Carl
Full Member
Posts: 125
|
Post by Carl on Sept 30, 2011 20:38:29 GMT -6
An important player in the 1876 Campaign,
General Terry's more important military
accomplishments were during the Civil War.
A 34 year old lawyer and clerk of a County Court,
he apparently had militia experience and began
the war as a Colonel. He ended it as a Brigadier
General in the Regular Army and a Corps Commander.
I was just doing some reading on Civil War events.
One piece of information I found interesting was this.
In 1866, at the Army reorganization, there were 17
General officers of the line. 1 General (Grant), l
Lt Gen (Sherman), 5 Maj Gen's (Halleck, Meade, Sheridan,
Thomas and Hancock), and 10 Brig Gen's (McDowell,
Rosecrans, Cooke, Pope, Hooker, Schofield, Howard,
Terry, Ord and Canby).
Of these 17, 16 were graduates of West Point, and 11
were in the US Army at the beginning of 1861. 13 of them
had been in service during the Mexican War.
Terry was the non West Pointer. Considering his Civil
War record and the 20 plus years post Civil War as a
leading commander of the Army, he deserves much
credit and certainly belongs in this distinguised group.
|
|
|
|
Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jun 21, 2012 13:24:16 GMT -6
An important player in the 1876 Campaign, General Terry's more important military accomplishments were during the Civil War. Terry was the non West Pointer. Considering his Civil War record and the 20 plus years post Civil War as a leading commander of the Army, he deserves much credit and certainly belongs in this distinguised group. It is pertinent to note that until he was obliged to go on the 1876 Campaign, Terry had not seen active service since early 1865. He had become a desk bound District commander, never involved in any Indian engagements, but was pressured into command of the Dakota Column when Custer was removed from that position by Grant's splenetic reaction to the evidence GAC gave at the Belknap Inquiry. Hunk |
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 21, 2012 15:22:22 GMT -6
Terry made it into Grant's memoirs, and Grant thought highly of the man. Everybody seems to have liked him, he was never making grab for credit, he was honest and supportive. When he came under attack by those done in by La Custer, his family - Hughes especially - and friends defended him vigorously. Really, one of the few generals that nobody who'd served with him had an iffy story about.
|
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jun 21, 2012 22:02:31 GMT -6
Correct me if I am wrong here guys, or something I am not seeing. When the Montana Column and the Dakota Column joined, had Terry not been there, dragooned from his desk not withstanding, Colonel John Gibbon would have outranked Lieutenant Colonel George Custer and Custer would have been de-facto under Gibbon's authority. Gibbon therefore would have been the task force commander, and as such would have been Custer's immediate superior and therefore subject to Gibbon's orders.
I fail then to see what difference all this would make.
|
|
|
|
Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jun 22, 2012 17:23:34 GMT -6
Terry made it into Grant's memoirs, and Grant thought highly of the man. Everybody seems to have liked him, he was never making grab for credit, he was honest and supportive. When he came under attack by those done in by La Custer, his family - Hughes especially - and friends defended him vigorously. Really, one of the few generals that nobody who'd served with him had an iffy story about. So he was a good guy? It did not make him a good field commander in 1876 and the good guy image rather paled when he pointed the finger of blame at Custer for the LBH in order to distance himself from the disaster. Why should he you ask? Because that is what good guys do, except of course, when a military career is at stake. |
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 22, 2012 17:54:00 GMT -6
Who else but Custer is to blame? He was the commander on the field. There was nothing in Terry's orders/instructions that mandated the outcome.
Custer went out of his way to attack, and reaped the results. He had many options.
Again, the campaign, the battle as a whole, and the disaster are three related but separate things. The campaign achieved its goals, the battle was a draw, Custer's portion was a disaster.
|
|
|
|
Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jun 23, 2012 10:48:29 GMT -6
1) Who else but Custer is to blame? He was the commander on the field. There was nothing in Terry's orders/instructions that mandated the outcome. 2) Custer went out of his way to attack, and reaped the results. He had many options. 3) Again, the campaign, the battle as a whole, and the disaster are three related but separate things. The campaign achieved its goals, the battle was a draw, Custer's portion was a disaster. 1) I believe that the Indians had a very big say in the outcome and were more 'to blame' for the end result, than any other reason. Terry created the tactics that led Custer to the LBH and he was the commander in the field. Custer was in command only of the 7th and closest in proximity to the enemy who he had been sent to find and bring to book - the purpose of the whole campaign. 2) Custer did not go out of his way to attack as his orginal intention was to attack on June 26th. The belief that his command had been seen by the enemy prompted a change of plan to attack at once. None of the surviving officers queried that decision in the immediate post-battle period. I am sure we would all be fascinated to learn from you what Custer's 'many options' were. Perhaps you will enlighten us? 3) A nice summary, though inaccurate. The original 1876 campaign forces did not achieve their objective. Post-battle, Crook joined with Terry and they meandered about looking for Indians without much success until both quit the field independent of each other in September 1876. The successful hounding of the Indians into reservations was achieved in 1877 by other forces led by other officers. I suggest that the Reno and Benteen forces did not consider their portion of the battle a draw, more like a desperate seige which some of them survived. Custer's portion was a disaster. The numerically superior Indians saw to that. |
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 23, 2012 11:37:30 GMT -6
1. Yes, they had a say, but only after contact. They were oblivious till then, for all intents. They had no command central. Terry created no tactics: he said what he thought should be done but allowed Custer to vary from it as field commander if Custer had reason to do so. That happened, and Custer is responsible for his choice.
2. Custer deviated from Terry's instructions to attack. While apparently he did plan to attack on the 26th, events moved that up. Custer's decisions all the way. Custer was determined to attack. I don't think Custer disobeyed Terry, you may recall. But once he made the decision to deviate with reason, it's all on him.
3. Oh, come on, Hunk. He could have followed Terry's instructions; he could have kept the regiment together; he could have scouted the camp before attacking it; he could have not attacked at all, but by presence nudged it north; he could have sent someone to talk to the Indians. He could have thrown a party. He could have arranged his entire regiment in a square in the south, with 25% holding horses in the center (less any bullet that missed a human target be wasted by the Sioux) as he marched on foot towards the camp singing Show Tunes, which he reportedly loved.
He could have done anything, as he was the commander on the ground, and he's responsible. What he lastly chose to do was attack with insufficient recon. Cavalry only gets one shot, because after there are wounded.
4. The 1876 campaign was designed to break up the hostiles, drive them to the reservations and keep them there, and punish those who objected. Due to weather, Reynolds, and other factors, it did not - like about 99% of military campaigns - go as planned. Go figure.
But, Terry and Crook's wandering about had the same effect as a successful large battle would have had. The Indians had to break up and keep moving or return to the rez, which they did in number in 1876, others stayed out and suffered, some were beaten in battle. The campaign destroyed the Sioux "threat", for the most part, and they never united in number again when not on the rez. The battle itself made no difference, absent the specific dead. Yes, other commanders were in place next year, and none of them remotely faced the odds Terry, Crook, or Custer faced. How come, if the '76 campaign was such a failure?
5. The desperate siege saw the vast majority survive, and with only casualties from the siege itself considered, a low rate. They held the ground, the Indians couldn't move them (or didn't, anyway), and the Indians left, just like at the Rosebud. By their respective standards, it was a draw.
The campaign succeeded, albeit not in the way preferred or, perhaps, imagined. The battle was a draw, since the numerically superior Sioux and Crew abandoned the field and broke up. Custer's group was, we agree, not successful.
|
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2012 11:55:22 GMT -6
The word blame in relationship to Custer is the wrong word. The word should be responsible. Yes the enemy had a vote. They exercised their vote. The fact that the vote was so decisive is all the responsability of Custer. It was Custer's series of mis-steps that made what the hostiles did as decisive as it was.
Custer, upon notification of the discovery of the disgarded boxes had all sorts of options. Attack immediately was certainly one. He could also have just as well have chosen easily defended ground and given the hostiles the option to attack him. In doing this he would have surrendered the initiative, but, and it's a very big but, the hostiles would have had to remain consolidated to mount an attack, and that eats up time to enable Terry to move into position in the north, vacinity Hardin. Had he chosen his position wisely he could have occupied a blocking position on the direct routh to the south and the Big Horns. Further he could have modified the above option with small forces conducting through reconnaissance of the battle space, while the bulk were engaged in preperation of the defensive blocking positions. So here are presentations of two possible variations of the second option.
In addition he could have taken the opportunity to thoughly recon the battlespace and perhaps made an approach march from a different direction then the one actually used.
As long as Custer was present in the vacinity I believe it would be ill advised of the hostiles to break into smaller groups and try and slip away without some type of hostile initiated holding action (like Rosebud).
Before we get to far afield here we must ask ourselves what were the primary and secondary objectives? I would say the primary was destroy the ability of the hostiles to wage war, and secondly, accomplishing the first gives them no choice but to return to the reservation for mere survival. You can accomplish the first by either bringing the wariors to decisive battle and destroying them. It can also be accomplished by destroying their infrastructure. To my mind the easiest of the two is the first method, bring them to battle away from the village. Being outnumbered as the 7th Cavalry was, a defensive battle I feel, while retaining the option to mount an immediate counterattack, is the way to go. Such a battle would have to be carefully orchestrated, and the tipping point of the hostile attack must be immediately followed by a devestating counter attack, that destroys all in its path. Easy words. Hard to do, but doable.
Hunk, DC is correct. The 1876 campaign was a complete success. You modified what he said. You placed a limitation by stating the original forces committed did not achieve success. That's true, but that has no bearing on the fact that the campaign lasting until 1877 was a success. The first half of the Ardennes Campaign was hardly a success. The last half led again by different officers was a resounding success. Same thing here. So your statement is irrelevent.
The Reno portion of the fight was a tactical draw. DC is again correct. Viewed operationally though it was a hostile victory, for they were able to contain Reno for a sufficient time to escape with their infrastructure, and avoid Terry.
Custer's portion of the battle was a disaster and Custer saw to that. He was the one that retained the iniative until inept maneuver allowed the hostiles to wrest the initiative from him and destroy him. We can BUT FOR this thing to death BUT HE was the one who permitted the opportunity for his own destruction.
|
|
|
|
Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jun 23, 2012 16:00:53 GMT -6
The word blame in relationship to Custer is the wrong word. The word should be responsible. Yes the enemy had a vote. They exercised their vote. The fact that the vote was so decisive is all the responsability of Custer. It was Custer's series of mis-steps that made what the hostiles did as decisive as it was. Custer, upon notification of the discovery of the disgarded boxes had all sorts of options. Attack immediately was certainly one. He could also have just as well have chosen easily defended ground and given the hostiles the option to attack him. In doing this he would have surrendered the initiative, but, and it's a very big but, the hostiles would have had to remain consolidated to mount an attack, and that eats up time to enable Terry to move into position in the north, vacinity Hardin. Had he chosen his position wisely he could have occupied a blocking position on the direct routh to the south and the Big Horns. Further he could have modified the above option with small forces conducting through reconnaissance of the battle space, while the bulk were engaged in preperation of the defensive blocking positions. So here are presentations of two possible variations of the second option. In addition he could have taken the opportunity to thoughly recon the battlespace and perhaps made an approach march from a different direction then the one actually used. As long as Custer was present in the vacinity I believe it would be ill advised of the hostiles to break into smaller groups and try and slip away without some type of hostile initiated holding action (like Rosebud). Before we get to far afield here we must ask ourselves what were the primary and secondary objectives? I would say the primary was destroy the ability of the hostiles to wage war, and secondly, accomplishing the first gives them no choice but to return to the reservation for mere survival. You can accomplish the first by either bringing the wariors to decisive battle and destroying them. It can also be accomplished by destroying their infrastructure. To my mind the easiest of the two is the first method, bring them to battle away from the village. Being outnumbered as the 7th Cavalry was, a defensive battle I feel, while retaining the option to mount an immediate counterattack, is the way to go. Such a battle would have to be carefully orchestrated, and the tipping point of the hostile attack must be immediately followed by a devestating counter attack, that destroys all in its path. Easy words. Hard to do, but doable. Hunk, DC is correct. The 1876 campaign was a complete success. You modified what he said. You placed a limitation by stating the original forces committed did not achieve success. That's true, but that has no bearing on the fact that the campaign lasting until 1877 was a success. The first half of the Ardennes Campaign was hardly a success. The last half led again by different officers was a resounding success. Same thing here. So your statement is irrelevent. The Reno portion of the fight was a tactical draw. DC is again correct. Viewed operationally though it was a hostile victory, for they were able to contain Reno for a sufficient time to escape with their infrastructure, and avoid Terry. Custer's portion of the battle was a disaster and Custer saw to that. He was the one that retained the iniative until inept maneuver allowed the hostiles to wrest the initiative from him and destroy him. We can BUT FOR this thing to death BUT HE was the one who permitted the opportunity for his own destruction. Chuck, you have explained yourself well but we will agree to differ about the succes or otherwise of the 1876 Campaign. That the Indians surrendered in groups the following year makes that the 1877 Campaign for me. As to Custer's options, again you put up plausible choices, but they are all premised on the basis that the Indians would have stayed where they were, or would have somehow been penned in by some of those choices. The Indians knew that territory like the backs of their hands and could have taken any number of routes to slip past Custer's force or any part of it. I seem to recall that some in fact did just that pre-battle, but I cannot locate that information as I write. I am also not inclined to subsrcibe to the idea that he made foolish decisions that led to his destruction. What seems to be constantly omitted from the equation is the immutable fact that the biggest concern was to stop the Indians escaping. It was not only Custer's concern, it stemmed from the very top. His immediate thought on believing he had been spotted was simply to stop that escape. We may perceive it as foolish, he did not and would have been court martialled if it had happened. It is just too easy to castigate Custer. We weren't there and thinking in the military mind set of the day. |
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2012 18:43:16 GMT -6
Hunk: Perhaps it makes it for you, but that is not what the United States Army makes it. According the the United States Army Center of Military History and the United States Army Institute of Heraldry the Little Big Horn Campaign lasted from February 1876 until its conclusion in 1877. Units participating in the theater between those inclusive dates are awarded the Campaign Participation Credit Little Big Horn. Little Big Horn is the name given to the entire campaign, not just the activites of May-June-July or even until September 1876. The also include the 3rd Cavalry fight on Saint Patricks Day, Wolf Mountain, The Dull Knife Fight, Rosebud, all of Miles' activities until the final surrender of the tribes in 1877. The Army considers this one campaign thread, and so do I.
I have no quarrel with what Custer did until he turned to the bluffs. Perhaps I would not have done it the same way, that is immaterial. When he went to the bluffs he committed his first error. When he continued north after 3411 he committed his final and fatal error. I am not castigating Custer as a person or a commander. He made a grave tactical error. It happens, and has happened to much better commanders than Custer. My point is that he was responsible. That is black letter stuff. He was responsible for everything his command did or failed to do. In the United States Army there is no he said she said. There is no quibbling. There is no pawning off. When you are the commander you and you alone must bear the responsibility.
You must seperate the operational and tactical decisions. Operationally, while not flawless he did what he was supposed and expected to do. He found the hostiles and got within striking distance. Custer is to be faulted for his tactical decisions, primarily the two I cited but there were others including his task organization, deployment of forces and assigning insufficient assets and unrealistic objectives. So one can say mindset of scatter until the Second Coming of the Almighty for all I care. The preconcieved notion of scattering was not his undoing. How he addressed the tactical situation placed before him once over the divide was his undoing. He invited defeat in detail. He was defeated in detail, and it was only by the Grace of God, and warrior aversion to incurring further casualties that prevented the entire 7th Cavalry from being a marble farm on the bluffs above the Little Big Horn.
|
|
|
|
Post by ulan on Jun 24, 2012 1:19:09 GMT -6
As to Custer's options, again you put up plausible choices, but they are all premised on the basis that the Indians would have stayed where they were, or would have somehow been penned in by some of those choices. The Indians knew that territory like the backs of their hands and could have taken any number of routes to slip past Custer's force or any part of it. I seem to recall that some in fact did just that pre-battle, but I cannot locate that information as I write. How could the fact that the indians would try to flee be a argument? Custer with his men, and 650 men was a strong enough force to handle this, was in touch with the village. They don´t had to fight small warrior group who could spread into any direction to go around any fighting. He had all together and the advantage was without doubt on Custers side. If the indians tried to flee the warriors had to cover all the moves of the villagers. Custer had high mobility but the villagers were slow. He had just to sit on their neck and bound the indians. I think that was Terry´s plan but Custer turned that simple and logical plan for a succsessful campaign into a disaster. Custer had to treat the indians maximal two days and bound them in the area. That was not a unsolvable assignment. |
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Jun 24, 2012 7:25:17 GMT -6
Ulan: I am in total agreement with you here. Custer's force in being must be dealt with before a split up of the villages. It's very true that small parties could find their way around Custer and escape. It is also true that the logistical infrastructure (wives, kids, old folks, the mobile camp and the horse herd) was relatively slow and must be protected by either some sort of mobile covering force, or a measure designed to cover that movement, like an attack.
|
|
|
|
Post by ulan on Jun 24, 2012 11:41:05 GMT -6
"The essesnce of command is timing, Mr. Cohill. A successful commander keeps his own counsel."
Actually essesnce of the whole live is timing in every section me thinks....
|
|
|
|
Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jun 28, 2012 15:07:45 GMT -6
Chuck, you make a number of assumptions on what Custer could or could not have done other than attack. As theories they are feasible, but the practice was entirely different. Shortly before the 7th reached the village the alarm had been given by the Oglala, Black Bear. In addition, Little Wolf’s band of Cheyenne was shadowing the soldiers and got into the siege against Reno on June 26th. If Custer had tried any of the options you suggest, the Indians would have been long gone as it was their intention to break up into their usual bands and disperse on the afternoon of June 25th as several Indian accounts verify.
There are also a number of Indian accounts that state they did not want to fight the soldiers, so unless Custer was moving against them aggressively, they would only have needed to keep scouts watching him whilst the rest of them dispersed via the Big Horn Mountains as they did on June 27th.
1”) The Ardennes Campaign was never styled the Ardennes Campaign of any particular year or period, but the military forces sent against the Lakota/Cheyenne alliance were sent out on a Campaign in 1876 and were not expected to still be out in the fall:
Custer newspaper statement March 15th 1876, “The expedition will be out all summer probably.” Gibbon dispatch of March 8th to Terry, “It ought not to take long to finish up this matter satisfactorily…” Sheridan letter of May 29th to Sherman, “It is easy to foresee the result of this condition, that as soon as the troops return in the fall, the Indians will go out again, and another campaign with all its expenses will be required…”
My statement is therefore entirely relevant.
2”) All that the U.S. Army Center etc., proves is that ‘spin’ is not a modern phenomenon. Seriously, what would you expect them to say? That the Army failed in 1876? Of course not, when the record can be manipulated to dovetail one failure into one success and make the end result a success, then garnished with the name of the battle (post event of course) attached to some meaningless award.
So presumably Gettysburg was a tactical draw? Viewed operationally though it was a Union victory, but Lee was able to escape with his infrastructure and avoid subsequent capture?
I will agree that Custer’s portion of the battle was a disaster, but from my perspective the Indians saw to that. You dismiss the 1876 military mind set with regard to their foes as playing no part in Custer’s decision making yet it played a significant part in the thinking of the army command structure viz;
Terry to Gibbon March 31st, “…but should direct your efforts to preventing the Indians from getting away to the north” and, “…be careful not to neglect the great object of keeping between the Indians and the Missouri.” Then Custer’s June 22nd newspaper dispatch, “…the danger being that the Indians, ever on the alert, would discover the presence of the troops as yet undiscovered, and take advantage of the opportunity to make their escape.” There are more examples, but these will suffice.
The baggage of ‘scatteration’ pervaded army minds at that time and will have weighed heavily on Custer’s thinking and strategy. Whilst we can condemn him in hindsight, he could have done very little different in my opinion, given the thinking and the tactics available to him to prevent the escape of the Indians.
As you say however, this can go to and fro endlessly, so I suggest we agree to disagree, though it is of course your right to respond as you wish.
Sincerely,
Hunk
|
|
