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Post by herosrest on Oct 28, 2011 9:15:56 GMT -6
files.usgwarchives.net/ok/cherokee/newspapers/advocate/5sep1877.txt www.ausbcomp.com/~bbott/Cowley/Oldnews/WORTMAW/SIOIND.htmfiles.myopera.com/herosrest/albums/8201592/NorrisMAP.JPGfiles.myopera.com/herosrest/albums/8201592/williamclarkmap.jpgI would like to discuss some of the early evidence relative to, and relating, the advance to anihilation by 7th Cavalry's right wing of five companies and the regiments head quarters, on the Little Big Horn river.
This evidence is Lt. Clarks map, P.W. Norris's map, and two news articles, 'Custer's Last Trail' which published August 24, 1876 and 'WHERE CUSTER MET DEATH' from July 25 1877.As a starter, there is confusion amongst historians and students of the battle concerning 'Dry Creek', which today is accepted as being Medicine Tail Creek. Water, water, everywhere..... Lt Clark's data indicates Medicine Tail Creek to have been wet, rather than a ridge or depression. Records indicates there to have been at least one watering place. Godfrey relates it to Calhoun Hill; various tribal accounts indicate a stream flowing into the river and it is known that Lt. Col. Custer's command watered their horses after Maj. M.A. Reno's battalion was ordered to advance into the river valley. Lt Clarks map indicates MTC to have been a 'wet' creek and therefore not a dry creek on 25th June 1876.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 28, 2011 9:51:22 GMT -6
The real question is are you wet or dry?
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 28, 2011 14:49:12 GMT -6
The real question is are you wet or dry? Q, please don't start a poll! As a matter of interest, the map made by Soldier Wolf, a Northern Cheyenne, who was there that day, clearly marks MTC as 'Dry Creek.' Hunk
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Post by herosrest on Oct 29, 2011 14:39:06 GMT -6
The real question is are you wet or dry? Waterproof ;D The real question is are you wet or dry? Q, please don't start a poll! As a matter of interest, the map made by Soldier Wolf, a Northern Cheyenne, who was there that day, clearly marks MTC as 'Dry Creek.' Hunk Well, Lt Clark wasn't present that day, his informant though - was. Clark's map indicates wet. There is some background to the story of the map posted below. An interesting aspect of Norris's map concern's what was known in 1877, as Custer's Hill - which today is Battle Ridge - ie the entire terrain of the what today is called a ridge, was actually what people referred to as Custer's Hill in 1877. When Norris was discussing the map with 7th Cavalry & various general's at Yellowstone during the flight of the Nez Perce, he referred to battle ridge as the 'elusive' Custer's Hill. The battlefield- Click the buttons below for some backgound ----- I have not introduced the lesser figures in this picture: men like American Horse, Young Man Afraid, Blue Horse, Rocky Bear and others who have since become, and were even in those days, leaders among the Dakotas. My canvas would become too crowded. It must do to say that each of these was full of native intelligence, wise in his way, and worthy of being encouraged in his progress along the new and toilsome path of civilization. But I must make room for a few words about Three Bears - Mato-yamani, a warrior fierce in battle and humane to the vanquished. I remember his coming into my tent one dismally cold night, while we lay on the Belle Fourche, on the outskirts of the Black Hills, after wiping out Dull Knife's village. Three Bears's eyes were moist, and he shook his head mournfully as he said, " Cheyenne pappoose heap hungry."
Sorrel Horse (Shunca-luta) was a "medicine man," a ventriloquist, and a magician. The women and children stood in awe of an uncanny wretch who boasted that, if they doubted his power, they might let him cut off a lock of their hair, and inside of three days they should die. After my electrical duel with " High Wolf," ( ' Sorrel Horse " manifested an inclination to show me what he could do. He lay down on the floor, put the hot bowl of a pipe in his mouth, and alternately inhaled the smoke or caused it to issue from the stem. Pretty soon he went into a trance, and deep groans and grunts were emitted from the abdominal region. When he came to, he assured us that that was the voice of a spirit which he kept within him. He shuffled a pack of cards, and handing it to General Mackenzie, bade him take out any one he wanted and he would tell the name ; Mackenzie did as he desired, and " Sorrel Horse " promptly fixed his fingers in diamond-shape and called out "Squaw," for the queen of diamonds, and similarly for the seven of clubs, and others as fast as drawn. He again lay down on the floor, and opened his shirt so that his ribs were exposed ; he took a small piece of tobacco, and pretended to swallow it. To all appearances, he be came deathly sick: his countenance turned of an ashen hue, perspiration stood on his brow, the same lugubrious grunts issued from his stomach and throat, and I was for a moment or two in alarm about his condition; but he soon recovered consciousness, if he had ever lost it, and triumphantly drew the moist leaf of tobacco from beneath his ribs. He had been a great traveller in his day, and there was but little of the Missouri or Yellowstone drainage that he was not familiar with. I have known him to journey afoot from Red Cloud to Spotted Tail Agency, a distance of forty three measured miles, between two in the morning and noon of the same day, bearing despatches. The Apaches, Mo- javes, and other tribes of the Southwest are far better runners than the horse Indians of the plains, but I have known few of them who could excel Sorrel Horse in this respect.
Nothing was to be done at this time except wait for news from Red Cloud and Crazy Horse. The Cheyennes were impatient to go out to war, 'but it was war against Crazy Horse and not the white man. However, the promise had been sent by General Crook to Crazy Horse that if he started in good faith and kept moving straight in to the agency, he should be allowed every reasonable facility for bringing all his people without molestation. Red Cloud sent word regularly of the march made each day: one of the half-breeds with him, a man who prided himself upon educational attainments, wrote the letters to Lt Clarke, who, with Maj Randall, was in charge of the Indian scouts. The following will serve as an example :
April 16th 1877. Sir My Dear I have met some Indians on road and thare say the indians on bear lodge creek on 16th april and I thought let you know it. And I think I will let you know better after I get to the camp so I sent the young man with this letter he have been to the camp before his name is arme blown off - RED CLOUD.
When Red Cloud and his party reached Crazy Horse they found the statements made by the latter Indian were strictly correct. The thousands of square miles of country burned over during the preceding season were still gaunt and bare, and Crazy Horse was compelled to march with his famished ponies over a region as destitute as the Sahara. The rations taken out for the women and children were well bestowed; there was no food in the village, and some of the more imprudent ate themselves sick, and I may add that one of Crazy Horse's men sent on in advance to Camp Robinson surfeited himself and died. John.G. Bourke - On the Border with Crook Custer's Hill today is Battle Ridge.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 29, 2011 15:09:26 GMT -6
1) Waterproof ;D 2) Well, Lt Clark wasn't present that day, his informant though - was. Clark's map indicates wet. 1) But are you bulletproof?! 2) The informant for Clark's first map was an unnamed Indian participant who drew a map on the floor, tried to erase it, but apparently left enough of it for Clark to reconstruct. On that map, Medicine Tail Coulee is drawn as a single line which can only be translated as 'wet' if the line is erroneously taken as a water course because Clark depicted soldier movements with blue ink. In May 1878 Clark accompanied Nelson Miles on his trip to the Little Big Horn and saw the battlefield first hand. Following that he drew his second map and it is interesting that if, as you claim, his first map showed Medicine Tail as 'wet', his second shows it clearly marked as 'Dry Creek.' I cannot believe that the meticulous Clark would issue two maps of the same location with differing appellations for Medicine Tail, so I suggest that you have a further look at your information and try to figure it out. You probably need look no further than blue ink, but you will no doubt let us know your findings. Hunk
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Reddirt
Full Member
Life is But a Dream...
Posts: 208
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Post by Reddirt on Apr 14, 2012 17:44:31 GMT -6
Herosrest, I adore your pictures. They do so much to show how the battlefield and surrounding areas played out. Others seem to be a tad aggravated with you but, I think you are super! Please keep up with your informative and interesting posts! You are, for sure, different, and that's what makes you special!!
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 15, 2012 6:41:47 GMT -6
There is no problem with a ridge having a hill. The top of Custer Hill had been removed long before your picture. At best MTC is intermittent in regards to water. I have found that Google terrain features tend to be exeragerated in appearance in my opinion.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 15, 2012 6:52:51 GMT -6
I would like to discuss some of the early evidence relative to, and relating, the advance to anihilation by 7th Cavalry's right wing of five companies and the regiments head quarters, on the Little Big Horn river.
What makes you think it was the right wing rather than the main body? Custer used a wing formation when the wagons were moved across country. Reno and Benteen were temporary wing commanders. Clearly everyone there except Pete Thompson got it right.
Custer reformed the Regiment so that Reno and Benteen each had a separate battalion and dissolved the wing formations as they moved to contact.
You should know you're in trouble when Joe Wiggs is your support.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 15, 2012 10:16:55 GMT -6
One thing that cgi photo shows (it is not a map) - and what a photo long ago that nobody can find now showed as shot from WP - is the horror of the land on the west side of the LBH.
Weir Point, near due east (left) of the noted area of Reno's firing line, would show the two options. On the west bank is flat cavalry land. Smooth, level, and as an added bonus contained the enemy and your target. Compelling.
On the east, leading up to LSH, is a horrendoplasty of geologic horror where entire Armies could be hidden and the fastest route there is at best indirect and provides you as a target from near every direction. That's assuming they wanted to get there in the first place. It remains my contention that no officer, Custer least of all, would be willing to go further north absent knowledge of a quick access to the village, i.e. MTC.
For those who are annoyed how far Custer ended up from the target of his intended attack, revisit looking at this graphic while those who contend he sent folks to Calhoun Hill to see the village and sweep north on his Perpetual Offensive to further crossing points. What could be seen from Calhoun not visible from Weir Point? Any north travel is against the grain of the land, clearly evident from Weir. Bad enough for cavalry, entertain the train surviving even if not under attack.
Google does exaggerate, but the land is bad enough that this exaggeration calls attention to the obvious in this graphic. No officer would choose, when in contact with the enemy, to go exploring in such a potential (soon to be upgraded to actual) horror. I really think that would not speak well of the Army if they did.
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Post by fred on Apr 15, 2012 11:57:13 GMT -6
God!, I hate getting involved in threads started by this guy! But what the hell; I'm a glutton for punishment....
Today's Battle Ridge is Custer Hill... so... I guess then I can say today's Reno Hill is Battle Ridge... therefore, Reno went to rescue the fair-haired boy, but got there too late. See... if we change all the names, we can justify everything. Sort of like saying, "He lied!" That way we can say we are correct and the other guy isn't. That explains "theory."
But I didn't come on here to say that; even fumbling around it is easy to spot sheer stupidity with some people. Marry-up, Reddirt; you would do yourself proud. Ripley or the Ringling brothers would be all over you.
As much as I agree with Dark Cloud's assessment of the terrain, it is immaterial or irrelevant, anyone's choice of words. Why don't we look at this event from the perspective of its sole, lone, driving factor... its sole cause: George Custer. Without him, there would have been no LBH fight on June 25, 1876. Period. So considering a village of 10,000 to 12,000, plus a military force of another 655 souls, we have one man responsible for setting all these people into motion, thereby creating a historic event.
This man Custer was an impulsive-- I will eschew the word "rash"-- hard-driving individual, ambitious, vain, brave, smart... but also quite arrogant and not prone to heeding the advice or counsel of others. When he made his decision to turn to the right and mount the bluffs he did so with only one aim or thought in mind-- and it wasn't terrain. Terrain became incidental and tertiary to the mission in his mind. It's sort of like storming the palisades of the St. Lawrence as opposed to charging along the Plains of Abraham.
He viewed the valley from 3,411. Martini said so; DeRudio said so... two nice Italian boys. He did not go to Weir Point. Why would he? The situation in the valley was becoming extremely fluid, extremely tense; movements were becoming masked by rising dust and increasing smoke. Noise was increasing... gunfire, screams, yelling, "yahooing".... Custer needed clarity; Custer needed speed. His troops were in a gully and Weir Peaks was several hundred yards away. The only person who even intimated a trip to Weir-- and we do not know that for sure-- was Martini... and only in later years. And he also intimated it was just him and his good friend George who made the trip.
Why the flock would George Armstrong Custer make a side visit to a hilltop with Giovanni "I Don't Speak English" Martini? The same Martini who left us with the head-scratcher of a "sleeping village" with only children and dogs in sight... gimme a break! The same Martini who left us with Boyer's comment about the Indians being away from camp. Personally, I venture to say, Martini wouldn't have known Mitch Boyer from Hermione Gingold at that point.
So now we have Custer riding north-- terrain not in his mind except for the damn juniper bushes interfering with his route of advance, a route taking him away from where he wants to go... something he couldn't tell unless he did go to the top of Weir! (Hint, hint!!!) He reaches MTC and turns left, now more anxious than ever because he still cannot see far enough down the valley; he still does not know the extent of the village; he still does not know where all these people are fleeing to; his route has taken him farther afield rather than closer; and the damn junipers have slowed his advance.
He turns up the speed and heads toward the river.
Meanwhile, back at the camp... old Iron Cedar, slack-jawed on the east side of the river, spots Custer's column and hi-tails it back to find Gall to let him know they are about to have another surprise encounter.
Quite possibly at this point-- and I do not know this for sure because this is one area of the battlefield I have not walked fully-- Custer can see far enough down MTC to spot tepees of the Cheyenne village. So he sees an easy rise to the heights to his right and he moves in that direction, landing himself atop Luce Ridge (not yet named that, Herosrest... the naming comes later in the saga). At about this same time, Boston Custer-- lathered horse panting away-- joins the gang and tells big brother Reno is in a brew of stew. More need for more speed, terrain be damned... along with good judgment, DC. So, pestered by Indians gaining strength around us, George drops the hiccuping Irishman back and grabs ol' reliable Yates and Smith and heads to Ford B to get a closer look. Too much rising dust... too many tents... too much confusion... "I've got to get a closer look...!"
(The redundancies of:) Meanwhile... Indians near the ford; Indians coming up MTC and suddenly reversing course; Cheyenne camp guards, glued by custom to their village; a Sioux lover out quail hunting; and probably a few others, spot these troops heading toward the river and put up a sharp, noisy row. Custer, never the one to absorb a bee sting gracefully, blithely swats it away, knowing he still has a distance to go. We have a man here, consumed with what needs to be done; consumed with the moment; consumed with the import of what is happening around him; consumed with his own self-importance and no terrain, no heat, no Reno, no bee-sting at the river crossing is going to stop him. He moved north to get behind the Indians... he was not forced there; the fighting lasted too long for being "forced." The archaeology works against "forced"; the body placements work against "forced"; the Indian accounts work against "forced." Custer moved north because he wanted to and he was still entirely confident of success.
The irony-- if I am using the word correctly-- is that the terrain now plays a major role. It is not only difficult to traverse, but it affords the enemy a perfect ally and may actually be the major cause-- certainly a major cause-- of George's undoing.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 15, 2012 12:28:53 GMT -6
It certainly could have happened just like that. But....
"He viewed the valley from 3,411. Martini said so; DeRudio said so... two nice Italian boys." May be true, but neither said so. You're implying they were that definite.
"He did not go to Weir Point. Why would he?" The highest point with the greatest advantage of view. Hard to believe nobody would go there, especially an Army officer.
Also being on the hill doesn't mean being on TOP of the hill. People on the bread loaf portion of Weir haven't necessarily been to the highest points. Gray, it seems to me, confuses that, as he tries to play of an account of being 'on' the hill as equal to being on the summit. In any case, even today when 30 feet lower, the land north on the east bank looks terrible for cavalry from Weir. And is.
"...a route taking him away from where he wants to go... something he couldn't tell unless he did go to the top of Weir! (Hint, hint!!!)" If he wanted to enter the village that was the way he wanted to go to keep the column in order to obtain the best route. Branch coulee to MTC.
But......Really? Whether he did or did not go to 3411, an Army officer would NOT go to the highest point in person or by scout to see what needed to be seen before an attack? You suggest a pro-active decision not to go to the highest point, which I don't get.
The quickest way to ANY part of the camp - described as void of warriors - or beyond it was through it. MTC was there and handy and hardly defended. Traveling in clear view to another notional option perplexes me, given for all he knew there were more villages north even on the east side of the river. Further, it's not even the five companies, which would make some sense, but two or three?
I disagree with each of your 'work againsts' as proven, but not because it's not possible. How does archaeology work against the 'forced' scenario? The sequential fire lines on the way could have lasted as short or long as needed for any scenario. You must mean lack of body placements. The Indian accounts, such as they are, are not really their first hand accounts, but decidedly filtered and often late on the ground.
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Post by fred on Apr 15, 2012 14:13:23 GMT -6
Without taking anything away from your emphasis on the importance of the terrain... "He viewed the valley from 3,411. Martini said so; DeRudio said so... two nice Italian boys." May be true, but neither said so. You're implying they were that definite. No, not implying at all. Without using the term, "3,411," they were about as precise as one could be. DeRudio-- at the RCOI-- gave an approximate distance measurement from Reno's entrenching location; Martini-- also at the RCOI, different, of course from his years' later silliness-- gave an approximate distance from a relative position (near the head of a coulee). If we were to plat those distances on a map, they intersect precisely at a terrain elevation point measured at 3,411 feet above sea level. (As an interesting aside, the highest point of Weir Peaks is 3,413 feet.) For further corroboration, DeRudio said the three riders appeared: (1) at the highest point on the east bank (from his location, i. e., closer to 3,411 than Weir, this point would appear higher than Weir); (2) the river ran close in to the bluffs (there is a wide base leading to the river at the foot of the Weir complex thereby eliminating Weir); and (3) when asked, specifically, if the riders were at the point of Reno's farthest advance, i.e., Weir Peaks, DeRudio replied, "No." It doesn't get any more definitive than that... to me. Speed, DC, speed. I put myself in Custer's boots. I know this village is breaking up and heading downstream, so I need to get there quickly; I need to see what's going on; I need to assess the enemy's size and what he is doing. Weir Peaks is several hundred yards away from my command-- several hundred yards to and several hundred yards from. I know things reach much farther downstream and Weir Peaks isn't that far away from where I was already looking over the valley. I am not going to waste time. I need to get close to the action-- to see and/or to act-- and Weir isn't it. If you spend the time to go to the loaf, you may as well spend the time to continue on to the peaks. I agree with you about Gray. I agree with you; no issue. Oh, absolutely; no question. But if he went to Weir, he could see that Middle Coulee was a far better route to MTC-- and therefore the ford-- than was Cedar. He could have easily signaled for Cooke to move the column up Cedar's sides-- something I believe they did, anyway, on their way down Cedar-- and swing into Middle. Again, the emphasis on speed and distance/time to the high point. No, this [former] army officer would want to use his speed to try to get ahead of his quarry, chancing there would be further high points downstream-- and in his direction of march-- to effect his recon. This is especially so since he is sure he has overwhelming force to be able to brush aside any opposition... also realizing he has achieved a modicum of surprise. This was untrue... and Custer wouldn't know it, one way or the other anyway. It would slow him down and he would not be able to bag those already fleeing. By the time Custer reached MTC ford, Reno had been on the ground for 1 1/4 hours... a lot of time for families-- and warriors-- to escape. This plays into Custer's failure to understand the intentions of his foe. That's correct... and those fleeing were what: two miles farther downstream already? And the Cheyenne camp circle extended another 1/4 mile below the ford. The bluffs above that ford gave him a decent look into the valley, yet he still needed a higher elevation to be certain... and a ford to cross to get below those refugees. With that notion, it becomes something of a guessing game here and you are painting yourself into a corner, DC... not like you, DC; you are wedding yourself to a not very tenable position. The terrain would preclude any villages on the east bank, and Custer could easily see that from Luce. Also, Custer did not travel in clear view once he left Calhoun Hill. Crazy Horse's move up Deep Ravine proves he had no idea Custer was already to his north. The only Indians who knew Custer was moving north-- along the back of Battle Ridge and the coulee just north of Cemetery Ridge-- were the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot band, and they numbered few indeed. Supporting my point Custer maintained the offensive and the opposition was light. He moved north with two companies leaving Keogh's battalion back to cover his rear and to wait for Benteen. Custer, knowing Ford B would be a major ingress route to his rear would leave a strong force behind-- for the purposes above-- while he continued his reconnaissance. The archaeology is not just ball and cartridge discoveries; it is about where bodies were found, coupled with identifying units. The locations of specific units argues against a "forced scenario." LSH is a perfect example of "forced." The Keogh Sector is another. It is body location and formation, plus the mixing of units vs. solitary units. In the Keogh Sector you have mixed mayhem, bodies from the three companies thought to have been in that locale under Keogh. LSH has members of all 5 companies and HQ. SSL was probably mixed with the fleeing detritus of the battle, indicating-- to me, at least-- it was the end or close to it. I understand this part is not definitive by any stretch, but common sense, arrived at by factors leading up to this part of the time-line, point out to me this scenario has the highest probability of being correct. You are correct here and when interpretation is necessary, we must all be careful. However... many of the whites' accounts require the same vetting, and what I look for is consistency. Unless it is an isolated event, i. e., one man witnessing the demise of a guy on a green horse, consistency is required. Otherwise I discard the account. But that goes for whites and well as reds. It must also be logical. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Apr 15, 2012 15:51:34 GMT -6
Hurrah there Fred. Very interesting exchange. Can you say at what point did Custer change from attack mode to recce mode and what triggered such a move? And as always the price he paid--Reno's battalion,Keogh's battalion,time and the command in DC's godawful terrain. And the conclusion that Custer came to grief when counter attacked while engaged in a recce? Further the gap between Custer's final position and Keogh's final position is just not far enough apart to suggest the rear guard scenario.Far more likely the breach occured due to Indian action. Best Regards
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 15, 2012 20:45:11 GMT -6
I'll have to read the book, Fred. I stood on the high point of Weir and recall being able to see the Reno monument but I don't recall anything as high as I was looking back. You're right, the map says it, I just cannot meld that into memory, and it's a hill right next to the road, so I'm perplexed. Not entirely, given I'm looking at pile of eyeglasses that will vanish when I need them.
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Post by wild on Apr 16, 2012 2:07:47 GMT -6
The recce to the North scenario is based on the total misreading of the situation by Custer. If when suggesting scenarios you first render Custer deluded then you are not restricted by military logic. Anyway imagine if you will Custer returning from his Northward recce.His intention has to be to rejoin Keogh.The question we must ask is, is he under attack?What situation is he confronted with when he reaches LSH?Why does he halt his troops here?Has Keogh failed in his rear guard mission of keeping the lines of communication to Custer open?Is Battle Ridge swarming with Indians, leaving Custer with no option but to make a "stand" on LSH? Keogh's position discussed ad nauseum resembles an ambush site.If he was in the role of rearguard one would expect to find some evidence of an organised robust defence.There's none. LSH and the gap between Custer and Keogh suggests a Northward movement to LSH under pressure with Keogh's rearward companies being cut off. I'v always been of the opinion that the simplist explanation must be dispensed with before going on to the more complex. If we could in fact dispense with the simple explanation then Fred's time study is the tool with which to do it.I look forward to reading the book.
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