|
Post by fuchs on Mar 28, 2014 14:14:10 GMT -6
If one clouds the truth in this particular form of legend what is the harm. So you are fine with national mythology posing as history. What's the harm in claiming the sun revolves around the earth? That earth was created a few thousand years ago? Who decides where the harm begins?
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Mar 28, 2014 14:22:41 GMT -6
No, you don't know that because that's not correct. What beat the Brits at Yorktown was the formal army in uniform trained by Van Steuben and Washington's other guys and majorly bolstered by the French Army, who knew how to lay siege while Washington really did not, and their huge fleet. There were no Minutemen anywhere after the first round in the Revolution. It's a myth. You left out Count Pulaski and Dekaulb, among others.The Brit Army in America were not their top guys, but often mercenaries and impressed soldiers. Some were. Several of their better officers refused to fight Americans who were so recently their allies and friends. They were fighting the Dutch and then the French again as well, near broke, and not enjoying things during our Revolution. Nobody is contesting the Second Amendment either, certainly not me. That's just something you want to announce to bolster affinity with others here. I don't know, or care, about the political percentages here but nobody is going to be beloved for their political views regardless. I am not looking to be beloved, just factual. My point about the NRA is that they usurped the false myth of the Minutemen. I find no false myth in their courage and the British were going to Lexington and Concord, to confiscate the cache of weapons and ammunition stored there. It ain't true, but it flatters the masses that Boone, Crockett, and Bumpo were just three at random Americans (one fiction, I know)no better than so many others. Well, not true. Sorry NRA. Why do you keep bringing up the NRA, trying to curry favor. In any case, England has had strict gun control for a long time and still seems decent enough. Is their crime rate against persons and property up or down since instituted? So does Norway and so do many other nations. France crawls with guns, always has, and even Russia had armed rural folk right through the Soviet Era. That's how they lived in Siberia. The supposed tyrants who take away guns generally occur in nations where the vast majority of poor NEVER had weapons they could not actually afford anyway and the brutes wanted to keep it that way. Like Germany, Italy, Austria, and maybe Norway never got them back after the Nazi's left. Switzerland, tell me about their gun control while you are at it. Any way much of the above is not why we are on this board.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Mar 28, 2014 15:12:22 GMT -6
Fuchs: You are treading on dangerous ground here. Both Tom and I were Guardsmen, and the Minuteman Statue at Concord Bridge has served us well and been a source of pride, and a symbol of the citizen soldier in this country since the time the men who stood at that bridge stood there, leaving home, farm, and family, to serve a greater cause.
Ordinarily I don't like legends when legends serve no purpose, but every country has them, and as long as they are put to good use there is no harm. When legends serve only to puff the piece, they are less than useless.
Now the Minutemen of Concord happened. The symbolism is far from national mythology. What is also true is that they weren't very good. That does not matter. What matters is they stood
If you don't like it speaking for all of the citizen soldiers who have ever served the United States ----TOUGHSHIT.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 28, 2014 15:26:48 GMT -6
1. "You left out Count Pulaski and Dekaulb, among others."
If I were making a list, yes. But probably contained in 'Washington's other guys.'
2. "I am not looking to be beloved, just factual."
But you're not.
3. "I find no false myth in their courage and the British were going to Lexington and Concord, to confiscate the cache of weapons and ammunition stored there."
Okay. Who was attacking their 'courage?' I don't mention it, only their relative incompetence. You gave an utterly false summation of Yorktown.
4. "Why do you keep bringing up the NRA, trying to curry favor."
Good luck trying to imply I curry favor from this board. Second, I brought up NRA a second time to reply to your post regarding my first mention. The NRA chose the Minutemen as a symbol based on a falsehood. That.
5. "Is their crime rate against persons and property up or down since instituted?" Hard to say, because they've started counting things like domestic violence and street fights they used to ignore as crimes in stats and a huge immigration wave. Also, they always had strong gun control through history, but it's been loosened of late. You seem to think the reverse is true.
6. Switzerland has no gun control to speak of, primarily because everyone serves in the military and keeps their weapons at home, as I recall. There was zero way to disarm Norway, Mafia and militia Italy, or Austria, all nations with strong rural history of hunting and guns. The Nazis certainly disarmed - or tried to disarm - urban sectors but usually after violence against themselves, and not too successfully.
7. "Any way much of the above is not why we are on this board."
Speak for yourself, and in any case weren't you the one expressing negative opinions of two recent and totally unrelated presidents on this board? Don't be a hypocrite.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Mar 28, 2014 15:59:33 GMT -6
1. "You left out Count Pulaski and Dekaulb, among others." If I were making a list, yes. But probably contained in 'Washington's other guys.' 2. "I am not looking to be beloved, just factual." But you're not. 3. "I find no false myth in their courage and the British were going to Lexington and Concord, to confiscate the cache of weapons and ammunition stored there." But, you find something about them a false myth is that correct?Okay. Who was attacking their 'courage?' I don't mention it, only their relative incompetence. You gave an utterly false summation of Yorktown. 4. "Why do you keep bringing up the NRA, trying to curry favor." Good luck trying to imply I curry favor from this board. Second, I brought up NRA a second time to reply to your post regarding my first mention. The NRA chose the Minutemen as a symbol based on a falsehood. That. Why did you not bring up, the Minute Man, on stamps, savings bonds, and National Guard symbols?
5. "Is their crime rate against persons and property up or down since instituted?" Hard to say, because they've started counting things like domestic violence and street fights they used to ignore as crimes in stats and a huge immigration wave. Also, they always had strong gun control through history, but it's been loosened of late. You seem to think the reverse is true. 6. Switzerland has no gun control to speak of, primarily because everyone serves in the military and keeps their weapons at home, as I recall. There was zero way to disarm Norway, Mafia and militia Italy, or Austria, all nations with strong rural history of hunting and guns. The Nazis certainly disarmed - or tried to disarm - urban sectors but usually after violence against themselves, and not too successfully. So you are in step with Nazi policies, or at least some of them? 7. "Any way much of the above is not why we are on this board." Speak for yourself, and in any case weren't you the one expressing negative opinions of two recent and totally unrelated presidents on this board? Don't be a hypocrite. Just making a point, you should have called me on the other.Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 29, 2014 9:04:28 GMT -6
tubman,
1. What the hell am I supposed to make of this? "But, you find something about them a false myth is that correct?" I've stated the Minutemen ARE a false myth and exampled why they are: the results on the field.
2. "Why did you not bring up, the Minute Man, on stamps, savings bonds, and National Guard symbols?" Gee. Tough One.
Because the NRA was formed to recapture the fictional excellence of the Minutemen as the founders were - justifiably - nauseated at the average competence in firearms they had recently witnessed. The Minutemen weren't some logo they thought looked good, they wanted to become what the Minutemen were. The problem was, the nation already was as good as the Minutemen were. The Minutemen were just guys, not Boones, Crocketts, or Bumpos absent shooting guys in the back in tight formations, at night. These are issues that do not - it must be the liquor speaking - somehow emerge in discussions of stamps, savings bonds, or the National Guard. Ironic, what?
All these cliched little tales that you use to support opinions are generally false on their face.
Mike Powell,
1. First thing: yes, thank you. You said it better than I. It's annoying given we have no reason to believe these arguments were of interest to the 7th on the days in question or ever. Small unit actions - the standard then (and now again) - surely by nature develop stuff more efficiently and applicable to their needs, all of which are immediate and to a certain extent organizationally rmessy. Once we call something, say, an "Advance Guard" we have essentially claimed it was ordered as such or automatically known by telopathic means by everyone and have to defend or attack the action in question as to whether the formal criteria of an advance guard were met. But this emerged as 'fact' not from the battle or the guys that fought it.
I understand that at the RCOI and for the press and public you have to gussy messy things up as Reno and others did because explaining 'we were gobsmacked and reeling and it was disorganized but we eventually pulled it together thanks mostly to Benteen" doesn't work as a recruitment tool or budget enhancer or career advancer. But former soldiers - say the male public at the time - had to know how to read between those lines. And we and historians and soldiers should know better based on experience or reading about others' experience. The percentage of former soldiers in the public was much higher then, and Benteen knew how to talk to them. People reading this stuff today forget that and take it verbatim, when it was code or oral encryption with nothing evil meant beyond protecting the 'innocent' public and exhausted, put upon vets.
2. And you again say it better. But, my fear is simply that we become so besotted with instant communications and so dependent, that soldiers won't be trained to succeed without them or, far worse, when the enemy retains them and we don't. Could happen. Microburst nearby and it's gone. Satellites down and it's gone.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Mar 30, 2014 4:07:17 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 30, 2014 8:42:57 GMT -6
tubman,
You go to lengths to avoid admitting error or cluelessness, which only calls more attention to those qualities. People, including myself from the Bay State and rather familiar with Minuteman lore, have seen many variations of the logos you provided to no known end. You entered this exchange 'knowing' only the myth of the Minutemen. It wasn't true, they weren't trained soldiers or great shots. What they DID exemplify is stuff that, for example, Ho Chi Min and many others around the world studied, admired, and utilized while the US created this Disney fiction and studied it as if it were true. The Minutemen were organized to respond quickly if to no great effect, and to keep supplies and intel working through the civvy population.
This is from the Wiki page dedicated to them. Note, however, that the terms Minutemen and militia are soon incorrectly melded, in that all Minutemen were militia, but all militia were not minutemen. Note that what the Minutemen actually were is rather opposite of what the NRA founders and members today thought they were. That said:
Through the remainder of the revolution, militias moved to adopting the minuteman model for rapid mobilization. With this rapid mustering of forces, the militia proved its value by serving as augmentees to the continental army on a temporary basis occasionally leading to instances of numerical superiority. This was seen at the Battles of Hubbardton and Bennington in the north and at Camden and Cowpens in the south. Cowpens is notable in that Daniel Morgan used the militias strengths and weaknesses skillfully to attain the double-envelopment of Tarleton's forces.
The historian M. L. Brown states that while some of these men mastered the difficult handling of a rifle, few became expert. Brown quotes the Continental Army soldier Benjamin Thompson, who expressed the 'common sentiment' at the time which was that minutemen were notoriously poor marksmen with rifles:[5]
Instead of being the best marksmen in the world and picking off every Regular that was to be seen...the continual firing which they kept up by the week and the month has had no other effect than to waste their ammunition and convince the King's troops that they are really not really so formidable. —[6]
Ammunition and supplies were in short supply and were constantly being seized by British patrols. As a precaution, these items were often hidden or left behind by minutemen in fields or wooded areas. Other popular concealment methods were to hide items underneath floorboards in houses and barns.
Criticism
The success of minutemen at Lexington and Concord is offset by the long history of failures of the colonial militia. Even Samuel Adams, who was at Lexington on the day of the famous clash, later said: "Would any man in his sense, who wishes war may be carried on with vigor, prefer the temporary and expensive drafts of militia and minutemen to a permanent and well-appointed army?" General Charles Lee, who had desired to lead militia forces, complained: "As to the minutemen, no account ought to be made of them." George Washington is also well known for a long series of scathing opinion of the shortcomings of militia forces.
However, the minuteman model for militia mobilization married with a very professional, small standing army was the primary model for the United States' land forces up until 1916 with the establishment of the National Guard.[7]
Note: the mobilization aspect of the Minutemen is the take away. Nothing else. The 'success' at Lexington and Concord was solely due to thinning the British ranks on their march home.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2014 11:10:07 GMT -6
A couple of things to note in this regard:
The symbol of the Minuteman, the statue with militiaman, rifle and plow, is a symbol of the rapid mobilization in time of need. Nothing more, but it is a symbol that has great meaning denoting that in time of need it is a citizens duty to take up arms for defense. It is engrained in our national character.
Since the founding at Jamestown and Plymouth, militia forces in this country have fallen into two categories, the unorganized militia, where every citizen between certain ages was required to own a rifle, and provide his own ammunition, standing in readiness to be called. The second category is the organized militia. These were men who formed trained bands for service in time of need and by virtue of the training they conducted on a regularly scheduled volunteer basis were immediately ready for a call by Colonial or State Governor. Such organizations like the North Regiment of Massachusetts, elements of the Stonewall Brigade in Virginia, and even the Texas Rangers during Republic days (and before) are examples. It was from this latter, the organized militia, that is the basis of the National Guard. It was one of these organized militia units that the name itself comes from. The 7th New York adopting the name of Lafayette's Guard National, with his approval after they escorted him on his last visit to the United States. The title National Guard was adopted for the entire force as a result of the Dick Act early last century, and shortly thereafter the Militia Bureau of the Army became the National Guard Bureau, and even more recently the Director of that organization, either an Air or Army Guard officer, has been elevated to, and appointed General (four stars) and is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The incumbent is an Army Guard officer from the Missouri Army National Guard.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 30, 2014 13:00:44 GMT -6
The question is not about why the Indians won or lost but should the US military used some different tactics in fighting them rather than as I stated earlier sending out large armies with a huge amount of supplies to keep them in the field. Custer refused Gatling guns and extra men (either to avoid sharing the victory or to lighten his load and speed up his march) which I guess could be classified as not going-by-the-book. However the end result was not very good! I see Sherman/Sheridan never followed up with the resolute officer leading 50 experienced frontiersmen plan after Beecher's Island so they must have just threw up the hands and said might as well go by West Point tactics.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 30, 2014 13:34:00 GMT -6
Found something interesting about Ranold MacKenzie's tactics and success in fighting Comanches that could have been used against the Sioux/Cheyenne that more US officers/commanders should have followed:
MacKenzie learned from his mistakes, developing the tactical proficiency that would turn the tide. With hardened troops and logistical experience from the Civil War he began to operate at great distances from supply lines. He learned to utilize Indian scouts (which required understanding the enmities between tribes) and divided spoils among them to reward information; to march with a detachment of cavalry between scouts and infantry as a shock absorber; carry cartridges on their person; to wheel and volley in the face of an attack; and not to divert forces to chase retreating Indians. He campaigned during the winter, when Indians tended to encamp and were therefore easier to find and less mobile. Most importantly, he determined how Indians followed water trails in the desert. He also studied their social structure, learning (as Andrew Jackson earlier had) that an asymmetric grab for Indian families would derail attacks and Indian chiefs would make any concession to ransom their women and children.
Mackenzie also realized, as no other soldier had before him, that mobility was the key to proficiency for the plains Indians: He didn’t have to kill all the Indians, he just had to take their horses. And he did. Mackenzie raided for horses not, as the Indians did, for honor, but to prevent his adversaries utilizing their principal advantage. That higher-level insight, so obvious in retrospect, led to the broader observation that without buffalo to hunt, the Indian way of life would collapse.
While he unrelentingly insisted that military success was required to force Indian compliance, Mackenzie advocated strategies that incorporated military operations with political and economic components. This was most visible in his advocacy of negotiations with the government of Mexico to prevent Indians having sanctuary across the border (and in his violation of the sovereignty of Mexico by attacking Indians inside Mexico until the government agreed to U.S. terms).
|
|
|
Post by fuchs on Mar 30, 2014 13:49:45 GMT -6
The question is not about why the Indians won or lost but should the US military used some different tactics in fighting them rather than as I stated earlier sending out large armies with a huge amount of supplies to keep them in the field. Custer refused Gatling guns and extra men (either to avoid sharing the victory or to lighten his load and speed up his march) which I guess could be classified as not going-by-the-book. However the end result was not very good! I see Sherman/Sheridan never followed up with the resolute officer leading 50 experienced frontiersmen plan after Beecher's Island so they must have just threw up the hands and said might as well go by West Point tactics. I think the problem is generally approached from the wrong angle, i.e. purely military. This is naturally, given the main interest here, but still not very useful. The "Indian problem" would have solved itself, even in the absence of any Army at all. See Canada for reference. This was mainly a political problem, for both sides of the conflict. The army spend very, very little time and effort actually fighting Indians, ultimately (in part due to its abysmal state after the Civil War, granted). But contrary to some opinions here, the reverse was true as well, when looking at the whole 1850-1880 (roughly) timeframe, and the whole Indian population on the northern plains. The vast majority of Indians came to the reservations on there own, not due to direct military threat. Because they saw that only cooperations promised any chance of survival, given the spectre of shrinking buffalo herds and torrents of settlers/miners first coming through (Oregon Trail) and later starting to come in. Army, or no Army. When looking into the cost/benefit ratio, I think two things stand out: Train tickets to Washington, or at least into some major city, to hammer home the message of "We have infinite numbers, resistance is futile". And at the some time offering a way out with the reservation system, and generous support for those coming in peacefully. After his time in prison, Spotted Tail had seen enough of the White multitude to become probably the most dedicated advocate of accomodation. And he had the reputation to actually take most of the Brule with him on that path. Single-Handedly taking out roughly 25% of the Lakota population of the potential pool of "Hostiles" For the military variant, the most effective forces to fight Indians were, not really surprising, Indians. Why teach the Army a skill they wouldn't need anymore after a few years, and wasn't interested in aquiring in the first place, when you have a pool of guys itching to get of the resrvations for some adventures, complete with the required skill set? Crookes Auxilaries at the Rosebud, his Apaches, the Lakota and Cheyenne employed as fighters as well as negotiators in the winter of 1876/77 and against the Nez Perce, the Pawnee batallion are examples that comes to mind, that worked and cheaply. Of course, the Army relegating itself mainly to backup and logistics as standard procedure wouldn't fly.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Mar 30, 2014 14:00:05 GMT -6
Nothing of what you have written Horse is a "new" tactic, rather it is an adaptation of basic tactics to fit a given situation
Mackenzie used his background and knowledge, incorporated factors unique to his enemies style of fighting, and introduced a "whole solution" approach.
All that is what we are expected to do. Nothing more.
It is when you fail to look at the entire picture, when you fail to take all the factors into account, you, as Custer did, fail. Simple as that.
I am glad you pointed out that Mackenzie quickly recognized the two Indian centers of gravity, horses (mobility) and the village (continued sustenance). Take out either one, or preferably both of those centers of gravity, and the wars over, everybody goes home.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 30, 2014 15:47:01 GMT -6
fuchs,
1. If you think the Indian 'problem' solved itself in Canada, you're mistaken. There was vastly less population pressure at first, so there was small problem, but it got bigger. If the US had the population proportions of Canada to land, yeah, no army needed, perhaps. But it didn't.
2. "The army spend very, very little time and effort actually fighting Indians, ultimately (in part due to its abysmal state after the Civil War, granted). But contrary to some opinions here, the reverse was true as well, when looking at the whole 1850-1880 (roughly) timeframe, and the whole Indian population on the northern plains." I have no idea what you're saying. Either your first statement is true, or the second, they're mutually exclusive. Why choose 1850-1880?
3. "The vast majority of Indians came to the reservations on there own, not due to direct military threat." If you mean they came without a literal gun to the head, okay. History has missed this event where they "...saw that only cooperations promised any chance of survival." Some did, of course, and much earlier than the 19th century, but many did not, and were into the Ghost Dance horrendoplasty with variants into the 20th Century. To this day, in fact, there are idiots looking to relive the fictional past, both red and white be it said. Some on these boards.
4. See, here's where the fiction of Indians being unique or having something different than western armies cost us, and its weird to see it still promulgated. "For the military variant, the most effective forces to fight Indians were, not really surprising, Indians. Why teach the Army a skill they wouldn't need anymore after a few years, and wasn't interested in aquiring in the first place, when you have a pool of guys itching to get of the resrvations for some adventures, complete with the required skill set?" If by 'some adventure' you mean 'not starving with the family,' then yeah, agree.
Except that we used to have those skills, lost them, read about them in fiction. And, we needed them in Mexico, the Philippines, everywhere in WWII and since. Other peoples had them in country. There was nothing particularly unique about our Indians, our cowboys, our West. The biggest issue after the Civil War was the huge percentage of Southerners in the federal army (as Scots invaded the ranks in England's). But our big issue, rarely mentioned, was it scared Southerners to bits to visualize black units with repeaters, unit integrity AND the skill of warriors out there. I'd go so far as to say it wouldn't have taken much to produce soldiers in house that could have done what other Indians did for us, but there was no wish to do so. The stuff after the Sioux uprising were street gang size and level, and it WAS cheaper to take advantage of Indians and then betray them, almost too easy.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Mar 31, 2014 11:09:33 GMT -6
<Mackenzie used his background and knowledge, incorporated factors unique to his enemies style of fighting, and introduced a "whole solution" approach.>
Then what it comes down to is a commander using his knowledge and experience in trying to accomplish a mission rather than a doctrine a la West Point academics.
A number of officers/commanders adapted their own means to accomplish a goal . . . to get the Indians to give up. Some, like MacKenzie and Crook were successful using far less resources, manpower and money to force Indians to come in. MacKenzie's famous attack at Palo Duro Canyon against the Comanches was a classic example of surprising a village but not killing many Indians but capturing the entire village and its contents thus forcing the Comanches to come in. MacKenzie later attacked Dull Knives village in Nov. 1876 and while casualties were light for the Cheyenne their entire village was taken and destroyed by the soldiers.
The one thing about MacKenzie was not his zeal to kill Indians but to capture a village and all its contents thus reducing the Indians to paupers.
Unfortunatley for MacKenzie he later went cuckoo and died young, too bad he couldn't have passed on his tactics to others.
|
|