I've got a question?

[bob1948]

  Does anyone find it odd that Col Gibbons made the statement about the timber A couple of days after the Battle?  I have always thought that a officer who second guessed another officer had a hidden motive.

[tubman13]

First, welcome, bob1948. Ok I agree with the premise of your statement, for the most part. What do you perceive his agenda to be?

[quincannon]

First I think it would be quite helpful to post the statement in full and elaborate on the context in which the statement was made and to whom. This will serve all here well

An officer making a statement, second guessing, the conduct or performance of another officer may or may not be out of line, depending upon the circumstances. Such statements should always be made in private, and certainly not in the presence of junior officers. The above deals only with the performance of official duties.

The practicality of this though, does not take into consideration the human condition, where anyone feels free to comment on anyone and anything. Under those circumstances you weigh the source of the comment.

You must also consider the perspective of the person making the remark about the event or action. John Gibbon commenting on defense, when it is the same John Gibbon who commanded the Iron Brigade, should probably be listened to. Keep in mind though that John Gibbon was not there, and Marcus Reno was. Marcus Reno saw all portrayed before him. John Gibbon did not, he only imagined it, and did not have to make the decisions. Each battle is different, everything about them, but still the outside observer draws upon their own experience, and that experience may not always be relevant, except in the most broad of context.

The best rule I think is if you do not have anything good to say, say nothing UNLESS it is related to and during the course of official duty.

Personally I think most post LBH statements, particularly that of Miles is smoke blowing, chest puffing, look how great I am bullshit.

[fred]

Since everything is all aswirl here again, I figured this is the best thread to "ask a question."

Henk...

What happened to that long post of yours? Fortunately, I copied it so I could respond to you, item by itm. It would have just been easier to do so by using the quote system here.

Anyway, I am fairly busy, still with some housekeeping chores on the book and now with a new article due in the next Research Review. It will take me a day or so to respond, but I will get to it.

Best wishes,
Fred.

PS-- By the way, I hope this little and most recent dust-up here hasn't chased you away.
FCW

[Deleted]

Fred,

I'm not quite sure which post you are referring to. I deleted all my posts on the infamous page 68. Perhaps you are referring to a post that appeared only shortly on this board with quotes from your article in the Newsletter. That post I deleted because I needed to rethink my questions. 

All the best!
Henk

PS As to the dust-up, it's a storm in a glass of water. <g>

All the best!
Henk

[fred]

For those of you interested, here is Henk's ("hevat") missing post:


“Because Boston Custer had reported Reno’s plight, it was known the major was in some sort of trouble – its full extent, never known – but like … those … who say, had Custer been in trouble at Ford B he would have retreated the way he had come …, it is not an unreasonable assumption for Custer to believe Reno would do the same thing, i.e., move back up-valley …” (Fred in: LBHA NEWSLETTER 23/2 p. 5)

“It is my opinion the slowness of the Indian build-up was a key factor in Custer's move north.”
"The man was no fool." (Fred in: Post 06-08-2014)

Fred,

These two quotes from your post of 06-08-2014 intrigue me. I accept that the Indian build-up was slow, however I cannot quite see why that is a reason to continue moving north - IF one is no fool, and I agree with you that Custer was no fool.

I'I'll try to explain myself. You conclude your article in the Newsletter speaking of Custer's "failed assumptions". In my - very humble <g> - opinion there is no need for assumptions. The circumstances seem to have been clear, in essence. What isn't clear, however, is how these circumstances did justify Custer's actions.

All the best!
Henk

=====

Premise:
Circumstances justify Custer’s decisions.

Given:
1. Custer moves north on the east bank.
2. Custer sends two companies to Ford B.
3. Custer reunites with these companies on Calhoun Hill.

Questions:
Ad 1. How do circumstances justify Custer’s movement north on the east bank?

Gerard informs Cooke that the Indians are attacking on the west bank.
Reno sends two messengers to Custer with the same information.

Custer knows that Reno is meeting more resistance than expected.

Ad 2. How do circumstances justify the movement of two companies to Ford B?

Boston informs Custer that Reno is in some kind of trouble.
Rule: if Reno retreats, it will be the way he came, i.e. Ford A.

Custer knows that:
1. the distance between his and the remainder of Reno’s battalion will increase when Reno has to retreat
2. in that case he will no longer be protected in the rear.

Movement to Ford B attracts the attention not only of the 150 or so Indians on the east bank but also of those on the west bank.

Custer knows that he has the attention of all Indians with the exception of those harassing Reno.

Ad 3. How do circumstances justify a reunion on Calhoun Hill?

Calhoun Hill is to the northeast of Ford B.
Custer’s battalion no longer poses a direct threat to the village (is seen but cannot see, according to Indian accounts).
The reunion gives the Indians time to take position between Custer and Reno and between Custer and the village.

Custer knows that the distance will increase:
1. (even more) between him and the rest of his regiment
2. between him and the Indian village.




Henk... if you do not want this here, please let me know and I will take it down. In the meantime, I am working on answering each point and will post all that as soon as I am finishes.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Deleted]

Henk... if you do not want this here, please let me know and I will take it down. In the meantime, I am working on answering each point and will post all that as soon as I am finishes.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred,

No problem at all. I just wasn't very happy with the post myself and wanted to rethink my questions. It's very kind of you to help me do this!

All the best!
Henk

[quincannon]

I don't mean to intrude but this post, those questions, will keep this board busy until the second coming or the next time we see fit to dance around the May pole, whichever comes first.

It's no secret that I have a slight case of indigestion about the two sentences quoted by Fred, the Boston thing, but Henk the questions themselves are insightful, and well stated. We have discussed Boston, but if you read Henk's questions Boston is nearly immaterial to the answers required.

[tubman13]

The heading for this thread could cover it all. I think this battle went sideways from Crows Nest on and have expressed my feeling about scouting, planning, and communication. With that in mind I have 3 questions.

(1) How would you reverse engineer what went down after Crows Nest to come up with positive results?
(2) Should a commander allow his foe to dictate his tactics, on the fly?
(3)And more importantly. How would have things played out(in your opinion)if Custer had actually supported Reno in the valley and sent the same note to Benteen?

Feel free to answer all, any, or none.

Regards,
Tom

[Yan Taylor]

Hi Tom, well it certainly did change after the Crow’s Nest, but I wonder what factors caused such changes to be made, or maybe Custer stuck to what he had planned anyway, but the reports of Indians in the area must have gotten through to Custer, as Lt. Varnum saw three near the divide, plus Sgt Curtiss came across another three searching for the biscuit box, Varnum again sees another three Sioux near the camp, he then comes across another seven, so if we class each Indian sighting as a new threat, then that would make 16 Indians reported in the vicinity, so Custer would be right to think that his column had been spotted and speed up the proceedings.

Now it was after he returned from the Crow’s Nest that he ordered over 80 men to join up with the pack train, so was this standard procedure or did he feel that B Company needed the extra help, so maybe the reports of Indians made him cautious, but not enough to stop him spitting up his command, because after this he moves down Davis Creek and divides his Regiment.
Ian.

[quincannon]

1) No you cannot reengineer the thing as long as Custer is in the picture. Remove Custer and there would be no need for reengineering in the first place.

2) NO. Enemy tactics are considered as one of the factors of METT-TC. They are considered precisely because you don't want them to dictate your actions on the fly or in the john or anywhere else. Winning commanders are in the business of dictating to, not being dictated to.

3) Victory probably marginal, but if you got real lucky it could have been a big one, meeting the campaign objectives.

[quincannon]

It may be helpful here before this thread progresses further, and I hope it does, to review once again the factors of METT-TC, METT-TC is a 20th century creation that changed, adding more detail twice in my time in service (the T and C were added),but the factors themselves, absent the memory aid, were used just as much by Alexander and Napoleon, as they were in Iraq, Afghanistan, or for that matter on the streets of Ferguson, Missouri.

MISSION: What must I do. What is my objective. What is the desired end state. What are my intermediate objectives if any.

ENEMY: Where are the enemy. What strength are they in. What are their dispositions. How well are they sustained. What is the state of their morale.

TERRAIN: Is the terrain favorable or unfavorable to my offensive operations. Is it open, restricted, mixed. Are there built up areas. What are the watercourses, their depth, and fordability. Are there natural or manmade obstacles present. Is my force properly structured to operate in this terrain.

TACTICS: What are the known enemy tactics. Do I have to or should I modify anything that I am about to do in light of these known tactics and tactical habits.

TIME: Is sufficient time available to accomplish the mission. As I plan my deployment have I made allowances for the time it takes for one element of my command to support another should the need arise. How much time can be expended before I must be forced to stop (i.e. Attacking on a winters day at 1600 hours is probably a poor choice of time if you wish to accomplish the mission before dark).

CIVIL CONCIDERATIONS: When I capture all those noncombatants what am I going to do with them. If the roads are clogged by civilian refugees fleeing from the battle area how is that going to effect my approach march to battle and what am I going to do about it.

[tubman13]

Aug 21, 2014 9:01:52 GMT -6 quincannon said:

It may be helpful here before this thread progresses further, and I hope it does, to review once again the factors of METT-TC, METT-TC is a 20th century creation that changed, adding more detail twice in my time in service (the T and C were added),but the factors themselves, absent the memory aid, were used just as much by Alexander and Napoleon, as they were in Iraq, Afghanistan, or for that matter on the streets of Ferguson, Missouri.

MISSION: What must I do. What is my objective. What is the desired end state. What are my intermediate objectives if any.
 Answer: Ok, I'll Bite. Block these NA's from getting away. Return these free roamers to the Rez.. Demonstrate to the Na's this is not going to end until they give up this way of life.
ENEMY: Where are the enemy. What strength are they in. What are their dispositions. How well are they sustained. What is the state of their morale.
Answer: In valley, I think. Scouts say in large #'s and trails seem to indicate same. Don't know. Well sustained. They are loving life, it seems.
TERRAIN: Is the terrain favorable or unfavorable to my offensive operations. Is it open, restricted, mixed. Are there built up areas. What are the watercourses, their depth, and fordability. Are there natural or manmade obstacles present. Is my force properly structured to operate in this terrain.
Answer: I have here say from my NA scouts, I wish I knew for sure. I wish I knew for sure. Mixed, judging from what I have seen. Should be nothing man made or built up. We are structured fine, I think. 
TACTICS: What are the known enemy tactics. Do I have to or should I modify anything that I am about to do in light of these known tactics and tactical habits.
Answer: Generally they don't like protracted engagements, will hit and run to allow movement to safer grounds. Might even disperse in different directions, if allowed. I should block south and southwest exits, as Terry is to the north and the Rez. are mostly east. I don't know for sure where Crook is, but he is not here so right now I want to herd them north if I can. At worst I want a holding operation.  I might even try a white flag when I am in position, to attempt to talk them down(very doubtful, but worth the effort, it might even buy time). 
TIME: Is sufficient time available to accomplish the mission. As I plan my deployment have I made allowances for the time it takes for one element of my command to support another should the need arise. How much time can be expended before I must be forced to stop (i.e. Attacking on a winters day at 1600 hours is probably a poor choice of time if you wish to accomplish the mission before dark).
Answer: Time is critical, as is distance. My command must be in timely supporting distance when we consider all of the unknowns/uncertainties listed above.
CIVIL CONCIDERATIONS: When I capture all those noncombatants what am I going to do with them. If the roads are clogged by civilian refugees fleeing from the battle area how is that going to effect my approach march to battle and what am I going to do about it.
Answer: Egress and ingress are not an issue if I am blocking or holding, unless I must retreat or withdraw. If they flee I  want to funnel them north, let them worry about the roads. I guess, my prime tactic would be constant pressure, as constant as I could make it.

You are the pro here, I only had to deal with minor logistics. Where is Fred, Montrose, and the Welsh Officer to help you hand me my lunch on this. As it is my best shot with all of the uncertainties Custer was facing. Never been to the college in PA, you guys with bars and such get to go to.

Regards,
Tom

[quincannon]

Well I am not going to hand you your lunch, as I skipped it myself.

The notes after METT-TC were not specific to the battle or any battle. They are just examples of the questions the commander aided by his staff asks and answers during the planning process. Examples only as the questions change, based upon the commander's appreciation of what confronts him before he starts the METT-TC process.

[Yan Taylor]

I will endeavour to place METT-TC in relevance to BLBH.

Mission: find the main trail, locate the village
Enemy: known to shy from major engagements, but brave and resourceful
Terrain: could favour both attack and defence
Tactics: irregular but capable of swift movement and ambuscades
Time: try and attack as early as possible in hope to catch enemy in situ
Civil Considerations: big job for 600 men, but as Terry was about to arrive this situation would be eased

One question is, was Custer and the 7th supposed to find the trail, locate the village, attack, destroy the place and take any survivors back to the rez, or was Custer part of a bigger picture, which was capable of such a feat.

P.S. Happy Birthday Tom, chill some beers and open tune your guitar to E Major and get you slide in action.

Ian.