personal effects they could, drove off the pony herd, and by flight put themselves beyond danger, and then scattering, made successful pursuit next to impossible...In Indian warfare, the rule is "touch and go".
Now regular posters on this board will recognise that I do not like this "touch and go" mentality of the 7th's officer corps into "blind attacks" one little bit, and why there was no apparent attempt to use the scouting function (as well as it's basic shortcomings) to additionally lengthen the unknown "touch" and shorten the "go" to avoid "blind attacks" without meaningful pre-battle recon.
WO
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Aug 9, 2015 20:08:20 GMT -6
I would posit that Godfrey's views reflect Godfrey's lack of skill, knowledge and ability (SKA is a US military term linked to a broad set of theories and analysis) of both scouting and Indian warfare.
The ideal situation is to have your own scouts find the enemy late in the day, without being detected. Then you move your combat assets in the hours of darkness to launch a surprise attack.
So we have a theory that says we must scout the enemy,...SUCCESSFULLY, in late afternoon, say 1500-1800 hours. Then position our combat power to react to this data to launch an attack at 0600 next day.
It is a nice theory, but hopeless in practice. How do you manage your recce and combat assets to only look for the enemy 3 hours out of 24? The nature of warfare is not kind to these ridiculous theories.
The critical task is linking the intelligence collection plan to the decision making cycle of the unit. Find the enemy, no matter where the sun is, then do something about it.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Aug 10, 2015 6:01:04 GMT -6
Montrose,
I think the starting point for the 7th was lengthening their undetected scouting reach, which itself has the desirable side effect of bringing the scouting function into the decision making process of the regiment.
WO
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Aug 10, 2015 6:30:10 GMT -6
WO,
Critical thinking should be part of the decision making process. GAC had the tools and the warnings at his disposal. On this day he did not completely use those tools to the level he should have. We have seen, in this same era, others(Miles & Mackenzie)use those tools to a much better effect time and again.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Aug 10, 2015 7:00:45 GMT -6
WO, Critical thinking should be part of the decision making process. GAC had the tools and the warnings at his disposal. On this day he did not completely use those tools to the level he should have. We have seen, in this same era, others(Miles & Mackenzie)use those tools to a much better effect time and again. Regards, Tom Tom, "On this day"....? GAC missed the satellite villages at the Washita. He used scouts just for tracking and then there was a divorced "touch and go". As you say, compare with Miles and particularly with Mackenzie. WO
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Aug 10, 2015 10:03:17 GMT -6
WO,
I was thinking only of this battle, probably could also have included the 24th as well. Washita? I have commented on those failings previously. The fact of the matter is he had 1st rate scouts(Shoshone) who truly knew their business. Did he use them to their level of their ability? These NA's knew that area like the back of their hand.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Aug 19, 2015 7:31:07 GMT -6
I have not forgotten this thread. I am waiting for some materials to arrive from the Center For Military History and from Fort Leavenworth library.
These are the topics I intend to address.
1. Recruitment of the scouts. 22 Ree and 4 Sioux (along with Dorman as interpreter) were recruited at the FT Berthold Reservation in Feb. They went to FAL where Porter gave them a medical and CPT Custer swore them into service. Supposedly they trained on their own, I would love details on this. Dorman stayed with the scouts from here til the campaign started. Gerard was not there, doing his own business affairs, in other states and was not at FAL.
2. Chief of Scouts. LT Varnum was appointed Chief of Scouts on 3 May. As we will see, this was a bad decision. Please note that the scouts were present at FAL for 2 months with no US officer in charge.
3. The interpreter problem. Dorman was the main interpreter for this campaign. He was the one with the scouts doing the daily job. Gerard was being paid to do so, but did not do his job. He was not at FAL at all, in fact left the state. He was finally fired on 6 May by MAJ Reno. In addition to not showing up for work, there were also accusations of financial issues, fraud and theft. LTC Custer was not comfortable with Dorman, mainly because of his race. So GAC rehired Gerard on 12 May. GAC made it clear that Gerard and Dorman were interpreters and not scouts. Their job was to stay with the scouts and interpret orders and reports between the scouts and the US chain of command, meaning Varnum and GAC. During the campaign, Dorman did his duty, Gerard did not.
4. 7th Cav planning. The planning for the 7th Cav was a disaster. Total clusterpuck. Custer's absentee landlord management , which started in 1861, is never more clear than the 2 years prior to LBH. Just a reminder, GAC and Reno had not seen each other for 2 years. GAC did no handoff to Reno before he started his 9 month leave to work the Frame Grant conspiracy. Instead, he handed off to Cooke and Tom Custer, who were not the senior officers. GAC was busy sending instructions and conducting planning with Terry, but also over his head to Sheridan and Sherman. He also sent instructions to Cooke, Tom, whoever he pleased, without going through Reno.
a. Gibbon. COL Gibbon faced a far more difficult situation for planning and organizing for this campaign than GAC. Both served under Terry, so this is a great case study. Gibbon consolidated very scattered forces, far from LOCs and got out the gate months before Custer.
b. Crook. Crook was vastly superior to both Terry and Gibbon. In fact, there is no possible way he would have put up with the incompetence of LTC Custer. Comparing Crook to Custer is like a high school football team playing the New England Patriots under Belichick. If you want to understand the amateur versus professional theory so loved by the other board, start here.
c. The rest of the Army. LBH attacks enormous attention, where folks assume the 7th Cav was an average unit. Or some fanatics will claim better than average as a unit, and LTC Custer as better than average as a commander. Some even more extreme fanatics with no knowledge of this Army, this era, rational thought or sanity claim GAC and/or the 7th were elite.
Indian fighting 1860-1900 was hard. There is no one answer. Just the terrain in Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Arizona etc should tell you something. The terrain varied, LOCs varied, international factors mattered if near Canada or Mexico, tribes varied widely in numbers, ability, and tactics. There were officers who seemed incapable of handling Indians anywhere they went. Some shined in one set of circumstances, but failed in others. The true Indian fighters, who could adapt to their situation, were rare.
5. WO, Dan or Ian will inevitably ask: So what? Was the planning training, preparation of the scout force sufficent. Was the operational daily C2 sufficient? We must understand that efficient and effective management of a combat asset ids a goal. But not a precondition for success. Bad units and bad leaders have success. "Sometimes the dragon wins" subtheory and associated literature.
WJB
|
|
|
Post by dave on Aug 19, 2015 9:23:05 GMT -6
Montrose
I apologize if my post offends you in any way but combat vets like you are the only source for the answers I seek.
The cyclic pattern of history always fascinates me and also excites. We do not have access to any of the soldiers who served with the Indian scouts but yet in a sense do.
During the period of the Indian Wars the US Army sought and hired members of local tribes to serve and fight against their ancient enemies other tribes. An example being the Arikara and Crows scouting against the Sioux. I am not aware of any incident where a Indian scout turned on the army but that is due mostly to my lack of knowledge and it may well have happened.
Correct me if I am wrong, but didn't the US Army seek and hire members of local tribes to serve and fight in Afghanistan and Iraq? How comfortable were you with working with various tribe members in small unit situations? Did you trust them? Or not but you had to work with them?
I have always wondered how much trust one could put in a man working against some of his own people. I realize tribal connections trump all but they would still be working against fellow countrymen...even if those countries had been drawn by the British and others after the turn of the 20th century and First World War...with the same religion.
Do you believe your that your own experience would be similar to Custer and his command even though the unit size is vastly different, in working with indigenous personnel?
Regards
Dave
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Aug 19, 2015 15:28:27 GMT -6
Dave, 1. The Indian scouts were loyal far better than dealing with the Pathan in Afghan or the Sunnis in Iraq. I know of only one case of treason, 2 Apache scouts changed sides in the middle of a skirmish. Both were executed. 2. I want you to look at 2 links. Apache scouts: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apache_Scouts. Extract follows: "Apache scouts were employed by the United States Army throughout most of the Apache Wars but it wasn't until about 1870 when General George Crook introduced the idea of enlisting entire companies of scouts. However, at that time, few Apaches were willing to join Crook so he was forced to recruit native Americans from various tribes across the Southwest. The majority of Crook's scouts were Apache, divided into two companies, but at first there were also Navajos, Pimas, Yaquis, Opatas, Papagos, Walapais, Yavapais, and Paiutes, as well as some Mexicans and Americans. General Crook allowed any captured Apache male to join his scouts, believing that "the wilder the Apache was, the more he was likely to know the wiles and statagems of those still out in the mountains. (sic)" While Crook was recruiting natives to fight for him, he was also fighting against the Western Apaches and the closely associated Yavapai tribe in central Arizona Territory. During the Tonto Basin Campaign in 1872, Crook deployed his scouts at the Battle of Salt River Canyon on December 28. Over 100 Yavapai and Tonto men, women and children were held up inside a cave overlooking the Salt River. With some 130 cavalrymen, and about thirty scouts, Crook attacked the cave, killing seventy-six people, including non combatants, and capturing the remaining thirty-four. The general followed up the victory with another at Turret Peak, on March 27, 1873, in which another fifty-seven Yavapais and Tonto Apaches were killed. Only one man was killed on the Americans' side during both engagements and soon after the Yavapai and the Tontos began flocking to Camp Verde to surrender.[2][3][4] The war was not over yet though, small bands of Yavapai and Apache raiders continued to harass the army and the settlers in and around Tonto Basin for two years more. The fighting was mostly skirmishing, but it was enough to keep the scouts busy. One of these skirmishes occurred on November 1, 1874 after Tonto Apaches stole some livestock from a rancher. Some forty Apache scouts and cavalrymen were then dispatched from Camp Verde to pusrue the hostiles and they caught up with them at Sunset Pass, near the Little Colorado River. During the fight that ensued, Lieutenant Charles King was badly wounded in the arm and temporarily stranded. King was rescued by his men who engaged the hostiles for some time, but, eventually, the order to retreat was given. King later wrote a book, titled "Sunset Pass", about his experiences serving with the Apache scouts in Arizona Territory. After the war ended, General Crook departed Arizona for Dakota Territory in 1876. Colonel Augustus P. Kautz took over the command of the scouts and he formed a third company in early 1877 and a fourth in 1878. Upon taking command of the scouts, Kautz wrote; "These scouts supported by a small force of cavalry, are exceedingly efficient, and have succeeded, with one or two exceptions, in finding every party of Indians they have gone in pursuit of. They are a great terror to the runaways [renegades] from the Reservations, and for such work are more efficient than double the number of soldiers. (sic)"[2][5]" End of extract. And the Crawford Affair. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crawford_Affair3. Compare and contrast the use Crook made of scouts as compared to Terry and Custer, especially the Fort McKean Indian Scout Company 1872-6. There are 3 significant differences. What are they? Just name 2 of the 3 for credit. I figure you university types like pop quizzes. Will
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on Aug 19, 2015 15:43:47 GMT -6
5. WO, Dan or Ian will inevitably ask: So what? Was the planning training, preparation of the scout force sufficient. Was the operational daily C2 sufficient? We must understand that efficient and effective management of a combat asset ids a goal. But not a precondition for success. Bad units and bad leaders have success. "Sometimes the dragon wins" subtheory and associated literature.
WJB Montrose, Not sure what point you are making there, so seeking clarification before responding...? Thanks. WO
|
|