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Post by steve1956 on May 18, 2012 21:50:06 GMT -6
This is just a thought I'd like others input on.....Was the Ford "B" feint/recce/attack the final point of no return that decided the fate of the Custer batallion?.....It appears to me.that for whatever reason it was made,(and yes,it seems to take pressure off Reno) in practical terms,all it does is say "Hey Indians..I'm here...Follow me".....and by following they're now neatly between Custer and anyone else............
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Post by ulan on May 19, 2012 2:20:58 GMT -6
To me it is very hard to understand why later Reno and Benteen had to defend their actions in court. Ulan, Did you go to the German Army General Staff School? You have a very, very good understanding of this whole battle. There are many, many American writers and historians who could not summarize the battle and what Custer should have done and what he did wrong as well as you just did in your post. I tip my hat to you! Best wishes, Fred. Oh thank you! No, i am a pacifist. But i try to understand military organisation. There are two types of generals it seems....generals who cares about their men(type Longstreet) and generals who didn´t (type Rommel). Custer i would not see as an ignorant and possible he was a good soldier and nice person in privat. But i think he had not enough experience for a general. His radius of concentration was not big enough for a leader of a whole regiment when it comes to strategic thoughts it seems. He had probably the best experience with indians, but that was just the experience to find the indians but not to fight them. He was probably convinced that he was an indian expert, but in fact he never understood the indians. He had scouts in company strenght but was unable to use the very important instrument of complete reconnaissance before fighting. No reconnaissance = no plan = no successfull fighting. If you care about your men, then you respect military rules cause they mainly were made for this.
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Post by fred on May 19, 2012 5:05:06 GMT -6
Well, I am not a pacifist, but it is good to be one. It is much more fun to talk about history and wars than it is to fight them. I am surprised at this. I have read a tremendous amount about the German army and you are the first person I have known to say this. That does not mean you are wrong! I spent a few summers at a spa in southern Austria-- I cannot recall the name of the lake-- and made friends with several old Afrika Korps veterans who spoke very highly of Rommel. Of course, that may have been just for the benefit of an Amerikaner. “The majority of fighting men in a swift exhausting tank battle at a given moment always succumb to a need for rest. No army is composed solely of heroes. They will insist for one reason or another that they cannot go on. The commander with his authority must combat these natural phenomena of weariness, and wrench his officers and men out of their apathy. The man in command must be the galvaniser of the battle. He must constantly be on the battlefield, in the front line, to exercise his control.” – Erwin Rommel [Carell, Paul. Foxes of the Desert (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1994), 189.] Extremely perceptive! I believe you are correct. Wow! Perfect! Remember one thing, however, Ulan. I believe much of what Custer was doing was reconnaissance, all the way to Ford D. But you are correct; the only plan he had was in his head; he never communicated anything to his subordinates. That, however, was because he attacked prematurely... too much of a hurry. You said it best: "he never understood the Indians." Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on May 19, 2012 5:23:24 GMT -6
Was the Ford "B" feint/recce/attack the final point of no return that decided the fate of the Custer batallion? Steve, In my opinion, yes. And maybe even a few moments before when he was on Luce Ridge. But definitely when he left the Ford B area and entered Deep Coulee, moving up toward Calhoun Hill. Again, my opinion only, but right on the money! The timing work I have done puts Boston Custer on Luce Ridge-- not in MTC as other writers have claimed. And DC will disagree with me here... we have had some very interesting discussions about Boston. Again, the timing tells me Boston saw the very beginning of the Reno retreat... but not its full extent, not even where Reno was forced toward the river. Boston had to have told this to George and George's foray to Ford B had to have taken some pressure off Reno-- eventually-- but even if it did it was only a secondary thought in GAC's mind... there was little or no altruism there. It is my belief GAC went to Ford B, not to attack or cross, but to observe. Even from the heights of Luce Ridge he was still a mile or more from the river and could not see over the bluffs, could not tell the full extent of the fleeing Indians (remember, dust!!! always dust... the Cheyenne kept their ponies in the northern valley, so lots of grass had been eaten off), and because of the nearness of the river to those bluffs could not even see the full extent of the village from Luce. He needed to get closer to see the full extent of the exodus, where they were gathering-- if they were gathering.... Then he could move farther north to cut them off. This is the only thing that makes any sense to me. An attack is ludicrous from Ford B, especially since he left Keogh and three companies back on Luce-- almost 60% of his force. The only way writers and historians can justify any ideas of attacking across that ford is to jerry-rig the battalion configuration and despite what certain idiots and "clowns" will try to tell you, there is plenty of spoken evidence of Keogh having three companies and Yates, two. There is no evidence of any other organization. So again, anything else-- to me-- is just wishful theorizing, twisting evidence to fit a theory. That is not the way history is supposed to work. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on May 19, 2012 5:27:27 GMT -6
I think the Ford B incident shows Custer's lack of tactical sense.
First, it was not a flank attack. A flank attack would, by definition, be on the flank of the Indians fighting Reno. That force was far upstream. In fact, if he had crossed the river and gone to Reno's support, he would be attacking the enemy rear.
Custer was met at Ford B by hundreds of Indians who had not yet committed to battle. I know there is an anecdote of 5 Indians who thought they chased off Custer by themselves. But what was behind them?
The pony herds were arriving in the village, and hundreds of warriors were still mobilizing to fight. So if Custer wanted to enter the village, he would have to conduct a frontal attack across a defended river.
So Custer blinked.He went looking for an easier crossing to the north, past the Indian village.
This decision meant Reno was on his own. Custer ha decided to consolidate the 9 companies of the Regiment in the Battle Ridge area of operations. Reno would have to fight it out on his own until 5 pm or even nightfall. Custer must have been operating under the assumption that the Indians would refuse to do more than long range skirmishing, like the 11 Aug 73 fight.
Meanwhile, Custer waved auf wieder bye bye to the Indians in the village, and moved away. He must have assumed they would just sit there passively and wait for Custer.
At the Washita battle, the other Indian camps had moved into the hills, and they never counterattacked. But this event was a rarity.Plains Indians were relentlessly aggressive.
Custer erred in not blocking Ford B until the Benteen and McDougall Bns arrived. Calhoun Hill is too far back to cover Ford B. Custer assumed away the enemy threat. This isn't just arrogance. He clearly did not understand the nature, organization, and tactics of the Plains Indians. It was amateur hour.
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Post by fred on May 19, 2012 6:03:00 GMT -6
Custer was met at Ford B by hundreds of Indians who had not yet committed to battle. I know there is an anecdote of 5 Indians who thought they chased off Custer by themselves. But what was behind them? Montrose, While I agree with your post, in general, I do not agree with what you wrote, above. The first indication in any accounts of Indians spotting Custer's command come from Iron Cedar who was on the river's east side and who then scampered down the bluffs to find Gall. "Hundreds of Indians" greeting Custer at Ford B presupposes advance warning, ambush, surprise, etc., and I rule out just those possibilities. According to Wooden Leg, if the village were attacked, the Cheyenne camp guards would rally to its defense. It would therefore make sense that any camp guards remaining in the Cheyenne camp would have rallied at Ford B. The Kit Fox warrior society provided the Cheyenne camp guards on June 25. Indian accounts provide us with enough data to assume the following were there: Cheyenne (seven to ten; possibly a few more): • Bob-tail Horse • Roan Bear • Buffalo Calf • Big Nose • Mad Wolf • White Shield—not there initially, but joined them a few minutes later. • Rising Sun • Hanging Wolf • Young Little Wolf—he first saw Custer in MTC, which should put him near the ford. • American Horse—the Cheyenne chief, returning from the Reno fight where he was not one of those crossing the Little Big Horn. • Possibly Wooden Thigh, Yellow Horse, and Horse Road, who were camp guards. Sioux (maybe four or five): • White Cow Bull (Oglala) • Shave Elk (Oglala): Possibly at Ford B. A member of Big Road’s Northern band of Oglala Sioux, Shave Elk and four others were riding up Medicine Tail Coulee when they saw Custer’s column coming at them. They rode back down, crossed at Ford B, and it is not unreasonable—though not certain—that one or more of them stayed to help defend the ford. If they all stayed—and that is equally unlikely—then it would explain the various commentaries about four or five Sioux being at the ford. If Shave Elk’s band remained at Ford B to oppose the on-coming soldiers, it could mean as many as twenty Indians fought Custer’s column at the crossing. This, of course, would include the four Cheyenne camp guards, above. Yellow Nose, a Ute/Cheyenne, may have been another. This Shave Elk business-- I believe-- would represent your five Sioux chasing after the troops. In addition to all of this, I have found some indication there may have been a few more warriors sitting atop-- or getting to-- what today is referred to as "Curtis Knoll," the southern extension of Greasy Grass Ridge that forms the northern boundary of Ford B. If so, it would probably have been only a few warriors, bringing the total there to about 30 or maybe 40... just enough to be a pain. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on May 19, 2012 6:16:51 GMT -6
Fred,
OK, let's hold aside your 15 at the river and on Curtis Knoll.
Were there any Indians who fought only Custer, and not Reno?
Were there any Indians who fought neither Custer nor Reno?
So at the moment of the Ford B recce,where were these folks?
The intelligence indicators of the ponies and warriors not on Reno would be clearly seen when Custer and the Yates Bn were at Ford B. LTC Custer was a reasonably intelligent and experienced officer, and he had some very experienced scouts with him. I do not see him overlooking enemy forces and activity during the Ford B phase of the operation.
So the issue here is a factor of level of command and perspective.
A Lieutenant is focused on the enemy in his front, the ford guards and Curtis knoll stragglers.
Regimental commander needs to do a timing analysis. If I attack B, how many enemies will reinforce, and how fast? So if I go to a bee's nest and see two bees; that does not mean if I throw rocks at that nest I will only fight two bees.
As our recognized timing expert, I am sure you know this.
My point is that Custer analyzed how many enemies he faced immediately, and how soon they would fight him if he attacked.
Respectfully,
Will
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Post by fred on May 19, 2012 6:36:37 GMT -6
Will, Were there any Indians who fought only Custer, and not Reno? Yes. Probably many more... 60% more. Yes. Many were still in the village, others were heading downstream accompanying the "refugees." Others may have been even heading toward the Reno fighting. As Reno was retreating, Indian numbers were growing, not ebbing, in that area. I agree, but the only scout he had with him at that time was Boyer. The pony herds-- while probably very active at this point-- were still mostly upstream and whatever Cheyenne horses were still grazing in the valley, were probably active, as well, being rounded up, creating dust, and masking activity. Again, remember, any concentrated resistance Custer may have met at the ford, could not have been organized, even in the very loose Indian interpretation of that word. Another indicator of "less" rather than "more" is in the lack of troop casualties and in the lack of archaeological evidence of any running fight or large-scale activity in the Deep Coulee flats. I realize the artifact collecting over the years may have taken a toll, but those flats are vast and seldom thought of. Most writers have concluded-- erroneously, I believe-- that Custer, once leaving Ford B, headed directly toward Finley - Finckle Ridge. That is incorrect. Custer moved up the flatter terrain of the flats, then "scaled" ( hardly the word!) the ridgeline and onto Calhoun Hill. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by ulan on May 19, 2012 8:32:24 GMT -6
Remember one thing, however, Ulan. I believe much of what Custer was doing was reconnaissance, all the way to Ford D. But you are correct; the only plan he had was in his head; he never communicated anything to his subordinates. That, however, was because he attacked prematurely... too much of a hurry. You said it best: "he never understood the Indians." Best wishes, Fred. Yes i know, scouting was Custers passion. But as you say he made everything in a hurry instead of using the reconaissance results for a battle plan. A correct conclusion would have been anyway to plan the attack for the next day. The chance of bringing a surprising attack to the indians was only in his dreams. But the success of his hard marching was that the indians had no chance to escape cause he was in touch to them and he had better mobility as the indian train now. That was actually a tactical success but he played it away caused by his temper. If he had done on 26th just what his order was, than possibly the whole campaign would have ended successfull. He would have hold his hero status also with a action like that but he had to share it with others then. But from todays sight it would be compareable to great efforts like John Buford did it on the Gettysburg battle for eg.
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Post by quincannon on May 19, 2012 10:14:00 GMT -6
Ulan: Agree on Longstreet. Disagree on Rommel. I think Rommel was a rare breed. His demands were overwhelming at times, but there are small indicators that I think are valuable insights into how he cared about his men. For instance Rommel insisted that his rations be identical to those of his men as a measure of their capacity to endure. Could you point to examples of rashness? Yes that would be fair to say, but fairness must be overall. He pulled back after Crusader. He pushed hard at Gazalla, He pushed even harder at 1st Alemain. He retreated before Montgomery, against stupid orders, took his thumping and rebounded quickly in Tunisia. He knew the game was up in November 42 and did everything in his power to save what he could while still delaying and counterattacking. Good general in my estimation, but like ALL of the other he had flaws, but I don't think not caring for his soldiers was one of them.
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Post by ulan on May 19, 2012 11:48:05 GMT -6
Rommel pushed his armee very hard against Tobruk. His staff tryed to make clear to him that it would be impossible to take Tobruk and it will cost many men and material without success. But Rommel was hot to take Tobruk and it was because he was a careerist like many other generals under Hitler.
Later he pushed his Army on and on without notice on the burnt out state of men and material. He found the limit in El Alamein because he had actually nothing left and his advance was senseless for weeks now. He ignore the bad state of reinforcement for his army wich would say stop and wait. That was all coming from him and he was responsible for the moves of his army.
Now after he notice his troops are totaly burned out he came under pressure of Hitlers idiocy to hold position and all the known bs.
Against Hitlers order he made a complete retreat then and yes, that was probably Rommels best effort in his career. You can note this as carrying for his men but it was late and i guess only because he burned them out before until collapse.
Well that just my opinion and i think many other will see Rommel in a better light.
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Post by quincannon on May 19, 2012 12:05:30 GMT -6
Ulan: I fully understand your views and you are not alone. In recent years there has been more and more work citical of Rommel. That often happens with the passage of time. I don't know how old you are, and that may seem a strange question. I am of a generation that admired Rommel as a tactical commander. Most American officers did in that day, particularly Armor officers.. If you are of a younger generation you mave have an entirly different view, at that is neither abnormal nor unexpected.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 19, 2012 13:02:58 GMT -6
Suspect a great deal of the praise of Rommel was due to the western need to inflate the reps and abilities of foes to excuse our own failures and to burnish the reps of the generals and admirals that beat them. That wasn't all personal hubris because in war it helps civvy morale.
Montgomery inflated Rommel beyond recognition, we inflated Yamamoto beyond human kind, and also with Lee and others. That's probably why we know of Pyrrus and of Hannibal, because their brilliance explains away actual brain dead opponents, in some cases, or bad luck in others.
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Post by fred on May 19, 2012 18:47:45 GMT -6
Here is a little outline-biography I have put together on Rommel. While I tend to agree we put a little too much "glamor" to some of these fellows to build up our own prowess, who the hell ever heard of "Erwin Rommel" in 1940? To me, most of this revisionist history is hogwash designed in later years for the exact same reason DC just mentioned. "We won, therefore we were so-o-o-o much better." Two idiots did the same thing with Manstein a few years ago. Yet, like the LBH, they conveniently leave out an awful lot, just to justify their criticisms of fallible and human men. Rommel, Erwin Johannes Eugen, GENERALFELDMARSCHALL (b. Heidenheim, Württemburg, 15Nov1891 – d. 14Oct1944. Forced suicide after swallowing poison capsule.) √ “… n outsider… as he had not qualified for high position in the hierarchy of the General Staff…” [Liddell Hart].
• “… vigorous fighting [soldier] whose [quality] promised well for local success without being of the intellectual caliber that might make [him a competitor] for… higher strategic direction.” • “… sickness may have accounted for his bad slip in the Battle of Mareth that opened Montgomery’s path into Tunisia, and thus paved the way for the [German’s] final collapse in Africa.” • “[Montgomery] later expressed the view that Rundstedt was the more formidable opponent of the two…. Montgomery never met Rommel at his best…” • “The outstanding feature of Rommel’s successes is that they were achieved with an inferiority of force, and without any command of the air. No other generals on either side gained the victory under such conditions, except for the early British leaders under Wavell, and their successes were won against Italians.” • “More definite defects were his tendency to disregard the administrative side of strategy and his lack of thoroughness over detail…. [D]id not know how to delegate authority….” • “In the field of tactics, Rommel was often brilliant in ruse and bluff…. lso subtle.” • “As a strategist, his defects were apt to be a serious offset to his subtlety and audacity. As a tactician, his qualities tended to eclipse his defects. As a commander, his exceptional combination of leading power and driving power was accompanied by a mercurial temperament, so that he was apt to swing too violently between exaltation and depression.” • Yet despite Rommel’s so-called strategic shortcomings, he recognized the importance of moving swiftly in Africa, something neither Hitler nor OKH understood. Rommel immediately recognized the importance of Mersa el Brega and Agedabia, even before he arrived in Africa. √ Officer Cadet in a Württemburg infantry regiment, 1910. √ Attended the War Academy in Danzig and promoted to Lieutenant in Jan 1912. √ Fought in WWI in the Battle of the Argonne.
• Served in Romania and Italy. • Wounded twice. √ Married Lucie Mollin in Danzig, Nov 1916. √ Awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class and the Pour le Mérite and promoted to captain, Oct 1917. √ Was an instructor at the Infantry School in Dresden, 1929 – 1933.
• Wrote Infantry Attacks. √ Promoted to major, Oct 1933. √ Promoted to LTC and Instructor at Kriegsakademie, Potsdam, 1935 – 1937. √ Oberst, 1937. √ 23Aug39, promoted to Generalmajor. √ At the outbreak of WWII, commanded Nazi HQ in Poland.
• Commanded Hitler’s bodyguard. √ Assumed command of 7th Panzer Division, 15Feb40. √ CG, 7th Panzer Div., XV Army Corps (Hoth), during battle for France.
• The division earned the sobriquet “Phantom Division” during this campaign because they moved so fast. √ Appointed CG, Afrika Korps, 6Feb41, as a GL (Jan41).
• Arrived in Tripoli, 12Feb41. Subordinate to the Italian General Staff. • 5th Light Div. (Allmendinger) • 15th Pz Div. (v. Prittwitz u. Gaffron) √ Awarded Oakleaves to the Knight’s Cross, 19Mar41. √ Promoted to General of Panzer Troops, Jul41, commanding the newly formed, Panzergruppe Afrika:
• Chief of Staff: GM Gause • GSO 1 (Operations): Westphal • GHQ was at Beda Littoria. • 21st Panzer Div. (formerly, the 5th Light Div.) (v. Ravenstein) • 15th Panzer Div. (Neumann – Silkow) • 90th Light Div. (Summermann) √ Promoted to Generaloberst, commanding Panzerarmee Afrika, Jan 1942. √ Promoted to Field Marshal, 22Jun42. √ Replaced temporarily by Stumme, 19Sep42, due to ill health. √ Commanding Armeegruppe Afrika, in Tunisia, Feb43. √ Left Africa for the last time, 9Mar43. √ Awarded Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves, Swords, and Diamonds. √ CG, Army Group “B,” at Normandy.
• Wanted to defeat the Allies on the beaches of Normandy rather than allowing them to land and then beating them in armored battles farther inland. • His experience warned him of the power of Allied air supremacy. √ Badly injured in British bombing attack, 17Jul44, on Route N179, between Livarot and Vimoutiers. √ Because of his involvement in the bomb plot against Hitler, he was forced into taking a poison capsule, 14Oct44.
Sorry, but the notes were never meant to be put out publicly, so I never included the damn sources, but those quotes are from various sources.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Gerry
Junior Member
Peter
Posts: 63
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Post by Gerry on May 19, 2012 22:01:29 GMT -6
Is that part of his story is pure fantasy? Did Peter Thompson see Reno´s battalion fighting? "I then looked across the river at the Indian Village, it was all in commotion. One party of Indians were dashing down the river; others were rushing toward the upper end of the village. The cause of this commotion was Major Reno with three companies of men about a mile distant from the upper end of the village, dashing along in a gallop towards them. The officers were riding in order, a little in advance of their respective companies." Ulan, Peter Thompson wrote his 26,000 word narrative and never once used a swear word. Not once, even when he tried to explain the fault of Custer’s defeat. So that is all that I will say about that BS. Thompson was a Sunday School teacher before joining the Army. BTW (by the way), My ancestors came from Germany. They were part of the Protestant Reformer Menno Simons. Peter the Great of Russia had a great deal of land north of the Black Sea and when he visited Germany, Peter the Great saw the great farms of these people and ask them to come and settle and flourish. They stayed in that country till Russia became unstable in the 1870-1890 when they immigrated to the US. Let us look at the passage that you quoted from Thompson’s narrative. At this time Thompson would have been south of the future Reno Hill on the ridge of the bluff in full view of Reno charging down the valley. Custer would have been in the vicinity of SSR and Cedar Coulee and Sgt Knipe is sent back. RCOI p521, Recorder - Q. In your official report, if I remember correctly- and if I do not, please correct me- I believe it is stated that you drove the Indians down the bottom. Describe what force you drove down the bottom. Reno - A. I suppose they were some forty or fifty- perhaps less. They were decoys sent out there. Major Reno a mile distant from the future skirmish line, Thompson see other Indians rushing south toward Reno and would be waiting as Reno halts the move down the valley and puts up skirmish lines. RCOI p190 - Moylan, “I think there were about four hundred Indians within five hundred yards of him (Reno) at the time.” RCOI p501- Reno, “I could see the Indians coming out from a ravine where they evidently had his themselves.” RCOI p 500 Reno A. When that company was put in the rear, I thought the charge would be make in that shape with the two companies, and I would hold the third one as a point to rally on afterwards. Proceeding further, I knew the number of Indians, and sent my Adjutant to bring that company into the line. The three companies were then in line of battle and I was in front. I suppose near the center, perhaps a little to the right. RCOI p501 Recorder Q. After you had all the companies in line and you were in the center, what gait did you take and how far did you go? Reno A. We were then at a gallop. I suppose I must have been forty paces in advance. RCIO p21 Wallace ,”Companies A and M were formed in line and my company was formed in line in the rear as a reserve, and the command moved forward, first in a trot and then in a gallop. The Indians, when the order was given, were apparently running from us, there was a bit dust, but as we moved on, the dust cleared away and the Indians were seen coming back. There the command was halted” RCIO p40 Wallace, “as they passed on the open prairie companies “A” and “M” were formed, left front into line. They formed in front, and “G” company formed in line in the rear. ... They formed in line as they were moving. After forming they moved in a trot fro some distance and then in a gallop. As they moved in a gallop the Adjutant came to “G” company, and they had to increase their gait and form on the left of the line, forming a line of three companies, Co “G” on the extreme left. We moved on in that order till we reached the woods.” Ulan, To answer your question, “Is it only Thompson who´s telling about a charge with their horses in full gallop?” No, I have put a few items out of the RCIO that describes the same event. It would have only lasted maybe 10 minutes at the most. Thompson is the only one describing the view from atop the bluffs looking down. Gerry
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