Here you go, Beth. I have cut a lot out from the original, but this should work fairly well. I do not think you will find any more complete.
June 22, 1876—Thursday—After 2 AM—Custer remained awake writing letters in his tent: one to his wife and a second, an anonymous correspondence to the
New York Herald.
Dawn—Reveille.
11 AM—Custer receives his official marching orders.
Noon – 12:10 PM—Custer and the entire Seventh Cavalry paraded before Terry,
12:40 PM—Reach mouth of Rosebud. Wallace described it as a narrow creek, about three or four feet wide and three inches deep! The mouth, however, was broad. High bluffs to the west, sage-covered hills to the east. The narrow creek snaked through the eastern flats. Column stops to re-tie packs, sloppily done in the early morning, probably because most of the packers were hung-over. Rainy day.
➢ Cross to west side of the Rosebud (left bank).
➢ Custer sent the Rees out in advance—though their fear of the Sioux kept them remarkably close to the column—with Soldier leading one group and Bob-tail Bull leading another.
➢ Because the valley narrowed sharply, Custer was forced to cross and re-cross the creek, causing problems with the pack mules as they struggled through the foliage-hidden creek bed.
➢ As the column moved farther up the valley, the terrain became more difficult.
➢ Heavy, cold wind blowing out of the north.
4 PM—Custer ordered camp near the base of a steep bluff on the west bank of the creek, about 12 miles from where they started, 10 miles up the Rosebud. Wood, grass, and water were in adequate supply.
Evening (about sunset: 8:50 ± PM)—Officers conference called by Custer.
➢ Not a cheery get-together [Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 16].
➢ Flare-up between Custer and Benteen: Custer questioned loyalty of some of his officers and said they were grumbling behind his back to Terry. Benteen challenged Custer to name names, but Custer said Benteen was not one of those in question. (It was probably Keogh.)
➢ Custer became very conciliatory after that (Gray does not mention this flare-up, but does say Custer encouraged his officers to cooperate; he does mention Benteen’s testiness, however). Willert brings it up, saying Benteen was the only person to have ever mentioned it and neither Godfrey nor Gibson—both of who wrote of the meeting—ever brought it up. Custer, uncharacteristically, even called for suggestions.
➢ Custer tells his officers of his estimates of the size of the Indian force:
o Indian Office in Washington estimated 3,000 persons, translating to 850 warriors. That tied in with Boyer’s estimate of 400 lodges = 800 warriors.
o Custer figured another 500 might come out of the agencies for the summer, making a maximum of 1,500.
o “This figure was an underestimate, for General Sheridan’s attempts to control the agency Indians with heavy garrisons would drive out exceptionally large numbers of summer roamers. That was what Custer did not know” [Gray,
Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 208].
➢ Custer announces no more trumpet calls; officers’ watches synchronized.
➢ Stable guards were to wake the troops at 3 AM; they were to march at 5 AM.
➢ Benteen designated Officer-of-the-Day for the following day [Mills,
Harvest of Barren Regrets, p. 240].
➢ LT Godfrey wrote that watches were compared to ensure they were set on “official time” [Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 17]. This was the only instance of comparing watches mentioned in any of the journals [Smalley,
Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 2 – 9].
➢ Custer gave great discretion to the troop commanders, saying the only thing to come out of his HQ would be, “when to move out of and when to go into camp. All other details, such as reveille, stables, watering, halting, grazing, etc., on the march would be left to the judgment and discretion of the troop commanders; they were to keep within supporting distance of each other, not to get ahead of the scouts, or very far to the rear of the column” [Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 16].
➢ As lieutenants Wallace, Godfrey, and McIntosh were walking away, Wallace made the comment, “Godfrey, I believe General Custer is going to be killed… I have never heard Custer talk in that way before” [Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 17].
➢ Godfrey made the necessary preparations and gave the necessary orders to his company. During this routine, he came to the bivouac area of the scouts and met up with Mitch Boyer, Bloody Knife, and Half Yellow Face. Boyer saw him and—apparently at the suggestion of the Crow—asked Godfrey, “‘Have you ever fought against these Sioux?’” The following conversation ensued: Godfrey: “‘Yes,’ I replied. Then he [Boyer] asked, ‘Well, how many do you expect to find?’ I answered, ‘It is said we may find between one thousand and fifteen hundred.’ ‘Well, do you think we can whip that many?’ ‘Oh, yes, I guess so.’ After he had interpreted our conversation, he said to me with a good deal of emphasis, ‘Well, I can tell you we are going to have a ----- big fight.’” [Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 17].
June 23, 1876—Friday—3 AM—Stable guards moved throughout the camp waking the troopers. Their breakfast consisted of black coffee and fried bacon cooked over small fires dug into the earth.
5 AM—Depart camp. Custer led out, followed by two sergeants, one carrying the regimental standard, the other carrying Custer’s personal flag. Godfrey mentioned it was the same flag Custer carried in the “Rebellion.” The column continues up the Rosebud, crossing and re-crossing, for about 30 miles. Benteen’s H and two other companies brought up the rear, behind the recalcitrant mules [Willert,
Little Big Horn Diary, p. 226], now re-organized into one command following the main column.
➢ The lead party probably consisted of Custer, Bloody Knife, Boyer, Herendeen, and Half Yellow Face [Smalley,
More Little Bighorn Mysteries, p. 1 – 4].
➢ Another very hot day.
7:40 AM—Custer crosses the stream to its right bank, the column passes 1st Sioux camp (8 – 9 miles). “Here’s where Reno made the mistake of his life. He had six troops of cavalry and rations enough for a number of days. He’d have made a name for himself if he’d pushed on after them.” Remark made to Varnum [Varnum in Willert,
Little Big Horn Diary, p. 227]. Benteen said the village was “immense.”
➢ This was the camp below (John Gray's R – 19) where Reno entered the valley (R – 22.75).
➢ This was the Indian camp Bradley had seen on May 27th.
➢ 350 – 400 lodges. LT Godfrey was perplexed by the “numerous stands of brush, whose crowns had been joined to form a kind of overhead framework.” At first, the troops thought it was to protect the Indians’ dogs, but it was later learned and Wooden Leg also told Marquis, these were wickiups housing young, single warriors who had joined the main camp [Willert,
Little Big Horn Diary, p. 228; Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 17].
➢ At one of these first Sioux encampments, the Ree scouts discovered ancient pictographs (they mistook for new) Bloody Knife interpreted to mean: “Do not follow the Dakotas into the Bighorn country... for they will turn and destroy you” [Connell].
10:20 AM—Pass 2nd Sioux camp (Teat Butte, 26 miles up the Rosebud), right bank; another 8 miles.
11 AM—Go another 2 miles; halt for pack train.
11:30 AM—Leave halt up right bank.
1:30 PM—Cross Greenleaf Creek and reach 3rd Sioux camp—the Greenleaf site (34 miles up the Rosebud), 6 miles farther up. Wooden Leg claimed this was the 4th Indian camp on the Rosebud. See May 28th.
➢ These last two camps were no more than fourteen miles from the first and the trail kept widening. Everyone assumed these camps were simply consecutive locations of one village and not possibly separate villages, all ultimately moving in the same southerly direction. Reno worried about this, but apparently was the only one who did.
➢ “The trail in some places was at least 300 yards in width and deeply worn. The scouts said it had been made by about 1,500 lodges and since there were doubtless other trails, they agreed that it proved that enormous numbers of Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes had left the agencies to join Sitting Bull. But the officers, misled by the report that there were only five to 800 warriors in the hostile bands, missed the significance of the trail entirely and persisted in believing that these large camps—they were from 1/3 to ½ a mile in diameter—were a succession of camps of a single band, rather than what they were, the single camp of several large bands together” [Stewart,
Custer’s Luck, p. 259].
➢ “Our trail… was from a quarter to half a mile wide at all places where the form of the land allowed that width. Indians regularly made a broad trail when traveling in bands using travois. People behind often kept in the tracks of people in front, but when the party of travelers was a large one there were many of such tracks side by side” [Marquis,
Wooden Leg, p. 207].
2:30 PM – 3 PM—The valley narrowed to about ¼ mile in width, bordered by steep, rocky hills covered in pine. It was along this stretch that Reno turned back. LT Wallace wrote, the “country back from the hills looked to be very much broken” [Willert,
Little Big Horn Diary, p. 229]. It was ideal country for an ambush.
4:30 PM—The column moved up the right bank, another 9 miles. Custer orders the regiment to pitch camp on a broad, sage plain. The camp was located near the present-day junction with the Colstrip Road [Gray]. Willert said where Lee Coulee enters the Rosebud Valley. They had traveled 33 miles for the day [Godfrey, “Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” p. 18], 43 miles from the mouth of the creek. (Godfrey claimed it was “about 5 PM” [“Custer’s Last Battle 1876,” pp. 17 – 18].).
➢ Pleasant summer aromas of plum, crabapple, and wild roses. Ash and elder covered the creek banks rather than the more common willow and cottonwood. To the west, rugged pine-covered bluffs; to the east, less rugged cliffs of sandstone, topped with pine.
➢ Stewart claimed the column was under constant surveillance by the Sioux and Cheyenne [
Custer’s Luck, p. 261].
Sunset (approximately 8:50 ± PM)—The last of the pack train arrived in camp.
Evening—This seems to be the evening Custer’s personal guidon blew down repeatedly, interpreted by some officers as a bad omen. LT Godfrey was the one who kept putting it back up. Willert claimed the incident occurred while the command was checking out the sun dance camp the following morning [
Little Big Horn Diary, p. 238]; Stewart as well.
Is this okay?
Best wishes,
Fred.