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Post by quincannon on Mar 3, 2014 20:22:07 GMT -6
Montrose: We are not in as much disagreement as you may at first think.
If you read this before I edited the comment sorry. Montrose is correct. We need an Army that fights not a collection of branches, but rather one organized on modern principles for modern war. All comments I have previously made on this subject are withdrawn.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 4, 2014 6:27:34 GMT -6
Montrose, I only wish I could have given you more than one thumbs up. Fighters are fighters, and if you can train that up you can build a leader cadre. I am not talking thugs here or hero want to be types, I am talking about people from all walks of life, who have the right make up. Hell the mechanics had probably had been told by some clown or clowns, that is what you are, pigeon holed them. Everyone needs to know their primary, no matter what selected career field. Some will be much better than others.
Weapons integration is a whole other ball of wax.
Regards, tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 4, 2014 8:39:37 GMT -6
I never got a chance to read Montrose’s post so I cannot give a critique, but the point I think is this, should a Cavalry Squadron just be classed as Reconnaissance Squadron? And its sole purpose be that of reconnoitre? If so then what is wrong with the way your Recce squadrons are organised now;
Command Troop 3 x Recce Troops
I would add a Support Troop myself equipped with 25mm M242s, and If want to keep it light then equip them with M-ATVs
Air Recce could be along the same lines with OH-58 Kiowa’s.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Mar 4, 2014 9:56:03 GMT -6
I guess I can post the following here... right?
Did any of you see the program on the Military Channel last night about Dak To?
I found it incredible... what a great show! The fact they found a film and sound-track of the battle is mind-boggling to me.
And just before that there was another about Robin Olds. Another hero. Absolute hero!!
Alfakilo, did you know Bob Tanguy? I will tell you guys something: those F-4 jockeys are my heroes. My God, were they great men!!!! And that includes Alfakilo.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 4, 2014 11:18:35 GMT -6
Ian: I don't know why Montrose edited his post. I know why I edited mine. I read it and in his first line he said I was wrong. He was correct. He said
"QC I could not disagree with you more. What the Army does not need is another branch"
He was absolutely correct. In fact the Army does not need all the branches they do have. In the U S Army there is nothing that has more impact on what we do than the various branches Infantry, Artillery, Armor and the rest. Branch politics, and career management, having enough flags and guidons to insure career progression, inhibits the force from being properly organized, not for the present, rather the future. The nature of war is constant, but the methodology that resides within that nature is constantly changing and as long as we have branches saying we have to have tanks, for if not what do we do with out tankers can be so detrimental to future readiness, and moreover how we view change,
This is a far deeper problem than how a unit is organized. It goes to the heart of what an Army is. The Marine Corps was built from way back to Colonial times on a completely different construct, where you are first a Marine, and then whatever else you are, That is what the Army must be as well, We have made a start with all this with our rather new Centers of Excellence. Today for instance there is no separate Infantry and Armor Schools, but rather a university like organization called the Maneuver Center of Excellence where there are Infantry and Armor subordinate "colleges" under one overall leadership group at the MCoE. Field and Air Defense Artillery have created the Fires Center of Excellence, and the various supporting and logistical branches have created them as well. This points to a horizon where branches will be merged, and that can produce nothing but good for our future. The Brits did this first with their Logistics Corps, and looking at their many recent amalgamations seem to be heading down this same road.
You may remember that after I retired from the Army I was in retail for nearly twenty years. Lessons learned from that time in retail, in fact the first one long before that time are
"In my first business I sold what I wanted. I failed. In my second effort in business I sold what the customer wanted"
"Those who do business today as they did yesterday, will be out of business tomorrow"
Both of these are applicable to Military and Naval organization, structure, and war fighting as they are to selling candy bars on a street corner.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 4, 2014 13:36:09 GMT -6
Good advice and good elaboration Chuck, I believe that every soldier should be trained in marching/drill, marksmanship/rifle drill and physical fitness plus have a good education, once they have reached their peak in these fields then they should be allowed to choose their branch of service.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 4, 2014 13:47:09 GMT -6
It goes well beyond that Ian.
The conventional thought on this issue is that I am a mechanic and when necessary I am a combat soldier. It must be totally reversed to I am a combat soldier and when necessary a mechanic or (fill in whatever blank you wish)
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 4, 2014 13:47:09 GMT -6
Do you think they should have stuck with the M113 APC and done away with the Bradley?
The combination of the Stryker, Bradley and Abrams does seem well balanced to me, but I know of your concerns of arming APCs with cannons and using them to fight other AFVs, the troops inside are potential targets and the Bradley is not as heavily armed as a Battle Tank. The Soviets also armed their APCs with cannons in the shape of the BMD-1 and these suffered high losses in Afghanistan, and they lost 1.317 during the nine year war.
Ian.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 4, 2014 13:55:42 GMT -6
I thought that this was the case, and every soldier no matter what branch could revert back to his role as a combat soldier.
I was talking to Carl over the weekend and we were discussing how after 1959, 1st Cooks were in fact Sergeants or E-5s (I hope I have remembered this right), so I cannot see how this Cook can’t pick up his weapon when needed and take up a position in the line, after all to become an NCO he must know his chops.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 4, 2014 14:00:34 GMT -6
Ian as far as I am concerned they could throw away all the Bradleys and the M113's. They are death traps. They could also throw away half of the tanks as well. Stryker is a good vehicle to transport, but once in battle it to serves no real purpose. If we would invest as much time and money in a state of the art reconnaissance vehicle (which we have NEVER done) and dismount all of our infantry I would be happy as a little boy with a new fire truck toy.
Fulda Gap and the threat it presented is long behind us. The name of the game today is strategic mobility, and once there an operational and tactical mobility, that cannot be matched by the opposition. Our Army is presently Infantry poor, and most of that is because we have far to many supporters and not enough shooters. If you looked at the number of dismounted riflemen in one of our combined arms battalions you would be shocked. I think the number is 96 or thereabouts. There are twice as many supporters in those battalions as there are shooters.
Always remember this. Straight leg Infantry is the most versatile of forces, because it can either remain as is, be heavied up by attachment, made 100 percept wheel mobile by attachment, 100 percent air mobile by attachment, or be lightened by leaving behind. It is THE all purpose force.
When someone comes up with a better balanced force for the expeditionary nature of 21st Century conflict that the Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade, or the Marine Expeditionary Force, please let me know.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 4, 2014 18:10:38 GMT -6
It goes well beyond that Ian. The conventional thought on this issue is that I am a mechanic and when necessary I am a combat soldier. It must be totally reversed to I am a combat soldier and when necessary a mechanic or (fill in whatever blank you wish) You have hit the nail on the head. I wish Montross had not taken down his earlier post, it seemed to come from the heart(gut). Let me say right up front, I never lobbed a round in combat, but I was, however never worse than 3 in unit competition. I was proud of that. I also know I would have had my butt handed to me by 99%t of the guys at national Military meets. Being Air Guard I knew I was probably going to be a long way from the $hit. I was also never more than a services NCO. I worked rapid runway deployment, I was in charge of services mobility and field deployment, yes I said field. I helped set up, some stuff for Panama and later Desert Storm. I knew, however what the primary function for all military personal was. I passed all my 9 level stuff and turned down a promotion as, I enjoyed Eglin and what I was required to do there plus the fact the other guy was more qualified at admin. Was I a bad dude? No. Did I work with some people that were in the $hit, yes. Most of them never considered themselves bad dudes either. Their primary and 2ndary training was to do a job. Just as yours and mine was. There needs to be more training, in all career fields, so guys like Montross talked about are ready to engage when required. How would you manage to retrain, cross train, and have shleps like me ready, ongoing, as needed?
Delta, a neat concept, integrated force would you agree? USAF will ferry them anywhere. I think we need integration, not only between branches, but in branch as well and better training for the mechanics.
If we look at the list of troops at LBH we see farriers, blacksmiths, and others. I am sure you will agree, that their primary function on 6/25/76 was to fight as cavalry or infantry once dismounted. How well were they prepared? We have talked MacKenzie recently. We talked Spur Boards earlier, all Spur Boards are not created equal, are they? Again way too much time on my hands. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Mar 4, 2014 23:19:35 GMT -6
Tom: With the Marines it started at Tun's Tavern. The Army should have started it at Valley Forge. At this late date it would require a complete culture change and that is not going to happen any time soon when those at the top think everything is just OK.
Don't get me started on cavalry dismounted being infantry. They ain't. They are cavalry fighting dismounted, which is every bit a part of the cavalry menu as riding a horse, or in later days a recon vehicle, Huey or Blackhawk. It the mission and methodology not the mount or lack thereof.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 5, 2014 4:45:56 GMT -6
Chuck, so you are saying that all Infantry should be trained not only as ground troops, but also be able to adapt to mechanized work plus be able to hop on a helicopter. Well I can see nothing wrong with that, if it is feasible. Here is an ABCT with personnel numbers; Battalion Headquarters Company: 160 Mechanized Rifle Company: 135 Mechanized Rifle Company: 135 Tank Company: 63 Tank Company: 63 Mechanized Engineer Company: 103 So if you take out the two Tank Companies, HQ Company and the Engineers, you are left with 270 men, so that means that almost two thirds are support troops. I see what you mean about the Marine Expeditionary Brigade, it’s very impressive. link
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 5, 2014 5:58:09 GMT -6
Don't get me started on cavalry dismounted being infantry. They ain't. They are cavalry fighting dismounted, which is every bit a part of the cavalry menu as riding a horse, or in later days a recon vehicle, Huey or Blackhawk. It the mission and methodology not the mount or lack thereof. You are right, pardon the poor use of language. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Mar 5, 2014 11:08:36 GMT -6
Ian of those men who are documented to those two mechanized Infantry companies 84 are vehicle commanders, drivers, and 25mm gunners. 96 are personnel whose job it is to dismount and fight on foot. The problem with the Bradley is that it will not hold a squad of any appreciable fighting value once dismounted. The system is all gun and no real ability to dismount and mix it up on foot. It was originally designed on paper to hold six in the back which would bring those dismountable numbers up to 144, but I can tell you those type battalions here put only four in the troop compartment. Jack and I had a long talk about this subject about a month ago, and he tells me that this is one of the main reasons for dropping down the numbers of CAB's in the force structure, and the plus up of straight leg infantry and Stryker units. Stryker holds nine, with a dedicated crew of two that stay with the vehicle.
What I am saying is that any rifle squad should be well trained enough as a matter of routine to board a helicopter, and deploy from it tactically with no problem at all. It requires about an hour on the ground and two or three training flights. The same should be true if you substituted Stryker, or truck, or extra large flying carpet. The difference is these are a means of transportation to battle, not a primary reason for existence. The Bradley was sold as being a vehicle that was both transport and an organic squad base of fire. That said four dismounts can only do so much, and are nowhere near, even with a Brad to the nine man dismounted rifle squad. In addition the propensity to use a Brad as a light tank which it is not. Those whose mantra is "death before dismount" usually get their wish.
I should insert here that my "perfect rifle squad" is twelve, a leader, an organic "fighting medic Geneva be damned" , and two five man fire teams each built around a high volume single man portable automatic weapon.. This would make a rifle platoon with a six man headquarters element 54 personnel. Included in that headquarters element would be a junior officer assistant platoon leader, plus a couple of nice to have extra bodies.
When you set out to design the means of mobility for a force, you first look at that force optimized for ground combat. You then study how they organize themselves for combat, how they deploy, how they fight. You then set out to design a vehicle for transport around that unit. What you do not do is design a vehicle, and force an adaptation of tactics and organization to fit the vehicle you designed.
Tom I had this all out a time or two with some of the dearly departed, and could never get them to understand 1) the cavalry mission as seen through American eyes 2) A cavalryman off his horse is just as much of a cavalryman in the fight as were he sitting upon it.
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