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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 17, 2012 14:18:10 GMT -6
If the officers had been surrounded by their men, they could reasonably be expected to have been in the center leading a defense. They were not. There were, I think, one or two men east or north of the LSH summit, but the majority were below them on the west slope. The top of the hill and the center of the defense, if any, are different locales. For all intents, those officers were on the outer ring of the defense, high up and vulnerable.
If they knew Indians were on the other side of the summit, they would not have gone there. Since they did, I can only assume they did not know, and officers on good horses would hurry to arrive quicker on high ground to scope the situation first, strikes me.
When they herded the markers together within the fence, Custer is suddenly surrounded by men. That isn't the description by accounts when found.
It truly looks to me that they summited the hill and got shot off their mounts or the mounts were shot from under them. If there were any Indians on the North and east, that would certainly have happened as soon as they came visible. Being on top of the hill with no protection absent Flicka was the worst place to be, anyway, but if you even formed a donut around the summit, at least it cuts down on being shot in the back, but there was so much wrong with that position, I just cannot believe that any officer chose it.
I also cannot believe any officer opted to stay on the east bank for any length of time rather than cross over quick. Hideous ground.
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Post by wild on Apr 17, 2012 17:36:24 GMT -6
but there was so much wrong with that position, I just cannot believe that any officer chose it. Incoming rounds would have a greatly reduced lethal zone. You cannot approach it without being seen and brought under fire. Attackers must converge and thus present a greater target. It is not over looked by any neighbouring terrain features. Allows for better fire control.[though I don't think the 7th were into such sissy stuff]
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Post by El Crab on Apr 17, 2012 17:48:13 GMT -6
The top had to have been safer than the western slope.
I don't believe any officer chose that ground to defend. I think their hand was forced, and forced rather suddenly. I think the situation went from tenable to holyshitwe'rescrewed in a very short time period, and the only choice they had was run for it or kill their horses and pray for a miracle.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2012 18:52:34 GMT -6
First, there is no safe or safer on a battlefield, Killing is an equal opportunity realtor.
Second, and God help me again I am agreeing with DC, there is a reason that a military unit occupies the military crest of an elevation rather than the topographical crest. On the topo crest you are skylined making you an easier target with the sky as background for the rifleman trying to turn your lights out. On the military crest your body, even though it may not be dug in has a tendency to blend with the surrounding terrain. You can still get killed there quite dead, but at least your making the other guy work for a living.
If Custer or any of his headquarters stood on the top of that hill, even to exercise command and control or for whatever reason they more than deserve what they got. Stupid is as stupid does.
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Post by fred on Apr 17, 2012 20:04:07 GMT -6
The top had to have been safer than the western slope. I would disagree here. There was a fairly strong Indian position on a knoll just east of the hill and apparently it took its toll. This I agree with totally, word for word. Perfect summary. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by El Crab on Apr 17, 2012 22:38:43 GMT -6
I would disagree here. There was a fairly strong Indian position on a knoll just east of the hill and apparently it took its toll. I didn't elaborate well enough. What I meant was those on the slope would have the slope itself exposing them. Whereas those on the top would not have as much exposure due to the their position leveling off and those shooting at them being further below them in elevation. The contrast is exposing themselves to fire would likely be a bit worse for those at the top for the same reason. But then again, any soldier would be in danger when trying to return fire, given how many were firing in their general direction. Lastly, the soldiers at the top, while having to deal with Wooden Leg Hill, did inflict at least one casualty to those warriors there. Undoubtedly, someone on the top of Custer Hill killed that warrior hit in the head on WLH.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 18, 2012 7:11:37 GMT -6
El Crab: I gave you the general rules above about topographic vs. the military crest of the hill. These are the ideal You never want to skyline yourself for a number of reasons chief among them detection and the fact you make an "easier" target for your adversary. That all said, like you, like Fred, and I am sure others, those folks in and around LSH did not have much of a choice in the matter. They were driven there. They had to fight where they stood. There was no deliberate selection of positions. Anything they did was bad. My post was to only point out that there was bad in this situation and there was worse and some through either choice or circumstance selected worse
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Post by wild on Apr 18, 2012 7:27:03 GMT -6
My guess is that although Custer was driven to LSH it was his choice to stand there.He could have halted else where depending on your choice of scenario. Where did Smith choose to make his stand Colonel? Although agreeing with the disadvantages as pointed out by the colonel, possesion of that hill by the Indians rendered all other positions in the immediate area untenable.
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Post by fred on Apr 18, 2012 7:46:36 GMT -6
I may have posted this before... but what the heck; it is pertinent now... again...
Walter Camp/LT Geo. S. Young (E/7I)-- Camp wrote Young a letter and in it he asked if the hilltop had been leveled or changed. “Several officers of the 7th Cavalry who were there when the dead were buried tell me that the extreme end of the ridge, where the body of Gen. Custer lay, was considerably higher than any other part of the ridge, being, in fact, a little round knob or peak not more than 20 feet wide on top, but not exactly level on top; that Capt. Tom Custer’s body lay at the highest point, the General’s body the third from it and a little lower down; that three dead horses lay across this so-called little peak or rise.”
James Brust/Brian Pohanka/Sandy Barnard-- "It has been said that the top of Custer Hill was higher and more narrow at the time of the battle, and that grading over the years… has lowered the hill significantly…. Captain Sanderson, who supervised the construction of the monument in 1879, made no mention of grading the hilltop in his report. When Lieutenant Roe's detail erected the granite monument in 1881, they did dig a hole eight feet on a side... then excavated the mass grave an additional 10 feet in each direction.... Roe likewise made no reference to grading the hilltop. It is not unlikely that he did so to some extent, but given the detailed descriptions in his report, if significant grading had been part of his activities, he probably would have mentioned it.... Lieutenant George S. Young, who was in charge of the reburial of the Fetterman/Fort Phil Kearny soldiers in 1888, told Walter Camp, 'I buried these bodies near where the Custer monument now stands and I am sure no leveling was necessary and none was done by me.' Young's testimony is of particular importance, for... he was part of the Terry-Gibbon column and was on Custer Hill immediately after the battle.... Young thought that no marked grading had occurred atop Custer Hill... 'As I recalled it, the ridge was amply wide for the purpose without doing any great amount of work....' Finally, Captain Owen Sweet… told Walter Camp that no grading or change in the ground on Custer Hill had taken place between those years.… Viewed from the angle at which Barthelmess took his photo, the contour of the Custer Hill knoll has changed little since the mid-1890s. The earlier comparison photos likewise do not show major changes in the shape of the hilltop…. [There] is strong evidence that the top of Custer Hill is not much wider now than it was at the time of the battle.... Although grading had to be done to create the parking area and the roadbed east of the monument and south along Battle Ridge, study of early photographs does not support the notion of major reshaping of the top of Custer Hill."
Richard G. Hardorff-- In 1876, "Custer Ridge was then a hogback, its length interrupted by several hillocks, its narrow summit not even wide enough to accommodate a wagon. The northwestern end… terminated in a knoll. Rising six feet above the adjacent ridge, the slanted top of this elevation was some thirty feet in diameter. On the very top of this little knoll... Custer and nine of his men perished."
Two Eagles [Cu Brulé]/Richard G. Hardorff-- A question was posed to Two Eagles about why no soldiers were killed on the top of the hill: “They were killed on top of the ridge. (Two Eagles explains that the top of the ridge was very level, and at the finish, and for some little time before, he was just a trifle north of west from [Last Stand Hill].)”
O'Neill, T., PVT-- G-- The end of Custer Ridge—where the monument stands—ended in a blunt peak. “It was neither level nor sharply peaked like a hogback. South of this ridge ran to a sharp peak, like a hogback.”
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 18, 2012 7:49:53 GMT -6
I suppose if you take up a position on a crest of any hill surrounded by enemy forces you are exposed to fire from 360°, also to try and defend a hill with one Company of troops plus a handful of demoralised survivors is a tough task in any battle scenario, made worse by lack of cover, smoke, dust and incoming fire.
Ian.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 18, 2012 7:57:05 GMT -6
Given all this, how is the conclusion I've drawn not shared by most here?
Officers would not gather at top of the hill, yet the majority with Custer were with him there. Isn't the logical conclusion they arrived together en route to a notional elsewhere or what they initially perceived as protected high ground and were shot down? Those following and rushing to join them, perhaps, from Keogh fell where they were found. Any rush west to a ravine as it ended would leave evidence indistinguishable from those killed heading up the hill previously.
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Post by fred on Apr 18, 2012 8:14:03 GMT -6
DC,
I am unclear what you mean here....
The major impetus in forcing Custer's command anywhere came from below, came from the Deep Ravine area, from the river crossing. Indians on a knoll to the north and east were not nearly as numerous and therefore their firing not as concentrated or intense. It is a matter of "push-pull" and most of the "pushing" was done from below. The fugitives from the Keogh Sector were few-- no more than 20, no more than 10 actually identified (and two of those may have even been Custer's orderlies, Mitchell and McIlhargey)-- so their body placement was incidental.
If Custer reached Cemetery Ridge after leaving Ford D, then further split his command, staying with "E" on the ridge and sending "F" into the basin area, they would have tended to migrate together-- separate avenues-- toward the high ground when Yates saw "E" was overrun and Custer began moving that way. (And there was evidence "E" was attacked on the ridge.) By the time these two elements re-combined, there was still 30 to 35 minutes left (I think that is the number) before the very end. Time for plans, time for officers to get together, time to organize for desperate action.
If you are on-- let's say-- the military crest of a hill and you are receiving concentrated fire from below(using TWC as the example since his body seems to have been found the highest up, or at least on the actual hilltop), your natural inclination is to back up, rising higher toward the hill's top, regardless of the less concentrated fire you would be receiving from positions north and/or east.
As best I can figure all these body placements described in various accounts a couple of days after the fighting, my scenarios work quite well.
Also, if you do not mind, please "redraw" your conclusions so I am clear what you mean.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Apr 18, 2012 8:15:27 GMT -6
Given all this, how is the conclusion I've drawn not shared by most here? Why allow the enemy possession of a feature which dominates the landscape. Custer's options if under pressure were down to two.Make for the Hill or stand ala Keogh on the ridge. At least the hill was heroic and suggested a stand.Would a stand have been suggested if Custer and clan were found in deep ravine?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 18, 2012 8:27:09 GMT -6
My interest is in an explanation for the concentration of officers about Custer on the top of a rise on the perimeter of the coagulated bodies. They're not in the center of anything, much less a defense. They're highly exposed to 360 degree fire.
I think they and their mounts were hit near the summit. That would occur if they were en route with the men in column, more or less, behind. The string of bodies heading to Keogh would reflect not a firing line but men shot in transit on foot. The bodies entertained as those rushing to Deep Ravine might also include those killed on the way up.
Isn't that the least complicated explanation consistent with what is known about men in combat? Which I can only read about, of course, but it seems in accord with what qc is saying, and not in detriment to Fred's theory I don't think.
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Post by wild on Apr 18, 2012 8:35:01 GMT -6
It smacks of a collision in and around the summit of LSH with the HQ group taking the brunt of the crash and the rest of the unit piling up behind leaderless.
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