jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
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Post by jag on Sept 2, 2012 21:00:56 GMT -6
The offering of smoke signals as indication of command and control is pretty pathetic. Neither speed nor accuracy nor much chance of reception whatever, especially in mobile circumstance. Especially given nobody then or now has explained what the language of smoke was - it's just assumed there was one, I guess - and, since there were none seen at LBH, how is this relevant? It's a system demanding structure the tribes did not have or want to. "Every writer on Indians, either of fact or fiction, has spoken of their use of smoke for communicating at long distances. These smokes are made singly or in groups to ascend into the air in different ways to each of which is attached a conventional meaning. Thus a single smoke ascending naturally means one thing; two smokes, another thing. A small fire is built on which is placed damp grass, creating a large volume of smoke. As it begins to ascend the blanket is held horizontally above it, and when the space beneath is quite full, the blanket is slipped off sideways and then quickly brought back to its place. Smoke managed this way ascends in round puffs...." "With almost all Indians, a single smoke, ascending naturally, is a warning to all Indians within range of vision that there are strangers in the country; and such is their habitual caution they make these signals even when in a state of profound peace. Every military command passing through an Indian country, will be preceded and flanked by these signal-smokes. To prevent its being mistaken for the smoke of a camp-fire, it is made on the side or top of a high hill, or on the plain, or a divide away from water. At night, fires are used as signals somewhat in the same way, not, however, so extensively, or with such effect, as smoke." "Besides these signals, which are used to convey information to persons beyond the sight of the maker, the Indians have other means equally remarkable for telegraphing to persons a long distance off, but who can be seen. Indian scouts are employed by the U.S. government at almost every post in Indian country. Their services are invaluable, indeed indispensable to success against Indians. ON the march, the leader or interpreter is kept with the commanding officer of the troops, while the scouts are sent far in advance or on the flank. Occasionally one shows himself, sometimes a mere speck on a distant ridge, and the interpreter will say at once what that scout desires to communicate. I learned some of these signals, which are all simple and entirely conventional. For instance, a scout rides to the top of a hill or ridge, pulls up his horse, stands motionless for two or three minutes, and then proceeds at a walk. He means, "All right, no signs of enemy or danger." Another will dash at full speed to the top of the hill and ride rapidly round and round in a circle. He means, "Danger; get together as quickly as possible." "These and similar, are ordinary signals used by all Plains Indians. A party going off on a raid or thieving expedition, will often, before starting, settle on meanings for the signals different from those in common use. By this means they are able to communicate without disclosing their true meaning to any casual observer. The only really wonderful thing about this telegraphing is the very great distance it can be read by the Indians. While with an excellent field glass I could scarcely make out that distant speck was a horseman, the Indian at my side would tell me what that speck wished to communicate." "Indian signalling and telegraphing are simply modifications and extensions of the sign language. All are offspring's of a necessity growing out of the number and variety of the of the Indian languages, and the constant wariness necessary and incidental to a life of peculiar danger."
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 3, 2012 0:49:39 GMT -6
Valueless. Puffs of smoke mean strangers in the country. Wow. No direction, no nothing. If they had command and control they'd have numbers, direction, timing and no need to betray their own presence.
And those ad hoc signals. Again: wow. Just like command and control.
Sign language was terra incognita to most in the army and a very weak reed of communication even among Indians.
For smoke, all they instantly need is grass, wet grass, wood, and time under cover to get that crucial signal up. And they can send as many as two (2) different signals? Wow. Just wow. No wind, plenty of visability, a snap.
Again, no source, and that's what you're hoping will be impressive with the dramatic revelation. It won't be.
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Post by wild on Sept 3, 2012 1:37:27 GMT -6
Dan I have no source, or manual to quote from, but my opinion which can certainly be disputed is that command and control equals authority. It is absolute. You cant have a little authority over your forces, you either have it or you dont Could I refer you to my friends the Boers who elected their own officers and operated a totally voluntry system. Command and control as we know it Jim, is a creature of the professional army,It is necessary, partially because motivation cannot be relied upon,It is a case of you fight whether you like it or not.C and C is the sticking stuff when all emotional factors go queer on you. The Indian system as with the "mob"was temporary and local.A significant battle won and what happens?Their "C and C" or what I prefer their common purpose vaporises and they disperse to the 4 corners of the State.
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Post by fred on Sept 3, 2012 10:44:47 GMT -6
Valueless. Puffs of smoke mean strangers in the country. Wow. No direction, no nothing. For my two cents, DC is right on the money here. Smoke signals were no more sophisticated than a grunt... high pitched for rejection, low pitched for acceptance. "Throw on some wet wood, Chief, to make the smoke darker!" I would guess if smoke signals were any more advanced than that, some dipstick would have it in print already. Smells to me like our neighbor's "Kentucky windage." Puff-puff!As for Indian sightings, it took months of head-scratching from the start of Gibbon's various commands: February 2, 1876—CPT Edward Ball with a detachment from Company H, 2nd Cavalry, leaves Fort Ellis escorting a wagon train with supplies for the Crow Agency along the Stillwater, 100 miles away. March 14, 1876—Tuesday—CPT Walter Clifford and his E/7th Infantry, leave Camp Baker [later, Fort Logan]—along Smith’s/Deep Creek—digging their way through snowdrifts toward Fort Ellis. (Loyd Overfield’s after-action reports claim Clifford left on the 17th). Clifford was to meet J. H. Conrad’s supply train from Fort Shaw, then escort the wagons to the new Crow Agency and await Gibbon’s arrival with five companies of the 7th Infantry. March 17, 1876—10 AM— CPT Charles Cotesworth Rawn (CO, I/7I, and as senior officer, CO of this battalion of the 7th Infantry) leaves Fort Shaw (about 20 miles west of the future site of Great Falls, MT) with five companies—A, under CPT William Logan and 1LT Charles Austin Coolidge; B, under CPT Thaddeus Sanford Kirtland and 2LT Charles Austin Booth; H, under CPT Henry Blanchard Freeman and 2LT Frederick Monroe Hill Kendrick; I, under CPT Charles Cotesworth Rawn, 1LT William Lewis English, and 2LT Alfred Bainbridge Johnson; and K, under CPT James Madison Johnson Sanno) and ten mule-drawn contract wagons with rations for ten days; twelve officers, 195 EM. Also with them were 2LT Charles Albert Woodruff (K Company), commander of the Gatling battery, and 1LT James Bradley (Company B) and twelve mounted infantrymen as scouts. March 18, 1876—Saturday—7 AM—LT Bradley departs William John’s ranch (near the head of Little Prickly Pear Canyon). April 1, 1876—Saturday—9 AM—CPT Lewis Thompson (CO, L/2nd Cavalry) leaves Fort Ellis, in command of four companies of the 2nd Cavalry (F, G, H, and L) and a civilian wagon train. Doctor 1LT Holmes Paulding, Assistant Surgeon, is with them, along with 2LT Edward J. McClernand (G/2C), who was detailed to Gibbon’s staff as the Acting Engineer Officer. April 3, 1876—Monday—COL John Gibbon, MAJ James Brisbin (CO, 2nd Cavalry and of Fort Ellis), 1LT Levi Burnett (Adjutant, 7th Infantry), 1LT Joshua Jacobs (RQM, 7th Infantry), and LT Samuel Todd Hamilton (L/2C) leave Fort Ellis in a furious snowstorm. Gibbon wires Terry before leaving that he and the rest of the expedition are off. April 25, 1876—Tuesday—9:15 AM—Ball’s column resumes its march. Covered 16 miles and halted on the left bank of the Big Horn River. During the day, smoke had been observed in the Big Horn Mountains, making the troops wonder if that was where the Sioux were… accounting for any sign of their presence in the Big Horn Valley. April 26, 1876—6 AM—Ball’s command leaves camp and fords the Big Horn, spending most of the day riding through enormous herds of buffalo. Evening/Sunset—Ball makes camp. Smoke seen in vicinity of Fort Smith, three miles away. May 2, 1876—Bradley wrote they were very perplexed at not having seen any signs of the Sioux. He opined about them having returned to their various agencies, awaiting another turn to take off. Bradley thought this might be the case because of Crook’s fight on the Powder. Nonetheless, Bradley still believed the Sioux were in the area. Late night into the following morning—A band of Northern Cheyenne warriors under Two Moon steal Crow ponies during storm. They took 32 Crow ponies, plus Henry Bostwick’s horse and mule. The Indians had seen the troops and were aware of the Fort Pease camp. They had even followed Ball’s command to the Yellowstone. One Cheyenne warrior had even sneaked into Pease and watched several officers playing cards in one of the buildings. And the only whiff we ever smell of smoke signals came the day before the battle... June 24, 1876—Godfrey wrote that smoke signals were reported—once or twice—from the direction of Tullock’s Creek valley. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Sept 3, 2012 10:49:38 GMT -6
Jag,
I read the web site you sent me to. My compliments. It was a Marine Corps document and I dont know where they got the information since there were only two Marines at LBH, one was killed the other in the rear with the gear(OH the shameof it) but if only half of it is true it gives me a new prospective of these warriors My belief has been that to have an effective fighting force you must have a rigid chain of command and absolute authority. Not so. What is the difference if your men follow your directions because they are duty bound to do so, or if they follow because they respect your leadership. As long as they follow thats all that matters. These warriors did follow their leaders. In fact it would appear that Custer was not only out numbered, but out Generald by these leaders. I never questioned the warriors courage but looked at them as a brave, but little more than a well armed mob, not so any more. Rosebud ..I think that is what you were trying to say, but I couldnt grasp it, it went over my head.
Again my compliments to both of you and thank you for the insight and the knowledge. I will look at this part of the battle, warrior tactics and leadership in a new light.
Be Well Dan
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jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
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Post by jag on Sept 3, 2012 10:52:10 GMT -6
Valueless. Puffs of smoke mean strangers in the country. Wow. No direction, no nothing. If they had command and control they'd have numbers, direction, timing and no need to betray their own presence. And those ad hoc signals. Again: wow. Just like command and control. Sign language was terra incognita to most in the army and a very weak reed of communication even among Indians. For smoke, all they instantly need is grass, wet grass, wood, and time under cover to get that crucial signal up. And they can send as many as two (2) different signals? Wow. Just wow. No wind, plenty of visability, a snap. Again, no source, and that's what you're hoping will be impressive with the dramatic revelation. It won't be. Oh, come on DC, anyone can google that stuff to find out who it was that wrote that. All you'd have to do is go to google books and then enter a phrase from what I quoted, oh... say like... - indeed indispensable to success against Indians - and then find the highlighted best match. As for myself I'll believe this guy over and modern day interpretation. If any white man was to know, it was him.
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Post by fred on Sept 3, 2012 10:56:52 GMT -6
If any white man was to know, it was him. Lazy people like me just love secrets! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 16, 2012 18:18:44 GMT -6
And the only whiff we ever smell of smoke signals came the day before the battle... June 24, 1876—Godfrey wrote that smoke signals were reported—once or twice—from the direction of Tullock’s Creek valley. Best wishes, Fred. Realising your diligence and breadth of expertise in the finer points of interpretation and interpretations of record, from late morning 24th June Far West was to and fro across the Big Horn, ferrying Gibbon, Brisbin, Low, Bradley and Carroll over. That was a good half dozen journeys across the swift flowing river current to the mouth of Talec Creek, as Curley named it in 'The Vanishing Race', p163 in my well thumbed copy. Now Tallec Creek's mouth was some distance off, there is confusion as to which spur of Tulloch's was Tallec but never the less Godfrey, as far as we know was with the command who camped on Rosebud during the evening of the 24th. Benteen, l believe trailed the column's march and Keogh had kept his troops a good spot for rest, aware that a night march lay ahead. Was it possible, that smoke billowing from Far West was the distant observations made and put down to heat haze and mirage? Just your opinion on that, l reckon the steam boat belched a good plume of smoke back and across the river. As regardspuff signals, l believe that Capt. P.W. Clark - White Hat, left knowledge in his book for the military about sign language but do not have it handy. I'll check up his knowledge on the matter of tribal communication and see what is worth imparting. It was Clark of course who forwarded the map copied from the dirt floor drawing by an informer, which tells us best, the layout of the camp and where the Brule tepees were located. One of the commanders at Greasy Grass was Kill Eagle and there was some diplomacy involved with his widely reported account of the battle. A later account by him is less well known of - after his information became central to accusations levelled at Maj. Reno and Capt. Bentenn in 1876. Here is Kill Eagle's fuller account of the fighting -April 9th, 1877 - query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A01E5D6103AE63BBC4E52DFB266838C669FDEI look forward to your reply and hope your health is recovered. Be well- Tapping Far Star.
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Post by herosrest on Oct 17, 2012 6:52:03 GMT -6
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Post by montrose on Oct 18, 2012 6:36:23 GMT -6
Smoke signals as a control measure are highly situational, right up there with volleys.
With either method, it depends on a previous agreed upon method. There was no morse code or tap code for either.
And on the Indian side, they lacked common language and common methods. So not only would 2 puffs mean vastly different things between tribes, but could have 50 different meanings within a tribe.
Please remember that US forces were very paranoid wth respect to smoke signals. They routinely believed cloud fomations, wild fires, lightning strikes, dust meant enemy signals.
Since you mentioned Godfrey, didn't he say that the so called smoke signal on 24 Jun were actually clouds?
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Post by montrose on Oct 18, 2012 6:50:40 GMT -6
Since we are on Indian C2, let me drop a hypothesis.
US force activity at Ford B and D generated a stronger and faster Indian response than a regimental attack across Ford A.
Indian decisions to enter battle were highly decentralized, and situatioally dependent. If the main threat stayed south, many Indians who fought in the north would never have entered the fight, and many of the slackers who entered the fight late, would have entered even later.
So as examine other COAs, consider this: a regimental attack in the valley not only exploits the US strength of command and control above individual level, but also faces less Indian combat power than any COAs in the north will face.
For wargaming terms, say a US company has a combat alue of one.But now say agrouping of 6 companies or more gains synergy from US command and control, where their combat value is now three.
The Indians have the opposite problem. The more of them at any one place, the less effective they are.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Oct 18, 2012 7:52:16 GMT -6
‘’Indian decisions to enter battle were highly decentralized, and situatioally dependent. If the main threat stayed south, many Indians who fought in the north would never have entered the fight, and many of the slackers who entered the fight late, would have entered even later’’
Hi William, so what you are trying to say is, if Custer and Reno stayed as a unit and took the valley route to the village, the warriors in the northern end of the village would have stayed to defend their own camps rather than moving to the southern end to fight the soldiers or maybe tried to escape north.
Ian.
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Post by rosebud on Oct 18, 2012 8:11:41 GMT -6
I think we can stop thinking of Indians with Command or control. They had the ability to make decisions but no real planning as to the tactics. What they did have was enough Indians that were scattered out so much that sheer numbers will leave some Indians in a position to be a threat to the army. The only real tactic that the Indians used was the surround tactic. This was more of a, lets see if I can find a spot to gain some glory for my little band or for the individual. Sheer luck and large numbers made it look like they had some leadership that was equal to that of the Army. If you have enough Indians.....Some are bound to be in the right place at the right time.
Wolf Tooth is a good example.....Sheer luck put him in a location to prevent Custer a clear avenue of attack at ford B. Instead Custer was forced to deal with that pesky bunch and prevented a quick strike on the lower end of the Village.
That is not to say that Custer would have had any success, it just prevented an opportunity. Luck, pure luck.
Rosebud
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Post by Rabble on Oct 18, 2012 20:25:56 GMT -6
This is probably the smoke signal/cloud that was seen! Ron
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Post by fred on Oct 19, 2012 17:14:57 GMT -6
Was it possible, that smoke billowing from Far West was the distant observations made and put down to heat haze and mirage? Just your opinion on that, l reckon the steam boat belched a good plume of smoke back and across the river. Herosrest, In a word, no. In more than a word, here is the timing and where things were when Godfrey made his observation: June 22—3 PM—Terry is aboard the “Far West.” 4 PM—“Far West” leaves the mouth of the Rosebud and heads upriver toward old Fort Pease, located about fifteen miles north of Junction City, on the north bank of the Yellowstone, six miles below the Big Horn – Yellowstone confluence. Terry, Gibbon, and Brisbin were on board. 8:15 PM—The “Far West” moors after traveling only about seventeen miles against a strong current. June 23—8:40 PM—The “Far West,” with Terry and a very sick Gibbon, ties up about fifteen miles below Fort Pease and the Big Horn. June 24—4:30 AM (just before daybreak)—The “Far West” passes Bradley’s camp. 5 AM—“Far West” arrives at old Fort Pease. Noon—Gibbon’s command begins ferrying across the Yellowstone to the east bank of the Big Horn confluence, aiming for Tullock’s Fork, a tributary of the Big Horn. 4 PM—The ferrying of Gibbon’s command is completed. Their march up the Big Horn begins. 5 PM—Gibbon’s troops begin their move to Tullock’s Fork—a tributary of the Big Horn—though without Gibbon and Kirtland’s B/7I. They are to camp on lower Tullock’s Creek. ➢ Gibbon still sick on board the “Far West.” 5:30 PM – 6 PM—Gibbon’s command goes into bivouac on Tullock’s Fork, about a mile above its mouth, at the foot of a perpendicular wall of rock. ➢ Terry, his staff, HQ, and escort leave the “Far West” and head up the Big Horn. ➢ Gibbon, still very sick, remains on board the “Far West.” 8:45 PM—The twelve Crow scouts returned... . ➢ Terry sends orders to “Far West” to enter Big Horn River at noon the next day (the 25th) and head to mouth of LBH by noon the day after (the 26th). June 25—12:30 AM—“Far West” enters mouth of Big Horn River and heads upstream. By the morning of the 24th, Custer's column was more than 45 miles up the Rosebud. It would have been impossible to see any smoke from the steamboat, which, when Godfrey saw the smoke signals, was still on the Yellowstone at Pease. Best wishes, Fred.
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