Post by bc on Apr 5, 2012 1:29:49 GMT -6
The June 2012 issue of Vietnam magazine has a story about Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer III. He was batallion commander of the 2nd Batallion, 27th Infantry operating near Cu Chi, Tay Ninh Province, Republic of Vietnam in an action in the Renegade Woods by the Vam Co Dong river by Cambodia from 2 April to 5 April 1970.
Custer III was the grand nephew of George.
Custer ended up with 12 friendly KIA and 16 wounded. NVA body count was 101, 1 POW, and 2 who switched sides.
Custer mainly stayed in his C & C (command & control) helicopter calling in artillery and air support during the fighting. The author was the Bn operations officer, Howard "Dutch" McAllister, who flew in the first day with Custer and took command of the companies on the ground after C company lost all their officers but one.
Custer's batallion and some rangers were reinforced by 2 mechanized companies and scouts from Troop D, 3/4 (3rd squadron of the 4th) Cav. They were up against 2 batallions of the 271st regiment, 9th VC/NVA Division.
Here are some of the comments he made about Lt. Col. Custer:
Custer was a mercurial leader. "Bald, blocky and bad-mouthed" was how another batallion commander in the brigade described him, referring to his combativeness in discussing tactical matters with superiors and subordinates alike. During one heated discussion Custer had with another bn commander, McAllister had to personally intervene when he was certain Custer was about to swing at the other Lt. Col. McAllister grabbed a handful of the back of his fatigue jacket and Custer turned instantly, smiled broadly at him and stalked out of the room.
McAllister had been under Custer about three months and had seen how his fearless nature and curiosity kept him just a step away from disaster most of the time. Tough, but also kind hearted, he never passed up an opportunity to perform humanitarian acts. He once ordered his unarmed observation helicopter to land in a village of questionable loyalty to take a sick child and mother to a hospital. McAllister said Colonel, you have got to stop doing stuff like that. You are going toget yourself and the pilot killed in one of those insecure villages. Custer smiled contritely, then turned on me and said smiling, "You can't talk to me like that. I am your commander."
Flying from FSB Jackson to the fight, Custer calmly impressed on me the need to take charge of the situation on the ground. Custer said you won't have a lot of time to get things under control before dark. You don't know the shape of what Charlie company is in. You've got the ball. Let me know what you need and I will make sure you get it. Watch your fire discipline. You don't want to run out of ammunition.
We weren't worried about support, Custer, a master at coordinating air and artillery, had practically unlimited artillery on call and an incredible amount of air support on station, since it was a quiet day for action elsewhere in the division. With Custer in the helicopter above, we knew we would make the most of it.
Throughout the fighting that afternoon, Custer kept McAllister abreast of plans to seal off the enemy force within the Renegade Woods, where it could be surrounded and destroyed.
Colonel Custer had some the same propensity for taking risks as his namesake, but his luck and timing were better. All that McAllister learned of Custer's activities during the day's fighting, except for his calm orders and questions on the radio, was drawn from the sometimes laconic, and sometimes excited comments of the pilots who observed him in the air. Yellow Hair rode again. What he did for his men on the ground was to put the lethality of air power where we needed it, when we needed it. He let us fight the battle on the ground. No combat infantryman can ask for more.
While there was an element of luck in the unusual wealth of available assets to support our Renegade Woods battle, McAllister remembers Custer telling him once that we make our own luck. At its essence, however, Custer was simply following what was taught at the Infantry School in those days: Careful planning followed by violent execution of the plans.
bc
Custer III was the grand nephew of George.
Custer ended up with 12 friendly KIA and 16 wounded. NVA body count was 101, 1 POW, and 2 who switched sides.
Custer mainly stayed in his C & C (command & control) helicopter calling in artillery and air support during the fighting. The author was the Bn operations officer, Howard "Dutch" McAllister, who flew in the first day with Custer and took command of the companies on the ground after C company lost all their officers but one.
Custer's batallion and some rangers were reinforced by 2 mechanized companies and scouts from Troop D, 3/4 (3rd squadron of the 4th) Cav. They were up against 2 batallions of the 271st regiment, 9th VC/NVA Division.
Here are some of the comments he made about Lt. Col. Custer:
Custer was a mercurial leader. "Bald, blocky and bad-mouthed" was how another batallion commander in the brigade described him, referring to his combativeness in discussing tactical matters with superiors and subordinates alike. During one heated discussion Custer had with another bn commander, McAllister had to personally intervene when he was certain Custer was about to swing at the other Lt. Col. McAllister grabbed a handful of the back of his fatigue jacket and Custer turned instantly, smiled broadly at him and stalked out of the room.
McAllister had been under Custer about three months and had seen how his fearless nature and curiosity kept him just a step away from disaster most of the time. Tough, but also kind hearted, he never passed up an opportunity to perform humanitarian acts. He once ordered his unarmed observation helicopter to land in a village of questionable loyalty to take a sick child and mother to a hospital. McAllister said Colonel, you have got to stop doing stuff like that. You are going toget yourself and the pilot killed in one of those insecure villages. Custer smiled contritely, then turned on me and said smiling, "You can't talk to me like that. I am your commander."
Flying from FSB Jackson to the fight, Custer calmly impressed on me the need to take charge of the situation on the ground. Custer said you won't have a lot of time to get things under control before dark. You don't know the shape of what Charlie company is in. You've got the ball. Let me know what you need and I will make sure you get it. Watch your fire discipline. You don't want to run out of ammunition.
We weren't worried about support, Custer, a master at coordinating air and artillery, had practically unlimited artillery on call and an incredible amount of air support on station, since it was a quiet day for action elsewhere in the division. With Custer in the helicopter above, we knew we would make the most of it.
Throughout the fighting that afternoon, Custer kept McAllister abreast of plans to seal off the enemy force within the Renegade Woods, where it could be surrounded and destroyed.
Colonel Custer had some the same propensity for taking risks as his namesake, but his luck and timing were better. All that McAllister learned of Custer's activities during the day's fighting, except for his calm orders and questions on the radio, was drawn from the sometimes laconic, and sometimes excited comments of the pilots who observed him in the air. Yellow Hair rode again. What he did for his men on the ground was to put the lethality of air power where we needed it, when we needed it. He let us fight the battle on the ground. No combat infantryman can ask for more.
While there was an element of luck in the unusual wealth of available assets to support our Renegade Woods battle, McAllister remembers Custer telling him once that we make our own luck. At its essence, however, Custer was simply following what was taught at the Infantry School in those days: Careful planning followed by violent execution of the plans.
bc