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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2014 16:59:51 GMT -6
Ziebert's with a Z I think.
Now Fred I did not know DC was a recognized expert on the Kingston Trio, although it does not surprise me. Due respect will be shown for that fact, when he respects the knowledge and expertise of others, and not one goddamned second before. Respect does not mean agree. It means respect.
Respect in this instance is defined as what is said is to be considered true, to the best of our knowledge and belief. The point can be argued and debated, when there is a question, but respect demands that the alternative point of view presented, must be backed up with some evidence from a reputable source calling into question what was first laid on the table. For instance if I should say the Allies had no knowledge of German plans for the Bulge, the person disputing this all knowing utterance of mine could come back and say, nay, a thousand times nay. The Ultra intercepts clearly show preparations being made, they were intercepted and decoded in plenty of time and ONLY Colonel Monk Dixon G-2 of First Army interpreted them correctly, and no one would listen to him. That then would cause my initial statement to be incorrect, and the statement invalidated. And if Time For Trumpets page so and so footnoted so and so, by Charles MacDonald is referenced, then that is refutation with respect.
Now if an opinion is offered regarding say points and flankers, a practice known since the most ancient of times, stating that being standard combat best practices, it can be assumed that they were used at LBH, although we only have one mention of it. If you wish to dispute this you better damned well have some reference to back you up, otherwise the dispute is nothing more than pigeon poop.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 1, 2014 17:52:56 GMT -6
Chuck, Patton's G-2 Col. Oscar Strong also had deduced the Bulge. Patton passed the info on to Ike, who passed it on to his G-2 Gen. Ken Strong, who promptly ignored it.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2014 18:38:09 GMT -6
Oscar Koch. I was aware of that as well, but Dickson (mis-spelled originally) was First Army G-2 and I think was in a better position to know having more data than Koch. Both of course were correct, and it did neither a hell of a lot of good.
Tom I think Koch made his deductions as part of the whiffing for Patton's planned attack. More of a instance of this happens or that happens what would be our contingencies. At least that is my impression. Patton's turn around of III Corps was an outgrowth of Koch's thinking and deducing. The plan then was already in place, awaiting only the execution order. Smart thinking and excellent staff procedures. I don't know if Koch ever sent his suspicions upward to 12th Army Group, or SHAFE, but I do not believe he did.. I think MacDonald is silent on the issue but I will refresh myself tonight or tomorrow. Perhaps Cole in the official history says something but as Cole and MacDonald were close, and Cole's work predates MacDonald I cant see Charles not including it if Cole did.
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Post by fred on Dec 1, 2014 18:46:09 GMT -6
I'm a bit surprised. The toughest part of sorting out the LBH for me was Keogh/Calhoun. The "gap" sure helped with that. Ask away, Chris; any time, you know that. The Custer battle was fairly straightforward for me, once I had my timing techniques down. I had a lot of measuring to do and my nephew and I checked out various speeds and maneuvers in a field and on the local high school track. We would exaggerate the times a bit to simulate properly movements in tougher terrain, but the real key to solving most of this for me was in my development of these things I call "Incident Reports." I culled every comment I could about specific actions, then put them all together in spreadsheets. When you make the side-by-side comparisons, you would be surprised at how much sense many of them make. The entire flow of the battle fit beautifully once I was able to fit in all the various accounts. The timeline verified everything without a single hitch and the really weird part was when I compared all that to the sounds heard by guys like Gerard, DeRudio, et al., farther upstream, and their estimates of the battle sounds and length of time they heard the firing. It was almost eerie. When I read what the survivors said about what they heard and when they heard it, then checked the action on the timeline, it became almost weird... it was almost as though the whole battle was being re-enacted in front of me. Almost chilling at times. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2014 20:18:30 GMT -6
Tom: Checked MacDonald and here are the cliff notes
Koch was concerned, thinking that he did not share the view that the enemy was beaten, pointing to the fact that they had twelve identified divisions out of the line. His main concern was that these divisions would be shifted 1) to counter the Third Army attack in the south 2 shifted north to counter the impending attack to the Ruhr, or 3) launch a spoiling attack in the Ardennes to delay the execution of options 1 and 2. There is no mention of predicting a major counter offensive that I can see, a several division spoiling attack only.
Koch presented all this to Patton. Patton instructed his staff based on Koch's presentation that nothing was to interfere with Third Army's planned 19 December attack, and directed the staff to "begin "limited outline planning" to meet any threat that may emerge from enemy action in the Ardennes. Patton concluded with "We'll be in a position to meet whatever happens".
I saw no mention of Koch expressing his concerns to 12th Army Group or SHAFE.
I place the same stock in Charles MacDonald, the former Chief Historian of the European Theater for the Center of Military History on all things concerning D Day to VE Day as I do in Fred Wagner for things concerning LBH.
MacDonald goes to great lengths in his first book, Company Commander, published before he joined CMH, to outline why the Ardennes was so concerning. MacDonald was with the 2nd Infantry Division when it held the same positions that were held by the 106th ID which was overrun, surrounded and destroyed in the Bulge. During his time there they shifted from a fairly compact linear defense to an elongated series of outposts to facilitate the withdrawal of units to participate in the planned attack up north. In other words the 2nd ID normal division front to a length of front that would normally be held by a corps. The other VIII Corps Bulge divisions did the same. Anyone in his right mind should have been concerned, but Bradley would not listen. Hodges and Middleton were left holding Bradley's bag.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 2, 2014 5:57:29 GMT -6
Chuck my copy of Company Commander arrived on Saturday morning, I started reading it yesterday, I like the way MacDonald goes to great lengths when he mentions every man in his company not only by name but by state, in the book I am enjoying how he and his platoon commanders have just been shown the place in the line were they have to replace another company, it his first action as a company commander and he initially wants to put two platoons in the line and keep the third as a reserve, but the gap he has to hold is too long for two platoons so he has to fields all three.
Very good stuff, glad you recommended it Chuck, thanks.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 2, 2014 7:11:13 GMT -6
Chuck you are absolutely correct, I would not doubt you, and never MacDonald. So Eisenhower got the info at least twice, probably more. His G-2 disregarded it. On 8 December 1944 Fort Driant surrendered. On the morning of 9 December 1944 Patton and Koch met to plan Operation Tink, that was supposed to kick off in 10 Days. Koch told Patton that as things stood now it looked as though he would face a small and vulnerable German force where he planned to cross the Rhine, into Germany. He points out that this is not the case on the 3rd army's left flank. Thirteen German infantry divisions have been relocated there. Information comes from his own German speaking spies, and recon info from the 1st Army. There is much more regarding mismanagement at this juncture and beyond, to include limited support from the north of the 1st Army, after the Bulge started, and so on. Admittedly there was limited air recon due to the fact that the majority of tank and artillery movements were done under cover of darkness, but the 1st Army scouts reported hearing the movements. If it had not been for the Allied weight of numbers and resources, and the fact that the Germans ran out of fuel the outcome of this action would have been far more devastating than it was.
I will, however, defer to you after the above last whimper.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 2, 2014 7:34:49 GMT -6
Tom, the offensive cost the Germans nearly 100.000 men and over 600 AFVs, the western allies were going nowhere at the time, and these men and vehicles could be put to better use stopping Stalin’s forces from revenging their home land rather than trying to capture a supply port in Belgium, totally crazy and no wonder many never took any warnings seriously, it was however the largest engagement ever fought by the US Army, the Bulge along with D-Day are my two favourites from ETO, so seeing that it is the 80th anniversary here are a few images; linkIan.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 2, 2014 8:19:30 GMT -6
Wonderful link, Ian. Thank you.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 2, 2014 8:55:09 GMT -6
You are welcome Tom, hey did Led Zeppelin ever play any of them venues you listed above?
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 2, 2014 9:08:30 GMT -6
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 2, 2014 9:20:20 GMT -6
My God Tom! Zep played there, it looks very small, I bet they blew the joint apart. With being a young cat (only 56) I missed them, by the time I got old enough to go to gigs they had become a stadium band and mainly toured the states.
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 2, 2014 9:24:09 GMT -6
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Post by tubman13 on Dec 2, 2014 9:27:05 GMT -6
We should stop filling this thread with trivia!
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Post by Yan Taylor on Dec 2, 2014 9:37:36 GMT -6
Yes I agree, once you guys start talking music then I feel compelled to join in, lets get back on the horse.
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