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Post by montrose on May 28, 2015 5:48:11 GMT -6
Montrose: Your insight is appreciated and noted. I do have two questions which are sometimes not taken into account when various alternate theories of attack are advanced concerning LBH. First you can't put a horse in a canter much less a gallop in more than a foot of water. Where could an all out charge have occurred? Second there is talk about the cavalry kicking up clouds of dust to reveal their position to others under Custer's command, but would the terrain and grass produced such clouds. There are plenty of examples where cavalry is concealed by undulating terrain at less than 200 yards. I am not following you here. The engagements in LBH were in the valley, Reno Hill and Battle Ridge. A foot or more of water is not present at any area where combat took place, except the Reno retreat crossing. AN all out charge was possible everywhere. Clouds of dust were noted by hundreds of participant on both sides. There was a movie filmed on the battlefield, I think Little Big Man. Look at the clouds of dust in this movie. I assume you mean that given dust and undulating terrain, it was possible to launch a mounted charge at a range of 200 meters, or less. I fully agree. So why did neither side do this? Because it would be suicide. I agree with you that the weapon systems at LBH had an effective range of 300 meters. But they would operate far better at 100-200 meters. Closing the gap is an enormous challenge in combat. I have trained soldiers from several 3rd world armies, maybe 9 African and 3 Mideast (and Italy, do they count?). One of these was equipped with SKS rifles, a cast off WW2 weapon from USSR. In four hours of training I can get these folks to effectively hit targets at 200 meters. I admit 300 meters is problematic, but today we have these things called machineguns, mortars, grenade launchers, etc to cover that. The main challenge is training officers and NCOs on range estimation, and controlling fire. At LBH we see that 7th Cav leadership allowed extensive firing at targets in the 600-800 meter range. Thousands of rounds were fired on Luce/Nye ridge, at targets far outside effective range, and there is no evidence they hit a single Indian. Shooting at targets at a range with a zero hit probability occurred all over this battle. The 7th had a very clear training problem, that contributed to their defeat. What is interesting is that this shows a clear training problem of the soldier, but a far more significant training problem of the officers and NCOs. In fact, it shows that the officers and NCOs were incompetent/
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Post by fred on May 28, 2015 6:13:40 GMT -6
I do not wish to visit a Custer Fan Club because I do not need my opinions to be reinforced but challenged by facts. Am I in the right place for that or are opinions here so hardened that discussion is unwelcome? Unlike the way some wish to portray it, this is not an anti-George Armstrong Custer site. The difference between this site and others is that, here, the posters generally take a more balanced, more critical, more intellectual view of GAC and the LBH. In additional, there are several former military men-- Army, Navy, and Air Force; enlisted and officer ranks-- something other sites do not really have... or have lost. While this site may seem to be anti-Custer, that is a false impression. Let us not lose sight of the fact the man lost the battle and along with it, the lives of 267 other men. As the commander-- and it is apparent I needn't tell you this-- he bears responsibility and therefore is open to more criticism than others. The major rub here-- at this site-- is the hyperbolic criticism others receive, more as an excuse for Custer's failures than for their own actions. Some who post here blame the posters for the tenor of the board, but in reality, it is the subject responsible for the board's tenor. As for me, personally, I am absolutely no expert on the LBH and I do not post as frequently (except for "bursts" here and there) as I used to (do not let the "posts" numbers fool you: I have come and gone from this site more times than I have come and gone from work!), but I can assure you I would step in and use my paltry knowledge to fight off anyone who decides he is anti-Custer or who posts with the hatred inherent in so many LBH partisans, one way or the other. That isn't history... and it certainly isn't truth. Like I tell my children, I am no longer in the "advice business," but if I can leave one small piece on the table: support what you say; support what you believe; support what you think happened. Facts... such as they might be... as a good friend-- "dave"-- told me, "You are not entitled to an opinion. You are entitled to an informed opinion. No one is entitled to ignorance." Best piece of advice I have seen in 75 years... well... a long time, anyway. And welcome. I hope you enjoy it here; I hope you make friends (many have); and I hope to learn from your knowledge. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mac on May 28, 2015 6:51:59 GMT -6
Jaguar Welcome! It is always good to have more thoughtful posters. This is a board for the use of evidence. Once this is understood you will see no particular bias. The only thing that doesn't fly here is unsupported opinion because that is not how the discipline of history operates. Cheers
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 7:01:57 GMT -6
Beth: The books I have read are in this order: Glory Hunter the Life of Custer, Custer Favor the Bold, A Terrible Glory Custer and the Little Bighorn, many portions of Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn, and am currently reading The Last Days of George Armstrong Custer a book which came out in February of this year. To let you know a little bit about me. My interest in LBH was rekindled strangely enough by a trip to East Cavalry Field at Gettysburg and having just read the book Protecting the Flank at Gettysburg. The author rightfully gives credit to Gregg for setting the pieces and putting them in motion, but gives short shrift to the contributions of Custer who with a force one third the size of Jeb Stuart’s successfully made two charges that turned the battle in the Union’s favor. This was no small feat given that Union cavalry had not faired well against Confederate cavalry and had just held its own at Brandy Station with a larger force. So the thought occurred to me that to win battles you need not only strategic thinking but doers, who always proved to be in short supply. I have read nearly every publication concerning Union cavalry including after action reports and a study conducted in the 188o’s by a general who examined nearly every significant engagement in which cavalry was employed together with every cavalry training manual written since the Mexican American War. Together with an interest in weapons of the time of which I have collected a few and my own experience riding horses I want to examine different theories of LBH to understand what I don’t know and to draw some of my own conclusions.
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 7:05:28 GMT -6
I do not wish to visit a Custer Fan Club because I do not need my opinions to be reinforced but challenged by facts. Am I in the right place for that or are opinions here so hardened that discussion is unwelcome? Unlike the way some wish to portray it, this is not an anti-George Armstrong Custer site. The difference between this site and other is that, here, the posters generally take a more balanced, more critical, more intellectual view of GAC and the LBH. In additional, there are several former military men-- Army, Navy, and Air Force; enlisted and officer ranks-- something other sites do not really have... or have lost.
While this site may seem to be anti-Custer, that is a false impression. Let us not lose sight of the fact the man lost the battle and along with it, the lives of 267 other men. As the commander-- and it is apparent I needn't tell you this-- he bears responsibility and therefore is open to more criticism than others. The major rub here-- at this site-- is the hyperbolic criticism others receive, more as an excuse for Custer's failures than for their own actions.
Some who post here blame the posters for the tenor of the board, but in reality, it is the subject responsible for the board's tenor. As for me, personally, I am absolutely no expert on the LBH and I do not post as frequently (except for "bursts" here and there) as I used to (do not let the "posts" numbers fool you: I have come and gone from this site more times than I have come and gone from work!), but I can assure you I would step in and use my paltry knowledge to fight off anyone who decides he is anti-Custer or who posts with the hatred inherent in so many LBH partisans, one way or the other. That isn't history... and it certainly isn't truth.
Like I tell my children, I am no longer in the "advice business," but if I can leave one small piece on the table: support what you say; support what you believe; support what you think happened. Facts... such as they might be... as a good friend-- "dave"-- told me, "You are not entitled to an opinion. You are entitled to an informed opinion. No one is entitled to ignorance." Best piece of advice I have seen in 75 years... well... a long time, anyway.
And welcome. I hope you enjoy it here; I hope you make friends (many have); and I hope to learn from your knowledge.
Best wishes, Fred.
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 7:10:02 GMT -6
Montrose: It is my understanding that training was not done or very little of it occurred because the command would not send enough ammunition to train as it was too costly in its estimate. That decision was made in Washington. Now I have read some who said that Custer could have charged across the river to attack the camp but that does not make sense since he was looking for just the ability to ford it. So how could the Indian encampment be charged? One more question regarding dust. Hasn't the vegetation changed significantly since the battle I thought there was a lot more grass then, but I could be wrong?
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Post by Beth on May 28, 2015 8:16:18 GMT -6
What an appallingly ugly piece of history. But I am struck by the fact that Mosby would have adapted better to the Indian Wars. Look at Mosby bio. interesting guy who became friends with Grant. Did much in later life. He did not let his military life define him. I am sure Will knows many fine former Special Operators, whose former life has not defined them post military. If you get a chance to see Ted Williams bio, HOF baseball player, look at military decorations. Yes Steve he was a Marine..
Regards, Tom
I spent the evening reading up on him. Very fascinating person and admirable. Beth
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 8:57:32 GMT -6
Jaguar: If you believe that I equate horse with tanks you are sadly mistaken. I made no such claim.
Prior to the advent of rifled, then rifled relatively rapid fire weapons the function of cavalry on the battlefield was fairly wide in that they performed both the roles of reconnaissance, and security, but were also used as a mounted assault force, such as we see with the Union Brigade at Waterloo. Sheridan, Wilson and others attempted to utilize cavalry and mounted Infantry during the ACW as a part of the main battle force. It showed potential for large force mobility, but those last two hundred yards remained problematic in that the exponential increase in firepower rendered those two hundred yards death ground, and a mounted man made a far better target than a man on foot.
Cavalry remained but languished in the post ACW to the eve of WWII. They were used here, as a constabulary, an auxiliary, but still a mission remained looking only for a mount. There were those in the U S Army that fought to retain the horse as late as the mid 1950 (I can give you a reference for that if you desire)
There was no suitable mount available until the scout car (what cavalry called Bantams, and the rest of the world called jeeps), the reliable light armored car, the light fast tank (this latter to get the recon guys out of trouble, and the self propelled howitzer came along. These systems were combined to equip cavalry, but the mission was limited to reconnaissance and security.
The assault portion of the mission was taken up by the tank and a new force was created, the Armored Force. That was the force that assumed the mission that Sheridan undertook when he skirted Lee and headed for Richmond culminating at Yellow Tavern. That was the mission that was assumed from Wilson's late war attempts in the deep south.
So if you think that the cavalry mission, is fulfilled in the mission of Armor you are deeply in error.
Cavalry is a battlefield function limited to reconnaissance, security and economy of force.
Armor is the mounted portion of the main battle force.
There was a mission split and that split was largely caused by the era now under discussion, and technology forced that split.
Now be advised, your dogmatic approach may be fine if it satisfies your wants and needs, but in the world we live in here dogma is useless, and fragile, and the dogmatic dreams of youth will eventually be shattered, while doctrine and function remain constant.
You are quite correct if you wish to confine your studies to a relative short period, a blink of God's eye. But you don't study war, you study one war, where most of us here study the art and continuum of war.
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Post by Beth on May 28, 2015 9:07:43 GMT -6
Montrose: It is my understanding that training was not done or very little of it occurred because the command would not send enough ammunition to train as it was too costly in its estimate. That decision was made in Washington. Now I have read some who said that Custer could have charged across the river to attack the camp but that does not make sense since he was looking for just the ability to ford it. So how could the Indian encampment be charged? One more question regarding dust. Hasn't the vegetation changed significantly since the battle I thought there was a lot more grass then, but I could be wrong? The vegetation has changed, because of introduction of some invasive plants like cheat grass but one of the biggest change to the whole ecosystem of the plains is the removal of the bison. You can't remove such a keystone species to the plains and expect it to remain unchanged. Even with grass, you have dust. If you go feel your lawn, (unless you currently in Texas) you will see that the very top dirt is dry and the moisture is held lower. When you have 1000's of people and animals moving around, you trample down the grass and you get even more dust--lots of dust. As for charging the village. The river was fordable, but once Custer went up on the bluffs, his choices of places to ford were extremely curtailed. Custer didn't seem to be looking for just any place to get across. He was looking for what he thought was the right place to ford--some place ahead of the fleeing villagers. Beth
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Post by dave on May 28, 2015 9:13:32 GMT -6
Jaguar: If you believe that I equate horse with tanks you are sadly mistaken. I made no such claim. Prior to the advent of rifled, then rifled relatively rapid fire weapons the function of cavalry on the battlefield was fairly wide in that they performed both the roles of reconnaissance, and security, but were also used as a mounted assault force, such as we see with the Union Brigade at Waterloo. Sheridan, Wilson and others attempted to utilize cavalry and mounted Infantry during the ACW as a part of the main battle force. It showed potential for large force mobility, but those last two hundred yards remained problematic in that the exponential increase in firepower rendered those two hundred yards death ground, and a mounted man made a far better target than a man on foot. Cavalry remained but languished in the post ACW to the eve of WWII. They were used here, as a constabulary, an auxiliary, but still a mission remained looking only for a mount. There were those in the U S Army that fought to retain the horse as late as the mid 1950 (I can give you a reference for that if you desire) There was no suitable mount available until the scout car (what cavalry called Bantams, and the rest of the world called jeeps), the reliable light armored car, the light fast tank (this latter to get the recon guys out of trouble, and the self propelled howitzer came along. These systems were combined to equip cavalry, but the mission was limited to reconnaissance and security. The assault portion of the mission was taken up by the tank and a new force was created, the Armored Force. That was the force that assumed the mission that Sheridan undertook when he skirted Lee and headed for Richmond culminating at Yellow Tavern. That was the mission that was assumed from Wilson's late war attempts in the deep south. So if you think that the cavalry mission, is fulfilled in the mission of Armor you are deeply in error. Cavalry is a battlefield function limited to reconnaissance, security and economy of force. Armor is the mounted portion of the main battle force. There was a mission split and that split was largely caused by the era now under discussion, and technology forced that split. Now be advised, your dogmatic approach may be fine if it satisfies your wants and needs, but in the world we live in here dogma is useless, and fragile, and the dogmatic dreams of youth will eventually be shattered, while doctrine and function remain constant. You are quite correct if you wish to confine your studies to a relative short period, a blink of God's eye. But you don't study war, you study one war, where most of us here study the art and continuum of war. QC Excellent post! You have just proven my point about your skills, which makes me a genius. Modesty is so difficult to have. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 9:59:17 GMT -6
Dave:
Jaguar is not alone in his lack of knowledge about the cavalry function. It is little understood outside the confines of the military itself, and from time to time they do not understand it either.
There was a fairly well known in his time Brit named Richard Simkin who wrote numerous articles for Armor Magazine and at least one book that I know of "Race To The Swift" One notable quote of his I always remember is "Boot is to track, as track is to rotor" He was speaking of the mobility differential between the dismounted and mounted portion of the main battle force, but did not stop there. He lamented that over the years the mounted main battle force and the force that screened and secured them had grown so mount alike, that the required mobility differential between the screener and the screened had disappeared, and needed to be corrected with yet a new mount. He drew on the monumental work of LTG James Gavin's landmark Collier's Magazine article "Cavalry, And I Don't Mean Horses".
I went back and obtained a copy of Gavin, which led me to the Howze Board report, and having grown up on Thomason's JEB Stuart, and being filled with the same romantic ideas of our newest member, it was only then, a First Lieutenant at the time, that I realized that cavalry was a function, and not just an byproduct of the updated and reequipped, renamed Armor Branch (by law the continuation of cavalry).
So while we ponder these things the cavalry function on the battlefield will continue, it must continue. One day there will be space cavalry, riding on platforms we have yet to dream of. There will always be an Infantry as well, and the Armor, mobile portion of the main battle force will be there as well. Their starship may well be named Audie Murphy, Sheridan, Roger Young, or JEB Stuart, but you can bet your sweet ass there will not be a George Custer.
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Post by fred on May 28, 2015 10:19:22 GMT -6
The vegetation has changed, because of introduction of some invasive plants like cheat grass but one of the biggest change to the whole ecosystem of the plains is the removal of the bison. You can't remove such a keystone species to the plains and expect it to remain unchanged. I am not sure how true this is regarding the flora, but you are 100% correct about the buffalo. I do not know what has or has not been introduced, so it is hard for me to say. Seasons and years change, so one year's drought leads to another's rain-forest: who is to say? I have photos of a lush green battlefield and photos of a dry, sere field. To me, the biggest changes are the loss of the "gap" and the extension of Deep Ravine. As for dust, 20,000 grazing ponies in several different areas; 92-degree heat for several days; 10,000 people-- give or take a dozen or two-- can wear out a green field pretty quickly and when you add the lack of cordite to old-fashioned ammunition, you have all the dust and smoke anyone could want. Best wishes, Fred.
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 10:26:15 GMT -6
Quincannon: You confused me when you wrote: "You have been reading all too many funny books. I would suggest to you that it takes the very same stuff to ride in Colts tank as it did to mount a horse draw your saber and ride into shot and shell. The difference is in degree. If hit in 1865 you got a hole in you, probably a fairly clean hole, fell off your horse and brake your neck. Today you would be burned alive to a crisp. It's all relative." I thought for sure you were making a comparison between an assault by horse cavalry and tanks. The fact that you could be killed either way is not disputed and irrelevant to the point. Frontal assaults by cavalry were more successful during Napoleon's time not because of smooth bores but because an assault would include 20k or more heavy cavalry on open ground. Cannons created the problem for cavalry then as did the square formation. In the CW there was little open ground and not near enough cavalry to attempt a charge against infantry whether they shot smooth bore flint locks or percussion cap rifled muskets. I am not dogmatic except as it concerns my desire to make sure my comments are accurately portrayed when I receive a reply. If someone puts words in my mouth I don't claim them.
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 10:26:55 GMT -6
I live in the west as most of you know. Out here we call any wind above ten miles per hour The Chinook. While I live in the normal suburban development, that development is surrounded by land used to graze cattle, open prairie. When the Chinook strikes you can't see your hand in front of you at times, and a haze falls over the land to a point where the sun is a blur.
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 10:32:08 GMT -6
And you have my permission to stay confused Jaguar.
You have not learned one thing in the short time you have been here. Correct that, or slide into irrelevance.
If you are among the "cavalry minded" or just a run of the mill runt like Custer fanboy, do what Beth suggested, go to a place where they thrive and thrill themselves with their fantasies. If you want to discuss doctrine, tactics, organization, reasons for and against, and a rational discussion of leadership and command, then stay, but keep you mouth shut and your ears open until such a time when you can speak with some authority on the subject under discussion. We do not do fiction here, we do fact, and more than anything else we realize that the Custer LBH episode is part of a continuum, where all time does not stop on 25 June but is influenced by what came before, and in turn had an influence on what came after.
Fred I told you I had the personality of a funeral director.
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