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Post by quincannon on Apr 16, 2012 16:55:49 GMT -6
Richard: You are correct about the four deuces. At that time the 4.2 inch (later refered to as the 107mm) mortars were in the regimental heavy mortar company, to the tune of three platoons of four each (at full strength) These, and I think it was only a pair would have been attached to 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry and not organic. 1/21 had 60's in the weapons platoons of the rifle companies, and 81's in the weapons companies of the battalions (Companies D, H, and M)
The problem in getting a handle on these things is that the 21st Infantry was so understrength, they were authorized in structure only two (themselves understrength) battalions. I believe the enabling companies were abreviated also, and it would not surprise me to find that the heavy mortar company of the 21st only had two platoons of two guns each.
Obscure hussar regiment. Well it was your damned post office.
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Post by fred on Apr 16, 2012 17:00:44 GMT -6
Chuck, no I know you didn't, but it was just a hasty, silly post on my part and I should have looked it up first.
I think you are probably correct about "last stand." It smacks more of journalism than a military debriefing.
If I ever run across that "Benteen-ism" again, I will let you know.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 16, 2012 17:23:10 GMT -6
Please do, and I trust you will look further into that other thing we discussed. I am sure those records must exist somewhere.
In addition I believe that looking at these statements through the lens of what they could possibly know at the time is the correct one. It's like your time sequencing and flow writ large. Inconsistencies and first account observations I believe go hand in hand. An observation on 27 June 76 that was recorded, often tells us more than a written statement, or even court testimony recorded even a scant few years later, because it is completely uncorrupted by later gained knowledge.
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Post by El Crab on Apr 17, 2012 0:08:08 GMT -6
Correct me if I am wrong here, but was not "Last Stand" more sensationalism on the part of contemporary journals than anything the a pro would have said early? It then became part of the lexicon due to over or popular use. That's my read anyway. Hmm. Good question. Wonder when the first usage of the term "Custer's Last Stand" was and by whom. Though I do think the idea of Last Stand Hill being the where the last of the combat occurred wasn't a media-created idea. I think the professional soldiers who saw the field came to that conclusion, based on the ID'd bodies (i.e. the presence of Custer and HQ and members from all five companies), the majority of the dead cavalry horses on the field (70-odd dead mounts were on the field, with over half being on Custer Hill) and the pseudo-forensics done on said mounts. Some said they appeared to have been led into place, nose to tail and shot in the head. So while I do agree that the Last Stand was an idea that the media took and ran with, but I'd say the idea of Custer Hill being a last-ditch position was one that occurred to those who saw the field days later.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 17, 2012 3:41:27 GMT -6
Yes El you have a good point there, the men who first got to the Custer sector of the battlefield had no place names and no Indian stories to make their account of what happened to Custer’s men, it looked to some that the Keogh/Calhoun Hill sector was a rout and over on the area we know as Custer Ridge/LSH it looked as if the Troopers made a last stand with Custer in the Center fighting to the last, they would have no idea of the men running down to the river, for all they knew these men could have died after being push back from deep ravine after forming a skirmish line near that area (the name south skirmish line may have come from the fact that Troopers were found dead in and around deep ravine), so this first impression must have been the cause of all the talk about a last stand.
Going back to Reno, Custer must have made a big misjudgement of the Indians, to send 130+ men to take on a village of this magnitude was a mistake, he could have at least given him Benteen’s Battalion as support, but they were on a scouting mission and had orders to join up with command if no satellite villages were found, but this was no use to Reno, he had to obey Custer’s orders and attack.
Chuck don’t get me started on the subject of Heavy Mortars (or Chemical Mortars), I have been compiling data of their use from WW2 to Korea, starting with Russian, Japanese, Romanian & German 120mm (the French also developed a 120mm Mortar Mle 1935 but failed to get them into use before the Germans invaded) and British 4.2in plus the U.S. 107mm M1A1 & M2, so I will leave it to rest otherwise I will end up posting stuff all night.
I will add one thing though concerning the 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion, The 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion was the only one to see combat after World War II. It was reactivated in 1949 and saw fought in the Korean War. In January 1953 its combat personnel were transferred to the 461st Infantry Battalion.
Ian.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 17, 2012 6:28:49 GMT -6
Custer's corpse was NOT in the center of anything. While at the highest point, he was not the center of the dead, but on the rim with too many officers. The markers, the fence, everything suspiciously conforms to a Last Stand today, but they don't reflect where people fell or the bodies were found or even where the initial markers were in key cases.
Officers riding at the head of a column shot in place would be there naturally, or would win a race to high ground with the superior horses, but would not be conducting a proactive defense on the rim.
The Battle of the Last Cartridge was only six years in the past, and literary and mythic templates abounded in then read books. Journalists could hardly do else.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2012 6:56:09 GMT -6
El Crab: I do believe the Last Stand as we have come to know it was created outside the Army, probably by the press, but as DC points out it was far from a foreign concept.
My point was only this. Some months ago I pondered about what would be the first impressions if one came upon the battlefield from the south, just as Reno-Benteen and the others did. My speculations were started by words in a report by Captain Bell where he states that so and so's body was found a mile away from the main battle. Bell was not there, so he must have received this information from one who was there. It is much the same with the 35 bodies to the north and east that Fred refered to last night.
Now if one was coming from the south, and had absolutely no knowledge of the battle save what they saw before them, I think it would be very easy to conclude that the main battle was fought in the Calhoun Hill/FF Ridge complex and that the others found down the road a piece were the last remnants who were cut off in mid retreat, perhaps by pursuit, prehaps by another force of hostiles, scattered, run to ground, and killed. Remember the scattered like corn comment, and the remarks that others made like rout. To me this would all fit comfortably as a first impression, before any evidence is examined, before any indian accounts are gathered. It is a matter of what they knew then vice what we know now.
There was evidence of a last stand initially, no question at all. Perhaps there was evidence of several last stands, but the popular view, the one of Budweiser, and all of the period romantics, of Flynn and DeHaviland, of the picture in every sixth grade history book, I believe to be a creation that came later.
Ian: The 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion and the 461st Infantry Battalion (Heavy Mortar) are one in the same. No transfer of personel, just a reflection of the USA Chemical Corps getting out of the mortar business by redesignation.
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Post by montrose on Apr 17, 2012 7:01:21 GMT -6
Reconnaisance is a part of warfare that is more art than science. There is the hard data of terrain, enemy, and for LBH village location and actions of noncombatants.
Now add in the pressure of time,and the need to match your own scheme of maneuver. And the classic action-reactions cycle, meaning as you take actions, enemy is responding and not always in ways you predict.
The goal is not to obtain the most information possible. The goal is to abtain useful information in time to make appropriate decisions. SO wmen the battle is rolling, you need to balance gaining information against feeding it back to make a decision. You have to cut corners.
The "art" is learning the difference between the best information, vice the best available. This applies to the discussion of going to Weir peaks vice 3411. The extra time in going there takes away the marginal information to be gained.I concur with LTC Custer's actions there. .
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Post by fred on Apr 17, 2012 8:35:27 GMT -6
The "art" is learning the difference between the best information, vice the best available. This applies to the discussion of going to Weir peaks vice 3411. The extra time in going there takes away the marginal information to be gained. I concu[ r] with LTC Custer's actions there. If I understand this correctly-- and have made the correct spelling change-- I agree. This is my whole point about Custer supposedly going to Weir Peaks. At this point in the battle, speed was more important than heading to another high point to view the valley. That could be done easily by heading farther downstream, something that had to be done anyway. The value of speed outweighed everything else and a good commander would have made this judgment. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Apr 17, 2012 9:40:28 GMT -6
Fred,
As LTC Custer continued to maneuver towards the north, he caught scout disease. He got wrapped around collecting information, and not fighting a battle.
This creates a paradox. His efforts to gain information involved short term efforts at speed. He pushed north as fast as he could. But in a larger perspective, he was wasting time. First, his information priorities became out of line with real priorities. Knowing what the squaws and papooses were doing took priority over knowing what the warriors (and friendly forces) were doing. Second, he was committing time and effort to data collection, far past the point where he should make a decision with the information already gained.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2012 9:46:54 GMT -6
William: Very good points. In short you are saying that Custer should have fought the battle he had, rather than continue seeking the battle he wished to have. There is no inside straight flush in the card game of glory.
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Post by fred on Apr 17, 2012 10:02:59 GMT -6
I agree, all the way around.
What it gets back to, however, is his orders. Once he made the commitment to attack he had to bag the lot and that is why Benteen was sent to the left. If Custer believed his scouts-- and I think he did, even though he ignored them-- he knew the village was vast and a head-on charge by the entire regiment might have bogged down in the village, too many Indians escaping in the process.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2012 10:27:21 GMT -6
Fred: When the blacksmith is at his anvil, it is a rare thing when he shapes the end product with one strike of the hammer. More often than not it takes several hammer blows in sequence to form, shape, and finish (accomplish to mission) in accordance with specification (orders). This is parularly true if the size of the item is large and multi-facited. I see no difference here. The obsession with one bite of the apple was the undoing, when several smaller bites would eventually find the core in the trashcan, which I find a heck of a lot more satisfactory then choking to death on the apple core in your gullet.
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Post by El Crab on Apr 17, 2012 12:18:09 GMT -6
There was evidence of a last stand initially, no question at all. Perhaps there was evidence of several last stands, but the popular view, the one of Budweiser, and all of the period romantics, of Flynn and DeHaviland, of the picture in every sixth grade history book, I believe to be a creation that came later. Agreed. All of the paintings and what not show men on their feet, fighting. I'm sure the soldiers viewing the field knew the men found at Custer Hill most certainly didn't shoot those horses to then stand up and fight. Plus they just had the experience of being repulsed (or arriving to find a repulsed command) and then spent their time behind whatever cover they could find, defending themselves. Surely this wasn't a foreign idea, that when faced with superior numbers and no chance to withdraw, you hit the deck and grab cover where it can be found. For Reno and Benteen, it was boxes, sagebrush and crude rifle pits. From what they saw of Custer's field, it was the destruction of horses. Which also points to desperation. 40-odd dead horses, in a rather small space likely impressed them with the idea that Custer's men, at whatever point in the fight this event occurred, felt flight was not possible and thus destroyed any possibility of flight at any future point.
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Post by El Crab on Apr 17, 2012 12:29:35 GMT -6
Custer's corpse was NOT in the center of anything. While at the highest point, he was not the center of the dead, but on the rim with too many officers. The markers, the fence, everything suspiciously conforms to a Last Stand today, but they don't reflect where people fell or the bodies were found or even where the initial markers were in key cases. Officers riding at the head of a column shot in place would be there naturally, or would win a race to high ground with the superior horses, but would not be conducting a proactive defense on the rim. The Battle of the Last Cartridge was only six years in the past, and literary and mythic templates abounded in then read books. Journalists could hardly do else. I know we'll never agree on this, but Custer Hill makes sense to me. Custer, HQ and the remnants of C, I and L occupy the rather small area at the top, F Company occupies the slope below. I'd say that's about the best they could do with a horrible situation. It's not as if they likely had their pick of ground to defend at that point of the fight. The only officers out of the place are Smith and TWC. But many feel Tom Custer was with the HQ, as Harrington led C on the Reno Scout and thus probably commanded C at the battle. So that leaves Smith. Yates and Reilly were found with what is assumed to be mostly F Company on the slope. Custer and his staff, plus a few troopers from right wing companies, were on the top. I guess I don't understand why Custer wouldn't be expected to be found on the top, where he could see more than if he were on the slope. Being on the top of the hill would give him views of F Company below to the west, the north where Terry was coming from, the south where the rest of his regiment would be found. I do think the changes to the battlefield make it difficult to discuss this. As DC says, they place Custer's marker where he wasn't found, and the formation of the monument, mass graves and parking lot have all but destroyed the look of the hilltop. And thus, any way to analyze the positions it offered.
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