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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 13, 2015 7:22:26 GMT -6
Good morning all;
As I said in an earlier post the cavalry used Trumpets and Guidons along with horse colours to help with command and control, a standard cavalry regiment had 12 companies, but the main reason how cavalry function on the battlefield is the fact that each company has two officers, now these officers along cannot co-operate in a regimental operation without orders from the RHQ and that would be how things functioned.
The Indian village was made up of circles, so I would expect each circle would have a tribal leader, you could say he acted like a company officer, the men of his tribe would gather around him and follow his directions, so if you say that the village contained a dozen tribes (similar to 12 companies in a cavalry regiment but in some cases a hell of a lot larger) and each one contributed a band under the control of their own leader, would I right in saying that there would be no higher command system to oversee all of these bands, and each would act independently?
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 13, 2015 7:30:11 GMT -6
Ian,
Each 7th company was allocated 3 officers, but most companies had 2 officers in the battle. A number were down to a single officer with the First Sergeant as second in command. A large number of troopers had been left at the Yellowstone camp, and the Yates/Keogh wing appear to have been weakened more by mule train detachments (logically so, following their scout under Reno).
There was a limited informal C+C system within the hostile force. That does not mean General Sitting Bull sitting down with his operations, intelligence, personnel staff officers, before anybody takes umbrage at that observation.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 13, 2015 7:58:22 GMT -6
Yes Justin, I forgot about the Captain, 1st and 2nd Lieutenants, I was stuck it the 7th cavalry @ BLBH mode.
When you look at the various maps, you can be forgiven for thinking that the Indians did imply some C+C, but in reality it was only the general direction of any advance to halt the cavalry, the names of Crazy Horse and Lame White Man plus the infamous “Suicide Boys” springs to mind, LWM may have simply led whatever warriors that were around him at the time, he then approach the cavalry via ford B and proceeded to move against L Company, the sweeping manoeuvre by Crazy Horse to cut off Keogh from Custer looks and sounds like a classic thrust to divide his enemy, but again he could have simply used the best point along the river which led him behind Keogh, Custer separating probably did him a favour, the Suicide Boys, well if these young men did give their lives to chase off E company’s horses and died in the process, well my hat goes off to them. Though the number of Indian casualties for the full battle at 36 is pushing it.
Ian.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 13, 2015 8:35:25 GMT -6
Ian,
C+C is an emotive term, especially to use vis-à-vis a native community, because people associate C+C with modern hierarchical regular armies.
But localised C+C there undoubtedly was. A warrior deferring to, say, the Constipated Buffalo or Gall is C+C. Either of the latter conferring, or acting in response to the actions of the other, is C+C.
It was at a basic level, but it was enough to defend the southern perimeter of the village and to take advantage of the tactical situation following Ford B.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2015 9:44:47 GMT -6
Good enough to win is all that matters. On this particular day a rudimentary system, under the leadership of motivated men, regardless of who they were or what position in tribal society they held, was good enough to defeat a more sophisticated system, that was not properly utilized.
Now we can discuss the nuts and bolts of that rudimentary system until the second coming, and I hope we do for the sake of my own poor knowledge on the subject, but the fact remains that it was good enough.
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Post by Beth on Jan 13, 2015 16:01:58 GMT -6
Good enough to win is all that matters. On this particular day a rudimentary system, under the leadership of motivated men, regardless of who they were or what position in tribal society they held, was good enough to defeat a more sophisticated system, that was not properly utilized. Now we can discuss the nuts and bolts of that rudimentary system until the second coming, and I hope we do for the sake of my own poor knowledge on the subject, but the fact remains that it was good enough. So basically things come down to that sometimes the Ewoks can defeat the Empire.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2015 16:49:32 GMT -6
That is exactly what it comes down to ---Pride goeth before the fall. When you think you can't be beat, that is exactly when you are beaten.
Most of it is who is playing quarterback for the Empire team.
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Post by montrose on Jan 14, 2015 7:08:33 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Use the Fetterman fight as a vignette to discuss C2.
2. Background. Red Cloud and other Indian leaders, encouraged by their successes, decided to undertake a large military operation against Fort Kearny before winter snows forced them to break up their large village on the Tongue River and disperse. The decoy trick had worked on December 6 and they decided to try it again, this time with a force adequate to destroy any group of soldiers sent to chase them. The warriors, possibly numbering more than 1,000, congregated about 10 miles north of Fort Kearny, reconnoitered, and decided the best place to lay the trap was along the Bozeman trail north of Lodge Trail ridge, out of sight but only about four miles from Fort Kearny. The Cheyenne and Arapaho took up positions on the west side of the trail and the Lakota on the east. The group of Indians chosen to decoy the soldiers included the young Oglala, Crazy Horse.[10]
According to a Cheyenne informant named White Elk, who was interviewed as he walked the battlefield 48 years after the event, 10 warriors were chosen as the decoys to lead Fetterman into the ambush: two Arapaho, two Cheyenne, and two from each of the three Lakota bands present: the Oglala, Brulé, and Miniconjou. The trail was used as a control measure with the Arapaho and Cheyenne on one side, and the Sioux on the other. The ambush was triggered by a signal from the decoys.
3. Discussion. The Fetterman fight clearly indicates effective Indian command and control. Observation of enemy behavior indicated a US weakness, a susceptibility to decoys. The Indians conducted reconnaissance and developed a sophisticated plan. A deception attack on the wagon train would bring out a US relief force. Indians planned to target and destroy the second force.
Sidebar: Which proves the theory that the Indians are incapable of fighting 2 actions at once completely false.
Using the trail to divide responsibility and aors is a control measure. Using a signal to start the ambush is a control measure.
Indian C2 was still messy. But despite the inefficiency, it was effective.
The Fetterman was a successful battle in a successful war. The Indians achieved their operational goal in forcing the closing of the forts on the Bozeman trail. They reached a strategic success in the treaty that reaffirmed their control of this region. They bought themselves 10 years.
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Post by montrose on Jan 14, 2015 7:47:58 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss Indian ability to change tactics, techniques and procedures during the Plains Wars.
2. Background. In the 1860s the Plains Indians were still a bow and club force. Their tactics were based on these weapons.
a. Fetterman fight, Dec 1866.. Only 6 of 81 US KIA were from gunshot wounds. And even these may have been gathered from US dead during the fight.
b. Beecher's Island Sep 1868. A handpicked force of mostly civilians with 50 US fought off an attack of several hundred Indians The Indian plan was for a dawn attack. The surprise was ruined by the lack of discipline of the Indians. A few eager beavers moved in before the attack order was given. Three times during the first day the Indians conducted massed mounted charges, that wilted under US fire. The Indians were trying bow and arrow and club tactics against breech loaders, and failed utterly.
3. The Indians learned form the 1860s fights.
a. Weapons. Indians made great individual effort to acquire modern firearms. One myth of LBH is that The Indians were 100% armed with repeating rifles. As we know, LTC Custer had made this claim numerous times, even in the 1860s. Indians had an estimated 300 breechloaders at LBH with same number of muzzle loaders. The primary weapon at LBH remained bows and clubs. Can someone find a picture of that club with 3 blades sticking out of it? Cavemen had better weapons. Don't misunderstand me. Indian weapons definitely improved 1865 to 1876. Indian firearms were the decisive factor in breaking US formations and killing US soldiers. But imagine if the Indians had 1500 Henrys.
b. Tactics. The Indians adjusted their tactics, techniques and procedures to reflect breech loading weapons. They adjusted far better then the 7th cavalry to the requirements of plains warfare. Notice the use of long range fire at LBH. This is a completely new tactic, not reflected at all 10 years back. In fact, Indian tactics were superior to their performance in 1873. There are no more massed charges. AT LBH we see use of dismounted skirmishers to disrupt US formations. We see infiltration tactics. We see an extensive focus on getting around US flanks to conduct attacks from the rear.
Look at the valley fight. Dismounted and mounted Indians sought to delay Reno. Yet the Indian main body swept around Reno's open flank, out of range of US weapons. They then attacked Reno from the rear. There were more Indians behind Reno than between him and the village. That's a gutsy move for a unit with US style command and control. For the Brownian movement Indian anarchy, pretty good work.
(Must have been Republicans).
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 14, 2015 7:51:04 GMT -6
The Fetterman fight did show that the Indians could plan rudimentary tactics, the luring and ambushing of Fetterman’s proved that, I suppose this tactic may have failed if Fetterman was not a such fool, because he disobeyed his orders from his commander Carrington not to pursue the Indians but to relieve the wood cutting party and bring them back to the fort.
His force contained around 50 Infantry (armed with Civil War Muskets) and about 30 Cavalry (armed with Spencer Carbines), the two columns left at different times and died in two different locations.
The wood cutting party who Fetterman was sent to rescue, made it back to the fort safely.
Crazy Horse was one of the ten warriors chosen to lure out the soldiers, he later went on to take part in a night march to hit Crooks column on the Rosebud, and if it is true he led a thrust that attacked Keogh’s battalion from the rear along with Lame White Man’s attacked that cut through C company, so these three deeds by Crazy Horse alone shows that the Indians could be capable of initiative, the Fetterman and Crook battles were planned in advance, but the attacks at the BLBH proves that they could achieve results with short notice.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Jan 14, 2015 8:24:55 GMT -6
Darkcloud and Scar, Unless you want to argue that the Indians were vegetables. An ingenious carnivorous plant that can be found in Borneo provides proof that formulating effective strategies does not need a brain at all times. A group of researchers, whose study on insect-eating pitcher plants that that uses a remarkable prey-trapping technique in order to catch the most number of bugs for food, has found evidence that evolved strategies are sometimes as effective as using thinking skills to respond to certain challenges. www.techtimes.com/articles/26453/20150114/carnivorous-pitcher-plant-is-proof-that-the-brainless-can-be-brainy-too.htmIf the Indians had no command and control, then their actions are all individual actions. There is no collective actions possible. So it is random chance that 1000 Indians showed up at the same place at the same time. Without C2, Indians are only capable of Brownian movement. Scar, your comment on Indian C2 makes no sense. Maybe you need to read about Indian society. And Sitting Bull didn't participate in the battle of LBH. He was with the papooses, out of sight of the battle.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 14, 2015 8:41:39 GMT -6
Montrose(one of my favorite towns in CO), the above three posts are direct and to the point. While nearly all on this boards are aware of these engagements, there are probably some few who would disagree with your premise. Probably because it will disrupt their own narrative and agenda. Bait and switch was used a number of times in the southwest as well.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 14, 2015 9:36:06 GMT -6
WO,
No, I haven't made a mess of anything. I've read a great deal on the RN and WWI, and the trivia you wheel out for distraction just reveals you have not. You've clearly not read Gordon, which the RN considers - and Brit military historians consider - one of the most important books of the last century and, I'd guess, this one.
For something to be "command and control" it has to have the ability to issue what is called "a command." No such Indian entity existed. It has to have the ability to exhibit control, ditto. Control requires a structure of command. The not-too-bright military mind ignores this and tries to wedge something into that box on the Indian side solely because the Army side has one. This is how they have to discuss these things. Without the handy jargon applying to both sides, they're lost on how to talk about it. It's nonsense.
This is related to Gordon's various points, and it is my opinion that Custer's battle suffered then in fact and now in discussion from the same problems writing about Jutland then and now has. You guys think the 'time' issue is confusing for LBH? RN ships used one official time in certain harbors and one at sea. Or were supposed to. And apparently were confused as to which was which. Or, like the Indomitable seems to have done, may have just split the difference. Try to meld their logs and journals during battle, which is so much more confusing. In at least one incident a group of officers on the bridge were somehow many miles away from officers elsewhere in the conning tower at the same time according to their own reports. Could be someone hadn't adjusted their clocks, or it could be another screw up. German reports are more coherent but have similar issues. Of course, there is the tiller direction issue previously mentioned. British records are not clear at certain times where the 5th Battle Squadron was in relation to the BCF, there are conflicts undoubtedly hampered by Beatty's attempts to falsify it after the fact. This atop the inadvertent 360 degree turn Beatty doesn't admit contrary to observations and records by some of his own ships and Germans both. This is 40 years after the LBH, and things ain't better.
So, WO, tell us how entities that could not issue a command are somehow command and control? It's a false equivalence you insist upon.
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 14, 2015 9:40:44 GMT -6
Montrose,
I will respectfully reserve the right to transfer your posts to the "Flank Nonsense" thread, if certain individuals persist with the errant nonsense that the hostiles were incapable of any C+C.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jan 14, 2015 10:37:12 GMT -6
Ian: I think the tactics were far from rudimentary. The command and control, thus the execution of those tactics was inefficient, but workable.
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