Fortunately, we learned from the LBH battle....didn't we?

[quincannon]

Ian: The "standard in most instances" rifle squad in the U S Army is nine. Platoons in all but the mechanized Infantry are slightly smaller than the 44 of my day, but not much.

Human material is much the same, regardless of volunteer or draftee. The challenges of training are about the same. Fred will point out that during the draft era we had some pretty intelligent people in the mobilization based army, but we had more than our share of dumbshits as well. I would not suspect that training is easier, and think it would go the other direction, for I believe we expect them to be able to do more.

The size of the current squad is a sore point with me. I think they should be larger, even if we have to sacrifice the number of squads we can field in a capped end strength environment. If you conclude that the rifle squad is the cutting edge of battle, it stands to reason that there is where you will sustain the most casualties. To me it is a no brainer that he larger the squad is structured to be, the longer that squad remains combat effective. Any organization, regardless of echelon, must be able to take its lumps and continue to function. The Marine Squad of 13, a leader and three four man teams to me is optimum, and for more than the reason stated.

[Yan Taylor]

Thanks Steve.

The military Colt 1873 had two barrel sizes (5 ½ inch and 7 ½ inch) and I think the Cavalry had the long 7 ½ inch along with the Army with Artillery crews getting the 5 ½ inch, some sites give the max range at 100 yards, which I find surprizing, but that would fall in with your 50 yards, I would expect that to be with the longer barrel version, as the extra two inches with aid accuracy, and as they say “size matters”

Ian.

[Yan Taylor]

Chuck remember when we were talking the other day about how the US and Germans used their squad LMGs? Well the British used a 10 man Squad system, usually led by a Corporal, he commanded the LMG section which consisted of him and a two man Bren team, the other seven men made up the rifle section and was commanded by a Lance Corporal, he led the advance or attack and the Corporal + LMG team covered them, like a base of fire, I think this concept is different to the US and German doctrine.

Ian.

[AZ Ranger]

I believe the Marine Corps still uses an M16 in its current M16A4 version. I also believe that there was a short barreled version from the start at least in the cleaning manual I received in Viet Nam 1969 and I still have. To call a M4 a lighter version when the difference is greater than weight alone seems odd to me. That is like calling the carbine a lighter version of a rifle. Of course it is lighter since the barrel is shortened which effects muzzle velocity and potential precision. So changing the stock to a collapsible reducing weight is not the only factor. Nor having a short forearm due to a shorter barrel.

All weapon systems seem to develop changes over time and most are improvements. Seems to me features on the M4 is conducive to close quarter battle and searching in confined spaces. There is no perfect weapon system and each has its job. For law enforcement the AR-15 carbine is ideal. Police need to give a verbal challenge unless circumstances require immediate action. So about out to 50 yards is the extent of patrol rifle. Some agencies qualify with some 100 yard course of fire but not all. The AZPOST Patrol Rifle Instructor course is 50 yards and less.

The longer distances are now called precision rifle and its in the ranges over 200 yards where the .308 shines.

There is not a lot of ammunition used in training and practice for the carbine as compared to handgun. A subset of officers would fall into the precision rifle operator and swat team member.

Regards

AZ Ranger

[AZ Ranger]

Jan 1, 2015 9:22:32 GMT -6 Yan Taylor said:

Thanks Steve.

The military Colt 1873 had two barrel sizes (5 ½ inch and 7 ½ inch) and I think the Cavalry had the long 7 ½ inch along with the Army with Artillery crews getting the 5 ½ inch, some sites give the max range at 100 yards, which I find surprizing, but that would fall in with your 50 yards, I would expect that to be with the longer barrel version, as the extra two inches with aid accuracy, and as they say “size matters”

Ian.

Shortly before I came on we had a Ranger that carried a SAA 45 Colt. Even when I came on we purchased are own revolvers and they had to equivalent to 357, 41 Mag, or 44 Mag. I purchased a S&W Model 19 in .357. That was because the Department furnished that ammunition in both wadcutters and duty rounds. I also had a short barreled .41 Magnum.

That Ranger was a top shot and placed high in statewide competition. We loaded from loops on our belts and were issued a 6 round belt carrier. Speed loaders really changed the rate of reloading.


Regards

AZ Ranger

[AZ Ranger]

We constantly cleaned our rifle whenever there was a chance. I can remember sitting around with the bolt in hand and shaking it to make sure it was free. It was my rifle and I took care of it.

AZ Ranger

[quincannon]

Ian: I don't believe anyone in the WWII-Korea time frame had squad organization right, meaning organized to the optimum. The Marines came the closest, I think. Three maneuver elements is the key. That gives you more tactical options than two, regardless of how the two are organized. Three is always better than two at any echelon, and four is better than three at echelons above company. At squad, platoon, and company four I believe strains span of control, except for very short periods of time.

Remember with three rifle and a weapons squad in a platoon, you still break down the weapons squad and generally attach a weapons crew or two to the rifle squads for employment. Then that weapons squad leader is used both as another set of eyes and ears and as a technical expert. That is the way I always did it and most of my contemporaries did the same.

The way I would typically move is with a rifle squad with A/A team (two men) attached up front. Then comes my platoon headquarters with a weapons squad leader, an LMG and A/A team attached, followed by my second rifle squad with LMG team attached, and a pure squad bringing up the rear. Not always of course, but most of the time. Upon contact you have balance, you can use arm and hand signals to deploy your people, and you have that bit of firepower close at hand which you can either employ yourself or attach to that third squad as it comes up for employment. If you train that way, the battle drills become automatic, and those squad leaders usually know what you want to do before you do.

The idea is getting fire forward fast.

[quincannon]

Steve your comment is exactly why I think Scales is either throwing a line of bull to support his agenda, or was a complete incompetent. There is no other choice available. Cleaning your weapon is so ingrained in the soldier practically from day 1 it is hard for me to conceive that a Captain (he said he was a battery commander), with five officers available to him to aid in supervision, would neglect such. Even with his three FO's attached out, that still leaves three officers in the battery area to oversee things/ Incomprehensible or incompetent.

The first thing you do when you sit down is get out a shaving brush and start cleaning the outside dirt off that weapon even if you did it only ten minutes before. As time and situation permit you run a patch down the barrel. All that being a stopgap during operations., and not relieving you from cleaning the weapon thoroughly at least twice a day.

[Dark Cloud]

Argh!

What do combat vets think of Fallows' complaint about lack of officer accountability in the recent wars? The Army doesn't fire people for incompetence or Peter Principle anymore although there have been, he feels, ample examples of those who should have been. General Sanchez, for example, wrote a whine book about not getting a medal he felt he deserved. That was his take away about Iraq. The corollary to that is the civilians have become so given to overpraise out of a sense of guilt and peer pressure that it's difficult to point out officer incompetence in battle anymore, contrary to our history. It becomes a variation of not respecting soldiers and the Vietnam disgrace we inflicted on a conscript army. Not one general was fired from his post in the Iraq or Afghanistan wars despite real screw ups on their watch. The contention is made that it is a dangerous mind set for the US.

What about the observations for over a century that military hardware is misapplied because tactics haven't adapted quick enough to tech advance AND that sometimes tactics are changed because a tech advance makes it possible, regardless of relevance to battle? The rifle didn't change things quick enough for the CW and navies became dependent upon low ranking signal experts who answered to no one, were a separate branch, and whose convoluted proprietary procedures - often pointless - cost ships and lives. We had flags, we should use them. But they were near useless in battle. Then we had wireless signals, also often useless because each side could jam the other. All the info, most trivia, is supposed to be a plus, but it seems to slow response and overload field officers to no point. If all info is shared, than cya is institutionalized and no one person can fail, and this corresponds to the lack of upper rank house cleaning in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is ALL relevant to the LBH, because ALL those issues are there in utero, foreshadowing or reflecting long ignored problems.

[quincannon]

What I, a non-combat vet, think of what you just posted DC is that you are both completely wrong and do not have a clue as to what you are talking about. I can think of three general officers off the top of my head that have been fired, and shown the door, after failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there have been a multitude of incompetent officers shown that same door at lower ranks as well.

Like you, Fellows seems to bray like a jackass.

Accountability is applied in many ways, and those ways are not always or often publicized, so I would submit that neither you or apparently Fellows have the requisite knowledge or access to make any such statements on a widespread basis. If you don't understand what I am saying here, it is simply that you do not have the bona fides to make any such statement, nor are you likely to obtain same.

[fred]

DC,

When I was in the Regular Army-- 1962 - 1967-- firing an officer was commonplace... or not unreasonably so. As a young second lieutenant, despite the fact I had the best platoon in the company and was "supposedly" thought of as the best officer in the unit, my company commander fired me because I mouthed off to him once to often... then told him he was full of s**t in front of a host of men. At the time, I figured that took care of that career!! Fortunately, I survived it and when I left the battalion, many considered me the best lieutenant in the battalion. But I will tell you, I came within a hair's-breadth of being drummed out of the service.

In Vietnam I fired two lieutenants, both OCS, both seconds, one for lying to me on an operation and the other for brow-beating my troops.

One of the finest men I ever knew-- Brigadier General (at the time; and the ADC2/3) James Hollingsworth-- fired a damn fine lieutenant because his men inadvertently re-fueled Hollingsworth's Huey with avgas rather than JP4 then began siphoning it out when their realized their mistake and Hollingsworth saw what had happened. You don't make those errors in combat.

In another operation, our division commander, Bill DePuy, had a brigadier general canned because he screwed up on an operation... and this guy wasn't even in DePuy's chain.

Chuck knows all about this incident, I believe, and even sent me a link-- which I lost-- to the whole affair.

As for today, I don't know. I suspect training is a lot better... we have learned a lot of lessons along the way... and I suspect our equipment is also better, but for the same reasons. In "my day"-- despite the problems with the M-16-- our equipment was the best in the world, with the possible exception of the Germans'. As for the quality of the men, I would put my men up against any the world can provide, then or now, draftees or volunteers. You want to see soldiers? Here are some soldiers... 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division...




You couldn't get any better than these guys.


Happy New Year, DC... all the best to you and your entire family.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[quincannon]

Fred: de Saussure was his name, and the operation was saved by a young Major, commanding 1-27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) by the name of Sandy Meloy, whose daughter is a close personal friend of mine, and whose husband is a former CAG on Enterprise. Sadly Meloy passed away last year in San Antonio. He rose to command the 82nd ABD and wrote several very good monographs on leadership.

Meloy's daughter Katie is currently heading up the raising funds to build the 4th Infantry Division museum and visitors center here at Carson, so if you have any pocket change she would probably like to hear from you.

They sent de Saussure to White Sands (it's not the Aleutians or Iceland, but what the hell), promoted him to Major General, and he retired rather early. He was the type of man who would overcomplicate a steel ball, and in combat that can be every bit as deadly as not planning well enough.

The name of the Operation was Attleboro and de Saussure had the 196th IB with 1-27 attached. Your boy came in during the festivities and canned de Saussure, but when he did the 196 was attached to 1st ID so de Saussure was within Depuy's chain.

What DC fails to realize, and it's fully understandable why he does not, is that in the Army, the pen that writes the OER is mightier than the sword/ Incompetents and substandard performers do slip through, along with a few nincompoops, but as you rise more and more are weeded out. Sycofants and yes men are usually found out as well but the process takes longer. Thus will always be so as long as we are forced to accept members of the human race into our army.

[fred]

Jan 1, 2015 11:07:46 GMT -6 quincannon said:

The name of the Operation was Attleboro and de Saussure had the 196th IB with 1-27 attached. Your boy came in during the festivities and canned de Saussure, but when he did the 196 was attached to 1st ID so de Saussure was within Depuy's chain.

Thanks, Chuck; I knew I could depend on you to remember. I need to copy-and-paste your post. I remember the whole thing very well, having been heavily involved with convoys during that whole thing. If I am not mistaken, the 25th Infantry Division was also engaged, and DePuy spent some time hauling their asses out of the mire, as well. We-- of the 1st-- did not have a lot of respect for the 25th... at least not early-on.

I also knew it was one of the light infantry brigades... just forgot which one. I did not know, however, it was actually attached to the 1st.


Cool stuff, Chuck... thanks!!!


Best wishes,
Fred.

[quincannon]

Fred: 1-27 was from the 25th ID and attached to the 196th for Attleboro. Other parts of the 25th were present as well, as were parts of the 4th ID. The operation was taken over by Depuy to orchestrate after de Saussure screwed the pooch. It turned out to be a very big deal, but started small and the 196th was to be the only unit involved. It was named for the city in Massachusetts, near Devens where the 196 deployed from.

There are few divisions that run hot all the time. The 1st ID is one of those, but is the exception not the rule. The 25th was very good in Korea under Kean, and the 27th Infantry, either as a regiment, or in a modern sense its constituent battalions, is another of those units whose reputation is untarnished by failure. Traditionally in the US Army if there is fighting to be done the 1st and 3rd ID's are your first choice if you have one.

Katie sent me a link on Attleboro some time back. I think if you Google Operation Attleboro the article that features her father will come up.

[Yan Taylor]

Fred ten out of the twenty in that photo have stripes, there may be more but I cannot see all of the sleeves, so is this just the NCOs mess having their photo took? One more thing what term do you have for the one strip rank? We call them Lance Corporal’s, now I will have a guess and say PFC, but I think this is wrong.

Chuck you mentioned Korea in an earlier post, and since we were discussing rifles, my I give a mention to the British troops who defended Gloucester Hill in Korea, these troops were still carrying bolt-action rifles when they fought off waves of Chinese regulars only to be cut off, the whole of the British 29th Brigade (4000 strong) held over 27.000 Chinese at bay, losing 1000 men in the process. Typical of the British high command when they sent our men out to Korea with only WW2 kit, the US Boys too had WW2 stuff but at least your rifle companies were fully automatic.

The way the US laid out their company organisation was in my mind a more balanced way of giving the company commander more options and fire power, the weapons platoon contained M1919 LMGs (in my view a medium MG) and 60mm Mortars, plus Bazookas available at CHQ, a British Infantry Company had a support section containing three 2in (yes that’s 50mm) Light Mortars, although they had three PIATs at CHQ.

Now I know that there are a few on here who look with distain at the very mention of “movies” being brought up but.. I saw the movie “Fury” last week and it is certainly worth a viewing.

Ian.