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Post by Beth on Apr 7, 2015 20:28:48 GMT -6
I was hoping that we could get past Reno Hill and Weir Point.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 8, 2015 3:30:29 GMT -6
Does anyone think that Custer was going to link back up with Keogh rather than Keogh upping sticks and going north to rendezvous with him?
The two main areas that Custer had to contend with were Ford B and Ford D, B was an active area that was probably in Indian control, D was unknown to him until after he left Keogh, so I reckon that Custer hadn't made up his mind as yet to what Keogh should do in relation to any attack, and he in turn was waiting for final orders off Custer.
Ian.
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Post by mac on Apr 8, 2015 4:39:32 GMT -6
If Custer was planning an attack through Ford B I do not see why he would cross MTC. So this suggests the attack would be further north hence Keogh joins him. Also, if the attack is to be at Ford B and you want Benteen along, crossing MTC just seems to make it harder. Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 8, 2015 4:51:48 GMT -6
But Mac just how will Keogh know when to pull out? he has deployed one company to fight on foot, he then sends another out on an operation to clear his flank, so by now two out of his three companies are engaged, so by now the prospect of simply pulling out would be very difficult indeed.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 8, 2015 5:20:22 GMT -6
The approach to MTC was obviously Cedar Coulee a slow grinding path to Ford B. Much actually happened here, Peter Thompson falls out, tired horse, he runs into NA's who have noticed Custer's approach. Gall was among the NA's who were watching. Goes Ahead and other Crow Scouts are released here. The first word of a second group of soldiers is probably conveyed to the village, prompting preparations to deal with this new threat.
Custer's repulse at MTC was probably due, as much to or more, to the warriors on the east side of the river as to those firing from the west side. This was the beginning of the build up that did in Keogh's three. It very well may have been the primary reason for leaving Keogh where he was left, to deal with this threat. It was probably underestimated. Keogh waiting for Benteen, can't be proved, it is an assumption!
Regards, Tom
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Apr 8, 2015 5:37:08 GMT -6
Does anyone think that Custer was going to link back up with Keogh rather than Keogh upping sticks and going north to rendezvous with him? The two main areas that Custer had to contend with were Ford B and Ford D, B was an active area that was probably in Indian control, D was unknown to him until after he left Keogh, so I reckon that Custer hadn't made up his mind as yet to what Keogh should do in relation to any attack, and he in turn was waiting for final orders off Custer. Ian. The key words are "Custer hadn't made up his mind". I think at this point GAC still believed he was in total control of the situation. He was repulsed at Ford B but probably didn't see the significance in this and the massive threat building. I don't believe he considered the possibility that the NAs would come out in force to meet him. He leaves Keogh in place to guard his rear while he continues north to scout a crossing. His intention was probably to call Keogh forward once he had secured a ford. This move north sealed the fate of the five companies. Over confidence, failure to see the threat developing, and placing too much distance between the companies were rookie mistakes that an officer of his experience should never have made. I don’t believe Keogh was waiting for Benteen and the pack train. Custer could not have realistically expected Benteen and the pack train to traverse the bluffs in a timely manner. Regards Mark
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Post by mac on Apr 8, 2015 6:08:21 GMT -6
To me there is little evidence of Custer being forced away from Ford B (repulsed). My understanding is that from the top of MTC Custer would be able to see the village at the bottom and hence would not attempt to cross. So he must have gone there to look, then decided to leave and move up to Calhoun. If he was repulsed and persued then surely he would not put MTC between himself and his other units. Even if he was wounded. So to me the move is volitional and with a view to moving further north. What is not expected is the aggression of the warriors and their preparedness to attack. That is what does in Keogh and Custer. As to Benteen.. yes Tom an assumption! But... based on the note asking him to "come on" suggesting he was to come on to Custer. Remember here though that the note contains no urgency, no "we need help", because when it was sent they did not need anything. I think it fair to assume that Custer did not expect an attack from the warriors, he expected Keogh to hold position and Benteen to make a fairly trouble free trip to join them, packs and all maybe. Although I expect he had confidence that Benteen would be more than capable of dealing with the security of the packs. Let me suggest that if the NA had packed up their village and started to scatter, then all this would have happened and Custer, Keogh and Benteen would have been in the north pretty much on schedule. The two problems were Reno being forced to climb the bluffs and the warriors attacking and not defending. As to the Keogh deployment Ian; what we see is the end point. I wonder what the starting point was when Custer left. Custer cannot see what is happening after he leaves, but Keogh can. I doubt that his men started where they finished. I wonder when they noticed Wagner's gap! I feel a lot probably happened in this part of the battle in a short time. Has anyone imagined what the initial deployment for Keogh might look like when Custer leaves, especially if he has not yet noticed the gap? Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 8, 2015 7:03:56 GMT -6
Mac, I have always wondered just how Keogh set up his battalion, I think it would be on these lines (please forgive my rudimentary art work). Ian.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 8, 2015 7:20:22 GMT -6
I have ridden down SRR to MTC and at the bottom you cross over Cedar Coulée so the end point is the same. I also rode down the next drainage toward the LBH starting in Cedar Coulée and following it to MTC. It ends not far from Cedar Coulee in MTC. The last was a route suggested by Donahue. The timing is all about the same. I don't like the SSR route since it is so far from the village.
Nearing the lower reaches of all three it obvious that there are drainages between them and the village and no reason to believe that the bluffs would not prevent movement of the five companies to cross the river. (We know that you can ride down to the river just below Weir. That could be where Peter Thompson observed someone (Custer according to PT). The crossing is great for Indians not under fire but riding down a slope on cavalry horses would seem to eliminate that approach to the river.
So Custer continues on toward MTC. The far side can be cleared by observation. You can observe a ridge apparently running right toward the village. There are right angle ridges that would allow for covered fire from company size skirmish lines if a retreat is necessary.
So you know that the drainage (MTC) will run to the river in a direction that you want to go. Its low and wide. Sounds like a cavalry crossing to me.
That ridge to move toward the village appeals to me instead of taken the bottom approach and after rejecting the Benteen type route crossing the drainages below Weir at right angles.
For sure the quickest way is right up the bottom. It's also feel like a place to get ambushed from either side.
If Custer knows of the route to the river near PT's location than he would know that the Indians could cross there and come up and be in one of those drainages as he nears the MTC-Ford B area.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by quincannon on Apr 8, 2015 9:14:08 GMT -6
Ian: To answer your question directly about Custer going back or Keogh coming forward. There is an unwritten tactical principle that you never fight or potentially fight for the same ground twice if it can be avoided.
Had Custer found what he was looking for at Ford D the proper thing to do then was bring Keogh forward. Only in the event(s) that he did not find anything, or found and was forced back by enemy action would there be any thought of Custer returning to Keogh's location.
It should also be noted that any attempt to prematurely seize and secure would be an exercise in insanity. You watch it but do not assault it until your assaulting force is fully assembled. Until the rest of your force is with you, you cannot be assured they will get to you. Seizing it before the entire force is assembled risks defeat in detail. Watching it takes the same risk, but in watching you are not tied to a piece of ground where seizing it you are.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 8, 2015 9:32:57 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, I reckon that nowhere on the Custer sector was safe, once they stopped and defended any portion of that field then they are going to eventually get surrounded and killed, it was best to keep moving and if they did stop then it should be similar to what may have occurred on LNC Ridge line, dismount fire a couple of times then mount up and move, never let them catch you in situ as what happened to Keogh, Custer and Reno will happen again, Benteen and his companies got back safe enough from Weir Point, so he knew that this area was bad ground to fight a mobile foe like the Indian.
Ian.
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Apr 8, 2015 9:41:37 GMT -6
Does anyone think that Custer was going to link back up with Keogh rather than Keogh upping sticks and going north to rendezvous with him? The two main areas that Custer had to contend with were Ford B and Ford D, B was an active area that was probably in Indian control, D was unknown to him until after he left Keogh, so I reckon that Custer hadn't made up his mind as yet to what Keogh should do in relation to any attack, and he in turn was waiting for final orders off Custer. Ian. The key words are "Custer hadn't made up his mind". I think at this point GAC still believed he was in total control of the situation. He was repulsed at Ford B but probably didn't see the significance in this and the massive threat building. I don't believe he considered the possibility that the NAs would come out in force to meet him. He leaves Keogh in place to guard his rear while he continues north to scout a crossing. His intention was probably to call Keogh forward once he had secured a ford. This move north sealed the fate of the five companies. Over confidence, failure to see the threat developing, and placing too much distance between the companies were rookie mistakes that an officer of his experience should never have made. I don’t believe Keogh was waiting for Benteen and the pack train. Custer could not have realistically expected Benteen and the pack train to traverse the bluffs in a timely manner. Regards Mark You know, I think Custer thought he was in control of the situation until close to the end.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 8, 2015 9:52:17 GMT -6
Shaw: There was a time I thought that too. No more. Everything he did from 3411 on was grasping at straws. You are not, you are never, in full control as a commander unless you know what you are going to do. What can you suggest that points unarguably to the fact that Custer knew what he was going to do, how he was going to do it, and where, and when. I see nothing that even comes close. He may have had some vague notion that the salvation to his situation lay further north, but that is not knowing what, where, and how.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 8, 2015 9:53:20 GMT -6
I think you are correct Shaw, but this false sense of security was brought about by three things;
1: the terrain deigned him a view of what was unfolding 2: he thought that Reno was holding them by the nose 3: he thought they would run
he should have kept mobile though, and not get caught fighting a pitched battle.
Ian.
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Post by dave on Apr 8, 2015 9:59:50 GMT -6
Ian Thank you for the map very informative and helpful. Regards Dave
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