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Post by mac on Jul 5, 2013 2:18:02 GMT -6
Thanks quincannon I understand that aspect of the topography. Fred makes a comment about the nature of the land only being apparent when you get down into it and that this could explain how Harrington got into difficulty. My thought is that if Custer moved over the high ground to the East of the river then the Keogh wing did not appreciate fully the topography which may account for their lack of recognition of the threat created by infiltration. I guess I am trying to give them a small alibi . Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2013 4:14:24 GMT -6
Mac, if Calhoun had got his Troop into position before any major threat developed then he had a good vantage point to watch the ford below, not sure about Calhoun Coulee though, anyway have a shufty at these two snippets, they will give you a good layout of what the Soldiers could see and what the Warriors could see (but due to black powder and dust being kicked up, this nice clear view could give you a false impression though). Deep Coulee and the Warriors view of Calhoun Hill; linkCalhoun’s view of the area from his position; linkIan.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2013 4:45:40 GMT -6
Chuck/Dan; if my theoretical attack did manage to pass the timber and move on to the target? (The village), then I would move the Pack Train and the Trooper Packers into the timber or prairie dog town area, my main attack would use the edge of the Woods to my right and drive northeast between Shoulder blade Creek and the woods, this would put me on a collision course towards the circles containing the Hunkpapa, Blackfeet & San Arcs, but I don’t know that yet of course. Chuck, here is good image of the US Marine Rifle Squad; Ian. Attachments:
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Post by mac on Jul 5, 2013 5:10:55 GMT -6
Thanks for the links Ian. I had enjoyed them before but it was good to view them with fresh eyes. Certainly to me it is very hard to see all the folds in that terrain and as I have noted before very easy to see why the Warriors were able to close range on the Cavalry. My point here is that if Keogh and his men moved from Luce across to Calhoun they may not have penetrated close enough to the river to be aware of the intriacies of the land and the ease with which the enemy could close on them. Although they have a view of the coulee down to the river it is still easy for men to move up towards their position and to move past them and around them to the East. Also they have no idea what is happening behind Greasy Grass ridge (although they will certainly be aware of that). So my question is: Under these conditions (Keogh's approach to his position)is Keogh able to appreciate the amount of "dead ground" around him? Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2013 5:41:34 GMT -6
Mac, I don’t think Keogh knew just how much dead ground there was surrounding this area, but I don’t think he was planning to fortify the area because he could have initially kept two Troops Mounted, which seems to me that he was only planning to stay for a short while (or the other reason that Fred has discovered), if he was ordered to hold this position he would have set up more than one Skirmish Line, and later when the opposition grew, the decision to move C Troop down to Calhoun Coulee was made, but because the area contains many places that are out of sight and able to contain Warriors, C Troop simply blundered into a maelstrom of fire.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Jul 5, 2013 7:51:27 GMT -6
I tend to doubt the difficulty of the terrain within those coulees was apparent to either Custer or Keogh. I have been up and down that battlefield road dozens of times; I have walked all around the Ford B area (which is difficult in itself, as I am sure BC can verify); I have wandered around the bluffs, but I have never been aware of how crazy the terrain within some of those coulees really is. Keogh would be unaware of it and the benefit would be for the Indians. That gives even more credence to my belief they were able to load up the coulee with warriors, get reasonably close to Battle Ridge, launch arrows, then deal with any troops entering that hellhole. And Deep Ravine today isn't a patch to what it was in 1876. First of all, its headwall was much farther down than today and that supports the idea Custer would have sent Yates into that basin area to deal with Indians coming up the ravine's headwall. Things are very deceiving today...
... are you reading this, DC?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 5, 2013 8:59:13 GMT -6
I concur Fred. I think they were aware that the wash board nature of it was not good for travel, but were completely unaware how difficult the terrain is internally, and what splendid routes they are for concealed infiltration.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2013 9:31:17 GMT -6
This is the best data I have got so far, and as you can see it does not give you much on the CHQ. Ignore the MG Platoon and the three Rifle Platoons because I am nearly there with them (well I have just got to do the HQ in the MG Plt) Ian. (If anyone is confused about why I have just posted this here, it is because I couldn't do it via PM, for some reason the dam thing wouldn’t let me attach it, so I have to post it here, As it was originally intended for Chuck to view on a PM) Attachments:
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 5, 2013 10:50:08 GMT -6
Today, the field is near rain forest lush compared to what it was in 1876. The photos taken in the years just after the battle show ground as frequently visible dirt and zero of the waves of grass that today often hide the various horrors of ground that, I'd contend, experienced officers would have seen and noted back then. To be avoided like a live grenade.
This was prime bison country with lots of game animals and that before the huge pony visitation, and this after centuries of much the same. MTC was a bison crossing by common accord, as I recall.
No officer or experienced plainsman would have willingly gone to LSH from the south, would not have taken the 'high road' along the hogback to provide easy targeting for those in the numerous gullies about. The reports of huge dust clouds in the battle support this. This was well devoured ground before the battle. It's hard to see some of the large marble markers at some times of the year because of the tall growth, not what Custer's guys dealt with.
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jag
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Post by jag on Jul 5, 2013 10:52:22 GMT -6
Mac: The terrain from MTC to the present cemetery is like one of those old fashioned wash boards that your mother probably used to do the laundry. Consequently he went up onto battle ridge, not only because it was the closest high ground but because it was much easier to travel then the up and down the straight line route north would be. That same washboard when viewed from the ridge were the infiltration routes Fred spoke of earlier, and all of them led to within 50 or 60 meters of the ridge top. I think it should be noted, and worth note, that "Consequently he went up onto battle ridge..." He did no such thing. As many things past tend to get washed away with belief, that ridge, as in "up onto" it, could not have been accomplished by his whole regiment, and wasn't recorded that he, as in alone, did, because it was a hog back in 1876 where barely a horse could stand upon it. Just to clarify terrain features thought to be one thing, that were quite another - back then.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 5, 2013 11:25:37 GMT -6
With due respect to both of you, I think you will find that Riva Ridge, Mount La Defensa, Old Baldy, Pork Chop Hill, and Chipyong-Ni were quite difficult presentations of terrain, as was Gloster Hill, for my friends in the UK. Military units go where they have to go and in each instance cited above they went there willingly despite the difficulties. As a consequence the difficulty of terrain is no sound argument alone to support go or no go, by any military force at any time since Adam and Eve walked in the Garden.
Some routes are better than others, that is where the choice comes in. The better is in either tactics or trafficibility. That does not in any way say that the route ultimately chosen or the terrain occupied, both as willing decisions are perfect, they are not, do not present certain difficulties, they do, but they are chosen on the basis of best available to attain the objective you intend.
All this reminds me of something my mother told me when I was young. Don't take the gravel path with your bike. You might fall off and skin yourself up. My mother never climbed Pork Chop Hill.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2013 12:25:29 GMT -6
DC, if you rule out both the southern and eastern routes, then that really only leaves the 7th with one good avenue of attack, and that is the route Reno took. What direction was Crook taking? If he didn’t get tangled up on the Rosebud Would his approach have come from the east or northeast?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 5, 2013 12:54:17 GMT -6
Chuck; here is some stuff on miscellaneous Units. link
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Post by fred on Jul 5, 2013 13:04:20 GMT -6
Let's not get too carried away with this "hogback" business and its inaccessibility. And I do not recall anyone claiming Custer rode on the very top of Battle Ridge. Even a civilian would note the silliness of that.
So, once again for the record, make your own determinations...
PVT T. O'Neill-- “I was a member of the party that buried General Custer.... I do not suppose Custer was in exactly the position where he fell when we found him, for he had been stripped naked, not even a stocking on. The last stand was made on what we call a ‘hogback hill.’ It appeared to me that the General had been placed by the warriors in a comfortable position, his head higher than his feet, lying on his back, arms by his side, features calm, without any distortion. One bullet wound on the body and one through the temples were visible. The wound on the body seemed to enter on the left side, a little behind and below the left breast, the bullet traveling between the back and breastbone, and coming out on the right side near the lower ribs. This wound was apparently made by an Indian on horseback, while the General was on foot. The other wound was squarely through the temples, and from the absence of powder marks, left no doubt in my mind that it was inflicted by an Indian on foot, and on the same level as the General." [Pacific Monthly, 1908 Custer Battle Casualties, II, 26 – 27.] A few years later O'Neill said, the end of Custer Ridge—where the monument stands—ended in a blunt peak. “It was neither level nor sharply peaked like a hogback. South of this ridge ran to a sharp peak, like a hogback” [Walter Camp notes, October 13, 1912; On the LBH with Walter Camp, 187].
Richard G. Hardorff -- In 1876, "Custer Ridge was then a hogback, its length interrupted by several hillocks, its narrow summit not even wide enough to accommodate a wagon. The northwestern end… terminated in a knoll. Rising 6 feet above the adjacent ridge, the slanted top of this elevation was some 30 feet in diameter. On the very top of this little knoll... Custer and 9 of his men perished" [Hokahey!, 71.]
LT C. F. Roe--F/2C-- Roe said the Custer ridge was level, originally, not rising to a peak. No grading had been done by 1878. [Camp interview, December 8, 1910; Custer in '76, 250.]
Young Hawk-- Ree scout-- Young Hawk referred to the hill where Custer fell as a flat-topped hill. [1912 interviews; The Arikara Narrative, 108.]
BG Alfred H. Terry-- “The monument is located on the point of the hill, six feet from where the remains of General Custer were found.” [Official report of the re-burials and the placing of the monument, October 9, 1881; Report of the Secretary of War, No. 1, Part 2, Vol. 1, pages 97 – 98, TheCuster Myth, 372.]
SGT D. Kanipe-- Camp asked Kanipe if the ridge where the monument now stands was so level and wide: Kanipe said, "no, says was narrower and Custer laid on very peak of it.” [Camp interview, June 16 – 17, 1908; Custer in '76, 95, FN 15.]
LT C. DeRudio-- “Custer lay on top of a conical knoll.” [Camp interview, February 2, 1910; Custer in '76, 87.]
As for the difference in the terrain, that is difficult to pinpoint because of the B&W photos versus a color visual today. There are plenty of scrub areas we trod across, many of which would correspond to what things looked like in 1876 or 1877. Park rangers feel conditions now are similar and in some areas I do not doubt it. Regardless, Custer chose his route; no one forced him there and the terrain was clearly not kindly to him.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jul 5, 2013 13:09:24 GMT -6
yantaylor,
Jackson could inspire and make his men move quick. That's good. But he was, it seems, somewhat bat guano insane in some things, distorted by his religious extremism. If nothing else, he ordered up pikes for his men to use. Spears. They were in a Richmond warehouse and never utilized, but ...... pikes. Not since the English Civil War and even then on the way out. That's not the modern military mind at work. His men called themselves 'foot cavalry' so lord knows what the madman was planning. He benefits in history from the Anglo-American habit of fluffing the defeated enemy so that you can brag without bragging and seemingly being gracious. He was brilliant (we beat him.....).
Crook was heading out from about where Sheridan is today and he was following the Rosebud north. He was following the leads of his scouts, so whatever they discovered would have pulled him west or not, and he'd have ended up at the Yellowstone.
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