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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 11, 2014 8:24:49 GMT -6
Hi Tom, when you wrote “Curley, Custer, girl B.S.’’ was that referring to the stories of Custer saving a squaw around MTC? If so I haven’t heard that one for a while, in fact I would place it in the panel of Sergeant Finkle surviving the battle.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Jan 11, 2014 8:38:59 GMT -6
... if he was shot at ford B and the command decided to return to the hilltop to wait for support of Benteen and the packs.... Even if wounded Custer, himself could have called for this withdrawal. He could see that he was going to lose too many of his command to pull off his grand scheme of capturing the women and children, in a timely fashion. There were more warriors left in this area of the camp than expected. He would also have needed medical attention post haste. I think someone else in the command structure made the call. They returned to what they considered high ground and hunkered down, in a deployed fashion, to wait for the support that would never come. Even if Benteen had arrived it would have only meant a greater slaughter around LSH.... It was my understanding that once Custer knew that Reno was engaged, and the warriors were massing in the lower end of the camp, he moved as rapidly as possible to ford B, already preselected by the scouts. Tom, I do not mean to preach and sometimes these posts come off that way. Despite being on this thing since September 2005, I have yet to figure out a way to make it a little more personal and a lot less antagonistic. When I get together with friends and we discuss it, we never have the same issues we have when confronting one another on these damn boards. I tend, at times, to be a nasty SOB, but I do try to temper things by merely staying away. My problem is that I seldom walk away from confrontation and that tends to make a mess of things at time. Anyway, please do not take offense at the tenor of my posts. They are not meant to be insulting. And if they were, believe me, there would be no question about it! Now, regarding your post above. Custer's wounds-- as described by Dr. Porter-- would have been debilitating, almost from the start and probably fatal within several minutes... even had the head wound not been acquired at Ford B. The chest wound appears to have been a lung-shot, and take it from me-- personal experience-- they are almost always fatal... and within 30 minutes. If Custer had been wounded at the ford-- and I doubt seriously he was that close to it-- the command would have pulled back either to where Keogh was situated-- Luce Ridge-- or the entire five companies would have pulled back up MTC. That is the way things were done. Tom Rosser-- Custer's USMA buddy and a Confederate cavalry general-- thought as much. Indians and enlisted personnel referred to "pullbacks" in much the same way; the command would not have gone on to Calhoun Hill, into unchartered territory. If they had-- for some inexplicable reason: say Custer demanded it-- he would have been dead by the time they reached the farthest point north. It makes no sense! Now remember... you may have a completely different understanding of events drawn from your reading, so bear with me. First of all, Custer was well aware of Reno's engagement: he watched it for probably eight minutes or so. Custer was pleased at what he saw, because he probably believed-- with good reason-- he had caught the whole shebang napping. And Reno was doing precisely what Custer wanted. The only problem was that which Custer believed from the time they left the vicinity of the lone tepee: the Indians were setting a screen to allow the families to scatter. Allowing this would have wrecked the entire campaign, so Custer decided to move north rather than support Reno directly. After viewing Reno for several minutes, Custer moved north down Cedar Coulee, intending to cross the river below the so-called refugees. Also, he needed to see more: the views from 3,411 were limited and Custer could not see the full extent of the village from there. He moved down Cedar, then sought the high ground of the intermediate ridges, i. e., Luce and Nye-Cartwright. Even from there, however, he could not tell the full extent of, (a) the village, and (b) the fugitive-run. Dust obscured a lot and when he made the turn out of Cedar and into MTC, he could see-- despite the distance-- the village extended below Ford B (I even have a photo showing it!... the ford from the turn, obviously). Somewhere around this time-- probably as he moved to Luce Ridge-- he learned of Reno's plight, though never its full extent, and despite the doubts of my friend DC, he learned this from his brother Boston who had been trailing the main column for the better part of three hours. Custer then moved to the ford, catching the Indians almost by complete surprise. Once near the ford, he deployed his troops in a proper tactical formation, saw what he needed to see, and made his determinations from there. He moved north voluntarily and deliberately, under virtually no pressure other than by small bands of Indians, probably never more than 20 to a split of 50. Keogh-- a mile back from the ford-- held marauding warriors at bay, by this time, converging from three areas: upper MTC, the ford, and West Coulee (the east side of the river), again, never in great numbers. The rest is simple. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 11, 2014 10:01:36 GMT -6
Tom: Permit me to be critical of the underlying theme of your posts so far.
You may approach the study of this battle by taking sides, as I believe there are indications of you doing here, and you will see only what you want to see, or you may remain neutral, without preconceptions, and follow the trail of known facts where they lead.
One road, the first leads to regurgitation, the second leads to understanding, an understanding while not complete, that will serve you far better I believe.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 11, 2014 12:32:47 GMT -6
I tend be inquisitive, if there is any evidence either through accounts or archaeology then I will try and view things like bare bones and then throw of a lot of question hoping for the whole board to try and help me flesh them out.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 11, 2014 12:42:14 GMT -6
Many people Ian, are afraid to ask questions, for fear of exposing some hole card of perceptive ignorance. What nonsense. The only stupid question, is the one not asked.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 12, 2014 9:07:11 GMT -6
So more of a decision making question regarding "Thompson's crossing". Peter Thompson has Custer riding down to the river and some say he was doing a recon. So forget the other activity that Thompson describes but my question is regarding leaving it unguarded. The crossing would be accessible from the village and out of range of any of Reno's troops. Once across the river you can climb up the bluffs between Weir and MTC under cover and concealment. That would allow any number of Indians to be between Custer and Reno and have access to any pack train before it reaches MTC.
The potential route is not in dispute you see it today and there is even a two track road in the the location.
So if Custer actually rode that route to the river as suggested by Thompson why would he leave a travel corridor between himself and the pack train if he wanted it to come the same route he had traveled.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 12, 2014 12:42:37 GMT -6
... if he was shot at ford B and the command decided to return to the hilltop to wait for support of Benteen and the packs.... Even if wounded Custer, himself could have called for this withdrawal. He could see that he was going to lose too many of his command to pull off his grand scheme of capturing the women and children, in a timely fashion. There were more warriors left in this area of the camp than expected. He would also have needed medical attention post haste. I think someone else in the command structure made the call. They returned to what they considered high ground and hunkered down, in a deployed fashion, to wait for the support that would never come. Even if Benteen had arrived it would have only meant a greater slaughter around LSH.... It was my understanding that once Custer knew that Reno was engaged, and the warriors were massing in the lower end of the camp, he moved as rapidly as possible to ford B, already preselected by the scouts. Tom, I do not mean to preach and sometimes these posts come off that way. Despite being on this thing since September 2005, I have yet to figure out a way to make it a little more personal and a lot less antagonistic. When I get together with friends and we discuss it, we never have the same issues we have when confronting one another on these damn boards. I tend, at times, to be a nasty SOB, but I do try to temper things by merely staying away. My problem is that I seldom walk away from confrontation and that tends to make a mess of things at time. Anyway, please do not take offense at the tenor of my posts. They are not meant to be insulting. And if they were, believe me, there would be no question about it! Now, regarding your post above. Custer's wounds-- as described by Dr. Porter-- would have been debilitating, almost from the start and probably fatal within several minutes... even had the head wound not been acquired at Ford B. The chest wound appears to have been a lung-shot, and take it from me-- personal experience-- they are almost always fatal... and within 30 minutes. If Custer had been wounded at the ford-- and I doubt seriously he was that close to it-- the command would have pulled back either to where Keogh was situated-- Luce Ridge-- or the entire five companies would have pulled back up MTC. That is the way things were done. Tom Rosser-- Custer's USMA buddy and a Confederate cavalry general-- thought as much. Indians and enlisted personnel referred to "pullbacks" in much the same way; the command would not have gone on to Calhoun Hill, into unchartered territory. If they had-- for some inexplicable reason: say Custer demanded it-- he would have been dead by the time they reached the farthest point north. It makes no sense! Now remember... you may have a completely different understanding of events drawn from your reading, so bear with me. First of all, Custer was well aware of Reno's engagement: he watched it for probably eight minutes or so. Custer was pleased at what he saw, because he probably believed-- with good reason-- he had caught the whole shebang napping. And Reno was doing precisely what Custer wanted. The only problem was that which Custer believed from the time they left the vicinity of the lone tepee: the Indians were setting a screen to allow the families to scatter. Allowing this would have wrecked the entire campaign, so Custer decided to move north rather than support Reno directly. After viewing Reno for several minutes, Custer moved north down Cedar Coulee, intending to cross the river below the so-called refugees. Also, he needed to see more: the views from 3,411 were limited and Custer could not see the full extent of the village from there. He moved down Cedar, then sought the high ground of the intermediate ridges, i. e., Luce and Nye-Cartwright. Even from there, however, he could not tell the full extent of, (a) the village, and (b) the fugitive-run. Dust obscured a lot and when he made the turn out of Cedar and into MTC, he could see-- despite the distance-- the village extended below Ford B (I even have a photo showing it!... the ford from the turn, obviously). Somewhere around this time-- probably as he moved to Luce Ridge-- he learned of Reno's plight, though never its full extent, and despite the doubts of my friend DC, he learned this from his brother Boston who had been trailing the main column for the better part of three hours. Custer then moved to the ford, catching the Indians almost by complete surprise. Once near the ford, he deployed his troops in a proper tactical formation, saw what he needed to see, and made his determinations from there. He moved north voluntarily and deliberately, under virtually no pressure other than by small bands of Indians, probably never more than 20 to a split of 50. Keogh-- a mile back from the ford-- held marauding warriors at bay, by this time, converging from three areas: upper MTC, the ford, and West Coulee (the east side of the river), again, never in great numbers. The rest is simple. Best wishes, Fred. No offense taken, I have had interest in LBH since childhood, recently retired and have enjoyed the posts. Am willing to learn, from all sources, have done a fair amount of reading over the years, drawn some conclusions, but am not rooted one way or the other in solid opinion. I do feel that Custer was not the biggest team player, generally a good tactical commander, certainly not a strong strategist. One of the conclusions that I have drawn is that he did not get the best use of his senior officers. Here again I certainly was not there nor do I have first hand knowledge of the real make up of the senior officers. Would it have made sense to have sent Reno on Benteen's errand? Would it have made sense to keep Benteen under his own command(keep your enemies closer)? Allow Keogh to attack the southern end of the village? While none of these questions matter in the grand scheme of things, I just wonder. I know, I know if frogs had wings on lily pads!
Your description of Custer's movements certainly adds time to the timeline I put forth.
Thank you, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 12, 2014 13:05:40 GMT -6
Tom: Permit me to be critical of the underlying theme of your posts so far. You may approach the study of this battle by taking sides, as I believe there are indications of you doing here, and you will see only what you want to see, or you may remain neutral, without preconceptions, and follow the trail of known facts where they lead. One road, the first leads to regurgitation, the second leads to understanding, an understanding while not complete, that will serve you far better I believe. Critical is good, on your part, but sides I would never take. Many mistakes were made by all commanders in this fight. Custer was in command of this portion, of a much larger operation and picked this fight on his own initiative. Could he have extricated himself from his predicament if he had not been wounded at ford B( as I believe), we will never know.
I am only here to learn from those, who have spent much more time on this than I. With regard to regurgitation, I save that for warm beer on hot days, working construction in my younger years.
Quincannon, I thought you retired from the Cavalry before John Wayne.
Thank you again, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 12, 2014 13:09:52 GMT -6
So more of a decision making question regarding "Thompson's crossing". Peter Thompson has Custer riding down to the river and some say he was doing a recon. So forget the other activity that Thompson describes but my question is regarding leaving it unguarded. The crossing would be accessible from the village and out of range of any of Reno's troops. Once across the river you can climb up the bluffs between Weir and MTC under cover and concealment. That would allow any number of Indians to be between Custer and Reno and have access to any pack train before it reaches MTC. The potential route is not in dispute you see it today and there is even a two track road in the the location. So if Custer actually rode that route to the river as suggested by Thompson why would he leave a travel corridor between himself and the pack train if he wanted it to come the same route he had travel. Regards AZ Ranger That is why I doubt this recon was ever done.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 12, 2014 13:34:44 GMT -6
Interestingly enough Tom the character which my good friend Chuck uses as an avatar was played by two different actors;
Fort Apache (1948): Dick Foran She wore a yellow ribbon (1949): Victor McLaglen Rio Grande (1950): Victor McLaglen
One day I will have the pleasure of saying to Chuck the immortal words “you’ll get busted for the Quincannon’’
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 12, 2014 13:50:56 GMT -6
Interestingly enough Tom the character which my good friend Chuck uses as an avatar was played by two different actors; Fort Apache (1948): Dick Foran She wore a yellow ribbon (1949): Victor McLaglen Rio Grande (1950): Victor McLaglen One day I will have the pleasure of saying to Chuck the immortal words “you’ll get busted for the Quincannon’’ Ian. Mclaglen also played with Wayne and Maureen O'Hara in The Silent Man. Also a good/fun watch.
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Post by benteen on Jan 12, 2014 14:52:35 GMT -6
[quote source="/post/95091/thread" timestamp="1389555284" author="@yantaylorian. Mclaglen also played with Wayne and Maureen O'Hara in The Silent Man. Also a good/fun watch. [/quote] Tom, I think you are referring to "The Quite Man" For me his best performance was in "The Informer". Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2014 15:00:09 GMT -6
I think the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences would agree as well with you Dan, he was awarded an Oscar for his performance. Few remember it though, but it was by far his best roll
Tom: I worked for a living. I was an Infantryman
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Post by fred on Jan 12, 2014 15:27:26 GMT -6
That is why I doubt this recon was ever done. If you are referring to some recon Thompson alluded to away from Ford B, I would agree with you completely. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 12, 2014 15:31:03 GMT -6
Many mistakes were made by all commanders in this fight. Tom, This is not directed at you, but I have read this comment many times, written by many people. Personally, I would like to know the mistakes being alluded to. I have my own opinions and if someone were to elucidate these "mistakes," we might just begin some new threads and some new discussions. Best wishes, Fred.
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