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Post by benteen on May 17, 2012 14:59:13 GMT -6
I noticed that peoplr have interest and are knowledgable about the war in the Pacific. I have a question for your opinions. An Island by its very definition is surrounded by water. It has to be supplied by sea (Or air drops). The Japanese had no real navy in 1945 and no ability to supply their troops. If we knew we were going to take Okinawa, why did we take Iwo Jima. Yes it was one of the greatest battles in Marine Corps history and had the most iconic photo of the war, but did we have to take it. Was this Nimitz vs MacArthur. If he wins a battle I have to. Or was it a must to take this Island. The Japanese soldiers were probably dieing by the dozens from lack of food water, medicine, why not just bypass it and let them die, they couldnt cause any problems
Be Well Dan
PS.. Just to add on, you can also reverse this question. If you took Iwo Jima why invade Okinawa
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Post by quincannon on May 17, 2012 15:21:08 GMT -6
Dan: I have not looked at the strategic imperatives behind the decision to assault Iwo for a long time, so please consider this a partial answer.
Iwo was essential for at least two reasons, both having to do with the strategic bombing of Japan. Iwo was in route to the home islands. The airfield there could recover damaged B29's as well as serve as a forward fighter base for the B29 escorts the P51D's. The shorter the distance the P51's had to fly to target, the longer was their loiter time over target, therefore you were extending their combat capability. The importance of recovering damaged B29's cannot be over emphasized.
We had B29s in quantity, but still not enough quantity where we could sustain heavy losses. In addition the crews were more valuable then the aircraft. The training involved with a B29 crew was far more complicated (not surprising in a more complicated aircraft) than the B17 or B24 which by then were obsolete. Now we could have probably gotten by without taking it as it turned out, but remember the invasion of Japan was still in the cards, and it was anticipated that the war would last at least 12 and possibly 18 months more than the August 45 end date.
So why Iwo in February, when Okinawa was scheduled in April, I think that question would best be answered by the bomber and fighter crews saved, restored, repaired, launched again to fight another day.
I'll tell you the same thing I told Richard. Read Shattered Sword to find out just how backward the IJN was, but make no mistake they were first rate fighting men, led by idiots who did not understand the concept of a ballanced navy and therefore were unable to resupply garrisons like Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. When you look at glory and forget beans, bullets, and the wherewithall to deliver them - you lose.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 17, 2012 16:00:28 GMT -6
I suspect there was a lot more going on. For one thing, the morale of the troops was not that great which is no slam against them. The Japanese, having zero chance of escape or resupply, just lived to kill pointlessly, and fighting island after island of that doesn't bolster the good feelings, I'd imagine. The troops in Europe were not thrilled about winning there and then transferring to a land war in China, Philippines, or Japan. There was a rush to get it done and over, and bless their hearts.
Sitting off yet another island with kamikaze and no end in sight had to be far more depressing and annoying than the books tell us. Hooray for the abomb. Push to shove, it was the one thing that did exactly what was planned for it right off and it ended the war. Japan was mentally fully prepared to fight it out with nothing.
Japan's military and naval problems were because the army and navy despised each other, and each ended up with its own air force, navy, and infantry. It made the service conflicts on our sides look like nothing. The Japanese Army assassinated each other and threatened admirals and was far more demented than the SS at the end.
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Post by quincannon on May 17, 2012 16:26:40 GMT -6
Dan: Just to add on - Okinawa was considered part of Japan proper by the Japanese for one thing. For another it was a magnet for the Kamakazi and futile naval sorties. It would be much better think I for the Kamakazis to have to fly to you, then you having to bring to carriers to them. The Kamakazies did a lot of damage, I seem to remember to the tune of fifty warships. Now imagine if they could take off, hug the terrain and then the wavetops and hit a carrier battle group 50 miles off the home islands.
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Post by benteen on May 17, 2012 17:13:13 GMT -6
. The Japanese, having zero chance of escape or resupply, just lived to kill pointlessly Colonel/Dark Cloud, I read your posts and know them to be accurate as I have seen in documentaries or read them. The above statement from DC is the genisis of my question. The Japanese indeed knew they couldnt win and would die but they wanted to kill as many Americans as they could feeling that if it was costly enough to us in man power we would seek a peace treaty. How can you kill Americans if there arent any to kill. Colonel I believe the figure they give is 20000 airmen saved on Iwo so it was certainly worth taking, but then why Okinawa. Obviously the bombers could take off bomb Japan and make it back to Iwo What I am saying is that I know we needed a base to bomb Japan so we had to take one of the Islands, why both? We had our base on Iwo, what purpose did taking Okinawa have. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on May 17, 2012 17:41:08 GMT -6
Okinawa would have been on the flank of the fleet giving the Jananese defenders more options as we attempted to invade Japan. Okinawa, not taken, would have to be covered, thereby disapating friendly assets. It would take everything we could muster to bring against Japan. I don't think it wise to detach a quarter of what you have to watch your backside.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 17, 2012 19:16:29 GMT -6
We didn't fully appreciate how dedicated the Japanese were to defending the islands. It made no sense to us, and we kept thinking that reality would dawn and they'd cave. There were elements for that, but Admiral Kurita had to be hidden and protected and any none kamikaze minded officer was in danger.
We had things in the works and stopping and then starting again would have been the worst. Keep the pressure on and maintain with no let up.
Conversely, the Japanese couldn't believe our bombing program. Staff officers wondered if the west planned to eliminate the cities one by one, and said they couldn't imagine such a mindset. Rather, they could not imagine the ability to do so, but by that time we produced during the war a major multiple of what our enemies EVER produced in aggregate. Japan took a long time to understand the implications. Most of the material that made the Yamato came to the yard by ox cart to give an idea of what their assumptions were based upon. Yamamoto may have understood the US production ability, but the Army did not and the people were clueless to the end. They were told to the end they were winning, suckering the Americans into final battle off Japan's shores, etc.
Yes, in hindsight and understanding what we do now, we could have done things cheaper and better, but it wasn't at all clear back then, and the public wasn't going to tolerate perpetual war here in the states. Finish it asap and withhold nothing.
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Post by Gatewood on May 18, 2012 7:29:10 GMT -6
I don't recall the particulars, but I seem to remember that there was considerable disagreement and discussion both within the navy and with the army as to whether Okinawa should be invaded. In particular, I believe that Nimitz and King had different views on the matter, but I don't recall which one advocated which course. In any event, everyone eventually came into "agreement" and it was in fact invaded.
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Post by quincannon on May 18, 2012 10:06:30 GMT -6
Gatewood: Potter's biography of Nimitz is the place for the answer. I have over three thousand books in my basement, and I went and looked for Potter to no avail, while making a second pot of morning coffee.
You are correct there was some disagreement, as there was on most campaigns. I don't recall that it was serious, more like should we do it now, or is there something better we can do or do first. When I find Potter and if the answer is radically different from my memory I will post it.
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Post by Gatewood on May 18, 2012 10:38:24 GMT -6
I'll make the disclaimer up front that I am talking from memory, which can be a dangerous thing, but, after thinking it over some more, I'll offer the following -
I believe the question of invading or not invading Okinawa was an adjunct of the issue of whether to return to the Phillipines or go to Formosa. Of course MacArthur pushed for the Phillipines but Nimitz felt that, by going to Formosa, we could kill two birds with one stone and negate the need of going to Okinawa. This is usually thought to have been a big point of contention between MacArthur and Nimitz that was decided by Roosevelt during their conference at Pearl. In fact, Roosevelt never made a decsion and left it hanging to "await developments". As it happened, the "developments" were that all of the various planning/staff organizations and eventually Nimitz himself came around to thinking that going to the Phillipines and Okinawa made more strategic sense than going to Formosa alone.
All of this may not be entirely correct, but I think that is the general gist of it.
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Post by quincannon on May 18, 2012 10:51:42 GMT -6
Yes.
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Post by Gatewood on May 18, 2012 10:58:18 GMT -6
Quincannon,
In regard to books, I recall one of your posts from some time ago (possibly on the other board), in which you said that you were particulalry interested in the Guadalcanal campaign. I just finished reading Neptune's Inferno, which recounts the major naval engagements around Guadalcanal. If you haven't read it, it is a pretty good book. It didn't really break any new ground or tell me anything that I didn't already know, but it had some informative "back stories" and was interesting. I would recommend it to anyone who would like to know more about these battles as well as anyone who just needs a refresher course.
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Post by quincannon on May 18, 2012 11:17:51 GMT -6
Gatewood: I have read Neptune's Inferno, and concluded that it was a good book, not a great book. It tells the story well, but think it ranks behind Guadalcanal by Richard Frank, a book I value greatly.
Guadalcanal is a story of combined arms air-land-sea. Neptune limits itself to the naval side, and I think it therefore limited to a third of the story. Frank puts everything into the proper flow, sequence and context. Iwo is a battle that assured a Marine Corps, in Forrestal's words, for five hundred years. Guadalcanal is the battle, along with The Bois de Belleau, and the Banana Wars that MADE the modern United States Marines.
Yes, Guadalcanal and the first year of the naval war in the Pacific, along with the Alamo and the Korean Conflict are the areas that I take special interest in. Books I find essential in the study of the former are
Shattered Sword by Parchall and Tully Anything by Prange-Goldstein-Dillon Midway the Battle that Doomed Japan - A partially selfserving tome by Fuchida Mitsuo - early but a very good read Eric Hammel three or four dependant upon edition volume history of Guadalcanal Japanese Destroyer Captain by Hara Tamichi (sp) - again early but very good Neptune and Midway, very recent works put you in the picture quite well Lundstrum's First Team and First Team on Guadalcanal are supurb Potter's Nimitz gives you strategic insights and insights into the man not found elsewhere.
A visit to the Nimitz museum should be on you to do list. It is located in Fredricksburg, Texas in the hill country north and west of San Antonio.
And then there were the personal friends of my late father who fought these battles in the first year of the Pacific and once again in my living room and around our dining room table, early inspiration for a pre-teen and teenager.
One of my dad's best friends was an officer on Edsall lost early in the war. A few years before my dad passed away I presented him with two of the models I made for him, Pennsylvania (his home state) and Edsall. He thanked me for Pennsylvania and Edsall brought a tear to an eigthy-eigth year old man's eyes, after so long.
I would also be remiss if I did not mention that my extensive collection of models of the various early war ships of both navies aid me greatly in understanding detail.
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Post by wild on May 19, 2012 7:41:30 GMT -6
Colonel We touched on Midway on the other thread and just to pick up on what you said about Japan being defeated from the getgo. I had a similar discussion sometime ago with his grey eminence on the possibility of victory going to the confederacy. I would agree with you100% if the action was on the sand table.But when you add in indeterminable variations such as chance,human nature,the price to be paid visavis the rewards. Why would America spend so much blood and treasure defending British,Dutch and French Colonies? And of course you have the enemy getting out of the blocks first with better pilots,more carriers.And as is written in stone on the Midway monument---They Had No Right To Win,Yet They Did,And In Doing So They Changed The Course Of The War. That is why I think Midway is so defining.It was at least by perception not as clear cut as a view from a post war perspective. Regards
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Post by quincannon on May 19, 2012 9:01:39 GMT -6
Richard: I have not had my morning coffee yet and you are asking me to refight the Pacific War. Remind me to catch you on Saint Patrick's Day.
The why of the war:
Japan needed resources, particularly minerals and oil. The Dutch and British colonies had them. They resolved to take them from the Dutch and Brits. To do this they had to move south from the home islands. The Philipines was on the flank of such a move. Were the Philipines to be attacked the United States fleet would move toward Japan and engage the IJN. That is what happened in a couple of sentences. The delay was because of the US Fleet being attacked at Pearl thus holding up offensive operations for nearly a year.
Chance: After Pearl there was no going back for the American people. Chance rules outgomes of battles sometimes. Chance cannot rule out production capacity where Japan's production was finite and ours was nearly infinate. When Pearl happened there was no price to high to pay. The American character took over and demanded destruction of the Japanese Empire.
More carriers-better pilots: Read Shattered Sword and I think you will change your mind. The Japanese Navy was a third rate navy with first rate sailors, fighting men to a man. It is what lies underneath the training, the design, the tactical doctrine, the balance, and most of all the culture that defeated Japan. Remember after Santa Cruz in November 1942 the IJN was beaten. They were not dead yet, but they were beaten.
What's on the monument: Read what's on the monument to Arizona at Pearl - "A bomb down her stack" A bomb never went down her stack. Pure fiction based upon the film taken of the heavy smoke discharge through her funnel, when it provided a vent to the explosion of the forward 14" gun magazine. Actually the odds at Midway were very even where they counted Kido Butai, against Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet and the unsinkable carrier Midway itself. The IJN was actually outnumbered in aircraft. Was there luck yes, both good and bad. The McClusky's luck turning toward Kido Butai and the Ring incompetence turning away.
Now what I want you to do is read the books I have listed for Gatewood. You started with Midway, now read Shattered Sword, then go back and read Midway by Prange (still in print) and the First Team by Lundstrum (hard to find but the Nimitz Museum has it and they mail order) and you will find after reading, that the John Ford Battle of Midway - Torpedo Eight was another of those legend creating things that has never quite died out dispite the facts. A lot of things are said or memorialized in wartime, a lot of heroes are made for good cause, and they, not the facts stay in a nations memory. I have in my collection a copy of the history of Hornet published and rushed to print very early in 43 (Hornet was lost in Nov 42). It belonged to a late friend and former member of her crew. Rare book. It is tripe, wartime tripe, that leaves you believing the war was fought to preserve the safety of hamburgers and Coca Cola.
Midway was the most decisive naval battle fought since Nelson at Trafalgar. It was commanded by a hotel keepers son from south Texas. Tactically it was led by two non aviators, that give the lie to this infantry-cavalry minded crap we see on the other board. It was fought by three fine ships, the three most famous in all our history, and men who were largely inexperienced, but determined and very pissed off.
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