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Post by welshofficer on May 24, 2015 11:53:41 GMT -6
This is a balanced assessment of events on Reno Hill... Herosrest, Nothing you have ever put up here has been "a balanced assessment." Not on Reno Hill, not in the valley, not anywhere. But thank you for trying. Best wishes, Fred. Fred.
He is "very trying"....not sure if the English English meaning of what I wrote translates into American English....?
WO
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Post by chris on May 24, 2015 12:03:58 GMT -6
Herosrest, Nothing you have ever put up here has been "a balanced assessment." Not on Reno Hill, not in the valley, not anywhere. But thank you for trying. Best wishes, Fred. Fred.
He is "very trying"....not sure if the English English meaning of what I wrote translates into American English....?
WO
Not answering for Fred but "trying patience" comes to mind. Best, c.
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Post by fred on May 25, 2015 6:06:15 GMT -6
He is "very trying"....not sure if the English English meaning of what I wrote translates into American English....? It translates perfectly. Besides, it is you fellows who call the shots with "English." We just follow along for the ride. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on May 25, 2015 6:28:32 GMT -6
Obviously we could point to any number critical periods. To me one of the most critical was the last officers call, the time was wasted, as no plan, conceptual or otherwise was put forth and discussed.
Regards, Tom
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Post by montrose on May 25, 2015 6:42:26 GMT -6
My critical period starts when LTC Custer orders MAJ Reno to start a regimental attack, and ends when LTC Custer ordered the 5 companies of the main body to move right.
The information available did not support the decision. From a decision analysis view, this period is critical to understanding the defeat.
And thanks to Welsh Officer to helping identify this as a critical flaw.
I think my first post here was on the 20 minute wait on Cemetery Ridge. That was a critical error for the Battle Ridge sector.
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Post by montrose on May 25, 2015 6:57:34 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss the delay of the Custer Bn on cemetery ridge.
2. Background. After returning from Ford D, Custer paused on cemetery ridge. E Company was deployed in a skirmish line towards the flats, while F Company and HHC were in reserve. After an estimated 20 minutes force moved towards LSH. That is my simple summary to start a discussion, I am aware of the many opinions on this topic.
3. Opinion. This pause is my biggest area of not understanding the battle. Upon returning from Ford D the practical imperative was to rejoin Keogh, and there does not appear to be any significant force between Custer and Keough, and by this I mean on the ridgeline itself.
a. Command location. The proper place for the regimental commander was with Keogh. He would have command and control of 5 companies, and be in a position to determine how to link up with the rest of the regiment.
b. Situational awareness. He had obviously learned something from the Ford D patrol, (I am deliberately not saying whether this was a recon patrol, or a failed attack). Keogh also was facing a different situation than when Custer left, as evidenced by gunfire and the Indians he could see from his location.
c. Unification. Tactical situation dictated that he should have moved to Keogh, or order Keogh to move to him. Since the rest of the regiment was beyond Keogh, he should have gone there.
4. Hypothesis One. Consolidation on Cemetery Ridge. Custer intended Benteen, Keogh, and the pack train to consolidate at his location. This seems a bit of a stretch, since how would he get this order to all the subunits involved? And there was unmistakable evidence of a fight on the other end of a ridge, any commander worth his salt would want to know what was going on.
5. Hypothesis Two. Enemy activity. Enemy attacks pinned his force in place. This concept is pretty weak, since he had an estimated 20 minutes with most of his force inactive, and only E Company in skirmish order. After E Company loses its horses, this becomes a done deal, but it appears on the initial return to Cemetery Ridge, there was an opportunity for action.
6. Hypothesis Three. Casualties. Custer likely had wounded from the Ford D action or from the suicide boys attack on E Company horse holders. There are a few bodies on Cemetery Ridge-3-6. The pause may have been to treat casualties, prepare to move wounded men by stretcher/blanket, and adjust for dismounted men, etc. In my opinion, this is what happened. A possible counterargument is the lack of bodies here. If there were casualties so badly wounded they had to stop, someone could have died. No way to tell. This leads the door to H3A, that they were carrying a stretcher patient, which is why the next move was only to LSH. There is no evidence for this, just speculation.
7. Hypothesis Four. Custer was wounded. Given the close attachment he had with Cooke, Yates, and his family; this could have produced a delay. Given the wounds on Custer's body, this appears unlikely, he would not have lived long. And if he were dead, toss his body on a horse and keep moving.
8. Discussion. Custer was an aggressive officer, with an excellent tactical eye for the area around him. I am not really happy with any of the options presented above. They don't feel right.
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Post by welshofficer on May 25, 2015 8:33:30 GMT -6
He is "very trying"....not sure if the English English meaning of what I wrote translates into American English....? It translates perfectly. Besides, it is you fellows who call the shots with "English." We just follow along for the ride. Best wishes, Fred. Fred,
Glad the main point made was understood.
Two states divided by a common language.....
WO
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Post by welshofficer on May 25, 2015 8:45:04 GMT -6
And if he were dead, toss his body on a horse and keep moving. Montrose,
That's how the military deal with a dead CO. None of the fancy nonsense proposed by some....
I have consistently gone with hypothesis one. A false sense of security in GAC's mind. It's consistent with the frittering away of his combat power over the previous few hours. From that you will deduce that I believe that the movement to Ford D was a recce. Not sure that consolidation was Benteen/McDougall dependent, if desired.
GAC thought he was the hound. Keogh overstaying his welcome at the southern end of battle ridge turned them both into foxes....
WO
P.s. finally ordered Fred's book, as I should have some time to read it and get up to speed in several weeks time.
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Post by quincannon on May 25, 2015 8:49:39 GMT -6
MEMORIAL DAY 2015
THIS WE'LL DEFEND - ALWAYS FAITHFUL - ALWAYS READY - HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT - AIM HIGH
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Post by welshofficer on May 25, 2015 9:02:26 GMT -6
My critical period starts when LTC Custer orders MAJ Reno to start a regimental attack, and ends when LTC Custer ordered the 5 companies of the main body to move right. The information available did not support the decision. From a decision analysis view, this period is critical to understanding the defeat. And thanks to Welsh Officer to helping identify this as a critical flaw. I think my first post here was on the 20 minute wait on Cemetery Ridge. That was a critical error for the Battle Ridge sector. Montrose,
For me, the 24th has always been critical when factoring in GAC's history and analysing his actions on the 25th. In particular:
(1) He didn't throw out his guides/scouts far enough ahead as he proceeded up the Rosebud. The main body was too close, with the almost inevitable discovery fear early on the 25th triggered the debacle. I would want one set of guides/scouts far ahead, hunting the village. Another set some distance ahead, protecting a screening advance guard from discovery by a hunting party.
(2) The night march was ill thought out. If he had to fight on the 25th, and his actions on the 24th were significantly increasing the risk, he was degrading his combat efficiency to an unnecessary extent.
WO
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Post by Beth on May 25, 2015 9:17:01 GMT -6
20 minutes seems like both a small yet long pause considering the situation. A minute frittered here, a minute there... waiting for people to catch up, overspent men and horses... 20 minutes could easily be spent with nothing accomplished.
What would/should Custer have seen and heard from his position?
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Post by quincannon on May 25, 2015 9:47:33 GMT -6
I agree with WO. Critical actions not taken on the 24th contributed greatly to the happenings on the 25th, and the night march was, putting it mildly ill advised. That in no way changes the criticality of the decision to move onto the bluffs after committing Reno. There was no earthly rational reason for doing so, and the probable sighting of a small band of Indians up that way, is no excuse for the movement, not even a good reason. The Indians were in the valley. The village was in the valley. The place to fight was in the valley. The potential of having the river and bluffs cover a regimental right flank was a gift of nature not taken advantage of.
IF Custer paused for upward of 20 minutes it was not to smell the posies. The fact that he threw out E in skirmish order means he was disputing this ground. We should, I think, focus on why he was so disputing. Normally disputing ground means that ground has some present or future value to at least one side. If no value is present, and it would not have any value if Custer intended to rejoin Keogh, then why do it?
Normally the rule is do not fight, or potentially have to fight, for the same ground twice. If whatever Custer was about up there turned out to be a dry hole, then why stay? If whatever he was about showed some future potential then that would be a sufficient reason to stay, but in staying immediately call Keogh forward. There is no indication of any calling forward.
If it was a dry hole, Custer should have immediately come back to Keogh.
My only conclusion is that he saw something of potential, but was overcome by events, not because of a pause, pause, but because he was confronted so quickly he tried to dispute the issue and failed.
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Post by Beth on May 25, 2015 10:10:31 GMT -6
I agree with WO. Critical actions not taken on the 24th contributed greatly to the happenings on the 25th, and the night march was, putting it mildly ill advised. That in no way changes the criticality of the decision to move onto the bluffs after committing Reno. There was no earthly rational reason for doing so, and the probable sighting of a small band of Indians up that way, is no excuse for the movement, not even a good reason. The Indians were in the valley. The village was in the valley. The place to fight was in the valley. The potential of having the river and bluffs cover a regimental right flank was a gift of nature not taken advantage of. IF Custer paused for upward of 20 minutes it was not to smell the posies. The fact that he threw out E in skirmish order means he was disputing this ground. We should, I think, focus on why he was so disputing. Normally disputing ground means that ground has some present or future value to at least one side. If no value is present, and it would not have any value if Custer intended to rejoin Keogh, then why do it? Normally the rule is do not fight, or potentially have to fight, for the same ground twice. If whatever Custer was about up there turned out to be a dry hole, then why stay? If whatever he was about showed some future potential then that would be a sufficient reason to stay, but in staying immediately call Keogh forward. There is no indication of any calling forward. If it was a dry hole, Custer should have immediately come back to Keogh. My only conclusion is that he saw something of potential, but was overcome by events, not because of a pause, pause, but because he was confronted so quickly he tried to dispute the issue and failed. I have not hear the small band of Indians reason before and frankly to my non military mind it makes even less sense to go up the bluffs just to check them out. Send a bunch of scouts, maybe a small detachment to see what the situation was, secure Ford A and support Reno. Whatever he saw that drew him up the bluffs it didn't cause enough concern to recall Benteen. Or have I managed to confuse myself again. Could Custer have sent someone to call Keogh forward and either they were repulsed or swallowed up? Beth
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Post by quincannon on May 25, 2015 10:27:59 GMT -6
1)Given the nature of the terrain, and the unlikely possibility of any significant body of Indians on the bluff/high ground area, as opposed to being near water, shade, and with more than adequate room to graze the livestock in the valley, why not just ignore any presence in small numbers up there?
Failing to secure key terrain (Ford A) when and if you have the opportunity is a big time no, no. Secure does not necessarily mean sit on it. It may simply mean placing you between it and them.
2) He could have. We don't really know, but there is no indication. So instead of saying he did or did not, no indication will have to do. He could have very well, and whomever he sent got up on that ridge, have seen the mess Keogh was then in and said - Maybe this was not such a good idea after all. Really does not matter for at that juncture both forces were extra crispy.
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Post by welshofficer on May 25, 2015 10:38:13 GMT -6
QC,
My instinct is that GAC simply got overtaken by events. He took the Yates battalion to Ford D, on a recce. He backtracked as far as the cemetery area, but no further because he had decided Ford D was his crossing point once he had concentrated force (certainly Keogh, possibly Benteen/McDougall) and the Yates battalion had travelled the furthest post-tiring night march. No need to take them all the way back to Calhoun Hill. if he thought Keogh had his sector under control (even if there was the sound of increasing gunfire). GAC didn't grasp the risk to Keogh, and Keogh collapsed quickly. The evidence? GAC got fixed on LSH, and nothing considered led to him being up there. That was a reactive move.
WO
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