|
Post by mac on Apr 10, 2015 5:55:58 GMT -6
Thank you both! Despite my cute and romantic manner there is a cynic inside.
Strategy and tactics are I suspect the same now as in 1876 or even 1066 or 490 BCE the only thing that has changed is the technology that adjusts the speed of actions, the shock value of weapons and the ease of communications. Similarly command structures and in some cases customs are conserved so I think there is much to be gained by this kind of conversation.
My next question relates to giving support or aid by say, riding to the sound of the guns. There is the notion that soldiers always rush to the aid of a comrade but surely this must have some limits. I recall a post where someone suggested that Benteen should have ridden straight into the valley to the sounds of the guns as soon as he arrived. The reply from Fred (I think) was that if he arrived at a valley full of dust and smoke with gunfire heard he would not be going anywhere until he knew what was happening. First view amateur; second view professional(?). In the training of modern soldiers what is the code and its limits? Would this likely be the same in 1876? Cheers
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 10, 2015 6:08:10 GMT -6
Mac I am sorry to hear about the death of Ritchie Benaud, he was the most impartial commentator I have ever heard, a fair man and a real gent, and let’s not forget a great Cricketer (bowler) too, as well as a good test Captain.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by mac on Apr 10, 2015 6:13:56 GMT -6
Yes Ian a very sad day. He is a legend here as both player (first man to take 200 test wickets and make 2000 test runs) and as you say a marvellous (in Richie's accent) commentator. Cheers
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 10, 2015 6:17:56 GMT -6
I remember someone saying that once you engage with your enemy you should hold him by the nose and kick him in the ass, which I suppose means keep his front occupied and out flank him, but seriously to attack without a plan leaves you with nothing if the worst happens, just rushing in blindly can get you chopped up, it may look good on the cinema screen, but then and even today troops should not just enter a combat zone without finding out what lies ahead and formulate a plan or strategy.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Apr 10, 2015 8:23:06 GMT -6
Yes Ian a very sad day. He is a legend here as both player (first man to take 200 test wickets and make 2000 test runs) and as you say a marvellous (in Richie's accent) commentator. Cheers Mac . I am sorry for your loss. Not being familiar with cricket is the 200 test wickets and 2k test runs good? Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 10, 2015 8:29:24 GMT -6
Dave it is excellent, to bowl out 200 opponents at test level is a great feat, and to knock 2000 runs is also amazing as at test level you are facing the cream of another country, so to make it into a test team at either cricket or rugby you have to be a top player.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Apr 10, 2015 9:45:56 GMT -6
Mac: Fred was correct, the amateur wrong. Access the situation before taking action.
Did anyone think to ask if riding to the sound of the guns is exactly what your enemy wants you to do?
It is a very nice catch phrase, meaning be aggressive in both thought and action(s), but its misuse exceeds its value.
Tactics have not changed. You find the same tactics used in the wars of ancient times, as you see today. What has changed is our ability to harness basic tactics, by virtue of technology, primarily advances in weaponry, mobility, and communication, along with more advanced schooling the study of what has gone before and its application to the modern battlefield. There have been periods of great technological leaps which seem to make the prior use of tactics irrelevant, but a closer study reveals that we are still doing things the same way as Caesar did only on a larger, more violent and precision oriented canvas.
You mentioned Sunny a few days ago. Reading Sunny tells us that strategic thought preceded his time, and he codified those thoughts. The operational area began to be inserted between strategy and tactics early last century by the Germans. It was placed there as both buffer and bridge between the two. The only thing we must be able to do is realize when strategy stops, operations start and stop, and where tactics begin. Montrose gave three one liners on this a few weeks ago and I can't find them to reproduce here, so I will give my version which I think will mirror his quite nicely.
STRATEGY -- The formulation of policy at a national level.
OPERATIONS -- Those actions undertaken to implement national strategy from theater through corps down to division level, and largely concerned with movement and defining and refining battle space.
TACTICS -- The actions of elements at brigade and below to close with, kill or capture the enemy.
Keep in mind here that a corps today would be the equal of a couple of field armies in Custer's day, a division equal to one field army, and a brigade easily the equivalent of one or two divisions.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Apr 10, 2015 20:12:37 GMT -6
Ducemus 'cos sometimes you just fight. If that's the orders. There is a problem, with the long standing problem of the 28 dead. Look long enough and ye shall find. The 28 dead were not in Deep Ravine and be your understanding as 1877, or 1879, because of course the signpost was erected in 1877 and a year and a half before RCoI but one year after burials - There were 28 dead with Keogh and everyone visiting the field or seeing the pictures (at least two of them) knew without doubt where the 28 men died. Archival Photographs from the University of Montana - mtmemory.org/cdm/landingpage/collection/p16013coll2728 men died in Keogh's Swale, a coulee or shallow ravine. When Company I men who survived the battle examined those dead, they identified two besides Keogh. These two were, the tallest and shortest men in the Company. Two of the twenty eight identified in 1876 within days of their deaths and the field marked in monument, one year later by Company I. Photographed in 1877, or if your head works that way, in 1879. Basic reality. I'll bet you a holiday in Santorini that that is not Sanderson in the photograph. Military ways. Be well. Custer's treasure - The soldiers had lots and lots of money, and we took it. We knew what the silver was, but the paper we didn't know. And the children played with it, they made little tepees out of it, and put about one hundred dollars in bills together and made toy shawls, and some of it was bloody. - Paints Bown, Ogalala. The Passing of Keogh - We were looking around and we found Captain Keogh, but left him alone, for we saw that he wore a scapulary, and we said that he was a Black Robe man. We dressed ourselves in the uniforms and put on the swords, and took the Mags and bugles and marched around, and we marched toward Reno that way too. - Paints Bown, Ogalala. archive.org/stream/tamingofsioux00fiskfr#page/98/mode/2up
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 10, 2015 20:33:05 GMT -6
You need to learn to add.
At best it is Keogh plus 28 which is ?
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 10, 2015 20:38:12 GMT -6
Page 112 of the book you gave a link to is factually incorrect. It has Benteen crossing the river twice.
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by mac on Apr 11, 2015 6:17:27 GMT -6
Yes Ian a very sad day. He is a legend here as both player (first man to take 200 test wickets and make 2000 test runs) and as you say a marvellous (in Richie's accent) commentator. Cheers Mac . I am sorry for your loss. Not being familiar with cricket is the 200 test wickets and 2k test runs good? Regards Dave Dave Yes it is a great stat. Test cricket is a very tactical game. Benaud became captain of the Australian team and in cricket the captain is the tactical leader. Benaud was a great captain as well as player. He took that tactical excellence plus a nice dry wit to commentary and was regarded all through the world of cricket as one of the great commentators. He was also a very nice guy. 84 is a good innings! Cheers
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 11, 2015 6:34:21 GMT -6
Lets not forget that in his day they didn't play half the number of test matches they do now, so getting that target back then was something special; linkIan.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Apr 11, 2015 13:24:17 GMT -6
Interesting thread. I will try to be simple, and not use Benning School for Boys language.
1. To examine maneuver, let's start at a baseline. Are you in contact, or out of contact. This makes a profound difference.
Generally, you start out of contact. The term used here is movement to contact. This term by itself has a whole literature on it. Basically, you have to balance risks in this phase. You want to balance speed and security. You want to have scouts out, flank security out but try to keep man body in a decent movement formation, meaning column. You try to avoid more tactically sound formations until contact is imminent, or even after contact.
Once you make contact, all your conditions change. Now some elements are fighting, so you are now in a fire and maneuver phase. Movement here has to be part of a plan. LBH forums get confused here. Reno was in contact after crossing Ford A. We know Indians lost 6 plus dead, Deeds and Galls family.
Movement has to serve a purpose, and we have great difficulty understand GAC's movement away from combat. Why did GAC not ride to the sounds of the guns? Why did he not support the valley fight? I do not know.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Apr 12, 2015 0:51:57 GMT -6
DucemusThe point of 'Ride to the sound of the guns', clarifies each of the constraints you indicate, by providing an assessment of contact underway and how to involve. Modern thinking about Custer moving away 'not' from combat, but from concentrating his forces was inflicted by Gray with his feinting theory - which he did not present properly or think through. In record of June 30 from Patterson Hughes, and observations from the timber by DeRudio, a force of hostiles located onto the bluffs between Custer and Reno\Benteen, and attacked Custer's command from that locale. Threat at the river and from the Weir's Peaks/ Cedar Coulee avenues. Regardles of theoory for a move away from Reno and Benteen, known cause exists. Developing opinion, as evinced by Donahue - quite open about his ideas, builds upon the enduring northern (western) ford ideas. Eventually, this will simply lead to a broad acceptance of complete rubbish and presage - Oh my God - Custer really was shot at the ford. A ford across the Big Horn! One way of presenting modern thinking about Custer, is - A very straight-forwardly military situation is turned into jelly being nailed to a wall, to disguise events in the valley and at Reno Hill. The tactical Custer fight was described by a Cheyenne who fought, to either Linderman or Allen by using matches to represent units and troops and hostiles. Armchair general by a participat. It was and remains instructive.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Apr 12, 2015 1:14:17 GMT -6
I remember someone saying that once you engage with your enemy you should hold him by the nose and kick him in the ass, which I suppose means keep his front occupied and out flank him, but seriously to attack without a plan leaves you with nothing if the worst happens, just rushing in blindly can get you chopped up, it may look good on the cinema screen, but then and even today troops should not just enter a combat zone without finding out what lies ahead and formulate a plan or strategy. Ian. DucemusKuhlman understood Custer's thinking on approach to the river, Legend into History - Perfectly straight forward, with Reno told to wait - not retreat, and be supported by the whole outfit. If you're interested in how, understanding of the Custer fight went so off the rails, (RCoI is a different contribution) babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015003748863;view=1up;seq=11;size=75Koury's foreward is great for coffee breaks. No one had then been aware of Sweet's report from the battlefield and Wessinger ordering 40 odd extra markers is simply..... beautiful. I'm fascinated in awaiting the paperwork to be published.... by.... erm, well ?
|
|