|
Post by tubman13 on May 27, 2015 11:01:54 GMT -6
Now if I were to write about LBH, it would be a book similar to Georgette Heyer's Infamous Army--sort of teaching history with a velvet glove. Not to say I haven't thought how it would be possible to do it but I am stuck on a couple of points. Like embedding three fictitious low officers in a battle that is so well know and how to logically get one with Reno in the valley, one with Benteen and one with Custer while still retaining their friendship and avoiding camp politics. Beth Dave, it looks like from the weather map you might to be facing some weather this afternoon and evening. Stay safe. Beth In all seriousness, you would reach far more people with a fictional history of the LBH than most scholarly tomes ever would. Additionally I believe that we have a serious problem with most girls and women who do not study or read about history because it is a guy thing. As you well know, dry facts are not everyone's forte, many more could be exposed to the study of Custer,Libbie and the Little Big Horn. Yeah, you could call it "George and Libbie Naked!Regards Da PS We always get your weather 24 to 36 hours later. Damn hand-me-downs again
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on May 27, 2015 12:06:33 GMT -6
Beth: Regarding your win myth above:
I believe Will or Justin could have been helicoptered in to the Busby camp site, on the 24th of June, told Custer he was relieved of command, then taken command of the 7th United States Cavalry, as is, and produced a solid victory on the 25th, 26th, or 27th, as the opportunity presented itself. I believe I could as well. LBH was lost for one reason, the incompetence of the commander.
Numbers by themselves are meaningless. Only numbers at the point of contact have meaning. If your enemy is fed and rested, make sure that your soldiers are better fed and rested. If your enemy is motivated for a fight, find a means or reason to unmotivated them. If your enemy is well positioned (that was the word you were looking for) draw them out, and deprive them of balance. That is what commanders do
|
|
|
Post by Beth on May 27, 2015 12:27:30 GMT -6
Beth: Regarding your win myth above: I believe Will or Justin could have been helicoptered in to the Busby camp site, on the 24th of June, told Custer he was relieved of command, then taken command of the 7th United States Cavalry, as is, and produced a solid victory on the 25th, 26th, or 27th, as the opportunity presented itself. I believe I could as well. LBH was lost for one reason, the incompetence of the commander. Numbers by themselves are meaningless. Only numbers at the point of contact have meaning. If you enemy is fed and rested, make sure that your soldiers are better fed and rested. If your enemy is motivated for a fight, find a means or reason to unmotivated them. If your enemy is well positioned (that was the word you were looking for) draw them out, and deprive them of balance. That is what commanders do I am sure you are right QC but it kind of supports on how Custer should have won was a myth. Almost anyone but Custer should have won but Custer was not capable of winning in June 1876. It would have been better for all if Custer could have called in sick on the 23th and then just caught up on the 28th to take the credit for his regiment's victory. Beth
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on May 27, 2015 12:42:36 GMT -6
I said over in the other thread that Montrose, Justin and I don't agree on everything but we all recognized a goddamned fool when that fool is commanding a regiment of cavalry.
My comment was not meant to refute. It was actually meant to reinforce yours. There are no bad regiments, some bright person once said, only bad Colonels.
Those that say that probably mean that the 7th Cavalry could have and should have won. That is no myth. If you look at it, it is a but for.
By the way the three people I chose for my illustration, were chosen only because they have experience at that appropriate level. It was not, and was never meant to mean that some others here could not have done a very good job as well. Keep in mind you have probably been exposed to more in the way of sound tactical concepts here, in your what, a year, than Custer was in his entire career
|
|
|
Post by Beth on May 27, 2015 14:19:27 GMT -6
I said over in the other thread that Montrose, Justin and I don't agree on everything but we all recognized a goddamned fool when that fool is commanding a regiment of cavalry. My comment was not meant to refute. It was actually meant to reinforce yours. There are no bad regiments, some bright person once said, only bad Colonels. Those that say that probably mean that the 7th Cavalry could have and should have won. That is no myth. If you look at it, it is a but for. By the way the three people I chose for my illustration, were chosen only because they have experience at that appropriate level. It was not, and was never meant to mean that some others here could not have done a very good job as well. Keep in mind you have probably been exposed to more in the way of sound tactical concepts here, in your what, a year, than Custer was in his entire career No problem. When you refute me, I know that I have been refuted, it's sort of like getting a tongue lashing with 30 grit paper. Sometimes though I'm not sure if we are on the exact same page is all. I'll have been here a year Aug. 1. It has been one heck of an education and I've appreciated every moment spent by everyone who has answered my questions, guided me to reading material, and put up with my ability to take almost any thread off topic. Your comment about Custer and education brought a question to mind. They rushed his class through WP to get officers out in the field. What about classes in the following years? If you don't want to take this thread off topic please direct me where to ask it. Did the year Custer missed include tactical concepts? Beth
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on May 27, 2015 16:09:26 GMT -6
I don't know the answer to your last question Beth, and West Point has changed over the years to where most of the tactical lessons are in the summer months. There is a training area across the river that they use whose name escapes me. You also see WP cadets at the airborne and some other courses during the summer months and there used to be a third lieutenant program for some in effect where they would shadow a platoon leader in an active unit. Keep in mind it is primarily a college.
Anything they get is only on a very basic level, much like you would find in ROTC programs. I had several WP grads in my Basic Course at Benning, and they were no better, and in most instances not a good as ROTC program people. The best we had were the direct commissions, all of whom had combat experience in Vietnam, followed by the OCS people, mostly Reserve Component OCS (a shorter course) who all had previous enlisted experience. Then came ROTC and WP, and they were quite raw, but most very smart.
The problem I see with Custer, and I give him a break that Montrose does not always do, and I know why and will elaborate upon, is that Custer's tactical knowledge was at the very basic Second Lieutenant level, and he made his rank much too fast, but still did not mature beyond that 2LT level as an officer. The lessons you apply as a battalion and brigade commander are first learned, in fact ground into your skull at platoon and company. If you don't have that grounding in, you may be able to lead a charge to great personal glory, but you do not learn the art of command, nor do you become flexible enough in your overall outlook to adapt to different situations, which leads me to what Montrose often speaks of.
You will notice that Montrose never gives Custer much flak about his ACW performance. I think he should be much more critical, but that is an opinion and irrelevant to what we currently discuss. He goes on to say Custer would not make anything but possibly a good private in the Indian Fighting Army. Now if you or Fred or anyone, including myself had said that, I would put it in the category of a slam and not pay a whole lot of attention to it. Why is Montrose different. The fact he wears crossed arrows makes it different. His specialty is the unconventional conflict, and he knows that to be really good at that you must in some measure forget the conventional (dare I use the word mindset) and fight in a much different and more adaptable way, and not every Tom Dick and Harry can do that. I could not for instance be a success at that, for I understand my own impatience, that's why I am still building my little toys at 72 to teach me patience. You see one particular person of that period who stands out as having adapted from the conventional to the much slower paced, more frustrating, more patience required, unconventional - Mackenzie.
Those are the reason that I find that Custer was a flop. He was all cotton candy, with no substance as a leader or commander.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 28, 2015 16:25:10 GMT -6
Fred,
I started this thread to discuss a valley project. We got distracted, per usual.
An area I feel is not well understood is the planning for this campaign. The following are points I feel should be brought up.
1. Sherman wanted a winter campaign. Crook was able to launch a campaign in Mar. Then he reorganizes and went out again. Gibbon was moving forces as early as March, but didn't get going to April. Last out of the gate was the 7th. The 7th had excellent rail and water LOCS, and should have been first.
2. Custer went on vacation in Sep 75, without waiting for Reno to return. Reno had been gone for 2 years. This was a significant factor in the poor preparation of the 7th for this campaign, in marked contrast to the far superior preparation of the Gibbon and Crook columns.
a. Reno's wife died, leaving him a single parent. When he asked for leave in 1874, GAC recommended no. I wonder how this effected their relationship? Given the extensive leave GAC took throughout his career, there is hypocrisy here.
3. Supply Train. It appears that the initial plan was for a wagon train, with Quartermaster Department organizing wagons and drivers in Nov. Then late Jan it appears a decision was made for a mule train. I would love to know who made these decisions, but I failed. Markland had some data, but incomplete. AT some point the decision for the Custer column was to start with a wagon train, carrying several hundred saddles. Then they could drop the wagons off at a depot. The saddles would then be put on the mules pulling the wagons to form a mule train. To make this work, civilian packers accompanied the column, to manage the subsequent mule pack train.
If I were to brief that plan today, to officers with no animal experience, my next command would be at Burger King.
It looks to me like a compromise decision. But still, it happened far enough in advance to buy the saddles, ship them To FAL, hire skinners plan for forage for the animal force and all the other parts to make the plan work.
4. The recall of the 3 companies on Reconstruction duty started in Feb, and we know Custer was involved. He was sending telegraph messages in support and these companies arrived at FAL before GAC did.
a. I wonder if this decision led to the largest planning blunder unique to the 7th. They failed to request sufficient remounts for the campaign. You think someone, somewhere would notice that they had more men than horses. Remember the chief of the remount service was COL Sturgis. But they didn't ask until May, which was too late. Fred will know the number, it was over 100.
I don't know that another 100 fighters at LBH would make a difference, but it certainly can not hurt.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on May 29, 2015 3:11:50 GMT -6
Will, you are totally correct, imagine if they did organise a proper military train and had troops from other detachments doing the work at both FAL and PRD. If these men were freed to join their respected companies then the totals for each company would look like this;
A -57 B -69 C -66 D -68 E -61 F -65 G -66 H -58 I -62 K -70 L -70 M -62
If you take into account that the standard number of troops per company is around the 70 mark, then Custer’s companies would be close on full strength.
P.S. I agree with your line about “Burger King” who the hell organises a cavalry regiment to go in the field without enough horses, it’s like assembling an infantry regiment for action and only having enough boots to equip two thirds of them, crazy!
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 4:49:43 GMT -6
Fred, I started this thread to discuss a valley project. We got distracted, per usual. An area I feel is not well understood is the planning for this campaign. The following are points I feel should be brought up. 1. Sherman wanted a winter campaign. Crook was able to launch a campaign in Mar. Then he reorganizes and went out again. Gibbon was moving forces as early as March, but didn't get going to April. Last out of the gate was the 7th. The 7th had excellent rail and water LOCS, and should have been first. 2. Custer went on vacation in Sep 75, without waiting for Reno to return. Reno had been gone for 2 years. This was a significant factor in the poor preparation of the 7th for this campaign, in marked contrast to the far superior preparation of the Gibbon and Crook columns. a. Reno's wife died, leaving him a single parent. When he asked for leave in 1874, GAC recommended no. I wonder how this effected their relationship? Given the extensive leave GAC took throughout his career, there is hypocrisy here. 3. Supply Train. It appears that the initial plan was for a wagon train, with Quartermaster Department organizing wagons and drivers in Nov. Then late Jan it appears a decision was made for a mule train. I would love to know who made these decisions, but I failed. Markland had some data, but incomplete. AT some point the decision for the Custer column was to start with a wagon train, carrying several hundred saddles. Then they could drop the wagons off at a depot. The saddles would then be put on the mules pulling the wagons to form a mule train. To make this work, civilian packers accompanied the column, to manage the subsequent mule pack train. If I were to brief that plan today, to officers with no animal experience, my next command would be at Burger King. It looks to me like a compromise decision. But still, it happened far enough in advance to buy the saddles, ship them To FAL, hire skinners plan for forage for the animal force and all the other parts to make the plan work. 4. The recall of the 3 companies on Reconstruction duty started in Feb, and we know Custer was involved. He was sending telegraph messages in support and these companies arrived at FAL before GAC did. a. I wonder if this decision led to the largest planning blunder unique to the 7th. They failed to request sufficient remounts for the campaign. You think someone, somewhere would notice that they had more men than horses. Remember the chief of the remount service was COL Sturgis. But they didn't ask until May, which was too late. Fred will know the number, it was over 100. I don't know that another 100 fighters at LBH would make a difference, but it certainly can not hurt. Montrose,
Whenever I question whether it is worth the effort on this board, with all the trolling disruptions from posters whose knowledge of strategy operations and tactics as well as military history could fit on the reverse of a postage stamp with not inconsiderable space left over, I read a post like that
I have just read Fred's conclusion (Chapter 20) and skimmed other key areas, and your post touches on something I was wondering about. GAC had all those troopers sat at a depot without mounts - what would have been the material impact upon his northern recce if he had the equivalent of another 100 troopers and they were mostly with his battalion? Enough to drop off a force to plug Ford C/Deep Ravine, whilst he continued toward the Ford D area? Similarly, if McDougall had been with his battalion and Reno or Benteen were providing the mule train guard company.
Obviously this is just a question of combat resilience to avoid calamity, after tactically it had all gone to pot. But possibly a big difference to all those widows and orphans...
WO
P.s. whopper and fries, large strawberry milkshake. UK size portions, not half a cow in the burger....
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 5:24:15 GMT -6
Beth: Regarding your win myth above: I believe Will or Justin could have been helicoptered in to the Busby camp site, on the 24th of June, told Custer he was relieved of command, then taken command of the 7th United States Cavalry, as is, and produced a solid victory on the 25th, 26th, or 27th, as the opportunity presented itself. I believe I could as well. LBH was lost for one reason, the incompetence of the commander. Numbers by themselves are meaningless. Only numbers at the point of contact have meaning. If your enemy is fed and rested, make sure that your soldiers are better fed and rested. If your enemy is motivated for a fight, find a means or reason to unmotivated them. If your enemy is well positioned (that was the word you were looking for) draw them out, and deprive them of balance. That is what commanders do QC,
I have a higher opinion of GAC than you. For example, his West Point problems were demerits.
My main issue with the Centennial Campaign was the way that GAC was incorrectly used, with far too much latitude given for any previously demonstrated tactical acumen during the course of his career. Once things start going wrong from Busby on the 24th, it was like a treadmill and every mistake was just being compounded. When the hostiles swarmed at the GAC right wing on the bluffs, the combat resilience was practically non-existent and the route back to Reno/Benteen had been gifted away.
My primary complaint is that Sheridan was not out there providing the operational and tactical leadership. Terry could attend to the logistics and keep the Dakota column supplied. If the hostiles built a huge stone fort and the tribes cowered within it, bring up Terry as he was your man.....
WO
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 29, 2015 6:26:09 GMT -6
I have a higher opinion of GAC than you. I do as well. Forget personalities... if we didn't no one would like anybody. To me, Custer made stupid mistakes he should not have made at the LBH. And this constant fan-boy harping of some about the supposed incompetence of Reno and Benteen only shows a total lack of intelligence and understanding, plus an unwillingness to learn. People like that are simply ignorant fools, no more intelligent than those who call Custer an idiot, moron, etc. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 6:37:55 GMT -6
I have a higher opinion of GAC than you. I do as well. Forget personalities... if we didn't no one would like anybody. To me, Custer made stupid mistakes he should not have made at the LBH. And this constant fan-boy harping of some about the supposed incompetence of Reno and Benteen only shows a total lack of intelligence and understanding, plus an unwillingness to learn. People like that are simply ignorant fools, no more intelligent than those who call Custer an idiot, moron, etc. Best wishes, Fred. Fred,
It becomes tedious talking about personalities, doesn't it? Great commanders have lost battles, and poor commanders have won battles. But GAC had a seriously "bad day at the office" on 25 June 1876. I am not saying he had a bad day every day, just that 25 June 1876 was pretty grim from a tactical decision making perspective. Nothing like it before or after against plains hostiles. Dispersed companies gifted to the hostiles piecemeal, and 5 wiped out to the last man. "Out of mutual support", to adopt your preferred terminology. Why? How did this come about? Why was it not prevented? Why did GAC not react until too late? Those are the questions that interest me.
WO
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 29, 2015 9:05:47 GMT -6
It becomes tedious talking about personalities, doesn't it? WO, Yes, it does. Very much so, but then that is endemic with this event. You have those who will choose a side and regardless of the evidence, reasoning, common sense, and first-hand accounts to the contrary, will never change their minds. I think we may add that to the definition of "ignorance." You bring up an interesting point here. Last night I was up late, well past midnight... and something of a chore for me since I am generally up around 5:30 to 6 AM... and was just trolling around between various sites, here, next door, Facebook, etc. A post caught my eye, and I do not even remember where I saw it or who posted it, but it was just the typical nonsensical distortion we see so much. And I have to paraphrase here because I was a bit groggy by then.... This poster claimed Custer knew... or told his officers... they would be meeting 1,500 warriors, "at least." It was the "at least" that caught my eye, as well as the number. The poster then went on to say something to the effect that Custer said this was the biggest village he had ever seen... or words to that effect. Things like this, of course, spur me on because I do not recall ever reading, hearing, or seeing anything quite like that... as coming from Custer. If it were true, then things would have to be looked at in a completely different light. So naturally, I started doing some research. Being entirely too lazy to hunt down the post... or even when it was put up: hell, if it was on Delphi, it could have been put up 10 years ago!... I just decided to put what I found here: Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” Century Magazine, January 1892—Godfrey made the necessary preparations and gave the necessary orders to his company. During this routine, he came to the bivouac area of the scouts and met up with Mitch Boyer, Bloody Knife, and Half Yellow Face. Boyer saw him and—apparently at the suggestion of the Crow—asked Godfrey, “‘Have you ever fought against these Sioux?’” The following conversation ensued: Godfrey: “‘Yes,’ I replied. Then he [Boyer] asked, ‘Well, how many do you expect to find?’ I answered, ‘It is said we may find between one thousand and fifteen hundred.’ ‘Well, do you think we can whip that many?’ ‘Oh, yes, I guess so.’ After he had interpreted our conversation, he said to me with a good deal of emphasis, ‘Well, I can tell you we are going to have a ----- big fight.’” The 1921 re-print of Godfrey’s updated and changed 1892, Century Magazine article. The original article was “revised” in 1908, but was not re-published until 1921—At officers’ call on the 22nd, Custer emphasized the need to keep the companies within “supporting distance of each other,” and based on Reno’s findings they “might meet at least a thousand warriors,” supplemented by agency Indians, bringing the total to 1,500. Custer was confident—based on all the reports he had seen—this was the most they would meet up with. This was also the evening when Godfrey ran across Boyer, Bloody Knife, Half Yellow Face, and some others, and Boyer asked Godfrey about how many Indians they were likely to meet and whether they could whip 1,500. At the RCOI—Herendeen estimated there were 1,500 lodges. “I have seen a great many camps and this was the largest I ever saw by a great deal…. I have always estimated them at that number. I have seen 700 or 800 lodges together before and I judge there were all of 1,800 there.” Herendeen thought the Indians had 3,500 fighting men. “I think there was a large force of Indians who had no women along.” From a statement made by Herendeen in Bozeman, M. T., on January 4, 1878, and published in the New York Herald, January 22, 1878—Boyer said it was the largest camp he had ever seen. Reynolds told Custer it would take six hours of hard fighting to whip them. At the RCOI—Fred Gerard—At about 11 PM on the 24th, Custer called Gerard and told him to take Half Yellow Face and Bloody Knife and ride at the head of the column with Custer. At 11:30 PM they pulled out and got at the head of the column, waiting for Custer to come up. Custer told Gerard to follow the left-hand trail no matter how small it might be. At some point they halted and Gerard sat with Custer while the Indians were finding the trail. Custer asked Gerard how many Indians he thought they might find and Gerard told him it would not be less than 2,500. The following day, Gerard asked that this number be changed to 1,500 to 2,000. “Scalp Dance”—a collection of Win Edgerly’s papers—Edgerly felt neither Terry nor Custer had any idea of the great number of Indians in the village (an interesting point, especially since they had been prepared for as many as 1,500). May 14, 1876—Sunday—Terry telegrams Sheridan: “It is represented that they have 1,500 lodges, are confident and intend making a stand” [Connell, Son of the Morning Star, 264]. Marc Kellogg, the civilian reporter for the Bismarck Tribune wrote: “The latest information brought in by scouts from the hostile camps report Sitting Bull as having concentrated his entire camp near the Little Missouri River… [h]is force is given at 1,500 lodges. This estimate would enable him to put at least 3,000 warriors into the field.” LT James Bradley estimated the village at about 400 lodges and 800 to 1,000 warriors. LT Roe, however—who was not with this scouting party—later expressed the opinion that there were between 1,500 and 2,000 warriors in this particular village [Bradley, The March of the Montana Column, 126; and Edgar Stewart, Custer’s Luck, 154, FN 33, referencing Roe, Custer’s Last Battle, 2]. Roe may have been correct for even Stewart claims more and more Indians were joining, so the camp had to be growing over this period. June 21, 1876—Wednesday—At this time the scouts placed the Indian strength at some 5,000 warriors, while Custer and a few others anticipated 1,000 to 1,500. It appears most officers felt even that number was too high [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, 242 – 243]. June 22—Custer tells his officers of his estimates of the size of the Indian force: Indian Office in Washington estimated 3,000 persons, translating to 850 warriors. That tied in with Boyer’s estimate of 400 lodges = 800 warriors. Custer figured another 500 might come out of the agencies for the summer, making a maximum of 1,500. Luke Hare interview with Walter Mason Camp, conducted, February 7, 1910—Boyer told Custer: “General I have been with these Indians for 30 years and this is the largest village I have ever heard of.” Hare assumed this was because of the size of the trail. So... nowhere in here is there the slightest hint of either of those statements. At the most, it appears Custer expected some 800 + 500 warriors, all of whom he believed he could deal with (yeah, with a full regiment, all together!!!)... and nowhere in there was it Custer's belief this was the largest village, ever, despite Herendeen's and Boyer's admonitions. It also appears-- at least to me-- Herendeen's observations came well after the fact. So again, here you have a classic case of distortion: the poster takes well-known "facts" and attributes those facts to someone else and completely out of the context they were originally placed. To me, that is a disgrace. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by welshofficer on May 29, 2015 9:16:27 GMT -6
Fred,
You are preaching to the converted!
Elsewhere on this board, I am trying to get the point across to Jaguar that GAC, if he was going to fight this battle on the 25th, did not have his own corroboration of anything. Location and numbers at the village? One village or a series of villages? One large village and satellite villages? Hostiles in the Upper LBH and intervening small valleys? River crossings and condition of each on the 25th?
3 of his 12 combat companies are sweeping the rear, the Upper LBH and intervening valleys, where there are no hostiles once the reconnaissance phase should be over and battle is commenced by the rest of the regiment. Indeed GAC goes off on his own reconnaissance mission whilst Reno is giving battle in the valley.
WO
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on May 29, 2015 9:37:35 GMT -6
It is a fundamental mistake that any one person can be considered all good or all bad. Demonstrated competence at one time does not mean demonstrated competence each time or every time.
I can easily call Custer a moron or an idiot, but that moronic or idiotic comment is event competence specific.
What a man did at Bull Run or Gettysburg has no bearing on what he did, on the Yellowstone, or at LBH. Each is a specific event, subject to specific analysis.
My personal belief is that he was not overly intelligent, and quite immature in his judgment. I think his personal life is an indicator of that, and I also think it carries over into his performance in battle. There is no on and off switch.
|
|