shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Apr 10, 2015 8:51:27 GMT -6
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Post by callmeconrad on Apr 10, 2015 10:15:14 GMT -6
Custer was a protege of Phil Sheridan. That carried a lot of weight back then. I'm reminded of the fact that the table on which Lee signed the surrender of the ANV was given as gift to GAC and Libbie by Sheridan. Or was it Grant's table? Anyway, he got a table from the surrender. No one asked the house's owner Wilbut McClean if he was okay with it.Indeed. Three slightly different accounts of the aftermath via the National Park Service: www.nps.gov/apco/learn/education/upload/Surrender%203a.pdfCheers, conrad
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Post by Beth on Apr 10, 2015 12:08:14 GMT -6
Custer was a protege of Phil Sheridan. That carried a lot of weight back then. I'm reminded of the fact that the table on which Lee signed the surrender of the ANV was given as gift to GAC and Libbie by Sheridan. Or was it Grant's table? Anyway, he got a table from the surrender. No one asked the house's owner Wilbut McClean if he was okay with it.Indeed. Three slightly different accounts of the aftermath via the National Park Service: www.nps.gov/apco/learn/education/upload/Surrender%203a.pdfCheers, conrad I find the last version with a quote by Libby to be interesting. The woman really lived in a bubble of her own making. Beth
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Post by dave on Apr 10, 2015 18:29:53 GMT -6
I have a few questions despite reading all 70 pages of the Why Does Keogh Get a Free Ride? Thread. If they are foolish please let me know as I want to learn more about the LBH.
1) What strategical and or tactical goal could GAC possible gain by detaching Keogh's battalion instead of smaller size units?
2) Did Custer or Keogh position the companies?
3) Did the quality of the company execs have any bearing on the outcome?
4) If Keogh knew he was too badly stretched to cover the sector, why wouldn't GAC?
5) Was GAC using the swag method as he went North?
I have reread Fred's book and especially the Gap. QC has said this was one of the most significant finds in the study of the LBH. I have tried to grasp the point of the QC's observation but have not quite gotten it.
All help would be appreciated.
Regards
Dave
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 10, 2015 19:01:55 GMT -6
I have a few questions despite reading all 70 pages of the Why Does Keogh Get a Free Ride? Thread. If they are foolish please let me know as I want to learn more about the LBH. 1) What strategical and or tactical goal could GAC possible gain by detaching Keogh's battalion instead of smaller size units? He could gain none, unless he saw how quickly the NA's were back filling areas as he left or passed them and he knew one company could not hold the ground he was leaving. I truly think he was trying to draw to fill an inside straight, from MTC north.
2) Did Custer or Keogh position the companies? Keogh in all probability made final dispositions, and was probably wounded rather quickly while running from place to place to sure things up.
3) Did the quality of the company execs have any bearing on the outcome? Gut says no.4) If Keogh knew he was too badly stretched to cover the sector, why wouldn't GAC? Again Custer was gambling after MTC, his mind was already riding north.
5) Was GAC using the swag method as he went North? You are probably using guess for the "g" I am using gamble. His last final should have been at Hudson High.
I have reread Fred's book and especially the Gap. QC has said this was one of the most significant finds in the study of the LBH. I have tried to grasp the point of the QC's observation but have not quite gotten it. All help would be appreciated. Regards Dave There are better equipped than I to give answers, and I am sure they will. No one lived to tell the true tale. I can only give opinion. I don't think anyone with Custer questioned direction given, both Yates and Keogh should have known better than to go along with everything, we assume was ordered. What I give above is not inline with what many others think. Montrose is probably off seeing the sights somewhere, when he rejoins us ask him outright and directly the above.
Regards, Tom
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rebcav
Junior Member
Posts: 56
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Post by rebcav on Apr 11, 2015 8:03:52 GMT -6
Hey All: Like I've said, I know jack about this phase of the Battle of Little Big Horn other than the outcome. But here's what I don't get. And kind of roll with me on this one, because it takes a minute. And away we go- I'm currently reading a biography of Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest(CSA); you know, of "get there first with the most men" and other fame.....And I'm wondering.....As Lt. Col. Custer is riding north looking for a good place to cross and hit the village from the flank, WHY would he not want maximum available force in that attack? WHY would he be cruising along, dropping Capt. Keough off here, cruising around there, etc. WHY not just take all of your available force and HIT them? I mean IF that was the original plan, WHY drop off a chunk of your "strike force"? Was he reacting to a developing situation? Was he leaving Capt. Keough behind to serve like as a "guide" or "intermediate reference point" for Capt. Benteen when he showed up? I just don't get it....
Aloha, Duane
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 11, 2015 8:24:43 GMT -6
Duane: I was saying the same myself last week, was Keogh the pivot for re-enforcements or was he a fall back position for Custer, if he was waiting for re-enforcements to reach battle ridge then he had a lot of faith in Benteen and MacDougal to get that pack train safely and in one piece over the bluffs and down them coulees.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 11, 2015 9:30:54 GMT -6
1) Keogh was there to provide deep cover for a recon. That's all he was doing. ----- It was all tactics Dave. Grant and Sherman were in D.C.
2) Don't know and neither does anyone else. Normally the overall commander would give some direction while leaving the placement of companies to the battalion commander. With Custer though it is a crap shoot. I would not take bets either way.
3) Not sure what you mean here Dave. All of those officers present seem to be bottom scrapings, with maybe one or two exceptions.
4) Who knows. Unless we know the exact content of the direction Custer gave Keogh, we are floundering about. We, looking at it from a distance know it is bad, but none of these guys were the sharpest knife in the drawer.
5) I would say Custer was in the KHAG mode when he went north.
THE GAP: Before Fred's discovery we did not have a clue why Keogh was so far out of position. With the revelation that a gap was there, we can surmise that he was there not as some deep out of position reserve, but to cover that gap. It was a mistake, fore in attempting to cover it he was spread much to thin for the capability of the forces at hand. Its significance lies in the added insight it provides. Does not change the fact that Keogh fiddled with Fido.
PLEASE: Let us not lose sight of the fact that Custer did the same thing here on battle ridge that he did moments before on the L-N-C complex. He sent two companies to recon Ford D, leaving three back, just the same way he sent those same two companies to Ford B. Same thing different terrain, and by the book. Three elements LOOK (Company E) CLOSE COVER (Company F), DEEP COVER Companies C-I-L)
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Post by dave on Apr 11, 2015 10:18:20 GMT -6
QC Thank you for the answers, especially the Gap one. I was asking if the quality of the lieutenants had any effect on the outcome or was it immaterial. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Apr 11, 2015 10:33:27 GMT -6
When your more senior officers set the stage for those lieutenants Dave, all they can do is die well, and a few of them probably did just that.
Another thing that comes to mind regarding Keogh's position. Ideally for a deep cover mission the Keogh battalion should have been positioned on LSH or thereabouts. Had it been so there is a fair chance Custer could have broken contact with Keogh's help, thus fulfilling the purpose of the deep cover element. The fact that they were not there, but further back on the southern portion of the ridge speaks to a couple of things I believe.
1) Keogh had more of a mission than just deep cover, and the most likely reason is a connector for Benteen.
2) Custer was unaware of just where Ford D (or possibly C) was located and positioning them where he did was an underestimation of distance.
3) At the moment Custer left, there was no danger apparent from the Ford B area. Had there been all thought of Benteen coming should have circled the bottom of the toilet bowl.
The one thing these guys probably knew how to do more than anything else was recon and dispute a ford. Looking at the ACW in Virginia, a lot of what transpired revolved around river crossings and the covering of the fords in those rivers.
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Post by Beth on Apr 11, 2015 11:40:30 GMT -6
What is KHAG mode?
Does anyone think that if Custer had stayed at Battle Ridge with the main body of his troops and allowed a smaller group to do the scouting/recon to ford D, things would have ended differently? or was the die cast once he was discovered on the bluffs?
Beth
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Post by Beth on Apr 11, 2015 11:47:31 GMT -6
3) At the moment Custer left, there was no danger apparent from the Ford B area. Had there been all thought of Benteen coming should have circled the bottom of the toilet bowl. I am currently rereading Fred's book about this part of the battle and am unclear perhaps on a timing matter. Is the volley fired at the NA coming across Ford B and up a coulee before or after Custer had sent Keogh to Battle Ridge? Beth
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Apr 11, 2015 12:43:25 GMT -6
I think the indication was the Keogh was already in position or very close. But of course, please correct me if wrong.
Also, as long as we're grousing about Keogh drinking the cool-aide, what should he have done once assigned to battle ridge? He was following orders as best he understood them. But let's say we put that aside. Keogh realizes it's not a good position. The light goes off. What is his next series of moves?
He did obeys orders and....
1. Follows Custer. 2. Falls back to the east befores he's encircled. 3. Heads back the way they'd come towards a theoretical hookup with Benteen. 4. Other choices?
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Post by Colt45 on Apr 11, 2015 12:52:04 GMT -6
Keogh should have kept his battalion mobile by staying in the saddle most of the time. He also should not have spread out his troops so that they couldn't support each other. The terrain he was on was terrible for a fixed defense, so staying mobile would have been the better option. If he was trying to cover the gap, plus cover movement coming up from Deep Coulee, he should have realized he had far too few men to adequately cover those 2 areas plus anything coming toward Battle Ridge from Deep Ravine. Staying closer together, in support range, plus staying mobile would have allowed him to either retreat from the area, move to a closer position from which to cover Custer and E and F companies, or link up and get the heck out of the area entirely.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 11, 2015 12:54:12 GMT -6
Keogh’s battalion could have been confronted on three sides in a relative short time, L could be holding its own when C got into trouble and Keogh’s own company could be still in reserve when his rear was threatened, thus taking his men out of any support role and into the frey, if this did happen then all of Keogh’s companies could be engaged at the same time.
Bottom line is that he could have had orders to hold and hold he did, until he got hit from three or more directions.
Ian.
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