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Post by mac on Apr 12, 2015 2:54:43 GMT -6
Interesting thread. I will try to be simple, and not use Benning School for Boys language. 1. To examine maneuver, let's start at a baseline. Are you in contact, or out of contact. This makes a profound difference. Generally, you start out of contact. The term used here is movement to contact. This term by itself has a whole literature on it. Basically, you have to balance risks in this phase. You want to balance speed and security. You want to have scouts out, flank security out but try to keep man body in a decent movement formation, meaning column. You try to avoid more tactically sound formations until contact is imminent, or even after contact. Once you make contact, all your conditions change. Now some elements are fighting, so you are now in a fire and maneuver phase. Movement here has to be part of a plan. LBH forums get confused here. Reno was in contact after crossing Ford A. We know Indians lost 6 plus dead, Deeds and Galls family. Movement has to serve a purpose, and we have great difficulty understand GAC's movement away from combat. Why did GAC not ride to the sounds of the guns? Why did he not support the valley fight? I do not know. This is my point on this thread untrained people do not know enough about how the military actually operate. I feel I know enough to know I don't know enough.I take this to mean that movement formatrions carry an inherent tactical risk. Makes sense, one of the few things I did learn in my huge military career .These movements then do not conform to the military way as accepted now and I expect as expected at any time in history.
Thanks montrose! Do not rest there are more questions. Cheers
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Post by mac on Apr 12, 2015 6:01:41 GMT -6
Following on the idea of security during movement. Let's say I am in a position where I am trying to link up with another force that I have lost contact with and need to first locate. Say in enemy occupied terriotory. In other words let's say I am Benteen. It would seem to me that if I just send a few scouts they may get picked off and I will learn nothing. If I send a recon in some force that may be better but when I get their report I need to be able to act quickly while the intelligence is "fresh" to delay risks the situation changing. So I only want recon when I am ready to act. Is this a reasonable analysis? Does it account for Benteen not wanting Weir heading off too soon? Is it the military way? Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 12, 2015 6:20:51 GMT -6
What confuses me is that Custer committed Reno to combat but he himself was not. What made him reject following Reno into the valley? A few Indians?
Seems to me that if he wanted to be effective in a short period of time he would not move north on the opposite side of the river. So why not delay Reno's river crossing until he moved into whatever position that allowed him to be ready for combat.
This looks to me like Custer started a plan (sooner rather than later of sending Reno across the river) and changed it in a short period of time after committing Reno. Seems to me when he committed Reno he should have been committed to following Reno and giving the promised support. Instead we see two plans but Custer had committed himself to the first plan. If he had waited to send Reno than Benteen and the pack train could have closed up.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 12, 2015 6:44:05 GMT -6
Steve, I think that Custer’s plan was so fluid that he amended in twice, his first plan was to send Reno through the valley and he takes to the bluffs, he then has a re-think at 3411 and amends it further after the ford b scenario, the problem is that these plans are based on Reno keeping active, Benteen getting involved and the Indians runner, but Reno was defeated, Benteen found himself incapable of deploying his battalion because of Reno’s predicament and the warriors had no intention of running, so all of Custer’s plans were thwarted because they hung on a shoe string.
Ian.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 12, 2015 6:48:47 GMT -6
Sorry to take the thread off topic, but Mac mentioned about linking up with a friendly force in enemy territory and this is a good example; linkIan.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 12, 2015 8:37:17 GMT -6
A military force moving to contact is in the shape of a diamond when viewed from above. The points of the diamond represent the security (point/advanced guard, flankers, rear guard) while the main body resides in the diamond's center.
Movement to link up with another force is just about like any other movement to contact, or deliberate attack. There are a few differences, but they are primarily in control of supporting fires. Best example I know of is Task Force Crombez moving to the relief of the 23rd RCT at Chipyong Ni.
I will look in after Church to see if there is any more on this.
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Post by mac on Apr 12, 2015 20:30:13 GMT -6
Custer's move to the lone tepee then can be seen as normal operational maneuver familiar to any military experience. At Ford A he seems to be setting up to send in an advanced guard. Again from an experienced military perspective what can we make of Custer sending in an advanced guard? Does it say anything about the disposition he expects to find in the valley? Put another way.. is this a tactical movement that an experienced officer would use for a particular enemy disposition? Must go. Cheers
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 13, 2015 3:08:21 GMT -6
Mac,
IMHO, for me things start to go wrong with the night march on 24/25 June.
It precipitates discovery, or fear of discovery, the next morning and a premature tactical attack on the 25th before any meaningful reconnaissance of the terrain and of the enemy.
Things spiral downwards with Benteen's left oblique and (critically) GAC's ascending of the eastern bluffs.
WO
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Post by mac on Apr 13, 2015 5:42:10 GMT -6
WO What do you see that is wrong with the left oblique? Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 13, 2015 6:24:40 GMT -6
Steve, I think that Custer’s plan was so fluid that he amended in twice, his first plan was to send Reno through the valley and he takes to the bluffs, he then has a re-think at 3411 and amends it further after the ford b scenario, the problem is that these plans are based on Reno keeping active, Benteen getting involved and the Indians runner, but Reno was defeated, Benteen found himself incapable of deploying his battalion because of Reno’s predicament and the warriors had no intention of running, so all of Custer’s plans were thwarted because they hung on a shoe string. Ian. Ian With the size of the village the only plan (A) that works for me is Custer following Reno. That he didn't have enough Intel on the size of the village is Custer's fault. When he moved to the bluffs that plan (B) should have been delaying Reno and gathering Benteen, pack train, and rear guard. Then sending Reno. It appears to me that he sent Reno on plan A and he operated on plan B. The expectation that Reno would do something for an extended period of time when he expected immediate support seems unrealistic to me. Regards Steve
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 14, 2015 7:41:02 GMT -6
WO What do you see that is wrong with the left oblique? Cheers Mac,
It's posthumously late reconnaissance and removes combat power that GAC cannot do without.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2015 8:52:57 GMT -6
Agreed.
We dwell on what did happen out there - essentially nothing. Now what would the situation be if Benteen runs into something out there ( and it would not necessarily have to be an outlying village, just something), and the Reno episode plays out just as it did?
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 14, 2015 11:19:44 GMT -6
Mac, IMHO, for me things start to go wrong with the night march on 24/25 June. It precipitates discovery, or fear of discovery, the next morning and a premature tactical attack on the 25th before any meaningful reconnaissance of the terrain and of the enemy. Things spiral downwards with Benteen's left oblique and (critically) GAC's ascending of the eastern bluffs. WO This is the major reason for Custer's "plans/actions/decisions" for the Battle of the LBH. The great fear the military had would be Indians running before the military could hit them. Indians running would result in "scatteration" and an almost impossible chance of tracking down Indians in any significant numbers. Indians escaping would be a humiliation and embarrassment to Custer, especially after Custer's dealings with Grant and Grant's brother. Everything Custer did was based on his command being discovered, not the size of the village, the number of Indians, the warnings from his scouts about what to expect. Everything was based on Indians escaping.
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 14, 2015 12:48:50 GMT -6
This is the major reason for Custer's "plans/actions/decisions" for the Battle of the LBH. The great fear the military had would be Indians running before the military could hit them. Indians running would result in "scatteration" and an almost impossible chance of tracking down Indians in any significant numbers. Indians escaping would be a humiliation and embarrassment to Custer, especially after Custer's dealings with Grant and Grant's brother. Everything Custer did was based on his command being discovered, not the size of the village, the number of Indians, the warnings from his scouts about what to expect. Everything was based on Indians escaping. CRZHRS, Maybe so, but it doesn't absolve him from getting whipped in a contested battle... WO
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2015 13:29:26 GMT -6
I think it is a basic error to engage in mind reading, but let us assume for a moment that Horse is correct, and that Indians escaping was paramount in Custer's thoughts. What then can we say that he did to prevent that escape, when looking at the only thing we know for certain, his scheme of maneuver. Doing that, the only thing that can be determined is that the scheme of maneuver facilitated that escape rather than prevented it. Escape to the southwest was the only real route the Indians could take, and Custer left that door wide open.
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