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Post by quincannon on Apr 16, 2015 9:48:18 GMT -6
Mac: When you go into battle, you must have at least two battles in mind, the one presently at hand, and the next one. Part of what you are doing with the one you have in front of you, is to set the stage for the next one, and perhaps the one after that. Your present objective is to not only defeat those arrayed before you, but also start a shaping of the battle space for the next by making your enemy react to your will. Absent that you may win a tactical victory, but do no real good in winning the operational battle, the campaign.
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 16, 2015 10:44:50 GMT -6
Mac,
If GAC gets to the north of the village, and if he drives it south westwards (both two huge if's!), what position is Reno in to prevent a withdrawal to the south west up the upper LBH...? Only Benteen was moving towards the upper LBH, until he turned right down Noname.
WO
Exactly so WO and my guess is when Custer took his peek at ford B he saw lots of movement fleeing the village into sqaw creek and then west. In fact the one direction he didn't want them to go. Even with his limited information he should have know the east side of the river would produce that result. For a military man in his situation tactically would not the notion of forcing escape into your other forces be always the preferred action? Cheers Mac,
From start to finish, too much recon and "thinking" on the hoof.
WO
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Post by mac on Apr 16, 2015 16:12:58 GMT -6
The timing is interesting. Too much recon after the first contact none before. Operational vs tactical. Cheers
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Post by herosrest on Apr 16, 2015 18:59:55 GMT -6
I think it is a basic error to engage in mind reading, but let us assume for a moment that Horse is correct, and that Indians escaping was paramount in Custer's thoughts. What then can we say that he did to prevent that escape, when looking at the only thing we know for certain, his scheme of maneuver. Doing that, the only thing that can be determined is that the scheme of maneuver facilitated that escape rather than prevented it. Escape to the southwest was the only real route the Indians could take, and Custer left that door wide open. DucemusThe door was wide open because Terry would not arrive on the junction of Little and Big Horns, near a very good ford of the Big Horn, until...... it escapes me.... However, Custer knew where Terry roughly was, probably spotted the dust of his column in Tullock's Creek and understood that a fleeing village could escape across the Big Horn as happened in 1873. It was unfortunate that they did not have artillery (not Gatlings). The object of the excercise was to destroy the property of the hostiles who would have no option but then accept placement at a reservation. Seeing a quiet village from the bluffs, Custer thought he had caught them npping. We have been told this by people there with him on the day, on the bluffs and it does not matter what Reno thought, understood or didn't. He was not in command. The timing is interesting. Too much recon after the first contact none before. Operational vs tactical. Cheers DucemusThe Ree and Dakota scouts were ordered into advance, told to take the pony herd in the valley. If that was not a recon then nothing is. The Ree's got a bit worried over playing trip-wire for the soldiers and Reno was sent to do it, because further observation of the village reported to Custer that it was big. No-one other than Cheyennes, and not all of them, knew of the early attacks on Custer by Wolf Tooth band and reportedly some fifty young bucks - a war party equal in number to any one company. Ford B could not be negotiated by cavalry because of a cut bank on the opposite side and it was lightly defended by at least one repeating rifle. The cavalry reacted to Wolf Tooth and moved down river towards Real Bird ford, sent for Benteen and............ halted for about 20 minutes. Because an officer was shot. No one knew of the Wolf Tooth band until John Stands in Timber and Peter Powell. Likewise, only a handful of people were aware of Freeman's Journal until 100 years after.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 17, 2015 5:16:39 GMT -6
Do you seriously think that Custer could see the dust made by General Terry’s column? If so then did Terry ever mention that he saw dust and smoke made by this battle, and if he did then why didn’t he act upon it.
And again; would these pony herders actually report to Reno what they saw of the village? I would think that in their minds that this was the soldiers work and that they had done their job, and now it was time to reap some rewards and capture as many horses as possible.
And how do you know that they sent a second messenger to Benteen after they moved away from Ford B? Corporal Foley? Sergeant Butler? These two were not attached to the RHQ, ah you could mean Trumpeter Dose, now he was an orderly attached to the RHQ and if I remember correctly they found him full of arrows around MTC or Deep Ravine, but what makes you think they sent him, and why would he choose such a dangerous route.
Ian.
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Post by mac on Apr 17, 2015 5:17:43 GMT -6
Custer initiates contact knowing little more than that there are a large number of warriors in the valley ahead of him. This is his fault but there will be situations where this happens. That is one is forced to contact with little recon. Is the conventional response to keep it as simple as possible rather than try any fancy maneuvers? I understand this is a huge generalisation. Cheers
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Post by mac on Apr 17, 2015 5:19:38 GMT -6
I am with you Ian. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2015 9:01:41 GMT -6
Mac: You start with the premise that the most simple of things under combat conditions are hard. Successful plans are normally characterized by their simplicity.
In this situation all Custer had to do was cross the river at Ford A with his entire regiment, and proceed northward to achieve contact. Once contact was made fight the battle, using nothing more complicated than battle drills. His right was anchored on a river with bluffs immediately to the east. He had a sufficiency of combat power to preclude his left flank from being turned, once the regiment was deployed on line. At that point it is a matter of a test of wills.
There would be no catastrophic defeat that day, and the worst case was a draw while remaining on the field. But draw or win, it was still a win for Custer in that there would be no possible southwesterly movement, removing all but one option from the Indians.
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Post by mac on Apr 18, 2015 19:51:35 GMT -6
QC Would this prevent an escape west, behind a screen occupying Custer? However going east as he did absolutely flings this door wide open. Cheers
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Post by herosrest on Apr 18, 2015 20:41:07 GMT -6
DucemusThe advice from quincannon in regards command is and should be considered very disturbing. A CO and battlefield commander is entitled to expect his officers to follow orders, and Reno did not. Benteen was late enough, arguably due to Reno pre-empting, that he could not or would not follow orders . Benteen was sent to join Reno who should have been fighting in the valley and not panic'd out of the fight. There are people who feel that Reno did ok, can be excused, can be lauded for running. That is not so and here is why. Custer's plan was to reinforce Reno. That Benteen would go onto the bluffs towards Custer is an insanity. Those who push that idea are not concerned about the events of the battle but its aftermath in regards failures in duty. If what was done to Custer had happened to quincannon, he would be finishing those officers off with his bare hands - be certain QC would have survived. Benteen couldn't manage that and couldn't manage subsequently to support Custer. It was not unreasonable, knowing today that Custer was engaged east of the river and delayed by this, that he waited for Benteen to reach Reno. This is the straight forward issue of any military consideration of the cavalry's fight. The decisive military move, was shown by Patterson Hughes of all people in his map of 30th June. The trail up the bluffs from the retreat crossing can only be that taken by hostiles, pulling off Reno. This is corroborated by DeRudio at RCoI. One half the hostiles in the valley went up the bluffs after Custer. Accepting contemporay record, that is between 400 and 1,000 hostiles cutting Custer off from Reno Hill and.... no blocking force left to cope with an advance by Reno! That halted Custer's attempt to return to Reno and Benteen and drove his command away from their support and to destruction. People have dreamt up many ways to disguise this reality for 140 years. A modern historian www.youtube.com/watch?v=93ZDOcU2TL4Would you go to Custer's aid from Reno Hill? Would you go immediately?
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Post by Deleted on Apr 18, 2015 20:57:36 GMT -6
DucemusThe advice from quincannon in regards command is and should be considered very disturbing. A CO and battlefield commander is entitled to expect his officers to follow orders, and Reno did not. Benteen was late enough, arguably due to Reno pre-empting, that he could not or would not follow orders . Benteen was sent to join Reno who should have been fighting in the valley and not panic'd out of the fight. There are people who feel that Reno did ok, can be excused, can be lauded for running. That is not so and here is why. Custer's plan was to reinforce Reno. That Benteen would go onto the bluffs towards Custer is an insanity. Those who push that idea are not concerned about the events of the battle but its aftermath in regards failures in duty. If what was done to Custer had happened to quincannon, he would be finishing those officers off with his bare hands - be certain QC would have survived. Benteen couldn't manage that and couldn't manage subsequently to support Custer. It was not unreasonable, knowing today that Custer was engaged east of the river and delayed by this, that he waited for Benteen to reach Reno. This is the straight forward issue of any military consideration of the cavalry's fight. The decisive military move, was shown by Patterson Hughes of all people in his map of 30th June. View AttachmentThe trail up the bluffs from the retreat crossing can only be that taken by hostiles, pulling off Reno. This is corroborated by DeRudio at RCoI. One half the hostiles in the valley went up the bluffs after Custer. Accepting contemporay record, that is between 400 and 1,000 hostiles cutting Custer off from Reno Hill and.... no blocking force left to cope with an advance by Reno! That halted Custer's attempt to return to Reno and Benteen and drove his command away from their support and to destruction. People have dreamt up many ways to disguise this reality for 140 years. A modern historian www.youtube.com/watch?v=93ZDOcU2TL4Would you go to Custer's aid from Reno Hill? Would you go immediately? Spot on summary and analysis HR. It is amazing how many discount the fatal impact Reno disobeying his orders and his panicked retreat had on future events. Regards Mark
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Post by dave on Apr 18, 2015 21:41:58 GMT -6
DucemusThe advice from quincannon in regards command is and should be considered very disturbing. A CO and battlefield commander is entitled to expect his officers to follow orders, and Reno did not. Benteen was late enough, arguably due to Reno pre-empting, that he could not or would not follow orders . Benteen was sent to join Reno who should have been fighting in the valley and not panic'd out of the fight. There are people who feel that Reno did ok, can be excused, can be lauded for running. That is not so and here is why. Custer's plan was to reinforce Reno. That Benteen would go onto the bluffs towards Custer is an insanity. Those who push that idea are not concerned about the events of the battle but its aftermath in regards failures in duty. If what was done to Custer had happened to quincannon, he would be finishing those officers off with his bare hands - be certain QC would have survived. Benteen couldn't manage that and couldn't manage subsequently to support Custer. It was not unreasonable, knowing today that Custer was engaged east of the river and delayed by this, that he waited for Benteen to reach Reno. This is the straight forward issue of any military consideration of the cavalry's fight. The decisive military move, was shown by Patterson Hughes of all people in his map of 30th June. The trail up the bluffs from the retreat crossing can only be that taken by hostiles, pulling off Reno. This is corroborated by DeRudio at RCoI. One half the hostiles in the valley went up the bluffs after Custer. Accepting contemporay record, that is between 400 and 1,000 hostiles cutting Custer off from Reno Hill and.... no blocking force left to cope with an advance by Reno! That halted Custer's attempt to return to Reno and Benteen and drove his command away from their support and to destruction. People have dreamt up many ways to disguise this reality for 140 years. A modern historian www.youtube.com/watch?v=93ZDOcU2TL4Would you go to Custer's aid from Reno Hill? Would you go immediately? Spot on summary and analysis HR. It is amazing how many discount the fatal impact Reno disobeying his orders and his panicked retreat had on future events. Regards Mark Simply Amazing! One is incapable of rational thought and the other refuses to use common sense and reason. Any battle plan is out the window once contact with the enemy is established. Neither Custer nor this duo have any concept of what Reno faced and actions taken based on facts and circumstances. Decorated veterans have shared professional opinions based on years of training and experience to interpreate actions taken by the participants at the Little Big Horn. In spite of this outstanding information being avaialble, you two have decided that y'all have the inside track and know the truth. Using tired old canards as Reno should have continued his charge to the indian village waiting for the whole outfit to come support them. Since Custer broke the troops up I suppose a troop would come one at a time as they were dispersed by Custer. Beam me up Scotty! Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Apr 18, 2015 22:35:17 GMT -6
Simply Amazing! One is incapable of rational thought and the other refuses to use common sense and reason. Any battle plan is out the window once contact with the enemy is established. Neither Custer nor this duo have any concept of what Reno faced and actions taken based on facts and circumstances. Decorated veterans have shared professional opinions based on years of training and experience to interpreate actions taken by the participants at the Little Big Horn. In spite of this outstanding information being avaialble, you two have decided that y'all have the inside track and know the truth. Using tired old canards as Reno should have continued his charge to the indian village waiting for the whole outfit to come support them. Since Custer broke the troops up I suppose a troop would come one at a time as they were dispersed by Custer. Beam me up Scotty! Regards Dave You will notice exactly how much they are Custer fanboys that they are willing to justify sending Reno and all the men with him to certain deaths for just the extremly slim chance that it might have saved George's butt than admit that Custer 'fudged up.' Also in doing so showthey a total ignorance in the way the Cavalry was operating in 1876. If Reno had 'charged' the village the way Mark and HR envision, he and his battalion would have been dead in a matter of a few minutes, less than 200 bullets aren't going to last long against 100's or even 1000's of Indians, especially when the soldiers and their horses were not used to firing while riding. Even if they had the astonding high rate of hitting 100 Indians that leaves a lot of empty guns and a whole lot of angry villagers surrounding them, waiting to pull the soldiers off their horses and make them into minced meat. Instead, Reno proceeded to attack the village exactly as it was done at the time. He occupied the Indians' attentions with his skirmish line and fall back to the timbers for 45 minutes to an hour before he was forced to make a breakout to save as many of his men as he could. It isnot Reno's fault that Custer elected to waste that window of time by his sight seeing on the upper bank instead of sending his promised support. Custer had the opening move in the battle and he alone blew it. Custer wasted time and those lives by giving an order based on what he wanted to happen, then road off for unexplainable reason instead of providing timely support. Of course I guess Custer could always hope that he came down to the area at Ford B that the area was covered with enough carnage spewed around satisfy the 'savage bloodlust" that the NA would just surrender to him. Somehow I doubt it though.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 19, 2015 3:58:24 GMT -6
Yes Beth I agree, Custer sent Reno on a mission that he was ill equipped to do, he was really understrength for such an attack. I know that due to the lack of recon that Custer didn’t know just how big the place was, maybe if he did then he may have adopted a different strategy, but who knows.
But he gave the orders that day and not Reno, here are the three big decisions made by Custer;
Benteen + three companies off to the left and detached from the main assault. Reno sent down the valley with a mere three companies. Custer and five companies go right and place a line of bluffs and a river between him and Reno.
If you want to know how this battle was lost then you needn’t look any further, and these decisions were made by one man, GAC.
I would love to see either of those two (HR & SF) command A, G & M that afternoon and ride down that valley, err no forget that thought, they may be stupid enough to attempt to charge the village and get all of those men killed, there again they might crap there pants and run.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 19, 2015 7:37:34 GMT -6
Mac: I believe it would, and at least part of the horse herd would be vulnerable as well. For one thing a lateral movement across the back of your screen by a slow moving village(s) of that size would preclude any depth to the screen, and screens require depth to maneuver. They would move northward away from danger, not across the front of danger.
I think there is a fair chance that had the entire regiment assaulted the south end of those villages that the inevitable screen in the amount of combat power required would, or could not have assembled until about where Medicine Tail Coulee reaches the LBH, if then.
I do not know why any doubt at Reno assaulted the village. He did not reach the village but he did assault (charge) it first mounted, then continued dismounted until he was stopped by increasing resistance. Not all assaults reach their objective. The enemy has a vote to determine that.
I have been accused many times n the past of being far too conventional in my approach, and not having any appreciation of how 19th century cavalry operates (for the record they operate the same way in the 20th and 21st century with different mounts that they did in the 19th). I would remind those people that there is a reason it is called conventional. as it is the convention, the standard.
These two, have been reading all too many comic books.
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