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Post by crzhrs on Feb 12, 2015 13:12:00 GMT -6
We hear so much of the 19th century US Military's tactics on warfare based on West Point aka "European" tactics fighting against large, standing armies. However, fighting Indians was never conventional, nor could one expect them to do or counter what any other "modern" military would do in battle. How much was Custer's "plan" based on fighting a conventional foe or was he thinking what would the Indians do? Or does it matter at all, warfare is warfare and a strategy against a large standing army would be just as good as an unconventional foe?
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Post by montrose on Feb 12, 2015 13:38:20 GMT -6
We hear so much of the 19th century US Military's tactics on warfare based on West Point aka "European" tactics fighting against large, standing armies. However, fighting Indians was never conventional, nor could one expect them to do or counter what any other "modern" military would do in battle. How much was Custer's "plan" based on fighting a conventional foe or was he thinking what would the Indians do? Or does it matter at all, warfare is warfare and a strategy against a large standing army would be just as good as an unconventional foe? Crazy, Look at 30 years of engagements with the Indians 1860-90. I do not see where conventional tactics were used by anyone. At LBH, assume that was Jeb Stuart with 1500 of his men. Would LTC Custer have used the same tactics? The challenge is that all were trying to adjust tactics. But there was no set standard. And the many different situations against the Indians means that there is no one school solution. The tribes varied enormously in how they were manned, trained, and equipped. The terrain also varied in a range greater than all of Europe. The adjustment from conventional to war to unconventional war has been around for thousands of years. Some commanders excel at one or the other, a rare few at both. For the Indian campaigns of the US in this period we have hundreds of engagements. LBH is the anomaly. It is the one unit at one moment at time that failed disastrously. SO the fault is not the ARmy over all, it is not the soldiers, it is not the weapons, it is not the title 10 functions.. |
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 12, 2015 14:13:12 GMT -6
We hear so much of the 19th century US Military's tactics on warfare based on West Point aka "European" tactics fighting against large, standing armies. However, fighting Indians was never conventional, nor could one expect them to do or counter what any other "modern" military would do in battle. How much was Custer's "plan" based on fighting a conventional foe or was he thinking what would the Indians do? Or does it matter at all, warfare is warfare and a strategy against a large standing army would be just as good as an unconventional foe? Whether there were 1500 Confederates or 1500 hostiles, where was the combat resilience to being counter-attacked (especially the right wing on the eastern bluffs)?
What intel/recon, co-ordination, communication and command failures depended upon whether there was a regular or irregular enemy in the LBH...?
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 12, 2015 14:19:01 GMT -6
Hello Crzhrs;
I suppose if Custer used the same cavalry manual tactics that he used in the ACW in which two cavalry brigades may clash on the field of battle, then I don’t know how much use it would be against a foe who avoided such clashes, there again I don’t really know what good Infantry would be either, if a mobile force like cavalry had a hard job locating the Indians then the Infantry would have no chance, but having said that the 7th managed to creep up on the largest Indian village ever seen, but would slow moving infantry column manage this feat?
So as I have said before, this would have been a job for a cavalry brigade or three cavalry brigades, one with Crook, one with Terry and one with Gibbon.
Ian.
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Feb 12, 2015 16:37:48 GMT -6
Custer's plan of attack was based on a common strategy in use at the time on the plains. Surprise the NA's in their village. If Custer failed in scouting, the NA's often failed in having guards on the perimeter of their encampments. At Sand Creek in 1864 the NA's were surprised. Of course Black Kettle wasn't at war with the whites. At Washita in 1868 he was surprised again. At the Maria's in 1870, the NA's were surprised. Never a perimeter guard.
The 7th surprised the village at the LBH.
The NA's were tied to their respective villages which included women and children. The US army was not.
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Post by mac on Feb 12, 2015 18:01:13 GMT -6
If we look at LBH and the other great disaster, Fetterman, we see an underlying tactical error of dividing your force. In Custer's case a deliberate divide and in Fetterman's a divide forced by indian tactics. No matter what play book you are using dividing your force is never a decision taken lightly (Custer) or one you let the enemy create (Fetterman).
Cheers
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Feb 12, 2015 20:10:37 GMT -6
March Divided, Fight United.
Napoleon
Not just pertaining to Custer but also to Terry and the campaign. To carry this off you need skill commanders. Ask Napoleon as he waited for Grouchy to come to the sound of the guns at Waterloo. What he got was a Blucher.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 12, 2015 20:27:25 GMT -6
Shaw: March divided was the reason that Napoleon created the self sustaining Army Corps.
Custer did a splendid job of fighting united if he was fighting a three brigade division. Not so much though with a three (four or five-depending upon how you count) battalion understrength regiment.
Let's never, any one of us, forget that tactics do not change. It is in their adaptation to situation, enemy, and terrain where we detect change.
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Feb 13, 2015 12:05:01 GMT -6
QC, Well stated. Years ago I read Chandler's work on the campaigns of Napoleon and he talks about the importance of the self sustaining corp in his strategy. It also led to food sources independent of scouring the countryside for sustenance. This latter part was a work in progress. Shaw: March divided was the reason that Napoleon created the self sustaining Army Corps. Custer did a splendid job of fighting united if he was fighting a three brigade division. Not so much though with a three (four or five-depending upon how you count) battalion understrength regiment. Let's never, any one of us, forget that tactics do not change. It is in their adaptation to situation, enemy, and terrain where we detect change. |
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Post by quincannon on Feb 13, 2015 12:15:59 GMT -6
Chandler is an essential work. I know about his logistics were far ahead of those of anyone else, but know little of the details of using pre-prepared foodstuffs, other than he did extensively.
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 13, 2015 12:43:57 GMT -6
Against a conventional "western" force one would assume the other side is not going to run but stay put and fight back. The driving phobia the US Army had with fighting Indians was they would rather run than stand and fight. Did Custer base his tactics on that? He must have because he divided his force believing Indians would rather run and if so one of his divided forces would either stop them or force them back to the others waiting for them thereby catching them in a no-way-out situation. Give credit to the warriors for their ability to be mobile and able to go from one force to another in a relative short amount of time.. Of course it helps when you have a multitude of warriors.
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Post by Beth on Feb 13, 2015 14:17:39 GMT -6
Against a conventional "western" force one would assume the other side is not going to run but stay put and fight back. The driving phobia the US Army had with fighting Indians was they would rather run than stand and fight. Did Custer base his tactics on that? He must have because he divided his force believing Indians would rather run and if so one of his divided forces would either stop them or force them back to the others waiting for them thereby catching them in a no-way-out situation. Give credit to the warriors for their ability to be mobile and able to go from one force to another in a relative short amount of time.. Of course it helps when you have a multitude of warriors. And know the land. I don't know if Custer could have contained very many of the Indians, especially when you look at the numbers and the area. If they couldn't get out by following the river, they could use the benchland. Capturing the village would have been like trying to dam the Mississippi with a beaver dam. It would work at the headwaters, but not in the delta. If Custer went into the campaign with the thought of just rounding up and capturing the 'hostiles', I think that he changed it somewhere along the way. Perhaps someone could answer a question for me. It's often mentioned that if Custer could have captured the women and children that the warriors would have surrendered. I can see how that would work when you are dealing with a small village like at Washita when they are all pretty much the same tribe but do you think that it would have worked at LBH. Would the Lakota stopped fighting if Custer had captured Cheyenne women and children or would they have fought even harder to make sure that the Lakota womand and children weren't captured? Beth |
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 13, 2015 14:40:16 GMT -6
Against a conventional "western" force one would assume the other side is not going to run but stay put and fight back. The driving phobia the US Army had with fighting Indians was they would rather run than stand and fight. Did Custer base his tactics on that? He must have because he divided his force believing Indians would rather run and if so one of his divided forces would either stop them or force them back to the others waiting for them thereby catching them in a no-way-out situation. Give credit to the warriors for their ability to be mobile and able to go from one force to another in a relative short amount of time.. Of course it helps when you have a multitude of warriors. And know the land. I don't know if Custer could have contained very many of the Indians, especially when you look at the numbers and the area. If they couldn't get out by following the river, they could use the benchland. Capturing the village would have been like trying to dam the Mississippi with a beaver dam. It would work at the headwaters, but not in the delta. If Custer went into the campaign with the thought of just rounding up and capturing the 'hostiles', I think that he changed it somewhere along the way. Perhaps someone could answer a question for me. It's often mentioned that if Custer could have captured the women and children that the warriors would have surrendered. I can see how that would work when you are dealing with a small village like at Washita when they are all pretty much the same tribe but do you think that it would have worked at LBH. Would the Lakota stopped fighting if Custer had captured Cheyenne women and children or would they have fought even harder to make sure that the Lakota womand and children weren't captured? Beth I don't know that they would have surrendered. Possibly if he captured enough of them, they may have disengaged and retreated back to the village to guard their own women and children. Given the finite numbers of NA, they couldn't afford to give lives away. In the case of the U.S Army and most modern armies, soldiers can afford to be lost and it does not upset the balance of the society. |
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Post by quincannon on Feb 13, 2015 14:59:58 GMT -6
What would anyone here do if their loved ones were held hostage by a hostile force?
Society can afford the loss Scarface? It is obvious you do not live in an Army town. I don't believe you would say that if you did.
Dismiss all talk of hostage taking, being a motivating factor. It is nonsense. Hostage taking is an act of complete desperation, by someone or somebodies, who have expended all other options for survival. No one goes in with that intention. Custer took them at Washita ONLY because his defecation was weak and watery.
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Post by Colt45 on Feb 13, 2015 15:10:07 GMT -6
If we assume Custer's plan by going to Ford D was to capture the non-coms fleeing north and west, how in the world would he have been able to do that with only about 80 men? There would have been close to a thousand women, childen, and old men in that fleeing convoy. All of his limited combat power in the Yates battalion would have been consumed with keeping the non-coms under control. Seeing that, I have no doubt but the Cheyenne warriors would have seen that as a tremendous opportunity to attack, kill soldiers, and free the non-coms. If Custer had crossed at Ford D and managed to halt the fleeing non-coms, we would find all the Yates battalion markers west of the river instead of on LSH.
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