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Post by wild on Mar 27, 2013 5:54:11 GMT -6
Just that Custer and Reno are on roughly parallel courses and Reno having stopped to form his line is still further North than Custer.
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Post by montrose on Mar 27, 2013 6:37:51 GMT -6
Let's look at LTC Custer's use of messengers.
SGM Sharrow and TMP Does had been sent to Benteen.
SGM Sharrow was used again on the scouts along Reno Creek.
CPT Cooke and CPT Keough went to observe MAJReno's movement to contact.
Note the capability of the messengers. They were men who could not just deliver a message, but obtain and evaluate the situation.
Martini seemed oblivious to all the other messengers. I believe this is because he was not near LTC Custer. (And/or Benteen was right in that he was very thick headed).
By the way, QC; I think the mot likely cause of Martini's horse being shot is friendly fire.
The use of Martini as a messenger implies a low priority task. I believe GAC didn't want Benteen and McDougall to run into the large Indian force that was between Reno and Ford A. GAC and staff were aware that Martini had the intelligence and capability of a passenger pigeon, unable to deliver or obtain situational awareness.
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Post by fred on Mar 27, 2013 7:15:20 GMT -6
Hey, Will... how are you? Hope you are doing well. ... and TMP Does had been sent to Benteen. Voss, not Dose. He never got to use Dose who was killed in Deep Coulee. Extremely good point. I believe you are incorrect here, Will. No friendly firing occurred on the east side of the river at this time. And we know of around 22 Indians-- scattered-- who were all over the east side. Completely agree. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Mar 27, 2013 8:06:15 GMT -6
Gentlemen,
Many of my thoughts are not born out of extensive research, but rather gut feelings. Martini is no exception. I agree that the third man that DeRudio observed was in fact Tom Custer. But heres my problem. There should have been a fourth. Martini.
Before the advent of the radio for communication, commanders used runners/messengers to convey orders/directives. That radio man or runner was always close by so the C.O. didnt have to look or send for him. That Martini wasnt with Custer at this point, tells me that Martini had already been sent before Custer got to 3411.
I dont believe Martini saw any of Renos fight, all he saw was Reno charging and assumed that he was driving the warriors. Thats where the "They skedadling" comes from.
I have seen some opinions of Martinis times and distance supported by Sgt Knipes times and distance which seem similar. That certainly has merit and is logical, except in my opinion, and let me be clear about this, this is only my opinion, again based on some facts, but mostly a gut feeling. I dont believe that Sgt Knipe was sent anywhere, by anyone, at any time and place. I dont believe that he was a messenger, and cannot use his statements.
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Mar 27, 2013 9:40:55 GMT -6
OK Dan. Let's look at it. Custer being on that knob with Cooke and TC in no way excludes Martini from being in the vicinity. Look at the picture Fred posted, and I think you will agree that Martini or any of the others from the headquarters group could have been ten to fifteen yards away and outside the field of vision from the valley.
Why would Custer send a message before 3411, the decision point? After makes sense. Before, no so much.
Kanipe. I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. Many are not. Had he given the messenger from TC story after the battle, I would give him no credibility. Doing it when he did though, had TC lived, and Kanipe had no expectation that he would not, Kanipe could be charged with desertion in the face of the enemy. That is one hell of a chance to take. That frankly is my only reason for doubt. I find two messages a little hard to swallow.
Will: I had given friendly fire some thought, perhaps from one of the stragglers, as well. Looking at it though, I think it most probably hostile.
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Post by bc on Mar 27, 2013 12:31:12 GMT -6
There was the alleged friendly fire incident where the half breed scout, Billy Jackson, I believe, was shot by Custer so he said anyway. The Ree scouts who brought the captured ponies across the river in that area may have been pursued by some Sioux. Maybe the same ones seen by Peter Thompson. These may have been the shooters.
bc
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Post by wild on Mar 27, 2013 12:33:55 GMT -6
The view from 3411 tells Custer precious little. It is too remote from Reno to ascertain with any certainity how that action was going. It is too remote from the village to view the extent of it. The view of the river further north is blocked so Custer cannot see MTCF nor can he see where the bluffs end. The view from 3411 is such that any commander contemplating an offensive action further North must tae himself to Weir Point before blindly going down any of those ravines
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Post by montrose on Mar 27, 2013 15:12:20 GMT -6
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Et1SkVldiHII used this clip in military decision making classes I taught in the Special Forces course. It is interesting to see how correct data can be incorrectly interpreted. LTC Custer had a cognitive framework issue. He had a preconceived concept of what he wante the Indians to do. He misinterpreted or ignored allfacts that contradicted his concept. Martini illustrated the cluelessness factor. He reported an empty village and fleeing Indians. He somehow overlooked 8-10000 Indians and 10k plus horses down there. He was under fire but didn't know it. He failied to observe friendly and enemy elements we know were near him during Martini's wild ride.
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Post by fred on Mar 27, 2013 17:34:49 GMT -6
The view from 3411 tells Custer precious little. Agree. Agree. Agree. Agree. And here I thought we could make it a quintella! You forget about the fact Boyer viewed the whole mess from atop Weir Point and knew the countryside like the back of his hand. There was no need for Custer to go to Weir Point... and he didn't. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by zekesgirl on Mar 27, 2013 17:44:22 GMT -6
The friendly fire that wounded Martini's horse, I believe, was from Martini himself. He knew there were plenty of hostiles in the area. He had the message in a pocket, his reins in one hand , and his pistol in his other hand. He shot his horse as he was whipping the horse to go faster and 'skedaddle' out of there.
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Post by fred on Mar 27, 2013 18:27:52 GMT -6
I would suspect Martini's horse was hit before he reached 3,411 or certainly Reno Hill on his way back.
By that time he was either running into some stragglers or had already done so. Regardless, whatever stragglers he ran into had already fired on the Ree scouts who had herded their stolen ponies up to those hills and were looking for a ravine in which to hide them.
I also believe QC to be correct when he says if Martini was anywhere near Custer while the latter was at 3,411, Martini was several yards behind, as would be Hughes, Dose, and Voss... if that were the case.
I also believe the first time Martini saw anything in the valley was when he backtracked with the note and passed over 3,411, going close to the edge out of curiosity.
If he saw sleeping dogs earlier, it was briefly, and obviously in the Spotted Tail encampment, not the main village.
I also subscribe to Montrose's opinion of Martini.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Mar 27, 2013 19:26:10 GMT -6
OK Dan. Let's look at it. Custer being on that knob with Cooke and TC in no way excludes Martini from being in the vicinity. Look at the picture Fred posted, and I think you will agree that Martini or any of the others from the headquarters group could have been ten to fifteen yards away and outside the field of vision from the valley. Why would Custer send a message before 3411, the decision point? After makes sense. Before, no so much. Kanipe. I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. Many are not. Had he given the messenger from TC story after the battle, I would give him no credibility. Doing it when he did though, had TC lived, and Kanipe had no expectation that he would not, Kanipe could be charged with desertion in the face of the enemy. That is one hell of a chance to take. That frankly is my only reason for doubt. I find two messages a little hard to swallow. Will: I had given friendly fire some thought, perhaps from one of the stragglers, as well. Looking at it though, I think it most probably hostile. Colonel, It appears I have committed the Cardinal sin of a forum. Voicing an opinion with no facts or evidence to support it. I agree that 3411 was probably the point where Custer made his plan of action. My thought is that Custer sent Martini before he made his decision or plan of action. He knew he had made a mistake in sending Benteen away and felt that whatever course he was going to take would involve Benteen. But in retrospect that is an opinion which I should have kept to myself until I could support it,if in fact it can be supported. As to Martini not being close to Custer on 3411, you are probably correct. When I read that DeRudio observed just three men on 3411 my minds eye assumed that he could see the entire hill or location and saw only the three men. It is very likely that he could only see the crest and not the whole hill and that as you say Martini was only a few yards away. As to Sgt Knipe. Rank and service time not withstanding, you and I are both soldiers and will always give another soldier the benifit of a doubt. In Sgt Knipes case how ever there is too big a red flag. Allow me to explain. Daniel Knipe was obviously a fine soldier. He was promoted to Sgt at a time when promotions were harder to get than finding hens teeth. That is where my problem with him being a messenger comes in. A soldier of Knipes caliber, an NCO. when given a message by his C.O. , unless he is shot, his horse is shot or there are too many warriors to get through, is going to deliver that message or die trying. Sgt Knipe was not shot, nor was his horse shot, nor were there any warriors in his way. He had clear sailing to his objective. Yet when he got there he delivered no message to anyone. That Colonel, is too big a red flag for me to get around, no matter how much I would rather support him. As to taking a chance of being caught, sure he took a chance, but I think when someone is desperate they take care of their primary concern first, then worry about the ramifications if any later. In this case of course there were none Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Mar 27, 2013 19:37:34 GMT -6
Remember something about Kanipe... he told no one who sent him back[/i] until the final results were tallied.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Mar 27, 2013 20:06:30 GMT -6
Remember something about Kanipe... he told no one who sent him back [/i] until the final results were tallied. Best wishes, Fred.[/quote] Thank you Captain. I had indeed overlooked that fact. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Mar 27, 2013 23:17:30 GMT -6
Fred: That I did not know and it makes a heck of a lot of difference I think.
Company C was already short on leadership, and choosing a sergeant for a messenger would seem out of place.
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