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Post by herosrest on May 8, 2015 0:18:39 GMT -6
Ducemus HR you are sadly mistaken that I have ever claimed to be an expert on LBH. I have stated many times here and elsewhere that I am not, and I am sure there are plenty here that will verify that I have said it numerous times. I consider Fred and Steve to be the only experts on this battle that I know, and even they have different areas of interest and emphasis. Fred has been kind enough to solicit my opinion on a few occasions, or perhaps better said use me as a sounding board, and these conversations have not been public, rather conducted over the telephone and a few times by e-mail. I do consider myself an expert though in a couple of areas, none of which are related directly with LBH, but are similar in some respects. I claim no more than a working knowledge of LBH. Now to directly address your direct challenge to me. I do not know the exact location of the timber, and neither does anyone else in that the timber no longer exists, so determination of the exact expanse is impossible. I do know the approximate location. I also have read period descriptions of it enough to lead me to believe that the timber location itself is irrelevant. I have also stated that the timber could be defended given certain prerequisites. As a mater of fact I think I last so stated such on this very thread if you should care to look. Location is irrelevant. Size is relevant, and the size of the force doing any defending is relevant, and their resources at hand is relevant. These last three size of area, force size, and resources make any successful defense impossible during that battle. Based upon the reported period size of the timber area and given that a river protects flank and or rear to a limited extent, it would require at least 400 and perhaps as many as 600 men to successfully defend the timber, and the resources required would be on the order of three or four units of fire, and a replenishment of food within 72 hours. Positions do not defend themselves, and successful defenses require not only terrain, but certain sufficiency of requirements that were not present with Reno on the afternoon of 25 June 1876 in the valley. Now if you are so foolish as to draw me into a discussion on Guadalcanal, The Naktong River Bulge, Chosin, The Imjin River Battles, Chinaman's Hat, or Chipyong Ni. I will gladly ram my expertise up your rosy red ass. DucemusI'll do some research, consideration and get on it. It will take a while to context each campaign but i'm up on the 1940's stuff, have looked at Chosin and the early Korean fighting. Let's rumble, if you're sure you want to go back there.
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2015 0:29:30 GMT -6
Do you want to start with TF Smith at Osan, and go as far as Pork Chop Hill and the final truce talks or would you rather limit it to the war of maneuver which is by far the most interesting portion from mid 50 to mid 51. Any time you are ready.
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Post by herosrest on May 8, 2015 2:19:19 GMT -6
Ducemus let's go with the maneuver. I'm visiting my wife and related meetings but will pick up later.
Interesting in broader terms with Central European tensions today.
regards
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2015 9:05:24 GMT -6
That is fine with me and I think it far more interesting. From mid 1951 on, with a couple of not really notable exceptions, the Korean War was very much a replay of the trenches on the Western Front in WWI, dull as dishwater, unless of course you were getting shot at.
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2015 10:25:51 GMT -6
On that other matter concerning battle groups, what we term as a task force (I actually like battle group as a more expressive term) you may wish to inquire of Colt and Montrose. Colt as an Armor officer used them throughout his career with the 2nd Armored Division, so he can fill you in on the advantages and pitfalls of cross attachment. I am not sure of Montrose's experience or at what level he had it, before he transitioned into Special Operations. Both of their opinions would be of more value than mine in that they have both done it while I have only seen it done. About the only thing I have experienced myself is the attachment of a platoon of tanks or engineers on occasion, and at the time I was not at any level to form any informed opinion from my experience alone.
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Post by Colt45 on May 8, 2015 10:33:55 GMT -6
My money is on you, Chuck. I think in a one-on-one with HR you will mop the floor with him when it comes to military expertise. It's no contest.
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2015 11:06:37 GMT -6
I can also mop the floor in my kitchen, but the point, for me is to discuss Korea, and folks who wish to do that are few and far between.
I do hope he does his homework. I expect it, and the most important part is the war before the war 46-49/50, because all understanding stems from that and there is little in the way of readily available material on that era.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 8, 2015 12:57:02 GMT -6
I do hope he does his homework. I expect it, and the most important part is the war before the war 46-49/50 What when the placed was carved up by the Soviet 25th army coming down from the north and the US XXIV with 72.000 men landing in the south? Apparently MacArthur gave the job of commanding this operation to Lt. Gen John R. Hodge, who by all accounts was an impatient and tactless individual with an aggressive streak. Ian.
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Post by dave on May 8, 2015 13:37:56 GMT -6
QC I have often thought that the North Korean's initial attack from June to September 1950, was almost like an arm wrestling contest where the opponent is almost pinned right at the start. The North almost squeezed the last of the Americans and ROK forces out of Pusan. We can discuss the effect of Task Force Smith. It took till September for MacArthur and Truman to get enough personnel and materials to break out of the Pusan perimeter. The US Marine's Inchon invasion began the rout of the North Korean forces and invasion of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I have never understood how the term Police Action, not war, could be used to describe a 3 year conflict that claimed 54,246---later changed to 33,686 in 2000--- American lives. Political Correctness has been with us for too long. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on May 8, 2015 13:58:59 GMT -6
I think that you have to take the term "Police Action" in context with the times and political atmosphere. I am sure I don't need to remind you that the Korean War pretty much parallels McCarthyism and the earliest parts of the Cold War but is less than a decade from WWII. No one is going to be wanting to use the term War so close to WWII even though know we do refer to it as the Korean War.
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2015 14:50:09 GMT -6
I don't believe Hodge was the problem. That dubious honor led through Tokyo and all the way back to DC. Hodge was the face of the problem though. 24th Corps was a bull in a China shop, a force totally unprepared for an occupation role. A force like the U S Constabulary in Germany and Austria would have been a much better choice, salted with Korean speakers. The problem with personnel turnover was at epidemic levels. Korea and the situation there was nothing like Japan. Japan in 1945 was bad. Korea was a basket case, trading an enslavement for an occupation, and the occupation force having no clear cut objectives, or the means to implement them if they were present. It started a process of sorting out as 45 turned into 46 then 47 and so forth, but was still in bad shape in 49 when the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions were withdrawn, and KMAG assumed the responsibility of training up South Korean security forces.
Police Action is something I never gave much thought to. It was a political term, which had a lot of detractors including the U S Marine Corps. I think we will find it was an outgrowth of the United Nations though. After all their charter was to stop war and maintain peace. They could not be seen (at least in their eyes) as marshalling a huge military force from the Free World to wage a war, thus they softened the name, that made it seem the intent was to clear up a bar fight in Lampasas, Texas.
Dave: The Immun Gun like the Texian Army only had one good fight in it. By the time they reached the Naktong River Line, which was the outward perimeter line of Pusan, they had been hurt, and Walker had them by the balls. May not seem like it when you read the accounts, and there was a lot of fighting yet to be done, but Walker let them destroy themselves trying to get across that river, much like Wellington did with Napoleon at Waterloo, and like Waterloo close run. The NKPA was too far away from their own briar patch up north to generate the combat power necessary to get beyond that river.
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Post by montrose on May 8, 2015 15:20:56 GMT -6
I don't believe Hodge was the problem. That dubious honor led through Tokyo and all the way back to DC. Wow, You blame Dark Cloud for everything.
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2015 16:03:49 GMT -6
Now that is one thing DC and I agree on (the Tokyo flash) MacArthur. I know it spoils my record, but consider it me winning life's lottery.
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Post by dave on May 8, 2015 21:08:52 GMT -6
QC MacArthur, The Real Emperor of Japan, was an American original. From having his mother near by West Point while he was a cadet. To his rise to Generalissimo to Supreme Commander. I have not been able to determine anything that he did prior to WW 2 to be outstanding. I realize his ego was bigger than Texas, and that he "Returned" but did not do anything outstanding during the war. I don't believe he rose up to Nimitz's statue but that could be my ignorance. I never agreed with his actions of not bringing the most of Japanese War Criminals to trial and allowing them to be absorbed in the post war administration. His Inchon invasion was his high water mark to me. HST put him in his place finally. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2015 22:52:19 GMT -6
He was a damned good brigade commander in the 42nd "Rainbow" Division in WWI.
As Chief of Staff he turned on vets during the Bonus March in DC. Patton and Eisenhower were both there as well, but in fairly minor roles. He did set the stage for mechanization of the Army during his tenure as C of S.
His performance during the first days of the war was worse than either Kimmel or Short and he should have been relieved for cause. He was well past his sell by date.
Five hundred years from now the only thing he will have in the plus column is his administration of Japan.
He would have been gone by mid 43 were it not for the performance of Kruger and Eikelberger (sp) 6th and 8th Army commanders respectively, and took all the credit for everything they did.
In Korea he hated the ground Walker walked on, and tried to undercut him at every turn. He really screwed Walker with the separate command relationships of 8th Army and X Corps (which was commanded by Almond who at the same time was MacArthur's Chief of Staff).
He was also a moral coward who kept his mistress in a love nest in Dupont Circle DC, and scared to death his mommy would find out. She was from the Philippines, and mommy would have cut his nuts off had she known. Keep in mind Mac was C of S of the Army at the time and afraid of his mommy.
Inchon was an off the shelf FECOM Op Plan called Blue Hearts developed in 1946 or 47.
When you disobey the direct order of the President of the United States not once but twice you deserve to be relieved. MacArthur was in tight with the Speaker of the House Joe Martin, and that saved his butt the first time.
There was no one west of San Francisco that was the equal of Chester Nimitz, and few maybe two his equal anywhere else.
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