Echelon.

[herosrest]

Echelon. Cavalry battle maneuver and tactics.

Enjoy ~
books.google.co.uk/books?id=IetasW3DVSsC&pg=PA182&lpg=PA182&dq=cavalry+echelon&source=bl&ots=CzRzxeUZTC&sig=dZ-zsAWgBW7MQkjsqC1EdnoxThA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=T3zIUquJEIyjhgfx0YHgBg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwACe


Custer's command were not divided into wings. Central to sll serious study of the fighting is Capt. Henry B. Freeman's Journal which if full of goodies and opinion and eyeball independent of 7th Cavalry. Freeman was 7th Infantry and commanded the battalion marching to Little Bighorn until Gibbon returned from the Far West during the morning of 26th June. From Brig. Gen. Freeman, MoH, we know that 7th Cavalry's regimental banner was lost. His book and its sketch tell the story.

The companies retreated from the river in echelon to cross and climb Deep Coulee as they were flanked, pushed north and surrounded. This basic battle tactic evades all students and yet explains how for example the battle theorised by Capt. O. J. Sweet, was conceptualised.

Cavalry tactics for a cavalry fight.

[herosrest]

Here archive.org/stream/volunteercavalr00whitgoog#page/n5/mode/2up

is an interesting and relevant work on fighting cavalry, and dedicated by the author, who also edited and contributed to the Army & Navy Journal, to a military historian with whom all students of Little Bighorn should be familiar.

[Dark Cloud]

We know Custer's command was not divided into wings. Before the 7th was returned to Custer's sole command, it was in two wings - under Benteen and Reno - until Custer regained control under Terry before the ascent of the Rosebud. Terry gave orders direct to Reno before his scout.

First, you wouldn't know and cannot distinguish 'serious study' from a collection of misidentified photos or, for that matter, 'study' from 'reading with moving lips.' Retreating from a river in echelon (or, correctly, en echelon) is not a tactic, much less a basic one. Moving en echelon is going from a square moving forward to a diamond moving at an angle. Two or more columns with an exterior column in the lead and each column progressively distant is equally behind the nearer - is something easily grasped by marching bands and elementary school students and is not evasive in nature and particularly not here, where it may or may not have occurred. Five two ship columns in parallel turn 45 degrees to the starboard and the right hand column is further advanced on the new heading and the left column furthest behind at maintained speed. It was not a concept it was near natural law and discovered early. Whom did it evade among Custer scholars, fanatics, knuckle walkers?

Is it possible? Unlikely, in that there was no rigid formation, but they may have retreated as companies but not in formation or resembling one.

[quincannon]

DC: You are quite correct, and as usual HR does not know his ass from a bass fiddle.

The two major uses of the word echelon for the military are

Organizing in echelon. A platoon contains so many squads, A company contains so many platoons, A battalion contains so many companies. These are referred to as echelons of command. In the force structure business when looking at new designs you must be quite careful to not remove an echelon, which will overextend span of control. One of the great army organizational fiascos was the battle group of 1957-62 which did just that and it was a complete failure. Another is in the current brigade combat team where supervisory battalion headquarters were removed from the enablers (engineer, signal, military intelligence etc.) and you found captains working for Colonels of different backgrounds and branches, so a guy like an engineer captain had no senior engineer to call on for advice, and the brigade commander a Colonel did not know B from a bull's ass about engineer matters to lend the captain a helping hand.

The second use of the word is just what you have said one unit moving to the rear of and slightly to the left or right of the unit ahead. The terms are left and right echelon,. They are a formation not a tactic, and they are generally used to refuse or protect a flank while on the march or in the attack. In a strictly attack mode the leader of the echelon, the first unit hits the enemy first and the echeloned units are generally able to clean up the spill over and proceed deeper into the adversaries rear, while still guarding against a flanking counterattack. It is a very hard formation to control. It was the formation of choice for Longstreet's attack on the second day at Gettysburg, The timing must be letter perfect or like in Longstreet's attack a whole lot of people are going to get whacked.

[herosrest]

Quite few of the troops under Custer did get whacked, a part of the problem with the interest in what went on.

The companies did ride in that formation before Martin left.

Freeman, certainly supports a dismount (led horses ) eat flank of Deep Coulee and dismounted skirmishers at NC ridge, although not apparently the Luce area. His sketch offers difficulty in interpretation but his lower ford is accurate as Real Bird and either one of Custer's, or Benteen, rode that route. Since Freeman was there with Benteen, there should be no issues. The sketch clearly defines the mouth of Deep Coulee and fighting positions in the Calhoun area.

Upon retreat, the warriors present charged. There were several fights and charges which took place. It is not unreasonable to believe or at least contemplate the flanking companies and any force on NC quickly becoming ensnarled in the buffalo hunting which befell Reno's charge out of the timber. There is evidence to support this.

The flank nearest the river got pinned to Finley Finkle as the remaining units climbed the high ground on a diagonal with a pincer swinging around ahead to put warriors out front along the gullies and Battle Ridge, surrounding the maneuver as groups of warriors spilled around the east flank likewise. As a model to play with it is quite elegant in explaining the havoc with orienting tribal accounts and actually it plays companies into the positions in which they were found. To simple for many, others paint Custer as simple.

The echelon can also form as a chevron. The basic problem the retreat encountered was the movement to led horses. That was a problem for Crook's guys a week earlier and is how and when White Shield made his kills during that fighting. Thinking along these lines finds 'support' in a few of the tribal accounts but that isn't particularly difficult. What is, is, making sense out of the move towards high ground in military fashion. The companies apprached onto the bluffs in line abreast. That is echelon. It is a flexible and aggressive formation which relates positively to Custer's stated intent. Crossing the river and capturing the village.


Added.

The formation covers a relatively broad front, and can swing into the required direction of attack, throwing one company after another to exploit the strike. It is pure aggression. For some reason or other, the companies halted.

[quincannon]

You don't have the foggiest frigging idea what either of us said do you?

Wrong again dumshit. The formation that resembles a chevron is called a wedge. If it resembles a V, that is what it is frigging called a V. An echelon formation may only be single directional. It may be an echelon left or an echelon right. Were it anything else it would not be an echelon.

The only time that anything suggesting an echelon was used at LBH is an echelon right with Yates in the lead, and Keogh in echelon to his right rear. That dear boy is only speculative because all that made up the formation were stone cold dead within an hour and Martin had already left.

Let me suggest that before you travel further down the road to embarrassment and insignificance you invest in a good dictionary of American military terms. Then read it. Then fully digest its contents. Then have it on your desk at all times and by your bedside if necessary. Such an investment would pay dividends and you would not continually step on your male appendage in this company.

Added to your added? Line abreast is not an echelon. It is line abreast or more simply a line. It is the least flexible of all formations and the hardest to control. You may use the line formation with companies (units) in column, or you may use it as a line with companies (unit) in line. An echelon either right or left has a base point, the lead element in the echelon. It is used for two purposes on the battlefield 1) to protect or refuse a flank which is a likely area of danger while on the march, or 2) to attack sequentially having the lead element hit the attack objective first, and the echeloned elements extend that attack either to the right or left of that lead element by hitting to either the right or left of the point of first contact

Take out three coins from your pocket Place one on the desk in front of you. Then place the second coin to the right and slightly to the rear of the first. Then place your third coin slightly to the right and rear of the second. That is a right echelon. If you were to do the same thing only placing the coins in the same relative locations to the left of the lead that would be a left echelon

Formations attempting to retreat or withdraw, typically move by bounds. One part of the force retreats and is covered by the part of the force remaining in place. Then those that initially covered retreat under the cover of those first to retreat that by then have taken up a position that allows them to provide that cover. The process is repeated until contact is broken.

I should not have to say this, for it is so obvious as to its importance. Each of these terms must be clearly understood by everyone. They are that important. If I tell you to move by right echelon I have a reason to tell you that, as it is a reflection of my belief that it will be your right as you move that will present the greatest danger. If you instead misunderstand the term and move in a line you have defeated both purpose and intent and left yourself vulnerable in the process.

Dare I ask the question then under what conditions would one adopt the formation squad column, fire teams in column. There is no strange unrelated picture, no obscure dug up text that covers that answer

[herosrest]

HI Q,

You haven't grasped the formation, or its militariness. It is the simplest of military deployments and a significant tactic. I reckon you would have done as well as Reno and Custer at West Point. Certainly, units echelon left and right. The point of my post.Units echelon flank and hence chevron. What is the point of discussing squads at Grasy Grass. Entirely out of and beyond context.

The companies were platoons of fours who marched in column of twos and fours, they fougt as thre man fours. It is a little removed from late 20th Century and current practice. The concept being adopted post Civil War was the stuff Watts de Peyster had pushed and was being worked up into front line. It was revolutionary and flawed by poor spoons and practice in respect horse holders in the cavalry, and the remount in contact. Put it down to poor generalship by Reno certainly, but it happened to Crook's cavalry also.

Custer's companies rode in echelon and simply because Martin did not know the term, does not negate his first hand testimony. We know it also from Roe. Tribal accounts describe it in detail.


Some mid 19th Century thinking on warfare and militaryness current to the surrender of Fort Sumter.

Elements of Military Art and Science ~ Henry Wager Halleck, Applewood Books, 2009 - History - 484 pages ~ books.google.co.uk/books?id=JwXow7yC1p4C&printsec=frontcover&output=html_text originally published 1861.

Henry Wager Halleck (1815-1872) ~ www.civilwarhome.com/halleckbio.htm

A thoroughly engaging read, www.kancoll.org/books/andreas_ne/military/military-p1.html but way off topic, maybe?

[herosrest]

Formations attempting to retreat or withdraw, typically move by bounds. One part of the force retreats and is covered by the part of the force remaining in place. Then those that initially covered retreat under the cover of those first to retreat that by then have taken up a position that allows them to provide that cover. The process is repeated until contact is broken.

A lesson which Reno may have skipped. We know Custer knew how to do it, Moylan also. That didn't happen at LBH, in the valley certainly, where forming up in remount was a bit chaotic and the retreat invited a charge by warriors.

What makes you think Custer's fight was any different. Fresh Sioux and Cheyenne ponies could eat the distance from flat to Luce or NC in no time at all. Certainly in the time it took to remount a disengaging platoon. Retreat from massing warriors invited disaster. Remind me, what happened to Reno's retreat and Custer's command of five companies?

[quincannon]

Companies were platoons of fours - what in the hell are you talking about?

It is either a Wedge Formation (what you incorrectly call a chevron) or it is an echelon formation it cannot be both as they are different.

I was leading a squad at a younger age then either Reno or Custer graduated from West Point. So speaking of points, what's yours.

Formations are not tactics. They are formations. They are essentially the same today as when Caesar fought in Gaul, when Hannibal smacked the crap out of Rome at Cannae, when Washington crossed the Delaware, and before Henry Halleck was a gleam in his father's eye

They are in fact a menu. You order from the menu of formations, just as you would order from the menu at a restaurant. When you order a formation it is suitable to terrain, mission, threat, and situation, just as when you order off of a menu it is suitable to your appetite and desires. You order line, echelon, column, in the same way you would order steak, eggs or ham. When you order one of these formations, all receiving that order know exactly what you want, as it has been practiced over and over again in training, just as the chef knows just what you want.

What you are attempting to do here is make up your own menu, and that is very much like ordering a Chicago style hot dog at a Chinese take out in San Diego. Even the great Sun Tzu would not know what you frigging want to say.

Why is my reference to late twentieth century squad formations applicable to a cavalry set of fours in 1876? If you have to ask that, then any explanation I could possibly offer would go as far over your head as apparently life itself already does.

Just please do yourself a favor and don't ever attempt to lead American soldiers. They would shoot you, and replace you with someone who knows what he is doing. Probably take less than three seconds.

PS: Typically does not mean always you idiot. And further Reno in the valley/timber was a breakout and not a retreat, but I suspect your inferior intellect would not know the difference so why bother. What Reno did moving away from the timber and what the 13th Demi Brigade Legion Etranger,did at Bir Hakeim and the 1st Marine Division did at Chosin differ only in scale.

So Poopsie, before you come back with one of your incomprehensible rebuttals think long and hard about ever hearing of a military force retreating toward the enemy. Bad form you know if it is a retreat. Now if it is a breakout, you attack through the ring that surrounds you, until contact is broken, then you have two options stand fast, or start your retreat. Reno stood fast.

[herosrest]

The point on study and West Point was humoour, so put your buns away, please.


A component of a military unit can echelon. For example to guard the flanks of a brigade in advance or attack. Terrain can impose the formation upon a maneuvering formation. If you rethink a moment, formations obviously are tactics, not necessarily relevant to the few occasions when in combat. Nit-picking to a degree but you kind off belittle militaryness and those who dream up and practice it. Despite years drilling the basics into officers, many do not grasp warfare at brigade, division or corps level and still get a job done staying out of trouble by following the instruction that is inherent to regulations, militaryness.

I offered and can broaden into overwhelming assault, a simple tactical deployment which elegantly assesses the evidence which exists, applied to little Bighorn. It isn't neccesary yet to get down to whereeach man spit a chew of tobacco, or lost a pair of spurs or get into an over bearing disection or dissemination of what someone thinks of myself, style or purpose. However,

let's assume you were Custer and for the hell of it, you have put your jacket back on, arrived in Medicine Tail's Creek, had a chat with the leader of the Ree scouts and sent trumpeter Martin to find Benteen. You are aware that the village is no longer asleep or empty of warriors and there seem to be a good number of people and panic opposite across the river. Quite some dust going up and Marcus has not shown up opposite in the valley.

You came here to capture a village and teach Sitting Bulls hostiles a lesson. Destiny awaits and you can hear the firing going on in the valley. For whatever reason, you are not going to cross the river at Maguire's point B. Gray horse company is sent along the river to find a croosing place below the village which you can exploit. You lead your command northish, across the mouth of Medicine's Tail Creek. You intend to cross the river, fight, and capture the village sprawled their. A bunch of pesky young bucks are showing proud and being a bloody nuisance and already a few head cases are crossing to attack from the village.

We know you make a fatal error in crossing MTC, but.........

What formation do you lead across the coulee in preparation for slamming over the river and getting the job done.

As a commander, what formation do you employ to meet the conditions you have found?

[herosrest]

During 7th Cavalry's fight with Sitting Bull and Gall in 1873, Lt. Braden led 20 men detached to hold high ground which dominated Custer's defensive stance. They fought off attacks by over 200 warriors charging them. Braden was severely wounded and eventually retired. Still being on muster rolls at the time of the battle of June 1876. µnder doctor's leave.

[quincannon]

A component of a military organization can adopt an echelon formation.

Formations are not in themselves tactics. Formations are the tools of the tactician.

We call officers that do not grasp warfare at brigade, division, and corps level by one name FAILURE.

First off if I were Custer I would never be on the east side of the river in the first place as it serves no military purpose whatsoever and being there, and adopting the scheme of maneuver he did violates each and every one of the Principles of War.

Were I in that unfortunate situation though, having been ordered there for I would never have ordered it myself. I would move in column up to 3411 and remain in column as I move down Cedar Coulee, with the provision that I would have a strong company watching my left rear. Once at MTC I would divide, sending one battalion up onto the L-N-C Ridge complex, with the other battalion parallel on the eastern side of the coulee, with both heading in a general northwesterly direction. At the point the ground around Ford B came into view, I would reject it for an attack across the river at that ford, and not go near the place for love nor money. The ground does not permit an attack on a broad front, and I am not going to try and cross that river in column.

What makes you think that a fatal error is made by crossing MTC. Non such. It is only fatal if you continue to move north. The ground on the eastern side of MTC (L-N-C Ridge) offers excellent fields of fire, maximum exposure to those trying to get at you, and most important a back door. Crossing any piece of terrain in and of itself is not a fatal error. Separating yourself further from those who can lend you support is and was the fatal error

So you ask yourself the question, rather than piss about with formation discussions you don't understand, if it was just a matter of adopting a formation why did not Custer just do it. Why did he apparently look at B and reject it. Why did he move further north? There is no terrain over there that is suitable to conduct offensive operations on an axis east to west. The opposite direction is well suited to offensive operations. There is no ground over there that can be held with the force Custer had available for any extended period of time. Instead of asking me stupid questions, why don't you just look at the ground, and then if you have eyes to see and a brain to think, you would have every answer your little heart desires why George Custer and 209 other men lay dead on a ridge top.

Braden: So what's your point. Different day. Different terrain. Different situation.

[herosrest]

I agree with quite a bit you give. Your tone is off, l do not salute to you, or to any one. l'll fight if 'l' want to. I'm having a Reno day.

There was no point crossing into the middle of the village of tepees.

There was no point moving beyond Deep Coulee other than to run off the Wolf Tooth crowd.

There was nothing wrong with being east of the river as long as a crossing was made to concentrate the regiment. Benteen would support Reno and the reserve with the packs brought a formidable force to support the 'advance' by Reno.

The move across MTC was fatal, due to the release of warriors from Reno's front who moved upriver east of it. On the part of Custer's command, no one would have expected that turn of events.

There is no sense what so ever in striking further down river than Deep Coulee. That that happened is a theory from long after the battle and, l believe, that not a single officer present with the expedition and seeing the field, thought that that took place.

Likewise, there was no reason to place or hold companies on NC against a limited threat. There was no reason on earth to ride down Cedar Coulee. What there was was an imperative to fulfil obligation to support Reno, and drive the population out of the village by threat. All that was neccesary, unfortunately, was to destroy the camp and easier done if emptied of the people. Destroy the property and move out, job done.

Braden's fight indicates method. Custer relied upon him to do as required which risked high casualties.

A poor theory with wide credence at the moment is this split wing fainting, with one battalion a mile from the river. The idea is of an attempt to draw pressure off the unit in the valley.

This indicates a willingness to engage in battle east of the river before Reno retreated. Rubbish. The stated intention was to cross the river and fight in the valley. Initially, capture an undefended village but subsequently even though teeming with warriors, it had to be attacked because the regiment was already commited to a fight in the valley and Benteen and the reserves had been sent there also.

As the probe and search for a ford by the gray horse company progressed along the river, the balance of the command would stay parallel until the crossing was found and made. There was no way to cross companies abreast of one another and thus E got the job. As Wallace gave of Custer's orders through Cooke at RCoI, 'E will support you'.

There are as many theories as ticks on a dog, but from Martin, the actual intention is known to be the making of a crossing to capture the village. There is no getting around that fact

[quincannon]

My tone is the same tone I have with all dumb asses. I don't like you. I don't like you because you add nothing and confuse the lot, those that come here for information, and you provide gibberish and nonsense, to their detriment and this boards devaluation. So if you don't like my tone toughshit. Don't engage.

I am sure your not a bad guy, and you have obviously researched and come up with one hell of a lot o raw data, but raw data is absolutely no good unless you can sift and sort that data and place it in the context and flow of this battle, or battles in general. If you can't do that it, your efforts are worthless to the study of the battle and to glean value from that study. Short of putting it in context and flow, you can't fully understand what you have, nor can anyone else. This is not the first time you have been told this by myself as well as others. You look upon what is said to you as a personal attack when in reality it is nothing of the kind What it is, is a growing frustration with the disconnected, the disjointed, and the inability to determine fabrication for cause with fact. That is your problem. Until it is solved by you, then please do not think you are owed a hearing, because you lay out something which is nothing more than disconnected junk and try to pass it off as serious study/

You are entitled to your own opinion. What you are not entitled to is trying to pass off your opinion as fact. Nor are you entitled to any more of my time Good night.

[Yan Taylor]

Have a gander at this lot, some nice shots.

link

Ian.