|
Post by quincannon on Aug 27, 2013 13:24:12 GMT -6
Britt: I think it does. I will go further and say that is the way I would have done it had I been calling those shots. I am not Keogh though, and that is why I classified it no better than a hunch, not wishing to be more definitive thereby suggesting my way was the only way. It is not. It is a simple, direct, and effective way of deploying a force. The advantages you give it are completely valid, covering of movement and buying time and security for other deployments until a position is fully set. Generally speaking the rule is, first in address the most immediate threatened area. If that area continues to be the most threatened first in then also becomes last out.
What surprises me is that no one commented about Keogh himself. Personally I think he gets a bad rap, mostly brought on by where his body was discovered. As a battalion commander, he would have turned over the running of his company to his senior subordinate. I cannot see a man like Keogh not being far forward and present where the most serious threat was. Initially that was Calhoun Hill. Now he was found back with his own Company I giving fuel for his detractors. I can think of two possible reasons for his presence with Company I that are completely in line with his battalion commander duties.
1) A new and unexpected threat emerged in that vicinity, and the place that leaders grace with their personal presence is in efforts to address threat.
2) Had Keogh, and this is just speculation, been given a time limit to stay in this area by Custer, or had Keogh decided on his own that it was time to go due to pressure, it would be likely that he would pass that first to Companies C and L, then back to convey the same message to Company I. All three then were caught in the act, and the rest is well known.
|
|
|
Post by johnnyq on Aug 27, 2013 15:47:00 GMT -6
quincannon,
I like your Keogh points. I think there is a 3rd too. Keogh riding the area minding his entire command is hit (based on his leg wound matching his horses wound) and removed to where his body was found.
I co was the best place for wounded. While we're a bit off topic, I'll add it could explain the number of NCO's found around Keogh.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Aug 27, 2013 16:08:21 GMT -6
If he were not riding the area minding his entire command, he would not have been doing his job. Absent conclusive evidence to the contrary we must then assume that doing his job was exactly what he was doing.
I have no opinion on what to do with the wounded other than take them to a place of relative safety. Where Keogh was found I would imagine would fit that descripting at certain early phases of the battle. I think that location as a general depository for all of the wounded though would not be satisfactory because of distance.
That though does bring up another possibility, that being, Keogh being wounded early on. A stray shot would do the trick, for it was obvious he was mounted when wounded and presented a much better target than a dismounted soldier. Under those conditions and taking note of the nature of the leg wound I think it would be perfectly natural for him to go back or be taken back to his company. Sometimes in looking for the unusual, the theoretical, or the conspiracy we overlook the simple and the obvious answers.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 28, 2013 5:03:26 GMT -6
It’s strange when you hear theories of Lt. Smith being the Officer wounded at Ford B, if the HQ rode up to meet Keogh then I would find it odd that they didn’t leave the wounded Officer or any wounded for that matter with Keogh, if the Keogh position was the link up point for units coming from the south and for Custer and Yates to fall back to, then all non-essential personnel (Autie Reed, Boston Custer, Mark Kellogg and maybe a Doctor) should stay with I Company.
Says a lot about Custer when he takes these civilians along with him on what could be a dangerous mission, which the move north was.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Aug 28, 2013 6:06:12 GMT -6
Folk put the wounded officer as Smith, primarily because of the story of the wounded officer (leader) at Ford B and Smith being found on LSH with Yates' Company F. Good deduction, but still speculation, speculation founded on evidence but still in no way conclusive. I tend to think Smith was the one, but the seriousness of the wound is undetermined, and as I mentioned in an earlier post it could very well have been getting a good whack from falling or being thrown from his horse. Were it, the wound or injury, not deemed serious I would see no reason he would not be taken along. Were it serious or incapacitating, leaving him with Keogh would seem logical, but that begs the question who goes with E.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 28, 2013 6:21:25 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, there is a slight possibility (but obviously just conjecture) that both Companies in the Yates Wing were commanded by Second Lieutenants, Sturgis (E) and Reily (F), if Smith was injured and Custer kept Yates close by then this could have been the format.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Aug 28, 2013 6:29:21 GMT -6
Sturgis was brand new, but from all reports E had a strong First Sergeant. I can buy that. Reily had more experience. I could go with that as well. In either event both companies were the size of platoons, so in theory either should have been up to the job.
It is ironic that a man who had commanded a division, would or had reduced himself to de-facto command of a rump company sized unit.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 28, 2013 6:56:21 GMT -6
Yes Chuck, but I do think that after he left hill 3411 everything was done on the double, just look at that scribbled note by Cook, my eight year old Grandson could have written better and neater, so it must have been done in haste, so must of his decisions must have been done on the spur of the moment, and chipping away at his own Battalion reduced him to a Company Commander.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by bc on Aug 28, 2013 7:44:24 GMT -6
Britt: I think it does. I will go further and say that is the way I would have done it had I been calling those shots. I am not Keogh though, and that is why I classified it no better than a hunch, not wishing to be more definitive thereby suggesting my way was the only way. It is not. It is a simple, direct, and effective way of deploying a force. The advantages you give it are completely valid, covering of movement and buying time and security for other deployments until a position is fully set. Generally speaking the rule is, first in address the most immediate threatened area. If that area continues to be the most threatened first in then also becomes last out. What surprises me is that no one commented about Keogh himself. Personally I think he gets a bad rap, mostly brought on by where his body was discovered. As a battalion commander, he would have turned over the running of his company to his senior subordinate. I cannot see a man like Keogh not being far forward and present where the most serious threat was. Initially that was Calhoun Hill. Now he was found back with his own Company I giving fuel for his detractors. I can think of two possible reasons for his presence with Company I that are completely in line with his battalion commander duties. 1) A new and unexpected threat emerged in that vicinity, and the place that leaders grace with their personal presence is in efforts to address threat. 2) Had Keogh, and this is just speculation, been given a time limit to stay in this area by Custer, or had Keogh decided on his own that it was time to go due to pressure, it would be likely that he would pass that first to Companies C and L, then back to convey the same message to Company I. All three then were caught in the act, and the rest is well known. Chuck, I haven't ruled out that Keogh didn't just adopt a defensive position around Calhoun Hill and the south end of Battle Ridge which is why he was there where he was at. We know that NAs crossed the river at MTC and Deep Coulee fords. They went up Deep Coulee to Henryville for sure and then followed Deep Coulee around to the east side of Calhoun Hill. It would be natural to form a L shaped or U shaped perimeter skirmish lines around Calhoun. I can see Co. C positioned around Finley-Finckle Ridge, Co. L on Calhoun Hill, and then Keogh taking his company on around by Horseholder Ravine and the Keogh Sector to cover the horses and the East Flank. Custer and others were to the North. From this position they maintained a defensive front for quite some time. Then when Gall, LWM, CH or whoever pressed their attack from all sides of each company, the end happened fairly fast. The separation between the companies allowed NAs to flank each company and then the soldiers began congregating together at the end. It appears someone split Keogh's Company with most congregating on Keogh where the horses were closer to and the other ones were closer to Porter who would have been stationed at the other end of the line. Then there were the ones who ran to LSH as well. Keogh would have been out of sight of FF ridge and if that fell then the rest get rolled up piecemeal. That would put Harrington on the hook for a Co. C charge. bc
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 28, 2013 8:09:47 GMT -6
Good afternoon (or in your case morning) Britt, I have mentioned before that Keogh had his men in a text book formation and could have been ready to pull out, the L Company skirmish line could have been to keep anyone from getting too close, but because they overstayed their welcome Keogh got entangled in a battle that he didn’t expect, he may have been ordered to temporally hold this position and that is why he had one Company in skirmish and two standing too, but after L got fixed he simply couldn’t leave them, and it could be around this time that Custer got in a similar mess.
Just my Tuppence worth.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Aug 28, 2013 8:59:19 GMT -6
I see it as an L shaped position, with Company L as fate would have it forming the base of the L. As long as Company L could concentrate its fire into Henryville, it could interdict any further movement around the flank and into the rear (Horse holders-Keogh Swale). Once C Company made its move and were smacked L had to partially change fronts and the volume of fire into Henryville became insufficient. So as I see it the combination of the Company C foray and the response of L in what appears to be a covering of remnants withdrawing, together caused the position to collapse.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 28, 2013 9:21:15 GMT -6
Yes Chuck, L Company would have had to alter its base of fire if they were forced to cover C Company’s retreat, but that is what I was eluding to earlier, was C sent into action because they had become embroiled in a long battle, and the Indians simply didn’t play the game and stand off. Once they arrived in enough numbers to move onto the assault, Keogh’s mission could have changed from holding a temporary position to fighting a full blown battle.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Aug 28, 2013 9:40:38 GMT -6
Ian: My impression is that Keogh had no intention of becoming decisively engaged. The other fellows had something altogether different in mind. I also believe that the assault phase was premature, and Company C going down there stirred them up before they were completely ready. They went after C as a target of opportunity, and then they said what the hell might as well assault while we have seized the advantage. Other actions, on other days, and on other fields have been decided by just such nearly instantaneous shifts in momentum.
|
|
|
Post by bc on Aug 28, 2013 9:52:43 GMT -6
I see it as an L shaped position, with Company L as fate would have it forming the base of the L. As long as Company L could concentrate its fire into Henryville, it could interdict any further movement around the flank and into the rear (Horse holders-Keogh Swale). Once C Company made its move and were smacked L had to partially change fronts and the volume of fire into Henryville became insufficient. So as I see it the combination of the Company C foray and the response of L in what appears to be a covering of remnants withdrawing, together caused the position to collapse. Ok. Now I can make sense of the situation. I was never a fan of the scenario that put I co. in a reserve position with C & L dealing with the threat. I see that the NAs had worked around to the east side of Calhoun fairly early on so the 3 companies were in a defensive perimeter. I know there are those who say Crazy Horse took the north fords and came around LSH from the north and east putting them in a position to hit Keogh's flank but I am not sure he was there or if he was it was after LWM breached the perimeter coming from the GGR area and Gall probably hit the horses and Keogh from the southeast. By this time, troops on LSH was keeping those NAs to the north and east and west at bay which allowed remnants of the Keogh battalion to run to LSH and the horse barricade. The horse barricade probably wasn't formed until the last when the Keogh battalion was being overrun and NAs had LSH blocked in the other directions. bc
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 28, 2013 9:56:31 GMT -6
One of the worst was King Harold at the Battle of Hastings, the English held the high ground and the Normans couldn’t shift them, and it was only when they faint a retreat that the stupid fools charged after them, thus losing the advantage of the higher ground and the momentum of the battle changed in favour of the Normans.
At Hastings, a juggler (or Taillefer) was reciting odes to the Norman Soldiers before the battle, and an English soldier ran out to kill him, the Juggler (who was juggling his sword at the time) killed the Englishman, and buoyed after his triumph ran straight into the English ranks and was killed (or so they say).
Ian.
|
|