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Post by jodak on Jul 9, 2015 14:17:58 GMT -6
It has been repeated on these boards and elsewhere ad-nauseam that the Indians always ran, or Custer expected the Indians to run, or the army expected the Indians to run, etc., etc., etc., but where in the historical record does it ever say that? Where in Sherman's/Sheridan's/Terry's orders or elsewhere does it ever say "Now remember, the Indians always run, so gauge your actions accordingly"?
It would be more appropriate to say that the Indians, as any prudent human or wild animal would do, endeavored to avoid conflict, especially against a stronger opponent, if at all possible or unless a favorable outcome seemed likely. In this they were keeping to want Admiral Nimitz would later define as "calculated risk" - " ... you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy".
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 9, 2015 14:33:34 GMT -6
Jodak,
You build your battle plan on the premise that you won't be defeated if the enemy doesn't run away, even if you suspect/expect flight.
That combat resilience was missing from GAC's dispositions on the 25 June 1876.
WO
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Post by jodak on Jul 9, 2015 14:38:10 GMT -6
That's the point that I was trying to make - that all of this "The Indians always ran" nonsense is just that, nonsense and a red herring.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 9, 2015 14:38:58 GMT -6
In regard to Company B (McDougall), they were not tasked with guarding the train per-se either, but to serve as the rear guard for the column. Since the train was at the rear of the column, serving as rear guard and guarding the train amounted to much the same thing, but they had other responsibilities as well, such as rounding up and hurrying along stragglers. As several have mentioned, one possible course of action would have been to have cached the train in a safe place and left it with minimal guard while adding the others back into the combat power of the regiment, but, in the absence of that, the number of men with the train was probably appropriate. Jodak,
Once Benteen swings left and GAC/Reno accelerate ahead, McDougall is simply the pack train guard.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 9, 2015 14:40:07 GMT -6
That's the point that I was trying to make - that all of this "The Indians always ran" nonsense is just that, nonsense and a red herring. Jodak,
I wonder what the widows and orphans of the Fetterman massacre thought of the "Indians always ran" theory.....?
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 9, 2015 14:45:11 GMT -6
Tom: What you see in the material Ian provided would be, using modern terminology, combat trains, and field trains. The material transferred to the packs would be the combat trains, who move further forward and follow the line of march of the combat elements. These are the people in modern times that would provide your immediate after action fuel and ammunition. The wagons left on Goose Creek, which is near Sheridan to give you perspective would be the field trains, your source of food and all other classes of supply for the expedition. They too would have been called forward at some point had Crook met success. I think it a bit of a tell into Crooks thinking, or the intensity of the Rosebud battle, that he chose to fall back on his field trains. The tell being that he expended so much during the battle, that even with his combat trains available they could not replenish his stocks. Jodak is right on the money with his commentary. Those detail men were there to supplement the inadequate number of packers. He is also correct about diluting combat power by an overall 10 percent, but that percentage is greater than that if you look at the percentage of combat power lost in some of those companies. The regimental average was 10 percent but I think you will find it might be as high as 15 percent at company level in some instances. Beth military orders must as a first requirement be clear. They should also ideally be short, but clarity of purpose trumps short and any other consideration. Today we have a very rigid stylized format for such thing. All you need do is follow the format as a check list to guard against the forgotten or overlooked. Then, it was a matter of presenting the idea on paper in as clear a manner possible, and if it took a first your do this then you do that so be it. You never want a subordinate walking away not understanding. Back to that Bulge book. One of the combat command commanders was brand new to his job. Prior to the operation being unfamiliar with his two maneuver commanders he chose to write out a full five paragraph order, and deliver that order to them in person, mainly to size them up and assure clarity. The other two combat command commanders, being familiar with their people chose to transmit execution orders by radio. So how formal you are depends upon previous associations as well. All three of the commanders were correct, even though all three did it a bit differently. QC,
All that I would add is that the 7th cavalry "strike force" was itself a "silver bullet". It was fighting one battle and then falling back on the Yellowstone for re-supply/replenishment, whatever the outcome of that battle. The residual pack train was basically, post-battle, to get the regiment back to the Yellowstone.
WO
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Post by Beth on Jul 9, 2015 14:50:30 GMT -6
It has been repeated on these boards and elsewhere ad-nauseam that the Indians always ran, or Custer expected the Indians to run, or the army expected the Indians to run, etc., etc., etc., but where in the historical record does it ever say that? Where in Sherman's/Sheridan's/Terry's orders or elsewhere does it ever say "Now remember, the Indians always run, so gauge your actions accordingly"? Did everyone fighting Indians post CW, think Indians always run or did Custer believe that Indians always run? I tend to think history of the Indian wars is very Custercentric unless someone is really into the history of the era. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 9, 2015 15:05:11 GMT -6
Beth,
The Indians did what circumstances dictated to them on each occasion. Mostly one would expect small irregular concentrations to disperse. But the options were much greater when concentrated and the numbers favourable, either offensively (Fetterman) or defensively (Gratton). GAC's dispositions were imprudent on 25 June 1876, even if the hostile strength had been at the lower end of the Indian agents' estimates. And of course, by attacking on the 25th, GAC was attacking blind and without his own independent corroboration/verification of hostile strength if he was not trusting his Crow scouts.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 9, 2015 15:11:16 GMT -6
Let us all look at where and how LT John Henry Parker's Gatling Gun Detachment, V Corps was utilized at San Juan Heights before we go too far down the road of categorizing that weapon as more useful defensively than offensively. We just might want to take a peek at the mobility and supply problems he faced and overcame as well.
The main weakness of a Gatling Gun, was the fact that it was mounted on a field carriage, and therefore incapable of providing a high volume of grazing fire, meaning that it was possible to get under the gun. It was not an MG42, but neither was anything else at the time, and it had one great advantage - they were available.
I agree about a mountain howitzer, but I would have much rather had a pack howitzer, manned by artillerymen, not some few detailed for the purpose.
Indians always running is nonsense, and I suspect just another attempt to give cover to Goldilocks. Has anyone ever seen any other commander in that period, base anything on Indians always run. My knowledge of the Army in the American West is not all that great, but I have never seen anything like that.
Indians, like any other force, fight when it is to their advantage, or when a fight is forced upon them.
Scattering is a technique used by a perceived to be weaker force, to avoid combat, by dispersal. G's are doing the same thing this very day in every hot spot in the world. Scattering and running are two very different things.
WO: Fully agree. The pack train was a picnic lunch to sustain them until dinner on the Yellowstone, or wherever the boat was at the time.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 9, 2015 15:33:41 GMT -6
Let us all look at where and how LT John Henry Parker's Gatling Gun Detachment, V Corps was utilized at San Juan Heights before we go too far down the road of categorizing that weapon as more useful defensively than offensively. We just might want to take a peek at the mobility and supply problems he faced and overcame as well. The main weakness of a Gatling Gun, was the fact that it was mounted on a field carriage, and therefore incapable of providing a high volume of grazing fire, meaning that it was possible to get under the gun. It was not an MG42, but neither was anything else at the time, and it had one great advantage - they were available. I agree about a mountain howitzer, but I would have much rather had a pack howitzer, manned by artillerymen, not some few detailed for the purpose. Indians always running is nonsense, and I suspect just another attempt to give cover to Goldilocks. Has anyone ever seen any other commander in that period, base anything on Indians always run. My knowledge of the Army in the American West is not all that great, but I have never seen anything like that. Indians, like any other force, fight when it is to their advantage, or when a fight is forced upon them. Scattering is a technique used by a perceived to be weaker force, to avoid combat, by dispersal. G's are doing the same thing this very day in every hot spot in the world. Scattering and running are two very different things. WO: Fully agree. The pack train was a picnic lunch to sustain them until dinner on the Yellowstone, or wherever the boat was at the time. Chuck, Beth,
Indians always run, in great part stemmed from the Hancock Campaign circa 1867. Smokey Hill Sage Line and all that stuff. There was plenty of grass, well fed ponies, and for the most part stashed family members. They were not necessarily running, but taking advantage of their greater mobility and knowledge of the area. Several generals had egg on their faces during this period of time. Beth, you mentioned guerilla warfare, for two summers it was hit and run. 6 different tribes were involved at different times during this futile effort to bring the "miscreants" under control.
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Post by jodak on Jul 9, 2015 15:35:19 GMT -6
It has been repeated on these boards and elsewhere ad-nauseam that the Indians always ran, or Custer expected the Indians to run, or the army expected the Indians to run, etc., etc., etc., but where in the historical record does it ever say that? Where in Sherman's/Sheridan's/Terry's orders or elsewhere does it ever say "Now remember, the Indians always run, so gauge your actions accordingly"? Did everyone fighting Indians post CW, think Indians always run or did Custer believe that Indians always run? I tend to think history of the Indian wars is very Custercentric unless someone is really into the history of the era. Beth I'm not convinced that anyone, including Custer, thought that. That was the point of my post - to say that I've never seen anything in the historical record to indicate that anyone that mattered thought any such thing. Instead I surmise that it is one of those things that someone said, then someone else repeated, then 1000 other people repeated until it has entered our consciousness as being indisputable truth, although it may not be at all.
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Post by Beth on Jul 9, 2015 16:14:57 GMT -6
QC,
All that I would add is that the 7th cavalry "strike force" was itself a "silver bullet". It was fighting one battle and then falling back on the Yellowstone for re-supply/replenishment, whatever the outcome of that battle. The residual pack train was basically, post-battle, to get the regiment back to the Yellowstone.
WO
Ironically, and as has been discussed before, if the campaign had been planned to be fought more in the style the NA use--hit a target quickly, destroy things like food other resources and move out quickly, It would have been a lot more effective at getting vast majority the 'hostiles' to return to the reservation. Of course that is assuming the campaign was about getting them back to the reservations. I suspect with Sheridan and Sherman involved the unwritten part of the campaign was kill as many Indians as possible while they were at it. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 9, 2015 16:36:24 GMT -6
QC,
All that I would add is that the 7th cavalry "strike force" was itself a "silver bullet". It was fighting one battle and then falling back on the Yellowstone for re-supply/replenishment, whatever the outcome of that battle. The residual pack train was basically, post-battle, to get the regiment back to the Yellowstone.
WO
Ironically, and as has been discussed before, if the campaign had been planned to be fought more in the style the NA use--hit a target quickly, destroy things like food other resources and move out quickly, It would have been a lot more effective at getting vast majority the 'hostiles' to return to the reservation. Of course that is assuming the campaign was about getting them back to the reservations. I suspect with Sheridan and Sherman involved the unwritten part of the campaign was kill as many Indians as possible while they were at it. Beth Beth,
The US Army was simply not logistically structured to mount that sort of campaign. It was structured to corral, but it should have been Crook from the south and Sheridan himself from the north.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 9, 2015 16:37:24 GMT -6
Jodak: That too was my point, an after the fact exercise in excuse making, fostered and promulgated by the Goldilocks fan club
Oh gee the Indians always run and they didn't this time, so you can't blame Custer for being an idiot.
Beth it is a fundamental military fact, that killing as many as you can gets your enemies attention, AND, Never make peace with someone you have not kicked the crap out of beforehand. Peace lasts longer that way. Not politically correct I suppose, but nonetheless as true as the sun that shineth above.
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Post by Beth on Jul 9, 2015 16:40:08 GMT -6
Did everyone fighting Indians post CW, think Indians always run or did Custer believe that Indians always run? I tend to think history of the Indian wars is very Custercentric unless someone is really into the history of the era. Beth I'm not convinced that anyone, including Custer, thought that. That was the point of my post - to say that I've never seen anything in the historical record to indicate that anyone that mattered thought any such thing. Instead I surmise that it is one of those things that someone said, then someone else repeated, then 1000 other people repeated until it has entered our consciousness as being indisputable truth, although it may not be at all. I guess it would require digging into reports and writing from then to find out. I've glanced through a Department of War Report from 1867 and there are quite a number of reports of Indians attacking a target then running, pages of them. However the other way to look at it is they (Indians) were making targeted strikes and departing. I could see where any Cavalry would view it as Indians always running to avoid battles/fighting. Beth
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