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Post by tubman13 on Oct 11, 2014 16:51:52 GMT -6
WO, welcome back, and best said after all of my blather.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 12, 2014 4:40:39 GMT -6
Hi Justin, the 7th as a whole was lacking in a lot of areas, Officers being one, I realise that having a full strength Regiment is nigh on impossible but they were really weakened, as here is a Regiment at full strength Regiment. 1 colonel 1 lieutenant colonel 3 majors 12 captains 1 adjutant (lieutenant) 1 QM (lieutenant) 12 first lieutenants 12 second lieutenants 1 sergeant major 1 QM sergeant 1 saddler sergeant 1 chief trumpeter 1 chief musician 12 first sergeants 60 sergeants (5 per company) 48 corporals (4 per company) 24 trumpeters (2 per company) 24 farriers/blacksmiths (2 per company) 12 saddlers 12 wagoners 648 privates (54 per company) Here is a graph that I have posted before; Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Oct 12, 2014 15:28:52 GMT -6
Ian,
I think it was the 2 missing majors and 4 missing captains that really altered the command structure.
The GAC wing companies were probably commanded on the day by Smith, Reilly, Calhoun, Harrington and Porter (with Keogh/Yates commanding battalions and TWC acting as ADC to his brother). Not a captain amongst the 5 companies, and some with only a single officer (F, C, I). L additionally had a 1 eyed infantryman and E additionally had a rookie (who may have assumed command during the battle, judging by the location of Smith's body and Smith was a semi-invalid himself even when unwounded).
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 13, 2014 6:38:35 GMT -6
Justin, have you noticed the difference in how the US Army have a more larger Sergeant to Corporal ratio then the British, I don’t know what the ratio is in a modern British Platoon, but in WW2 and later, each UK/Inf Platoon would have three Corporals (and three Lance Corporals) to one Sergeant, here we see 60 Sergeants to 48 Corporals, I know this was back in 1876, but in WW2 a standard US Infantry Platoon would have five Sergeants to three Corporals, I have found that most US units are top heavy in Sergeants.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 13, 2014 9:28:04 GMT -6
We have far too many general officers too, but that is beside the point.
Part of what you elude to is pay and career progression, but the other part is a window into how our units are organized. At the squad level there is a staff sergeant, the squad leader, and two sergeants, the fire team leaders. The fire team leaders are meant to be fighter leaders - go where I go - Do what I do. I suppose we wish to pay them for the effort. In combat though you see all this whittled down considerably, and if you have two or three leaders remaining during periods of extended intense combat, you can consider yourself lucky.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 13, 2014 9:40:44 GMT -6
Chuck, that is a lot more streamlined to what I have circa 1944;
1/ Technical Sergeant (located @ PHQ) 2/ Staff Sergeant (located @ PHQ) 3/Staff Sergeants (three in total and in the rifle squads)
So if the officer commanding gets put out of action, I would guess that the Tech Sgt would take over as he was a grade 2 compared to the grade 3 listed Staff Sgts, I suppose if the Tech also goes down the command would fall of the Staff Sgt who got promoted first, I think.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 13, 2014 10:04:45 GMT -6
Technical Sergeants in theory had no command role. They were specialists.
Often under dire circumstances a platoon or squad were led by the senior man, and just as often that could be a corporal or private first class. The cut off platoon of 1-7 Cavalry at LZ XRAY for instance was led through most of that two day experience by a sergeant, who was slotted as a fire team leader. His name was Ernie Savage, and he should have rated the MOH for what he did, in my opinion.
We try to develop enlisted leaders early in their careers, mainly because we know these things happen.
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Post by welshofficer on Oct 13, 2014 12:38:06 GMT -6
Ian,
Just a product of differing philosophies. British Army hierarchy hate conscription other than under extreme wartime conditions, and ideally want long service professionals. Harmony requires lots of NCOs or few NCOs. Which do you think HM Treasury prefers?!
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 13, 2014 12:50:30 GMT -6
Ian, Just a product of differing philosophies. British Army hierarchy hate conscription other than under extreme wartime conditions, and ideally want long service professionals. Harmony requires lots of NCOs or few NCOs. Which do you think HM Treasury prefers?! WO Justin, By the looks of it reservists. The rank of L/Corp is not a rank in the US Army, I think the closest they come to this is PFC. The US Army also had a technical grade system, but this may linked pay performance. Ian.
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Post by montrose on Oct 13, 2014 13:05:50 GMT -6
I can not talk to UK manpower policies. But I can about US, lol.
In the 1870s and 1970s the US Army ran a volunteer force, at conscript pay rates. What you end up with is a smaller force than a conscript Army, filled with soldiers less capable than conscripts.
The other hidden issue is that volunteer Armies try to use less coercion than conscript forces. So in both Armies there was an explosion of discipline issues. The 1870s Army had an annual desertion rate of 25%. I am surprised that the many military folks here don't seem to react to that. It boggles my mind.
I was a platoon leader in the 80s when the Army decided to clean up the 1870s Army. I had a 32 man platoon and in 18 months I chaptered out of the Army 30 of them. Overwhelmingly for drugs.
Now the real challenge here is first termers and lifers. Armies need first termers who join and leave. Many are encouraged to leave, and we have many ways to give the muttonheads an incentive. The US Army has many more folks in the E-4 to E-6 rank than pretty much any other Army. But note that promotion to these ranks are, by design, at reenlistment time for first termers. We use promotion as an incentive to keep the good folks. And if you are at 4 years of service and still a private, take a hint and flip burgers at McDonalds.
Now look at the 7th in 1876. Their deserters left before the campaign started. They had a bunch of new recruits, but because of piss poor planning by LTC Custer, they didn't have the horses to mount them. So the new guys were left behind. The LBH had a higher than normal proportion of 2nd termers, and lifers. And every indication I have from this battle is that the enlisted men fought well.
Look at the north sector. 5 companies died in 5 clumps, all widely separated. None was in supporting distance of any other. This shows that the enlisted folks stayed under command and control til situation was hopeless. It also shows that the officers in the northern sector were grossly incompetent.
Her's a question? Who was the worst officer at LBH: Keogh or DeRudio? Keogh by a mile, since the enlisted personnel refused to obey the coward DeRudio. Keogh's gross incompetence not only caused the annihilation of his command, but causing minimal enemy casualties in the process. And I believe Calhoun, Crittenden, and Harrington all performed like heroes that day.
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Post by welshofficer on Oct 13, 2014 13:20:29 GMT -6
Now look at the 7th in 1876. Their deserters left before the campaign started. They had a bunch of new recruits, but because of piss poor planning by LTC Custer, they didn't have the horses to mount them. SO the new guys were left behind. SO the LBH had a higher than normal proportion of 2nd termers, and lifers. And every indication I have from this battle is that the enlisted men fought well. Look at the north sector. % companies died in 5 clumps, all widely separated. None was in supporting distance of any other. This shows that the enlisted folks stayed under command and control til situation was hopeless. It also shows that the officers in the northern sector were grossly incompetent.
Her's a question? WHo was the worst officer at LBH: Keough or DeRudio? Keough by a mile, since the enlisted personnel refused to obey the coward DeRudio. Keough's gross incompetence not only caused the annihilation of his command, but causing minimal enemy casualties in the process. And I believe Calhoun, Crittenden, and Harrington all performed like heroes that day. Montrose,
I wish more folks would grasp the highlighted paragraph, which I think is spot on. Obviously there are the bunching allegations, in extremis, but not evidence of widespread flight as the primary cause of tactical disintegration.
I have to reserve judgement on Harrington, because I was not there to witness what went wrong down in the swale. I suspect that Calhoun got fixed in wheeling to support and reel in Harrington survivors, fatally weakening his fencing fire into "Henryville".
WO
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Post by Dark Cloud on Oct 13, 2014 14:25:59 GMT -6
"Look at the north sector. % companies died in 5 clumps, all widely separated. None was in supporting distance of any other. This shows that the enlisted folks stayed under command and control til situation was hopeless. It also shows that the officers in the northern sector were grossly incompetent."
I'm not convinced any of that is true. There were five sorta clumps and we know there were five companies with Custer, but were the clumps so closely composed of one company that we can definitely say this? There are lines of soldiers between Keogh (no 'u' in Keogh, WO) and LSH which could indicate they broke and ran or were under command when running, and we can't say which way they all were going. The supposed skirmish line by Deep Ravine could be such, or it could be markers placed to indicate such, as Camp thought.
Please recall: the markers only indicate where people were buried first, and even that isn't for sure; not where they fell, not where they died. From them, however, you are willing to condemn fellow officers of the US Army as incompetent 130 odd years later? IF the markers showed where people fell, such could be hypothesized by combat vets. But you aren't looking at the dead as they fell. And if you judge all officers by the standards you judge DeRudio and Keogh - both Catholics.....well, sorta - how does Custer emerge? How about Weir? Edgerly and his nonsensical tale of the farrier, which he blamed on Weir and then Reno.
If DeRudio were a coward, odd he joins the army - and that for years - wherein no charges of cowardice were ever brought despite being in combat. He was a Catholic officer with an accent and the affected ways of European nobility - which he was both part of and not - and he rubbed Benteen wrong and others. But one group of enlisted men liked him enough to give him a gold sword in 1870, which annoyed Custer. If he lied, nobody dared call him out, and if a bad soldier with admitted enemies he somehow got an honorable discharge. He married beneath his status someone he apparently loved and who loved him and who pled for his life. He survived and thrived in San Francisco, as snooty a town as any on the east coast till he died.
I only ask that these condemnations of yours - they might be true, for all I know - be couched in less sureness. People did think that of DeRudio and Keogh. But others did not, and there's nothing of proof one way or the other. If the theory Keogh was shot where Comanche's wound corresponded, he likely had a broken thigh just above the knee, loss of femoral blood, and may not have been at his best when constructing his defense.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 13, 2014 15:12:17 GMT -6
DC: I suspect your observations are about as accurate as your observation of who misspelled Keogh.
You really must try to make the effort to be more observant , and curb your lust for the vindictive comeback, lest it bite you in the butt as it did here.
The only takeaway from your observations are that you did not thoroughly read the text so what validity can therefore be given to your comments?
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Post by quincannon on Oct 13, 2014 16:04:37 GMT -6
WO: I fully agree with Montrose on Calhoun and Crittenden. Harrington is a two sided coin--- possibly. We really don't know if he was ordered down in that coulee or went there on his own hook. If it was the latter then he gets a triple check mark for exercising poor judgment. I don't have any question though about his courage. None. I think it an error to lump courage with competence though, as if they were one in the same. We tend to give a pass to the courageous incompetent. I suppose dying with courage makes better copy than discerning what manner of incompetence may have caused the person to die in the first place.
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Post by welshofficer on Oct 13, 2014 16:50:57 GMT -6
WO: I fully agree with Montrose on Calhoun and Crittenden. Harrington is a two sided coin--- possibly. We really don't know if he was ordered down in that coulee or went there on his own hook. If it was the latter then he gets a triple check mark for exercising poor judgment. I don't have any question though about his courage. None. I think it an error to lump courage with competence though, as if they were one in the same. We tend to give a pass to the courageous incompetent. I suppose dying with courage makes better copy than discerning what manner of incompetence may have caused the person to die in the first place. QC,
I simply will not assess Harrington's judgement without being a witness to what happened to C company and whether he was acting under orders and, if so, the terms of those orders.
The evidence strongly points to the GAC wing unravelling from Harrington's C company, and quickly so.
I question not his courage.
WO
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