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Post by dave on Jul 28, 2017 17:23:38 GMT -6
Fred
I have a couple of questions if you don't mind regarding the number of effectives Custer had on July 25, 1876.
1) I know the 7th did not have enough mounts for the soldiers but was this just a 7th Cavalry issue or Army wide? 2) Since the whole regiment had been scattered all over the South and West were they short on mounts then or only after assembling at Ft Lincoln?
3) Did Custer carelessly move onto the Little Big Horn without checking on the number of his command or did he do what was customary when moving a regiment across country?
I am sure you tire of being a resource or "the go to guy" but it is your own fault by being so knowledgeable and a nice guy. Thank you. Regards Dave
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Post by edavids on Jul 28, 2017 17:39:56 GMT -6
Now now. I was only off by 8 men 😎
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Post by fred on Jul 28, 2017 19:51:28 GMT -6
I have a couple of questions if you don't mind regarding the number of effectives Custer had on July 25, 1876. Dave, why would I mind? I do not really know, but I suspect it was army-wide. I have not heard of any shortages while on Reconstruction duty. Custer's role while he was in Kentucky was essentially to procure horses, not just for the 7th, I believe, but for other units as well. I may be wrong on that and the Stiles book would be a better guide than I am. Oh, I doubt he had an exact number; that was the sergeant major's and the adjutant's job, but I am sure Custer was aware of his troop strength. K M A. Best wishes, Fred. < G >
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Post by montrose on Jul 29, 2017 7:14:05 GMT -6
There were two sources of animals for the 1876 Army.
1. The Remount Service bought horses to meet unit authorized strength. This is both make sure every one authorized a horse has one, but also replacing annual attrition. Attrition rates varied widely due to terrain, weather and operations. Running campaigns like the starvation march causes enormous animal losses.
a. It was a pull system. Units provided their current and future needs to the Departments. Horses were bought and then pushed to the units. Local purchase was often authorized, but not feasible for most units due to remote locations.
b. The person running the Remount Service in 1876 was COL Sturgis, the actual commander of the 7th Cav. He was detached from the 7th, and was supplying horses to the whole army. It is a certainty he would favor any request from his own unit, where his son was also serving.
c. There is a time gap between requesting and receiving horses. The severe winters in the northern Departments, and severe summers in the southern Departments, caused long delays.
d. It was understood as early as Sep 1875 that there would be a winter campaign. Both departments started requesting supplies, to include horses, in this time frame. The official decision to launch military operations was Feb 76. Notice Crook and Gibbon initiated combat actions. The 7th did not.
e. The 5 P's: Prior Planning Prevents Poor Performance. Crook and Gibbon had sent in their support requests in a timely manner. Custer did not.
2. 7th Cav poor planning. LTC Custer had personal business in the east, so he made a hasty plan in Sep 75 and left. He expected to be back in time for the winter campaign. He kept extending his leave and ended up trying to plan from the east coast.
a. LTC Custer initially planned to use only the companies in the Dakota Department. He decided in Feb to ask for the 3 Reconstruction companies. He failed to check the status of their mounts and request appropriate replacements.
b. LTC Custer also asked for priority fill on new recruits, which was granted. Ensuring sufficient mounts was his responsibility.
c. The problem know was time. It was too late to buy mounts and get them to FAL. The requirements were being identified in Feb and refined through April and May; to support an operation that was supposed to start in Feb. To try to fix the shortfall, the 7th sent 2 people to the Remount Service to help buy horses. I believe the Regimental QM was one, have to relook up the two individuals. (With already existing officer shortfalls, the 7th was forced to send leaders for a support requirement, because of bad planning).
3. The Quartermaster(QM) Department. The QM Department fell under the Secretary of War, and not under Army command or control. (Sherman was so irate over this he moved his HQ from Washington to Chicago). They provided animals for support purposes. This means wagon trains and mule trains.
a. Sidebar: QM department had a category called condemned horses. These are horses too weak to carry a cavalry soldier, but sufficient for lesser duties. Lesser duties meant pulling artillery, Caissons, ambulances and wagons. They were buying horses, just not very good ones.
b. The QM department provided hundreds of animals for the Crook and Terry supply trains. This pretty much proves that if you had a timely request in 1876, it was filled. The 7th Cav mule train did not exist in 1875. It was created out of whole cloth, and was at FAL ready to go to the field BEFORE the 7th Cav was ready to go to the field.
4. Crook and abusing the system. Crook wanted to mount his infantry. He asked the Army (Remount Service) and was told no, not authorized. So he then asked to beef up his already large and well established mule train through the QM department. They fell for it. He then requisitioned 200 saddles from the Army. He used the mules to carry perishable supplies when he left his base. Once that was gone, he pulled the saddles out of wagons, and mounted 200 infantrymen, who otherwise would not be present at the Rosebud.
5. Planning matters. LTC Custer planned poorly, and was short mounts, to the point where some 100 men marched on foot from FAL, and had to be left at PRD. On the other hand, Crook planned so that he had 200 extra fighters on hand at his battle. See the difference?
Respectfully,
William
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Post by dave on Jul 29, 2017 8:57:47 GMT -6
Montrose Thank you for that very comprehensive answer. I had suspected that Custer had not planned properly for the summer campaign but was not sure since the whole regiment came together so late that Custer was responsible for the lack of mounts. As you mentioned the 5 P's it begs the question had Custer ever planned an expedition or campaign on his own? I mean even going back the 1860's did he not have Sherman and or Sheridan planning and outfitting his operations? Custer was not a detail kinda of guy and it is the little things that bite you in your gluteus maximus bohiney in the military or civilian life. Regards Dave
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Post by edavids on Jul 29, 2017 12:14:17 GMT -6
There were two sources of animals for the 1876 Army. 1. The Remount Service bought horses to meet unit authorized strength. This is both make sure every one authorized a horse has one, but also replacing annual attrition. Attrition rates varied widely due to terrain, weather and operations. Running campaigns like the starvation march causes enormous animal losses. a. It was a pull system. Units provided their current and future needs to the Departments. Horses were bought and then pushed to the units. Local purchase was often authorized, but not feasible for most units due to remote locations. b. The person running the Remount Service in 1876 was COL Sturgis, the actual commander of the 7th Cav. He was detached from the 7th, and was supplying horses to the whole army. It is a certainty he would favor any request from his own unit, where his son was also serving. c. There is a time gap between requesting and receiving horses. The severe winters in the northern Departments, and severe summers in the southern Departments, caused long delays. d. It was understood as early as Sep 1875 that there would be a winter campaign. Both departments started requesting supplies, to include horses, in this time frame. The official decision to launch military operations was Feb 76. Notice Crook and Gibbon initiated combat actions. The 7th did not. e. The 5 P's: Prior Planning Prevents Poor Performance. Crook and Gibbon had sent in their support requests in a timely manner. Custer did not. 2. 7th Cav poor planning. LTC Custer had personal business in the east, so he made a hasty plan in Sep 75 and left. He expected to be back in time for the winter campaign. He kept extending his leave and ended up trying to plan from the east coast. a. LTC Custer initially planned to use only the companies in the Dakota Department. He decided in Feb to ask for the 3 Reconstruction companies. He failed to check the status of their mounts and request appropriate replacements. b. LTC Custer also asked for priority fill on new recruits, which was granted. Ensuring sufficient mounts was his responsibility. c. The problem know was time. It was too late to buy mounts and get them to FAL. The requirements were being identified in Feb and refined through April and May; to support an operation that was supposed to start in Feb. To try to fix the shortfall, the 7th sent 2 people to the Remount Service to help buy horses. I believe the Regimental QM was one, have to relook up the two individuals. (With already existing officer shortfalls, the 7th was forced to send leaders for a support requirement, because of bad planning). 3. The Quartermaster(QM) Department. The QM Department fell under the Secretary of War, and not under Army command or control. (Sherman was so irate over this he moved his HQ from Washington to Chicago). They provided animals for support purposes. This means wagon trains and mule trains. a. Sidebar: QM department had a category called condemned horses. These are horses too weak to carry a cavalry soldier, but sufficient for lesser duties. Lesser duties meant pulling artillery, Caissons, ambulances and wagons. They were buying horses, just not very good ones. b. The QM department provided hundreds of animals for the Crook and Terry supply trains. This pretty much proves that if you had a timely request in 1876, it was filled. The 7th Cav mule train did not exist in 1875. It was created out of whole cloth, and was at FAL ready to go to the field BEFORE the 7th Cav was ready to go to the field. 4. Crook and abusing the system. Crook wanted to mount his infantry. He asked the Army (Remount Service) and was told no, not authorized. So he then asked to beef up his already large and well established mule train through the QM department. They fell for it. He then requisitioned 200 saddles from the Army. He used the mules to carry perishable supplies when he left his base. Once that was gone, he pulled the saddles out of wagons, and mounted 200 infantrymen, who otherwise would not be present at the Rosebud. 5. Planning matters. LTC Custer planned poorly, and was short mounts, to the point where some 100 men marched on foot from FAL, and had to be left at PRD. On the other hand, Crook planned so that he had 200 extra fighters on hand at his battle. See the difference? Respectfully, William Hello Colonel: From what I understand Major Reno was the 7th's de facto commander while Sturgis was on detached duty and Custer back East. Did he have any say in properly supplying the 7th for campaigning or was he pretty much a lame duck? Best, David
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Post by montrose on Jul 29, 2017 13:04:34 GMT -6
MAJ Reno joined the 7th in 1871. He had minimal contact or experience with LTC Custer. He started out with Reconstruction duty, in a different Department than LTC Custer, this pattern followed for years.
In 1874 Reno's wife died. Reno as a single parent had to go arrange care for his children. He did not return until Oct 75. LTC Custer left on leave in Sep 75, with no transition with Reno. GAC was supposed to back in a month, but kept extending his leave, not returning until May 76.
From New York City, LTC Custer communicated with Terry, Sheridan, Sherman without informing Reno. It likely never crossed his mind. He frequently sent telegrams directly to LT Cooke with orders and directives.
LTC Custer commanded unit Regiment to company with no intermediate element. Remember, LTC Custer had no authority over companies in other Departments. Frequently he only commanded the companies at FAL, I think in KY he commanded just a single company.
This means that GAC lacked experience in managing 12 companies all at once. He wasn't used to the planning, support and administration of such a large force. This can be managed in garrison, in the field commanding 12 companies proved beyond his ability.
The solution in this era would be to rely on intermediate officers, especially the only other field grade officer in the regiment. GAC could not delegate.
The technique used in every other expedition of this era was to form groupings of companies as soon as the organization was planned. These units existed for the duration of the campaign to maintain same commanders and maximize the combat power of units who worked together day by day. Note that these task forces did not consist of units from the same regiment, nor of the same branch.
The confusing part is they used the term 'battalion' where today we use the term 'task force'. The term battalion today is a permanent organization, manned, trained and equipped to operate as a unit.
Custer couldn't even get this standard operating procedure right. The expedition started with a wing and battalion structure, but GAC hated it. He was used to commanding the companies directly, micromanaging everything. SO he abandoned the wing and BN structure. Literally on the day of battle, he organized new task forces, of companies that did not habitually work together, under commanders assigned that moment, with no staff. This is command and control 101, standard for this army, of this era. And he got it wrong.
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Post by montrose on Jul 29, 2017 13:08:02 GMT -6
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Post by wild on Jul 29, 2017 17:28:14 GMT -6
Reading the Colonel's observations re Custer and his failure to form intermediate formations; it brings to mind Benteen's abandonment of his battalion on his juncture with Reno. He simply walked away from it allowing one company to take off to God knows where. Which might lead one to suggest that intermediate formations were just ad hoc, forming when a task was required and disbanding if it's co lost interest. Maybe a case could be made that the company arrangement was more flexible? Cheers
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Post by montrose on Jul 29, 2017 19:36:06 GMT -6
Reading the Colonel's observations re Custer and his failure to form intermediate formations; it brings to mind Benteen's abandonment of his battalion on his juncture with Reno. He simply walked away from it allowing one company to take off to God knows where. Which might lead one to suggest that intermediate formations were just ad hoc, forming when a task was required and disbanding if it's co lost interest. Maybe a case could be made that the company arrangement was more flexible? Cheers Richard, Brilliant troll post. A troll post is one designed to create emotional reactions through deliberate falsehoods and emotional data. Wild knows the truth, through thousands of posts over the last ten years. He just wants to see if I will put emotion over reason. This is the wrong board for that. CPT Weir performed horribly at LBH. They could not court martial him because of the political spot light of the disaster. So they did a "soft" relief for cause, and sent him to recruiting duty. While they fired Weir, they pulled in every other officer on the 7th Cav roster who was on the books but assigned elsewhere. This included General Sheridan's brother. How many officers were kicked out for failure at LBH. Weir and only Weir. They kept the terrorist and coward De Rudio. Think about that. The reason CPT Weir was not shot for refusing to obey orders was the weakness of the task force system. The battalion entity in 1876 could exist for milliseconds. Again, hundreds of posts. Weir went renegade, proved he had no ability to execute judgement and leadership as a company grade officer in any capacity. He was fired, sent to admin duties, and drank himself to death. It was only in the last task that he showed any understanding of his ability. Every board needs a Richard, to challenge beliefs. But countering prevalent beliefs shout not replace evidence, empiricism, overwhelming proof, and the development of philosophy over the last 2500 years. Else you can put on a hat from this era, and claims that this gives you insight into this battle that allows you to add and delete every fact and theory for both this battle and the history of military affairs over the last 4000 years. You are opening a path to lunacy, and we have another board run by another organization who are devoted to this purpose. I hope you are doing well. I literally laughed out loud when I read your post.
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Post by wild on Jul 30, 2017 0:46:50 GMT -6
Bravo Colonel will get back to you. Richard
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Post by herosrest on Jul 30, 2017 4:11:25 GMT -6
There were two sources of animals for the 1876 Army. 1. The Remount Service bought horses to meet unit authorized strength. This is both make sure every one authorized a horse has one, but also replacing annual attrition. Attrition rates varied widely due to terrain, weather and operations. Running campaigns like the starvation march causes enormous animal losses. a. It was a pull system. Units provided their current and future needs to the Departments. Horses were bought and then pushed to the units. Local purchase was often authorized, but not feasible for most units due to remote locations. b. The person running the Remount Service in 1876 was COL Sturgis, the actual commander of the 7th Cav. He was detached from the 7th, and was supplying horses to the whole army. It is a certainty he would favor any request from his own unit, where his son was also serving. c. There is a time gap between requesting and receiving horses. The severe winters in the northern Departments, and severe summers in the southern Departments, caused long delays. d. It was understood as early as Sep 1875 that there would be a winter campaign. Both departments started requesting supplies, to include horses, in this time frame. The official decision to launch military operations was Feb 76. Notice Crook and Gibbon initiated combat actions. The 7th did not. e. The 5 P's: Prior Planning Prevents Poor Performance. Crook and Gibbon had sent in their support requests in a timely manner. Custer did not. 2. 7th Cav poor planning. LTC Custer had personal business in the east, so he made a hasty plan in Sep 75 and left. He expected to be back in time for the winter campaign. He kept extending his leave and ended up trying to plan from the east coast. a. LTC Custer initially planned to use only the companies in the Dakota Department. He decided in Feb to ask for the 3 Reconstruction companies. He failed to check the status of their mounts and request appropriate replacements. b. LTC Custer also asked for priority fill on new recruits, which was granted. Ensuring sufficient mounts was his responsibility. c. The problem know was time. It was too late to buy mounts and get them to FAL. The requirements were being identified in Feb and refined through April and May; to support an operation that was supposed to start in Feb. To try to fix the shortfall, the 7th sent 2 people to the Remount Service to help buy horses. I believe the Regimental QM was one, have to relook up the two individuals. (With already existing officer shortfalls, the 7th was forced to send leaders for a support requirement, because of bad planning). 3. The Quartermaster(QM) Department. The QM Department fell under the Secretary of War, and not under Army command or control. (Sherman was so irate over this he moved his HQ from Washington to Chicago). They provided animals for support purposes. This means wagon trains and mule trains. a. Sidebar: QM department had a category called condemned horses. These are horses too weak to carry a cavalry soldier, but sufficient for lesser duties. Lesser duties meant pulling artillery, Caissons, ambulances and wagons. They were buying horses, just not very good ones. b. The QM department provided hundreds of animals for the Crook and Terry supply trains. This pretty much proves that if you had a timely request in 1876, it was filled. The 7th Cav mule train did not exist in 1875. It was created out of whole cloth, and was at FAL ready to go to the field BEFORE the 7th Cav was ready to go to the field. 4. Crook and abusing the system. Crook wanted to mount his infantry. He asked the Army (Remount Service) and was told no, not authorized. So he then asked to beef up his already large and well established mule train through the QM department. They fell for it. He then requisitioned 200 saddles from the Army. He used the mules to carry perishable supplies when he left his base. Once that was gone, he pulled the saddles out of wagons, and mounted 200 infantrymen, who otherwise would not be present at the Rosebud. 5. Planning matters. LTC Custer planned poorly, and was short mounts, to the point where some 100 men marched on foot from FAL, and had to be left at PRD. On the other hand, Crook planned so that he had 200 extra fighters on hand at his battle. See the difference? Respectfully, William I remember from long distant record hunting that a train load of mounts for either 7th or 5th Cavalry went up in flames en route and barbequed the load. I'll hunt it up.
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Post by wild on Jul 30, 2017 10:18:22 GMT -6
Colonel
This means that GAC lacked experience in managing 12 companies all at once. He wasn't used to the planning, support and administration of such a large force. This can be managed in garrison, in the field commanding 12 companies proved beyond his ability Mine above was a discussion piece triggered by your observation on the 7th's company structure and Custer's inability to command there of. I think you misunderstand the function of said Regimental company structure . The regiment was the basic fighting unit with subordinate units facilating the command and control system and allowing for maneuver , formations, and the tactical application of force.To wit frontage of attack,second line, reserve, rearguards,advance guards flankers etc. All part of and in support of the regiment as a whole. You seem to be saying that the basic unit is the company, with the regiment CO possibly having 12 companies detached and operating independently under the direction of reg HQ? This was not possible.
CPT Weir performed horribly at LBH. If the battalion unit is a temporary ad hoc formation then its termination [Benteen's]at Reno hill is understandable and possibly explains Benteen's and Weir's behavior. Benteen finds himself 2/ic of a rabble with no defined role. Weir no longer has to report to Benteen and Benteen is no longer responsible for him or the battalion. The only orders Weir has are Custer's which Benteen transmitted to him on the trail. And so rather than performing horribly acted decisively and progressed the only existing orders as far as possible.
It should be noted that US infantry had the same regiment/company structure as the cavalry. Cheers Richard
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Post by herosrest on Jul 31, 2017 1:59:23 GMT -6
[CAVALRY HORSES BURNED ALIVE ON FREIGHT TRAIN.] Arkansas City Traveler, June 21, 1876. A Car Load of Choice Horses Burned Alive on a Freight Train. For more than a month past the government has been purchasing cavalry horses in Kansas City for use in the Crook Expedition against the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians. A few days ago a number of these fine, fat animals were shipped westward over the Kansas Pacific, destined for Cheyenne and the military posts further north. The horses fared well, and were being rapidly borne westward over the plains in cattle cars at the rate of at least 15 miles per hour, when on Tuesday morning the accident below described occurred. The train had just left Wild Horse Station, when a fire broke out in the loose hay in or near a car load of horses. The alarm was given at once, and the train stopped on the main track and an attempt was made to get the now frantic and suffering horses out of their fiery prison. But this was impossible. The car soon became one mass of fire, flame, and smoke. The cries and screams of the struggling animals are described as harrowing and horrible in the extreme. Kansas City Times. Source
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 31, 2017 5:16:21 GMT -6
Richard, you and I have been through this Weir/Benteen stuff before. How do you know Benteen conveyed those orders to Weir on the trail? Benteen should have warned or removed from command when he left the morass on his own. Had that been the case there would have been no issue on Reno hill. Maybe though Weir drank himself to death when he tried to make a move on Libby and was rebuffed. After all on many occasions when GAC was away Weir was her designated escort.
Regards, Tom
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