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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 23, 2012 19:29:20 GMT -6
HR believes Benteen crossed the LBH and was to the left of Reno in the LBH valley if I understand him correctly.
I don't
Merry Christmas
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Post by herosrest on Dec 23, 2012 20:39:32 GMT -6
Actual time is a study of its own by HR what time do you them crossing the divide and what time did Benteen start his movement away from the main body? Yep, a key factor. I'd like to hear it myself. bc The only place to start is with those present, and the further back towards the battle that one looks, the earlier in the day are times given ~ examples are Gibso and DeRudio, there is information on distances marched and time given in the news article forwarded by wire by Lounberry on 5th July from Bismarck. There are the initial reports, for example Reno's stating that he charged at 2pm. He met Benteen at 2:30 pm. Obviously there is aproblem with this, but Reno's reatimony at his Inquiry clears that up. There is Maguire's report stating arrival near the village at 2pm and that can only have been Benteen's command. There has developed a plethora of confusions which today have become the accepted way, but that does not hide the confusion. The battle remains important history and one of the important reasons why is that it is the story of history and how it happens. That is priceless. People, myself included, do what we do and it is actually popularised into politically correct for today. That is actually nothing new and happened several times over with LBH from Godfrey, Curtis, Graham, Gray, and on so, eg ~ www.bigskyjournal.com/articles/big-sky-journal/summer-2011/130/images-of-the-west-fallen-heroes.html a view on the history of the history. There are glaringly obvious oversights that should simply demolish entire tenets of argument and controversy and the most important is the fact of Custer on the bluffs looking at the village with binoculars. where is the mystery in this and yet show me a single work or author who acknowledges this all encompassing matter. Custer sat on the bluff viewing the village before Reno attacked it.There is nothing to argue or dismiss, that was the way of it.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 26, 2012 7:57:15 GMT -6
There is Maguire's report stating arrival near the village at 2pm and that can only have been Benteen's command.
Was Maguire's report an affidavit? (since you place such high value)
Can a sworn witness testify to times and locations when they weren't there?
Exactly what value do you place on someone who was not there?
And let me know how you discern that only Benteen's command could have been near the village at 2pm.
AZ Ranger
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Post by fred on Dec 26, 2012 22:37:53 GMT -6
There is Maguire's report stating arrival near the village at 2pm and that can only have been Benteen's command..... Exactly what value do you place on someone who was not there? Primo!He cannot... and Benteen wasn't. At 2 PM, Benteen was still watering his horses at the morass. At 2 PM, Reno was still fighting on the prairie floor. There are probably only two or three times given by these participants that we can accept as accurate... or fairly accurate. And 2 PM ain't among them! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by glennvalis on Nov 17, 2020 12:39:41 GMT -6
Time studies have shown Benteen moved at a fast walk or trot the whole time he was actually traveling. He did stop to water his horses... it was a very hot day and they had not been watered for 8 to 12 hours and 18 or 20 miles. The 'morass' still exists, but both the Creek and the morass have varying amounts of water in them... sometimes little or none. Obviously the creek had little or no water or he would not have had to water his horses in a morass/swampy area. He took from 10 minutes (lowest officers estimate) to 30 minutes (highest estimate), with most towards the low end. Regardless, that was how long it took. NO ONE reported they stopped to make coffee and sit a spell... they just stopped to water the horses. Something necessary. Benteen was ordered to do two things by Custer's last message: "Come quick" and "Bring Packs". Benteen was not in charge of the packs. The Pack train could NOT be brought into battle or within sight of the warriors, or they would turn on the pack mules and drive them off. The Indians wanted both to have the goods, and deny them to the troops. The 130 or so troops guarding the pack train would not be able to do so from large numbers of warriors. The pack train could only move at a walk- 3 miles per hour. Four or so if they could rush the mules... but then they would lose packs. Benteen had a fighting battalion- he could not go into battle with the pack train, and he could not arrive quickly if he brought it with him... So, what did Custer's order to "Big Village,Come Quick, Bring packs" (paraphrased) mean? Does it mean, "Hurry forward, and report to me As quickly as possible?" I do not believe it means that at all. It means "Come to the Little Big Horn as quickly as practical, we are engaged with the enemy, have the pack train follow as quickly as they can." Why does it NOT mean, "Report to Custer"? Custer had sent Benteen to the left, then march 15 miles to the LBH. Custer did not know where Benteen would be! He sent Martini back to find him, telling Martini to follow their trail back to where Benteen separated, then to go find him. Benteen could have been over 25 miles away when Martini started out looking for him... 17 miles from the ridge back to the divide, then 8 or more miles across the badlands, looking for the "Valley". Then Martini would have to follow and catch up. We are talking HOURS of riding to get him, and HOURS of Benteen riding to Custer. What would the situation be then? Custer had no idea. He was trying to figure out exactly what he was going to do himself, looking for useable fords, over terrain he did not know. He could not write an order with explicit instructions, since he did not know where Benteen was, what route he would arrive on, where Custer himself would be, or what the situation would be. All he could do was tell him to come to the battlefield instead of 'valley hunting ad infinium" He could not possibly order Benteen to "report to me" without giving Benteen full authority to act as he saw fit when he arrived. It is a short order message. No explicit instructions on what to do if Benteen ran into an warriors. Nothing to say he should stop escaping warriors, or escaping women and children Nothing about needing to 'pile in' to an battle in the best way possible to achieve victory. It can NOT possibly be a plain order to "report to me as quickly as possible. Do not pass go, DO NOT stop to help any one else, do not stop to gather up enemy women and children, do not stop to fight any warriors. Do nothing but report to me." Remember: Benteen was sent for by Custer BEFORE HE WAS IN ANY TROUBLE. Custer did not expect serious trouble- if he did, he would have moved south at that point, not north. He would have tried to link up with Reno or Benteen, not moved away from them. Benteen of course, had no idea what was happening. He would normally not feel any need to "rescue" Custer. Custer had a large force, and freedom to move away from trouble...
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Post by Colt45 on Nov 18, 2020 20:33:20 GMT -6
Good post, Glennvalis.
Custer's order is terrible in that it does not give specifics, as you have noted. And it is full of inconsistency, as you pointed out. It is open to a lot of interpretation by the reader, any reader. And had Benteen continued on going valley to valley until reaching the LBH river, as per his orders, by the time he reached the area around ford A, he would probably have been facing the hostiles alone, as Reno and Custer both would have already been wiped out. The oblique he was on carried him further away from the battle zone and the only reason he was able to help Reno was because he abandoned the valley hunting and returned to the main trail.
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Post by noggy on Nov 19, 2020 2:13:20 GMT -6
When I started reading about the battle, and checking different boards, this was the first "point" where I felt I was in oppostion to people far more knowledgeable than myself. Hurrying along to God knows where with a pack train in order to assist the Regiment`s strongest unit and just leave Reno`s mauled unit to fend for itself struck me as weird early on. Of course it`s not quite that simple, but I agree with the two last posters, to put it that way.
Noggy
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Post by noggy on Nov 19, 2020 2:57:08 GMT -6
Good post, Glennvalis. Custer's order is terrible in that it does not give specifics, as you have noted. And it is full of inconsistency, as you pointed out. It is open to a lot of interpretation by the reader, any reader. I like trying to seethese things from as many sides as possible, and brainstorm a little. The order did not come directly from Custer. For all we know, Custer`s verbal orders may have been sound and as eli...ele...eloquent as a Shakespeare piece. But then Cooke totally botched it up, either because he was in a hurry or stressed. It was, after all, not the best situation to write at two pages long order. But regardless, that note was all Benteen had to go by. All the best, Noggy
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Post by montrose on Nov 19, 2020 17:28:28 GMT -6
The problem is thinking LTC Custer had a plan. He did not, He kept changing his mind.
1.His initial estimate of the situation had an Indian village at the intersection of Reno Creek and South Fork Reno Creek. The Benteen battalion was sent on a flanking movement against this target. It was a dry hole, so LTC Custer moved on, without informing CPT Benteen. He likely assumed Benteen would reach the empty target, and follow trail of main body, which is what happened.
2. LTC Custer next assumed an Indian village near Ford A. He gave a regimental attack order, one battalion (BN) up front, two back. Please note that the movement from SFRC to Ford A had the advanced guard in textbook range of the main body.
3. Then came the lethal decision. GAC decided the village was farther away from Ford A than his estimate. He also decided that their was a crossing downstream behind the enemy village. It is impossible that his own scouts had seen this. He must have been influenced by his Indian auxiliaries, who knew traditional village and crossing sites. So LTC Custer stopped supporting his own advanced guard, without informing them or the trailing two battalions of the change of plan.
4. Reno sent a messenger for main body to support advanced guard. This was completely correct. The main body did not show. He sent another messenger. The problem is main body had abandoned him, and when these messengers arrived LTC Custer was scouting for fords downstream. The headquarters detachment was led by Cooke, a staff officer. Cooke had no authority to send a regimental messenger, or even send back a Reno BN messenger. So he sent his personal assistant, the incompetent liar Goldin. The choice of messenger proves this.
5.LTC Custer's decision making is the sole cause of this loss. There is no comparable loss to the Indians by any other US force in this era. He scattered his regiment into 8 elements, none within supporting range of any other.
Pop quiz. Was LTC Custer qualified to command at company field grade? Today, company grade officers require a minimum of 12 months as platoon leader and 18 months as company commander to even be qualified for promotion to field grade. GAC had 3 months in the 5th Cavalry. The guy was a professional coffee cooler, whose life was focused on hanging around high level headquarters. I have known these pretty boys my entire career, they are brown nosers, not combat leaders.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 23, 2020 9:11:53 GMT -6
No, he did not meet the requirements.
Regards
Steve
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 24, 2020 5:08:19 GMT -6
I have always held the belief that Custer didn’t have a grasp on the total situation in hand and suffered from tunnelled vision. So much so that when he reached MTC, he could only guess at the positions and situations of his other two combat battalions, so he was only focusing on his own battalion, thus he was later left isolated, with not enough combat power to either attack the village or even save his battalion.
Ian
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 24, 2020 7:24:41 GMT -6
Ian
William suggested a book called Blink a long time ago. It deals with figuring things out in a hurry and making decisions. I think at that battle, Custer's blinker failed him.
Regards
Steve
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Post by noggy on Nov 27, 2020 12:41:16 GMT -6
In case anyone thought I defended GAC`s decision-making (lack of it), that is not the case. Just an observation of how the order was passed on. When I took history at university we had to do a lot of theoretical reading, and examples of verbal vs written was history was ofc a big thing. It was also used in practical examples. The concrete examples slip my mind, but were in part from court cases (perhaps Nuremberg?); one part claiming he just wrote down a superior`s order and passed them on as he was told, while the other part refused to have given such orders, which created a scenario where one only could choose who`s word to believe.
GAC messed up all over the line that day, pretty much, but the note which is discussed in detail to this day was hastily written down by Cooke. Exactly what GAC envisioned at that point is therefor not something we`ll ever know, even if what Cooke wrote could be direct quote for all we know. Or, he missed out a "don`t" and altered the meaning totally. And yes, this is just rambling and brainstorming. They all died and we can never know everything these men said and thought in their last hours.
All the best, Noggy
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Post by montrose on Dec 5, 2020 9:01:53 GMT -6
LTC Custer is an odd duck. I rate his ability as follows:
A good platoon leader (3 months experience)
A poor company commander (Zero experience)
An up and down regimental commander, generally very bad. (Technically 10 years, but spend more time away from regiment than with it. He attended some operations, but hardly ever any training after 1867.)
An average brigade commander in ACW.
A pretty good division commander at closing stages of ACW. Top ten percent, a clear above center of mass officer efficiency report.
His complete lack of experience at company grade activity made him useless as regiment commander. He did not know what he never did. There was no professional military education to fix his complete lack of knowledge of how to run company and regiments with respect to training, development, administration, tactics, and operations. In professional armies, he would never, ever be assigned any position in post ACW Army higher than company commander. He was not qualified. This means can not even be on the list of potential field grade officers.
It amuses me that he was convicted by court martial of gross negligence and gross incompetence, and folks tend to gloss over this. He is the LT Calley of this era. Calley was convicted of war crimes in Vietnam, but a review of his qualifications shows he was a Custer, unqualified for his position and commission.
As a former branch chief, I find this interesting.
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2020 9:29:27 GMT -6
LTC Custer is an odd duck. I rate his ability as follows: ... As a former branch chief, I find this interesting. Will, A great summary and I agree, 100%. Hope you are doing well; I miss our back and forth. Very best wishes, Fred.
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