Post by patrick422 on Nov 28, 2011 22:11:13 GMT -6
GENERAL NELSON A.MILES ACCOUNT OF THE CUSTER MASSACRE FROM HIS BOOK.
PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS.
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SIOUX Indians have already been referred to in connection with the Minnesota war of 1862, and the causes leading thereto. These Indians were formerly known as the Dakota Nation, and the name “ Sioux ” is alleged to have been given them in derision, and to mean “cut-throat” or “the enemy.” It was perhaps the strongest body of Indians that had existed on the continent. Like the Six Nations they were to some extent a confederation. Parkman speaks of them in recounting the campaigns of two hundred years ago along the western portion of the Great Lakes, conducted by Lord Halifax, and says that as civilization pushed them west they in turn subjugated and adopted into their family other smaller bands of Indians, or confederated with them, until the affiliation practically embraced ten different tribes, all known as the Sioux Nation, or, as the Indians called themselves, the Dakota Nation. These tribes were the Uncpapas, Ogalallas, Minneconjoux, Sans Arcs, Yanctonnais, Santees, Northern Cheyennes, Tetons, Assinneboins and Brules.
Some of the Dakotas were located west of the Missouri before the Minnesota massacre ; others went there after the campaigns of Generals Sibley and Sully on the upper Missouri, occupying a region extending from the Platte River on the south to the Canadian border on the north. As they moved westward they gradually drove before them the Crow Indians, formerly a very powerful tribe who claimed all the country as far as the Black Hills on the east, and to the mountains on the upper Yellowstone and Big Horn. So strong were the Dakotas that many expeditions had been unavailingly made against them. One was made by General Harney. Later Generals Sibley, Sully, Dodge, Stanley, and others in turn penetrated their country. Yet so powerful and independent were they that long after the line of communication had been established from the upper Platte River to the Big Horn they made their protests against them in a very vigorous way, especially on the occasion of the Fort Fetterman massacre, in which they killed eighty-two officers and men. In accordance with their demand, that route was eventually given up, and the Forts Phil Kearney and C. F. Smith were abandoned at their dictation. The sending out of commissioners representing the government to make peace with them resulted in the treaty of 1869, in which the government granted to the Indians various reservations known as the Red Cloud, Spotted Tail and others in the country west of the Missouri River. In addition to these reservations they were also allowed a large range of country as hunting grounds, where they were to be permitted to rove at will in pursuit of game.
This treaty was partially observed by the government for several years but it cannot be claimed that it was very rigidly adhered to. This resulted from the fact that during the years 1873, ’74 and ’75 great excitement prevailed throughout the country owing to the discovery of gold in the mineral fields of what is now known as South Dakota, and there was great clamor on the part of prospecting parties to be allowed to enter that region. In fact surveys were being pushed through that territory for the different lines of railroad, the principal one being the Northern Pacific, and people were eagerly seeking opportunities to establish colonies, take up lands, open mines and establish other interests in that country. As a matter of fact some military expeditions were sent into the territory to explore and reconnoitre with a view of discovering its natural resources. This was especially the case in ’74 and ’75. The country was at that time practically overrun by prospectors and mine-hunters through the region of what is now South Dakota, and particularly in that district known as the Black Hills.
While the Indians claimed that the treaty of ’68 was not adhered to by the government, neither was it observed by all the tribes of Indians. While the great chiefs, Spotted Tail, Red Cloud and others, kept most of their people on the reservations and carried out the terms of the treaty, yet many of their young men would quietly steal away on raiding parties and go on long expeditions against the Crow Indians and the Mandans, or against the white settlers wherever they could find them.
These were animated and encouraged by the example and influence of an Indian called Crazy Horse, who was the personification of savage ferocity.
Though comparatively a young man he was of a most restless and adventurous disposition, and had arrived at great renown among the warriors even before he was twenty-six years of age. In fact he had become the war-chief of the southern Sioux and the recognized leader of the hostile Ogalallas.
Those Indians occupying the country still farther to the north never made any pretence of being agency Indians. Sitting Bull was the exponent of that element. From his youth he had been a wild and restless warrior, constantly getting up horse-stealing expeditions and campaigns against the friendly Crow and Mandan Indians and against the whites both east and west. The latter, whose sparse settlements skirted the western part of Montana on the west, and to the east extended along the extreme western borders of Minnesota and eastern Dakota, felt the effect of his enterprise and never-ending hatred. He would rarely come in to the agencies or trading posts; and when he did would remain only the short time necessary to trade his furs for rifles, ammunition and whatever he required. He would occasionally attack even his favorite trading places, namely, the trader’s store near Fort Buford at the mouth of the Yellowstone, and the one at Poplar Creek on the Missouri. He would send occasional assurances of good behavior, and then he would come in and after remaining several hours to dispose of his furs and robes, would go away, and perhaps as he went turn and stampede the herd or fire a volley into the post. On one occasion he came into the trader’s post near Fort Buford, Dakota, and was given a red shirt with the suggestion or request that when he came for war he would wear that shirt in order that the trader, who desired to be considered his friend, might know what his purpose was. Sitting Bull accepted it with the remark that “right now would be a good time to put it on.” He did so, and as the band went out after completing their trading, they turned and fired a volley into the post. They occasionally came down to the fort and drove off everything in the way of stock that was not gathered betimes within the protection of the post corral.
Red Cloud, Sioux Chief.
The sawmill established there was seized by them, and they beat the circular saws with great glee, thereby making what they considered music like that of tom-toms. They felt very secure here, because they thought that by being in possession of such a place they would not be fired upon. But in this they were mistaken, on one occasion at least, for a piece of artillery was trained upon them in the sawmill, and a shot sent through it killed two of their men.
On another occasion when he came in to Poplar Creek store with quite a band of warriors to trade, he took occasion to complain to the trader, Mr. Tabor, that he was not getting enough in the barter. He then jumped
Sitting Bull and the Red Shirt.
over the counter and immediately took charge of the establishment himself in the most threatening manner, and to the great delight of the stalwart warriors that at that time filled the store. He then proceeded to hand down clothing, ammunition and all kinds of goods and receive upon the counter buffalo robes and fine furs. Then the Indians had to barter, and in mimicry and derision he would imitate the trader in minutely examining the furs and finding fault with their quality, complaining that they were not so good as he wanted, putting down the valuation and saying that his goods were so choice and expensive that he could not afford to trade on any other terms. After going through the whole ceremony of trading, however, the final result was that each Indian received a much larger amount for his pelts and furs than he was in the habit of doing when the proprietor was occupying the same position. This mimicry was carried on to the extreme delectation of his followers and amid their jokes and grunts, but the trader was in such terror and hot rage that at length he resorted to a rather novel means of defense. Anticipating that on their departure they would either slay him or destroy his store, and possibly both, he determined that if extreme measures were resorted to he would blow up the entire establishment. He had at one end of the counter a large open keg of powder, from which he was accustomed to supply the wants of his customers. He coolly and quietly filled a large pipe with tobacco and lighted it, and stepped over and took his position by this keg of powder. Then he told the interpreter to inform the Indians that if any shooting was begun or any violence commenced, he would empty the lighted pipe of tobacco into the powder, and blow the store, and all the people in it, into the air. The determination depicted on his face and the seriousness of what might result to them was a sufficient warning to the Indians to continue their revelry in a cautious manner, though it did not immediately end the humorous phase of the situation.
Many of the raids and marauding expeditions were not of such a humorous character as this, but were attended with the terrible atrocities that have marked the history of that frontier. Travelers, settlers, wood-choppers and others along the Missouri River were killed in considerable numbers and frequently without warning. Men were often tortured while women and children were carried into captivity. In the summer of 1875 General Custer conducted an exploring expedition into the Black Hills. It was followed by an expedition under General Crook against the hostile element of the Sioux Nation in the winter of 1875. Starting from Fort Laramie and going north from Fort Fetterman, his command encountered the hostile Indians under Crazy Horse near the head waters of the Tongue River. A portion of his command under the gallant General Reynolds surprised Crazy Horse and captured a herd of horses, but, in taking them south they were overtaken by a terrific snowstorm, during which the Indians followed them and succeeded in stampeding the herd during the night, and so recaptured them, thus rendering ineffective all the efforts of the campaign.
Spotted Tail, Sioux Chief.
In the spring of 1876 three expeditions were ordered into that country. One, organized at Fort Lincoln, Dakota, was to be commanded by Lieuten-ant-Colonel and Brevet Major-General George A. Custer, but was afterward placed under the command of General Terry. Another was organized to move from Fort D. A. Russell; and a third, under Colonel and Brevet Major-General Gibbon, moved down the Yellowstone from Fort Ellis, afterward forming a junction with the column under General Terry and that under General Crook.
The command under General Crook first encountered the Indians under Crazy Horse near the Rosebud, and after a sharp engagement it moved back to its supply camp on Goose Creek, a southern tributary of Tongue River. The commands of Generals Terry and Gibbon formed a junction near the mouth of Rosebud and Yellowstone.
As the command of General Terry moved from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota, crossing the Little Missouri, Powder and Tongue Rivers, thence to the mouth of the Rosebud River, scouting the country to the south and west, the main trail of the Indians was discovered between the Tongue River and the Rosebud. General Terry, thereupon, divided his force, sending General Custer with the Seventh Cavalry up the Rosebud; and with the remainder of his force he himself moved up the Yellowstone and Big Horn to the junction of the Little Big Horn. I will not at this time describe the various phases of General Custer’s march, battle and tragic death, but will return to it one year later in my narrative; at which time we camped on the ground and made a thorough examination of the field, accompanied by twenty-five of the principal men who were engaged in the fight on the side of the Indians.
The Custer Massacre.
IT is probable the battle on the Little Big Horn in which a part of General Custer’s command, including himself, was destroyed, and known as the “ Custer Massacre,” has been more discussed, written about and commented upon, than any other single engagement between white troops and Indians has ever been. It was a terrible affair, almost a national disaster ; and there were some most remarkable features connected with it. The loss of two hundred and sixty-two men under such circumstances would have caused a very searching investigation in almost any country, and it is strange that there has never been any judicious and impartial investigation of all the causes that led to that disaster. True, there was a court of inquiry held at Chicago some months after the affair occurred. It was called at the request of one of the participants, and the conclusion was reached that further action was required.
A general impression has gone abroad, and to some extent prevails throughout the country to-day, prejudicial to General Custer. He has been accused of “disobeying orders,” and it has been said that “he had made a forced march,” that “ he was too impatient,” that “ he was rash,” and various other charges have been made, equally groundless and equally unjust, and all started and promoted by his enemies.
It is known that there were two sets of officers in his regiment, one friendly to General Custer, and the other, few in number, bitterly hostile to him. His brothers and several of his best friends died with him. In fact, all that could have been known of the purposes and influences that governed his action were thus lost, as none of his immediate command lived to explain the circumstances. We can only judge of what prompted his course of procedure by what he did previously, and by the testimony of the Indians who were opposed to him.
I have no patience with those who would kick a dead lion. It is most remarkable that so little was known of the number and character of the Indians then opposed to the United States forces.
Sixteen years after the affair occurred, Captain E. S. Godfrey, Seventh United States Cavalry, an experienced and gallant officer, wrote an interesting and candid account of the affair, in which he was one of the participants, which was published in the “Century Magazine” for January, 1892. Accompanying that article was a three-page, fine-print article over the signature of James B. Fry. General Fry, since deceased, was at the time of this publication an officer of the army of high standing and reputation, and recognized as a good authority upon all military matters. Students of that campaign will be well repaid for reading and studying these two articles. In the one by General Fry, on page 385, he says.
“ Captain Godfrey’s article is a valuable contribution to the authentic history of the campaign which culminated in ‘Custer’s Last Battle,’ June 25, 1876.
“The Sioux war of 1876 originated in a request by the Indian Bureau that certain wild and recalcitrant bands of Indians should be compelled to settle down upon their reservations under control of the Indian agent. Sitting Bull, on the Little Missouri in Dakota, and Crazy Horse, on Powder River, Wyoming, were practically the leaders of the hostile Indians who roamed over what General Sheridan called ‘an almost totally unknown region, comprising an area of almost 90,000 square miles.’ The hostile camps contained eight or ten separate bands, each having a chief of its own.
“Authority was exercised by a council of chiefs. No chief was endowed with supreme authority, but Sitting Bull was accepted as the leader of all his bands. From five hundred to eight hundred warriors was the most the military authorities thought the hostiles could muster. Sitting Bull’s camp, as Custer found it, contained some eight or ten thousand men, women, and children, and about twenty-five hundred warriors, including boys, these last being armed with bows and arrows. The men had good firearms, many of them Winchester rifles, with a large supply of ammunition.
“War upon this savage force was authorized by the War Department, and was conducted under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sheridan in Chicago.
“The campaign opened in the winter, General Sheridan thinking that was the season in which the Indians could be ‘caught.’ He directed General Terry to send a mounted column under Custer against Sitting Bull, and General Crook to move against Crazy Horse. Bad weather prevented Custer’s movement, but Crook advanced March 1. On March 17, he struck Crazy Horse’s band, was partially defeated, and the weather being very severe, returned to his base. The repulse of Crook’s column, and the inability of Custer to move, gave the Indians confidence, and warriors by the hundred slipped away from the agencies and joined the hostiles.
“In the spring Sheridan’s forces resumed the offensive in three isolated columns. The first column, under Crook—consisting of fifteen companies of cavalry and five companies of infantry (total 1049)—marched northward from Fort Fetterman May 29. The second column, under General Terry—consisting of the entire Seventh Cavalry, twelve companies (about 600 men); six companies of infantry, three of them on the supply steamboat (400 men); a battery of Gatling guns manned by infantrymen, and forty Indian scouts—moved westward from Fort A. Lincoln, on the Missouri, May 17.
“It happened that while the expedition was being fitted out, Custer unwittingly incurred the displeasure of President Grant, who directed that Custer should not accompany the column. Through his appeal to the President and the intercession of Terry and Sheridan, Custer was permitted to go in command of the regiment, but Terry was required to accompany and command the column. Terry was one of the best of men and ablest of soldiers, but had no experience in Indian warfare.
“A third column under General Gibbon (Colonel of Infantry) consisting of four companies of cavalry and six companies of infantry (450 men all told), marched eastward in April, and united with Terry on the Yellowstone, June 21. When these columns started they were all some two or three hundred miles from the central position occupied by the enemy. Gibbon was under Terry’s control, but Crook and Terry were independent of each other.
“The authorities believed that either one of the three columns could defeat the enemy if it ‘caught’ him; otherwise isolated forces would not have been sent to 4 operate blindly,’ without means of mutual support, against an enemy in the interior of an almost totally unknown region. Indeed General Sherman said in his official report of 1876: ‘Up to the moment of Custer’s defeat there was nothing, official or private, to justify an officer to expect that any detachment would encounter more than five hundred or eight hundred warriors.’ The appearance of twenty-five hundred to three thousand in the Custer fight, General Sherman adds : ‘ amounted to a demonstration that the troops were dealing not only with the hostiles estimated at from five hundred to eight hundred, but with the available part of the agency Indians, who had gone out to help their friends in a fight.’.
“The utter failure of our campaign was due to underestimating the numbers and prowess of the enemy. The strength he was found to possess proved, as General Sherman said in his report, that the campaign had been planned on wrong premises. Upon this point Gibbon said: ‘When these various bands succeeded in finding a leader who possessed tact, courage, and ability to concentrate and keep together so large a force, it was only a question of time when one or the other of the exterior columns would meet with a check from the overwhelming numbers of the interior body.’.
“ The first result was that Crook’s column encountered the enemy, June 17, and was so badly defeated that it was practically out of the campaign.”.
In the above extract General Fry shows by statements made by themselves that neither General Sherman, commanding the army, nor General Sheridan, commanding the military division, was aware of the formidable character of the hostile force, and Captain Godfrey in his statement says that General Custer a few days before the fight, in a council with his officers advised them that from the best information he could obtain they would not have to meet more than one thousand, or at the maximum, fifteen hundred hostiles. These statements show that our troops were
GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER.
entirely without knowledge of the strength of the enemy, and, as General Sheridan states, operating in an almost totally unknown region. A fact still more remarkable is that they were operating on exterior lines without any positive concert of action or direct communication.
In the first affair with the Sioux, previously alluded to, General Crook met with so serious a repulse that on the following day he commenced his retreat back to his base of supplies, eighty miles distant, and remained there until several weeks later, when he was reinforced by General Merritt. If the two commands of Crook and Terry had been acting in concert they could have united, as they were not more than forty or fifty miles apart at the time. So apparent was this want of knowledge of the strength of the enemy that even when General Terry’s force came together at the mouth of the Rosebud, he felt it safe to divide it again, and send General Custer up the Rosebud, and with the remainder, including the column under General Gibbon and a battery of Gatling guns, he himself moved up the Yellowstone and Big Horn to the mouth of the Little Big Horn.
As to what the understanding was when the two commands separated, the best evidence is the written order of battle, and it cannot be disputed, or gainsaid, or misconstrued. The nature of such an order must be regarded as absolute. It is like the constitution of a State or the fundamental law of a community. The order in question was given in very plain language, as follows:.
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River.
Montana Territory, June 22nd, 1876. Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, Seventh Cavalry.
Colonel : — The Brigadier General commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tulloch’s Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s column, with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon’s command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander,-who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders. Very respectfully,Your obedient servant.
E. W. Smith.
Captain Eighteenth Infantry, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
It will be observed that General Custer was directed to move up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians. The next sentence, it will be noticed, leaves no question that it was expected that his command would come in contact with the Indians ; and surely when this command was directed to move by a course in which they would be placed from forty to fifty miles distant from any other, confidence was reposed in the knowledge, zeal, and ability of the commander to exercise his best judgment. It is folly to suppose that either a small or a large band of Indians would remain stationary, and allow one body of troops to come up on one side of it while another body came up on the other side and engage it in battle. It is fair to give the Indians credit for a reasonable amount of intelligence.
Again, when Custer’s command was ordered to move out as it did, it left the Indians, who were acting on interior lines, absolutely free to attack either one of the commands thus separated, or fight them in detail as might be preferred. But we have positive evidence in the form of an affidavit of the last witness who heard the two officers in conversation together on the night before their commands separated, and it is conclusive on the point at issue. This evidence is that General Terry returned to General Custer’s tent after giving him the final order, to say to him that coming up to the Indians he would have to use his own discretion and do what he thought best. This conversation occurred at the mouth of the Rosebud, and the exact words of General Terry, as quoted by the witness are.
“ Custer, I do not know what to say for the last.”.
Custer replied: “ Say what you want to say.”.
Terry then said: “ Use your own judgment, and do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, Custer, hold on to your wounded.”.
This was a most reasonable conversation for the two officers under the circumstances. One had won great distinction as a general in the civil war; was an able lawyer and department commander, yet entirely without experience in Indian campaigns. The other had won great distinction as one of the most gallant and skillful division commanders of cavalry during the war, commanding one of the most successful divisions of mounted troops ; he had years of experience on the plains and in handling troops in that remote country, and he had fought several sharp engagements with hostile Indians.
General Terry's Last Order to Custer.
As the command of the Seventh Cavalry moved out, upwards of six hundred strong, the leader was fully confident that he was able to cope with any body of Indians that they were likely to encounter, and all were in the best of spirits at the prospect of a vigorous, and what they believed would be a successful campaign. Moving up the Rosebud until he struck the main trail, then following this up to the divide separating the Rosebud from the Little Big Horn, and on to the latter stream, it is fair to believe that from the reports he received Custer feared that the Indians might make their escape without his being able to bring them to an engagement.
The fact of his slow marches indicates his care and judiciousness in going from the mouth of the Rosebud to the battlefield on the Little Big Horn. The first day’s march was only four hours, or twelve miles in distance. The second day, June 28, thirty-three miles or twelve hour’s march, with long halts for the purpose of examining trails, abandoned camps, and evidences of the presence of Indians. The third day, the 24th, twelve hours march or twenty-eight miles. The night of the 24th, between 11:30 and the morning of the 25th, he moved ten miles in order to conceal his movements and position from the enemy. On the morning of the 25th, between eight and ten, he moved ten miles, later fifteen; in all 108 miles in four days. During these four days, he frequently called his officers together and counseled with them; in fact his directions amounted almost to an appeal. They were pathetic.
Captain Godfrey says that General Custer stated that with the regiment acting alone there would be harmony, but acting with another organization there might be jealousy; that the marches would be from twenty-five to thirty miles per day; and that officers were cautioned to husband the supplies and strength of their commands; on another occasion, that they must act together and not become separated; again, he informed them that the trail led over the divide, and that he was anxious to get as near the divide as possible before daylight, where the command could be concealed during the day, and give ample time for the country to he studied; that he expected to fight on the 26th.
With a large cavalry command like that moving over a dry and dusty country, it was next to impossible to conceal it. Any movement of the scouts or of the command was liable to be quickly discovered by the enterprising enemy. Not only did General Custer receive reports of the exact locality of the Indian camp, but he also discovered through more than one source that the Indians were aware of the presence of the troops. This undoubtedly caused him to move against them on the 25th to prevent if possible their escape, as he evidently expected that they would make such an attempt, and had they succeeded he would have been severely censured. But whatever impression of this nature Custer may have been under, he decided to make the attack during the forenoon of the 25th.
He formed his command in three columns, moving parallel to each other and practically in line. He took position himself on the right, with five troops of cavalry. Reno was directed to follow the trail with three troops and attack the village. Benteen with three troops was to move on the extreme left, Custer’s object undoubtedly being to attack in this form, which allowed sufficient space between the columns for the deployment of the three commands, and yet would not prevent their acting in concert.
In moving out from the valley of the Rosebud, over the divide to the valley of the Little Big Horn, it was fair to presume that the presence of the command would have been discovered by the Indians, and he may have thought that if he did not attack them, they would make their escape without waiting to find themselves placed between two forces, or, very naturally, with their entire force would attack him.
On approaching the Little Big Horn, Custer followed the trail down a small tributary of that stream. It was long afterward learned that a large body of Sioux warriors had returned from their encounter with General Crook’s command on the Rosebud, June 17, over this trail, thus making it a fresh one and possibly giving Custer the impression that the Indian camp was moving. The Indians state as a reason for their failure to discover the approach of Custer’s command until it was upon their camp, that they had been all the night previous to the battle celebrating what they claimed was a successful encounter with the troops on the Rosebud, and were consequently sleeping late in the forenoon. Custer undoubtedly expected to find their camp at the junction of the Little Big Horn with the small creek down which he was following the trail, and made his disposition accordingly by moving the three battalions of his regiment in parallel columns.
Custer’s order to Major Reno to move forward on the trail and attack the village, and that he would be supported by the other battalions, was a proper command, and did not imply that the supports would follow immediately in his footsteps. An attack by the battalion on his right or on his left or by both simultaneously, would be the most effective support he could have had.
As these battalions were moving forward into action Custer rode forward, well in advance with the scouts, and ascending a high butte where he could overlook the valley, discovered that the Indians, instead of being encamped at the junction of the Little Big Horn and the creek down which Reno was moving, had moved down the left bank of the Little Big Horn and camped two miles below the junction. Here it was that he changed the order in the disposition of his troops by sending a courier to his left column, commanded by Captain Benteen, with a despatch containing these words. “ Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. ” The last referring to the pack-train that was following a short distance behind the command escorted by one troop and having the reserve ammunition. As he sent no dispatch to Reno to change his movements, he evidently expected that officer to follow the trail and attack as he did in accordance with the then existing orders.
The intervals between the columns had by this time become somewhat increased, although not to the extent of placing them beyond supporting distance, which is shown by the fact that Benteen’s command was easily reached by the courier, and that Reno’s command could be seen from the crest where Custer’s column was moving.
Reno followed the trail down the tributary of the Little Big Horn, crossing that stream, and then, moving down on the left bank on the wide, flat prairie, he deployed his command in line of skirmishers with supports, and moving further down to within a short distance of the village, he commenced firing into it from a strong position that had formerly been the bed of a river, or behind what is known as a “ cut bank,” where he dismounted his command; his horses being thereby furnished a safe shelter in the brush and timber in the rear of his line of troops. His men occupied an excellent position, where they were completely covered behind what was to all intents and purposes a natural rifle-pit, and from which they could fire and easily enfilade the Indian village. If he had held this position it would have been of the greatest advantage and might have had a decisive effect upon the final result.
The Indians were camped in the following order: The Uncpapas, Ogalallas, Minneconjoux, Sans Arcs and Cheyennes. The camp was thrown into great consternation. As the firing commenced at the upper end of the village the Indians fled from it, first trying to strike their tents and escape, but in many instances abandoning them. The women and children fled out onto the prairie, and the warriors gathered out to the left on a “mesa,” or high ground, some four or five hundred yards from the village.
There they commenced skirmishing with Reno’s troops, but their fire had little effect until Major Reno ordered his command to mount. Then he ordered them to dismount, and again to mount; and finally directing them to follow him, he dashed out of the timber, leaving the strong position, and galloped back across the plain toward the hills on the right bank of the Little Big Horn. The Indians seeing this movement of the troops, and interpreting it as a retreat, as it was, rushed after them in hot pursuit. As was quite natural they took every advantage of the disorder in the ranks where officers and men were running such a wild race, rushing and climbing as best they could up the steep banks of the stream and did all the injury possible before the troops reached the high bluffs on the right bank of the Little Big Horn. Here they came in contact with Captain Benteen’s command as he was moving down the high ground on the right bank of the river in accordance with Custer’s last order to “Come on,” and “Be quick,” and in a way that if he had not been interrupted by the retreat of Reno, would in a few minutes more have brought his command into action between those of Custer and Reno. Captain Benteen halted his men and helped to rally the battalion of Major Reno. In that vicinity the two commands remained the entire day and night. One commander had received positive and repeated orders from Custer to attack the enemy; the other had received Custer’s last and equally positive order to “Come on,” “Be quick,” and “Bring packs” containing the reserve ammunition. The courier who brought Custer’s last order was the best possible guide to be had to lead the way to Custer’s position if any direction was needed; but the sound of the rifle shots and the volleys down the river indicated exactly where the troops and the ammunition were required and should have gone.
Under rules governing all military forces, whenever two commands come together the senior officer is responsible for the whole. And the senior officer should give the necessary orders. Major Reno was therefore the responsible commander at that point.
Captain Godfrey says that from where Reno’s command remained they could hear the firing going on farther down in the valley between Custer’s men and the Indians, for a long time. The Indians disappeared from that front after having reno’s troops out on the bluff.
The Custer Battlefield Two After.
Seven troops could and ought to have gone. One of the scouts, Herendeen, and thirteen men who were with Reno, and who were left in the timber from which Reno retreated, after the Indians had gone down the valley, walked across the plain, forded the river, and rejoined their command on the hill.
These two. movements indicate that there were no Indians in this vicinity during the time that the firing was going on that is mentioned by Godfrey, down the valley of the Little Big Horn where the real battle was being fought.
All that was known of the fate of Custer’s command for at least two years, was derived chiefly from the evidence found upon the field after the engagement. In this way it became known that his trail, after passing the butte from which he had sent the last order to Captain Benteen, bore on down toward the Indian village nearing the creek at one point of low ground, and then moving to the right where it took position along a crest parallel with the Little Big Horn and the Indian village. Here the dead bodies showed that the engagement had occurred along this crest. The bodies of the men were found, some on the slope toward the Indian camp, many on the crest, and some back a short distance in the rear of the crest. Lieutenant Crittenden’s body was found near the extreme left; Captain Keogh, with a number of his troops, in the rear of the center; General Custer and his two brothers on the extreme right. The bodies of some forty soldiers were found scattered on the ground between the extreme right and the Little Big Horn, those nearest the river in a small ravine or depression of ground.
At first the impression was that Custer had attempted to go down this ravine and had been driven back; but no horses were found along this line of dead bodies. This is approximately all that is known of the fate of Custer and his command from what information could be obtained from the appearance of the ground and the bodies of the men and horses after the fight.
After the Custer Massacre.
THE announcement of the annihilation of Custer and this large body of men, whatever may have been the causes of the same, as discussed in the preceding chapter, shocked the entire country, and was telegraphed around the world as a great disaster. I remember reading on the morning of July 5, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the headline of a newspaper, printed in the largest kind of type and running across the entire page the single word, “ Horrible.” Then followed a brief but graphic account of the disaster upon the Little Big Horn. It shocked our little community there perhaps more than it did any other part of the country, as General Custer was well known among us. He and his regiment were most popular throughout all that region, and the disaster seemed to their friends most appalling. It seemed to magnify in the public mind the power and terrors of the Sioux Nation.
PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS.
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SIOUX Indians have already been referred to in connection with the Minnesota war of 1862, and the causes leading thereto. These Indians were formerly known as the Dakota Nation, and the name “ Sioux ” is alleged to have been given them in derision, and to mean “cut-throat” or “the enemy.” It was perhaps the strongest body of Indians that had existed on the continent. Like the Six Nations they were to some extent a confederation. Parkman speaks of them in recounting the campaigns of two hundred years ago along the western portion of the Great Lakes, conducted by Lord Halifax, and says that as civilization pushed them west they in turn subjugated and adopted into their family other smaller bands of Indians, or confederated with them, until the affiliation practically embraced ten different tribes, all known as the Sioux Nation, or, as the Indians called themselves, the Dakota Nation. These tribes were the Uncpapas, Ogalallas, Minneconjoux, Sans Arcs, Yanctonnais, Santees, Northern Cheyennes, Tetons, Assinneboins and Brules.
Some of the Dakotas were located west of the Missouri before the Minnesota massacre ; others went there after the campaigns of Generals Sibley and Sully on the upper Missouri, occupying a region extending from the Platte River on the south to the Canadian border on the north. As they moved westward they gradually drove before them the Crow Indians, formerly a very powerful tribe who claimed all the country as far as the Black Hills on the east, and to the mountains on the upper Yellowstone and Big Horn. So strong were the Dakotas that many expeditions had been unavailingly made against them. One was made by General Harney. Later Generals Sibley, Sully, Dodge, Stanley, and others in turn penetrated their country. Yet so powerful and independent were they that long after the line of communication had been established from the upper Platte River to the Big Horn they made their protests against them in a very vigorous way, especially on the occasion of the Fort Fetterman massacre, in which they killed eighty-two officers and men. In accordance with their demand, that route was eventually given up, and the Forts Phil Kearney and C. F. Smith were abandoned at their dictation. The sending out of commissioners representing the government to make peace with them resulted in the treaty of 1869, in which the government granted to the Indians various reservations known as the Red Cloud, Spotted Tail and others in the country west of the Missouri River. In addition to these reservations they were also allowed a large range of country as hunting grounds, where they were to be permitted to rove at will in pursuit of game.
This treaty was partially observed by the government for several years but it cannot be claimed that it was very rigidly adhered to. This resulted from the fact that during the years 1873, ’74 and ’75 great excitement prevailed throughout the country owing to the discovery of gold in the mineral fields of what is now known as South Dakota, and there was great clamor on the part of prospecting parties to be allowed to enter that region. In fact surveys were being pushed through that territory for the different lines of railroad, the principal one being the Northern Pacific, and people were eagerly seeking opportunities to establish colonies, take up lands, open mines and establish other interests in that country. As a matter of fact some military expeditions were sent into the territory to explore and reconnoitre with a view of discovering its natural resources. This was especially the case in ’74 and ’75. The country was at that time practically overrun by prospectors and mine-hunters through the region of what is now South Dakota, and particularly in that district known as the Black Hills.
While the Indians claimed that the treaty of ’68 was not adhered to by the government, neither was it observed by all the tribes of Indians. While the great chiefs, Spotted Tail, Red Cloud and others, kept most of their people on the reservations and carried out the terms of the treaty, yet many of their young men would quietly steal away on raiding parties and go on long expeditions against the Crow Indians and the Mandans, or against the white settlers wherever they could find them.
These were animated and encouraged by the example and influence of an Indian called Crazy Horse, who was the personification of savage ferocity.
Though comparatively a young man he was of a most restless and adventurous disposition, and had arrived at great renown among the warriors even before he was twenty-six years of age. In fact he had become the war-chief of the southern Sioux and the recognized leader of the hostile Ogalallas.
Those Indians occupying the country still farther to the north never made any pretence of being agency Indians. Sitting Bull was the exponent of that element. From his youth he had been a wild and restless warrior, constantly getting up horse-stealing expeditions and campaigns against the friendly Crow and Mandan Indians and against the whites both east and west. The latter, whose sparse settlements skirted the western part of Montana on the west, and to the east extended along the extreme western borders of Minnesota and eastern Dakota, felt the effect of his enterprise and never-ending hatred. He would rarely come in to the agencies or trading posts; and when he did would remain only the short time necessary to trade his furs for rifles, ammunition and whatever he required. He would occasionally attack even his favorite trading places, namely, the trader’s store near Fort Buford at the mouth of the Yellowstone, and the one at Poplar Creek on the Missouri. He would send occasional assurances of good behavior, and then he would come in and after remaining several hours to dispose of his furs and robes, would go away, and perhaps as he went turn and stampede the herd or fire a volley into the post. On one occasion he came into the trader’s post near Fort Buford, Dakota, and was given a red shirt with the suggestion or request that when he came for war he would wear that shirt in order that the trader, who desired to be considered his friend, might know what his purpose was. Sitting Bull accepted it with the remark that “right now would be a good time to put it on.” He did so, and as the band went out after completing their trading, they turned and fired a volley into the post. They occasionally came down to the fort and drove off everything in the way of stock that was not gathered betimes within the protection of the post corral.
Red Cloud, Sioux Chief.
The sawmill established there was seized by them, and they beat the circular saws with great glee, thereby making what they considered music like that of tom-toms. They felt very secure here, because they thought that by being in possession of such a place they would not be fired upon. But in this they were mistaken, on one occasion at least, for a piece of artillery was trained upon them in the sawmill, and a shot sent through it killed two of their men.
On another occasion when he came in to Poplar Creek store with quite a band of warriors to trade, he took occasion to complain to the trader, Mr. Tabor, that he was not getting enough in the barter. He then jumped
Sitting Bull and the Red Shirt.
over the counter and immediately took charge of the establishment himself in the most threatening manner, and to the great delight of the stalwart warriors that at that time filled the store. He then proceeded to hand down clothing, ammunition and all kinds of goods and receive upon the counter buffalo robes and fine furs. Then the Indians had to barter, and in mimicry and derision he would imitate the trader in minutely examining the furs and finding fault with their quality, complaining that they were not so good as he wanted, putting down the valuation and saying that his goods were so choice and expensive that he could not afford to trade on any other terms. After going through the whole ceremony of trading, however, the final result was that each Indian received a much larger amount for his pelts and furs than he was in the habit of doing when the proprietor was occupying the same position. This mimicry was carried on to the extreme delectation of his followers and amid their jokes and grunts, but the trader was in such terror and hot rage that at length he resorted to a rather novel means of defense. Anticipating that on their departure they would either slay him or destroy his store, and possibly both, he determined that if extreme measures were resorted to he would blow up the entire establishment. He had at one end of the counter a large open keg of powder, from which he was accustomed to supply the wants of his customers. He coolly and quietly filled a large pipe with tobacco and lighted it, and stepped over and took his position by this keg of powder. Then he told the interpreter to inform the Indians that if any shooting was begun or any violence commenced, he would empty the lighted pipe of tobacco into the powder, and blow the store, and all the people in it, into the air. The determination depicted on his face and the seriousness of what might result to them was a sufficient warning to the Indians to continue their revelry in a cautious manner, though it did not immediately end the humorous phase of the situation.
Many of the raids and marauding expeditions were not of such a humorous character as this, but were attended with the terrible atrocities that have marked the history of that frontier. Travelers, settlers, wood-choppers and others along the Missouri River were killed in considerable numbers and frequently without warning. Men were often tortured while women and children were carried into captivity. In the summer of 1875 General Custer conducted an exploring expedition into the Black Hills. It was followed by an expedition under General Crook against the hostile element of the Sioux Nation in the winter of 1875. Starting from Fort Laramie and going north from Fort Fetterman, his command encountered the hostile Indians under Crazy Horse near the head waters of the Tongue River. A portion of his command under the gallant General Reynolds surprised Crazy Horse and captured a herd of horses, but, in taking them south they were overtaken by a terrific snowstorm, during which the Indians followed them and succeeded in stampeding the herd during the night, and so recaptured them, thus rendering ineffective all the efforts of the campaign.
Spotted Tail, Sioux Chief.
In the spring of 1876 three expeditions were ordered into that country. One, organized at Fort Lincoln, Dakota, was to be commanded by Lieuten-ant-Colonel and Brevet Major-General George A. Custer, but was afterward placed under the command of General Terry. Another was organized to move from Fort D. A. Russell; and a third, under Colonel and Brevet Major-General Gibbon, moved down the Yellowstone from Fort Ellis, afterward forming a junction with the column under General Terry and that under General Crook.
The command under General Crook first encountered the Indians under Crazy Horse near the Rosebud, and after a sharp engagement it moved back to its supply camp on Goose Creek, a southern tributary of Tongue River. The commands of Generals Terry and Gibbon formed a junction near the mouth of Rosebud and Yellowstone.
As the command of General Terry moved from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota, crossing the Little Missouri, Powder and Tongue Rivers, thence to the mouth of the Rosebud River, scouting the country to the south and west, the main trail of the Indians was discovered between the Tongue River and the Rosebud. General Terry, thereupon, divided his force, sending General Custer with the Seventh Cavalry up the Rosebud; and with the remainder of his force he himself moved up the Yellowstone and Big Horn to the junction of the Little Big Horn. I will not at this time describe the various phases of General Custer’s march, battle and tragic death, but will return to it one year later in my narrative; at which time we camped on the ground and made a thorough examination of the field, accompanied by twenty-five of the principal men who were engaged in the fight on the side of the Indians.
The Custer Massacre.
IT is probable the battle on the Little Big Horn in which a part of General Custer’s command, including himself, was destroyed, and known as the “ Custer Massacre,” has been more discussed, written about and commented upon, than any other single engagement between white troops and Indians has ever been. It was a terrible affair, almost a national disaster ; and there were some most remarkable features connected with it. The loss of two hundred and sixty-two men under such circumstances would have caused a very searching investigation in almost any country, and it is strange that there has never been any judicious and impartial investigation of all the causes that led to that disaster. True, there was a court of inquiry held at Chicago some months after the affair occurred. It was called at the request of one of the participants, and the conclusion was reached that further action was required.
A general impression has gone abroad, and to some extent prevails throughout the country to-day, prejudicial to General Custer. He has been accused of “disobeying orders,” and it has been said that “he had made a forced march,” that “ he was too impatient,” that “ he was rash,” and various other charges have been made, equally groundless and equally unjust, and all started and promoted by his enemies.
It is known that there were two sets of officers in his regiment, one friendly to General Custer, and the other, few in number, bitterly hostile to him. His brothers and several of his best friends died with him. In fact, all that could have been known of the purposes and influences that governed his action were thus lost, as none of his immediate command lived to explain the circumstances. We can only judge of what prompted his course of procedure by what he did previously, and by the testimony of the Indians who were opposed to him.
I have no patience with those who would kick a dead lion. It is most remarkable that so little was known of the number and character of the Indians then opposed to the United States forces.
Sixteen years after the affair occurred, Captain E. S. Godfrey, Seventh United States Cavalry, an experienced and gallant officer, wrote an interesting and candid account of the affair, in which he was one of the participants, which was published in the “Century Magazine” for January, 1892. Accompanying that article was a three-page, fine-print article over the signature of James B. Fry. General Fry, since deceased, was at the time of this publication an officer of the army of high standing and reputation, and recognized as a good authority upon all military matters. Students of that campaign will be well repaid for reading and studying these two articles. In the one by General Fry, on page 385, he says.
“ Captain Godfrey’s article is a valuable contribution to the authentic history of the campaign which culminated in ‘Custer’s Last Battle,’ June 25, 1876.
“The Sioux war of 1876 originated in a request by the Indian Bureau that certain wild and recalcitrant bands of Indians should be compelled to settle down upon their reservations under control of the Indian agent. Sitting Bull, on the Little Missouri in Dakota, and Crazy Horse, on Powder River, Wyoming, were practically the leaders of the hostile Indians who roamed over what General Sheridan called ‘an almost totally unknown region, comprising an area of almost 90,000 square miles.’ The hostile camps contained eight or ten separate bands, each having a chief of its own.
“Authority was exercised by a council of chiefs. No chief was endowed with supreme authority, but Sitting Bull was accepted as the leader of all his bands. From five hundred to eight hundred warriors was the most the military authorities thought the hostiles could muster. Sitting Bull’s camp, as Custer found it, contained some eight or ten thousand men, women, and children, and about twenty-five hundred warriors, including boys, these last being armed with bows and arrows. The men had good firearms, many of them Winchester rifles, with a large supply of ammunition.
“War upon this savage force was authorized by the War Department, and was conducted under the direction of Lieutenant-General Sheridan in Chicago.
“The campaign opened in the winter, General Sheridan thinking that was the season in which the Indians could be ‘caught.’ He directed General Terry to send a mounted column under Custer against Sitting Bull, and General Crook to move against Crazy Horse. Bad weather prevented Custer’s movement, but Crook advanced March 1. On March 17, he struck Crazy Horse’s band, was partially defeated, and the weather being very severe, returned to his base. The repulse of Crook’s column, and the inability of Custer to move, gave the Indians confidence, and warriors by the hundred slipped away from the agencies and joined the hostiles.
“In the spring Sheridan’s forces resumed the offensive in three isolated columns. The first column, under Crook—consisting of fifteen companies of cavalry and five companies of infantry (total 1049)—marched northward from Fort Fetterman May 29. The second column, under General Terry—consisting of the entire Seventh Cavalry, twelve companies (about 600 men); six companies of infantry, three of them on the supply steamboat (400 men); a battery of Gatling guns manned by infantrymen, and forty Indian scouts—moved westward from Fort A. Lincoln, on the Missouri, May 17.
“It happened that while the expedition was being fitted out, Custer unwittingly incurred the displeasure of President Grant, who directed that Custer should not accompany the column. Through his appeal to the President and the intercession of Terry and Sheridan, Custer was permitted to go in command of the regiment, but Terry was required to accompany and command the column. Terry was one of the best of men and ablest of soldiers, but had no experience in Indian warfare.
“A third column under General Gibbon (Colonel of Infantry) consisting of four companies of cavalry and six companies of infantry (450 men all told), marched eastward in April, and united with Terry on the Yellowstone, June 21. When these columns started they were all some two or three hundred miles from the central position occupied by the enemy. Gibbon was under Terry’s control, but Crook and Terry were independent of each other.
“The authorities believed that either one of the three columns could defeat the enemy if it ‘caught’ him; otherwise isolated forces would not have been sent to 4 operate blindly,’ without means of mutual support, against an enemy in the interior of an almost totally unknown region. Indeed General Sherman said in his official report of 1876: ‘Up to the moment of Custer’s defeat there was nothing, official or private, to justify an officer to expect that any detachment would encounter more than five hundred or eight hundred warriors.’ The appearance of twenty-five hundred to three thousand in the Custer fight, General Sherman adds : ‘ amounted to a demonstration that the troops were dealing not only with the hostiles estimated at from five hundred to eight hundred, but with the available part of the agency Indians, who had gone out to help their friends in a fight.’.
“The utter failure of our campaign was due to underestimating the numbers and prowess of the enemy. The strength he was found to possess proved, as General Sherman said in his report, that the campaign had been planned on wrong premises. Upon this point Gibbon said: ‘When these various bands succeeded in finding a leader who possessed tact, courage, and ability to concentrate and keep together so large a force, it was only a question of time when one or the other of the exterior columns would meet with a check from the overwhelming numbers of the interior body.’.
“ The first result was that Crook’s column encountered the enemy, June 17, and was so badly defeated that it was practically out of the campaign.”.
In the above extract General Fry shows by statements made by themselves that neither General Sherman, commanding the army, nor General Sheridan, commanding the military division, was aware of the formidable character of the hostile force, and Captain Godfrey in his statement says that General Custer a few days before the fight, in a council with his officers advised them that from the best information he could obtain they would not have to meet more than one thousand, or at the maximum, fifteen hundred hostiles. These statements show that our troops were
GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER.
entirely without knowledge of the strength of the enemy, and, as General Sheridan states, operating in an almost totally unknown region. A fact still more remarkable is that they were operating on exterior lines without any positive concert of action or direct communication.
In the first affair with the Sioux, previously alluded to, General Crook met with so serious a repulse that on the following day he commenced his retreat back to his base of supplies, eighty miles distant, and remained there until several weeks later, when he was reinforced by General Merritt. If the two commands of Crook and Terry had been acting in concert they could have united, as they were not more than forty or fifty miles apart at the time. So apparent was this want of knowledge of the strength of the enemy that even when General Terry’s force came together at the mouth of the Rosebud, he felt it safe to divide it again, and send General Custer up the Rosebud, and with the remainder, including the column under General Gibbon and a battery of Gatling guns, he himself moved up the Yellowstone and Big Horn to the mouth of the Little Big Horn.
As to what the understanding was when the two commands separated, the best evidence is the written order of battle, and it cannot be disputed, or gainsaid, or misconstrued. The nature of such an order must be regarded as absolute. It is like the constitution of a State or the fundamental law of a community. The order in question was given in very plain language, as follows:.
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River.
Montana Territory, June 22nd, 1876. Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, Seventh Cavalry.
Colonel : — The Brigadier General commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tulloch’s Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s column, with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon’s command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander,-who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders. Very respectfully,Your obedient servant.
E. W. Smith.
Captain Eighteenth Infantry, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
It will be observed that General Custer was directed to move up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians. The next sentence, it will be noticed, leaves no question that it was expected that his command would come in contact with the Indians ; and surely when this command was directed to move by a course in which they would be placed from forty to fifty miles distant from any other, confidence was reposed in the knowledge, zeal, and ability of the commander to exercise his best judgment. It is folly to suppose that either a small or a large band of Indians would remain stationary, and allow one body of troops to come up on one side of it while another body came up on the other side and engage it in battle. It is fair to give the Indians credit for a reasonable amount of intelligence.
Again, when Custer’s command was ordered to move out as it did, it left the Indians, who were acting on interior lines, absolutely free to attack either one of the commands thus separated, or fight them in detail as might be preferred. But we have positive evidence in the form of an affidavit of the last witness who heard the two officers in conversation together on the night before their commands separated, and it is conclusive on the point at issue. This evidence is that General Terry returned to General Custer’s tent after giving him the final order, to say to him that coming up to the Indians he would have to use his own discretion and do what he thought best. This conversation occurred at the mouth of the Rosebud, and the exact words of General Terry, as quoted by the witness are.
“ Custer, I do not know what to say for the last.”.
Custer replied: “ Say what you want to say.”.
Terry then said: “ Use your own judgment, and do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, Custer, hold on to your wounded.”.
This was a most reasonable conversation for the two officers under the circumstances. One had won great distinction as a general in the civil war; was an able lawyer and department commander, yet entirely without experience in Indian campaigns. The other had won great distinction as one of the most gallant and skillful division commanders of cavalry during the war, commanding one of the most successful divisions of mounted troops ; he had years of experience on the plains and in handling troops in that remote country, and he had fought several sharp engagements with hostile Indians.
General Terry's Last Order to Custer.
As the command of the Seventh Cavalry moved out, upwards of six hundred strong, the leader was fully confident that he was able to cope with any body of Indians that they were likely to encounter, and all were in the best of spirits at the prospect of a vigorous, and what they believed would be a successful campaign. Moving up the Rosebud until he struck the main trail, then following this up to the divide separating the Rosebud from the Little Big Horn, and on to the latter stream, it is fair to believe that from the reports he received Custer feared that the Indians might make their escape without his being able to bring them to an engagement.
The fact of his slow marches indicates his care and judiciousness in going from the mouth of the Rosebud to the battlefield on the Little Big Horn. The first day’s march was only four hours, or twelve miles in distance. The second day, June 28, thirty-three miles or twelve hour’s march, with long halts for the purpose of examining trails, abandoned camps, and evidences of the presence of Indians. The third day, the 24th, twelve hours march or twenty-eight miles. The night of the 24th, between 11:30 and the morning of the 25th, he moved ten miles in order to conceal his movements and position from the enemy. On the morning of the 25th, between eight and ten, he moved ten miles, later fifteen; in all 108 miles in four days. During these four days, he frequently called his officers together and counseled with them; in fact his directions amounted almost to an appeal. They were pathetic.
Captain Godfrey says that General Custer stated that with the regiment acting alone there would be harmony, but acting with another organization there might be jealousy; that the marches would be from twenty-five to thirty miles per day; and that officers were cautioned to husband the supplies and strength of their commands; on another occasion, that they must act together and not become separated; again, he informed them that the trail led over the divide, and that he was anxious to get as near the divide as possible before daylight, where the command could be concealed during the day, and give ample time for the country to he studied; that he expected to fight on the 26th.
With a large cavalry command like that moving over a dry and dusty country, it was next to impossible to conceal it. Any movement of the scouts or of the command was liable to be quickly discovered by the enterprising enemy. Not only did General Custer receive reports of the exact locality of the Indian camp, but he also discovered through more than one source that the Indians were aware of the presence of the troops. This undoubtedly caused him to move against them on the 25th to prevent if possible their escape, as he evidently expected that they would make such an attempt, and had they succeeded he would have been severely censured. But whatever impression of this nature Custer may have been under, he decided to make the attack during the forenoon of the 25th.
He formed his command in three columns, moving parallel to each other and practically in line. He took position himself on the right, with five troops of cavalry. Reno was directed to follow the trail with three troops and attack the village. Benteen with three troops was to move on the extreme left, Custer’s object undoubtedly being to attack in this form, which allowed sufficient space between the columns for the deployment of the three commands, and yet would not prevent their acting in concert.
In moving out from the valley of the Rosebud, over the divide to the valley of the Little Big Horn, it was fair to presume that the presence of the command would have been discovered by the Indians, and he may have thought that if he did not attack them, they would make their escape without waiting to find themselves placed between two forces, or, very naturally, with their entire force would attack him.
On approaching the Little Big Horn, Custer followed the trail down a small tributary of that stream. It was long afterward learned that a large body of Sioux warriors had returned from their encounter with General Crook’s command on the Rosebud, June 17, over this trail, thus making it a fresh one and possibly giving Custer the impression that the Indian camp was moving. The Indians state as a reason for their failure to discover the approach of Custer’s command until it was upon their camp, that they had been all the night previous to the battle celebrating what they claimed was a successful encounter with the troops on the Rosebud, and were consequently sleeping late in the forenoon. Custer undoubtedly expected to find their camp at the junction of the Little Big Horn with the small creek down which he was following the trail, and made his disposition accordingly by moving the three battalions of his regiment in parallel columns.
Custer’s order to Major Reno to move forward on the trail and attack the village, and that he would be supported by the other battalions, was a proper command, and did not imply that the supports would follow immediately in his footsteps. An attack by the battalion on his right or on his left or by both simultaneously, would be the most effective support he could have had.
As these battalions were moving forward into action Custer rode forward, well in advance with the scouts, and ascending a high butte where he could overlook the valley, discovered that the Indians, instead of being encamped at the junction of the Little Big Horn and the creek down which Reno was moving, had moved down the left bank of the Little Big Horn and camped two miles below the junction. Here it was that he changed the order in the disposition of his troops by sending a courier to his left column, commanded by Captain Benteen, with a despatch containing these words. “ Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. ” The last referring to the pack-train that was following a short distance behind the command escorted by one troop and having the reserve ammunition. As he sent no dispatch to Reno to change his movements, he evidently expected that officer to follow the trail and attack as he did in accordance with the then existing orders.
The intervals between the columns had by this time become somewhat increased, although not to the extent of placing them beyond supporting distance, which is shown by the fact that Benteen’s command was easily reached by the courier, and that Reno’s command could be seen from the crest where Custer’s column was moving.
Reno followed the trail down the tributary of the Little Big Horn, crossing that stream, and then, moving down on the left bank on the wide, flat prairie, he deployed his command in line of skirmishers with supports, and moving further down to within a short distance of the village, he commenced firing into it from a strong position that had formerly been the bed of a river, or behind what is known as a “ cut bank,” where he dismounted his command; his horses being thereby furnished a safe shelter in the brush and timber in the rear of his line of troops. His men occupied an excellent position, where they were completely covered behind what was to all intents and purposes a natural rifle-pit, and from which they could fire and easily enfilade the Indian village. If he had held this position it would have been of the greatest advantage and might have had a decisive effect upon the final result.
The Indians were camped in the following order: The Uncpapas, Ogalallas, Minneconjoux, Sans Arcs and Cheyennes. The camp was thrown into great consternation. As the firing commenced at the upper end of the village the Indians fled from it, first trying to strike their tents and escape, but in many instances abandoning them. The women and children fled out onto the prairie, and the warriors gathered out to the left on a “mesa,” or high ground, some four or five hundred yards from the village.
There they commenced skirmishing with Reno’s troops, but their fire had little effect until Major Reno ordered his command to mount. Then he ordered them to dismount, and again to mount; and finally directing them to follow him, he dashed out of the timber, leaving the strong position, and galloped back across the plain toward the hills on the right bank of the Little Big Horn. The Indians seeing this movement of the troops, and interpreting it as a retreat, as it was, rushed after them in hot pursuit. As was quite natural they took every advantage of the disorder in the ranks where officers and men were running such a wild race, rushing and climbing as best they could up the steep banks of the stream and did all the injury possible before the troops reached the high bluffs on the right bank of the Little Big Horn. Here they came in contact with Captain Benteen’s command as he was moving down the high ground on the right bank of the river in accordance with Custer’s last order to “Come on,” and “Be quick,” and in a way that if he had not been interrupted by the retreat of Reno, would in a few minutes more have brought his command into action between those of Custer and Reno. Captain Benteen halted his men and helped to rally the battalion of Major Reno. In that vicinity the two commands remained the entire day and night. One commander had received positive and repeated orders from Custer to attack the enemy; the other had received Custer’s last and equally positive order to “Come on,” “Be quick,” and “Bring packs” containing the reserve ammunition. The courier who brought Custer’s last order was the best possible guide to be had to lead the way to Custer’s position if any direction was needed; but the sound of the rifle shots and the volleys down the river indicated exactly where the troops and the ammunition were required and should have gone.
Under rules governing all military forces, whenever two commands come together the senior officer is responsible for the whole. And the senior officer should give the necessary orders. Major Reno was therefore the responsible commander at that point.
Captain Godfrey says that from where Reno’s command remained they could hear the firing going on farther down in the valley between Custer’s men and the Indians, for a long time. The Indians disappeared from that front after having reno’s troops out on the bluff.
The Custer Battlefield Two After.
Seven troops could and ought to have gone. One of the scouts, Herendeen, and thirteen men who were with Reno, and who were left in the timber from which Reno retreated, after the Indians had gone down the valley, walked across the plain, forded the river, and rejoined their command on the hill.
These two. movements indicate that there were no Indians in this vicinity during the time that the firing was going on that is mentioned by Godfrey, down the valley of the Little Big Horn where the real battle was being fought.
All that was known of the fate of Custer’s command for at least two years, was derived chiefly from the evidence found upon the field after the engagement. In this way it became known that his trail, after passing the butte from which he had sent the last order to Captain Benteen, bore on down toward the Indian village nearing the creek at one point of low ground, and then moving to the right where it took position along a crest parallel with the Little Big Horn and the Indian village. Here the dead bodies showed that the engagement had occurred along this crest. The bodies of the men were found, some on the slope toward the Indian camp, many on the crest, and some back a short distance in the rear of the crest. Lieutenant Crittenden’s body was found near the extreme left; Captain Keogh, with a number of his troops, in the rear of the center; General Custer and his two brothers on the extreme right. The bodies of some forty soldiers were found scattered on the ground between the extreme right and the Little Big Horn, those nearest the river in a small ravine or depression of ground.
At first the impression was that Custer had attempted to go down this ravine and had been driven back; but no horses were found along this line of dead bodies. This is approximately all that is known of the fate of Custer and his command from what information could be obtained from the appearance of the ground and the bodies of the men and horses after the fight.
After the Custer Massacre.
THE announcement of the annihilation of Custer and this large body of men, whatever may have been the causes of the same, as discussed in the preceding chapter, shocked the entire country, and was telegraphed around the world as a great disaster. I remember reading on the morning of July 5, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the headline of a newspaper, printed in the largest kind of type and running across the entire page the single word, “ Horrible.” Then followed a brief but graphic account of the disaster upon the Little Big Horn. It shocked our little community there perhaps more than it did any other part of the country, as General Custer was well known among us. He and his regiment were most popular throughout all that region, and the disaster seemed to their friends most appalling. It seemed to magnify in the public mind the power and terrors of the Sioux Nation.