Worst error?

[jag]

Aug 29, 2011 11:37:35 GMT -6 @rosebud said:

Not waiting for Terry, and attacking together, no need for night marches and sending off Benteen,


Nothing wrong with that. Terry and Custer could have attacked a day or two later and it would have been much better.

The village would be empty and no one would be killed.

No, nothing wrong with it at all. Nor is there anything wrong with your reply. It does make one wonder if that very thing might have been what Custer was thinking before leaving Busby.

F. Girard, RCOI As he related... About 11pm evening of the 24th. - pg 76
While we were there, Gen. Custer asked those two Indians (Half Yellow Face, Bloody Knife) if he could cross the divide before daylight, and they replied no. And he asked them
if he could cross after daylight without being discovered by the Indians in the bottom and they said "no." And he then asked then where there was any timber where they could be concealed during the day where the Indians could not discover them. (Interesting as this is, the Court decided they had heard enough.)

[rosebud]

Godfrey

In all our previous experiences, when the immediate presence of the troops was once known to them, the warriors swarmed to the attack, and resorted to all kinds of ruses to mislead the troops, to delay the advance toward their camp or village while the squaws and children secured what personal effects they could, drove off the pony herd and, by flight put themselves beyond danger ……..

More on page 137 The Custer Myth

So what was different on the LBH?….Nothing …..Well only one thing. The warriors were not only able to delay the troops they were able to send them running to the hills. Indian tactics did not change just for the LBH, In fact they did exactly as expected. The Indians, however did not need to run on that day.

Most people don't know just how close some of the Montana Column was to the village on the eve of the 26th.

March of the Montana Column starting about page 157

Bradley:
It was now sufficiently evident that we had Indians in our front, and the column advanced slowly in fighting order, the Gatling battery and three companies of infantry in column on the left, and one company of infantry and the pack-mules in the center-a part of the infantry at the head and part at the rear of the packs. Generals Terry and Gibbon with their staffs rode at the head of the column, Lieutenant Roe with his company of cavalry being advanced half a mile or so on the bluffs to the right, while I moved abreast of him on the left up the valley, passing through the timber that grew in occasional clumps along the stream.

As we advanced, I continually saw Indians up the valley and on the bluffs to the right, riding about singly and in groups of two, three, half a dozen and more. Once they appeared to the number of 75 or 100 on a distant hill, and not long afterwards several rifle shots rang out from the bluffs where Roe was advancing, and a few shots were exchanged by the Indians and a few of our eager men who pushed to the front. One circumstance caused me a good deal of disquietude, and that was that the Indians were evidently massing in the timber at a narrow place in the valley, with the apparent intention of resisting at that point our further advance.
.......skip ahead....

Meanwhile Lieutenant Roe was advancing on the bluffs and from his elevated position could see a long line of moving dark objects defiling across the prairie from the Little big Horn toward the Big Horn, as the village were in motion, retreating before us .But between him and them was a numerous body of warriors.

I will end there. I think we see the same tactics repeated over and over. There was nothing special about the way the warriors fought on that day. It was like any other battle, only this time they won so we have to make it look special to give the army an excuse for their loss.

[rosebud]

I am going to change my mind again.

Worst mistake......Send Reno to the left and send Benteen to charge the village.

[crzhrs]

At the Battle of the Rosebud the Indians had sufficient knowledge of a large number of soldiers coming. Did they break camp and scatter? No. They attacked Crooke's command and forced them to fall back. If the LBH camp had discovered Custer's command before it attacked they may have been the aggressor just like at the Rosebud. This camp was different. They were confident, had their best leaders and warriors to build a coalition and were not in any mood to run. They had been threatened, attacked, given an ultimatum and in the words of Low Dog (paraphrase): No one believed anyone would be foolish enough to attack such a large camp.

[Yan Taylor]

RB, Do you think that the village was going to move on the 27th or do you mean that the Indians would have caught wind of the Custer and Terry commands about to hit them, and made good there escape.

[rosebud]

crzhrs.....At the Rosebud they met Crook about 20 miles from their village. There was no need to run when Crook turned tail and headed to goose creek in Wyoming.

When Gibbon is on the North side of the Yellowstone, the Indians kept a close watch on him. Gibbon's inability to cross the river made the Indians safe. Gibbon leaves the mouth of the Rosebud and heads East to meet Terry and the Indians quit watching because they thought the soldiers were leaving the area and would no longer be a threat. They know nothing of them returning with Custer and Terry and the plan to follow the Indians up the Rosebud.

I use the word run, and it would probably be better to use the word avoid. The Indians did what they could to avoid the troops and keep the village safe. This is a large village and it will need to move every few days just to find fresh hunting grounds. This is why Custer was able to get as close as he did without being spotted. The Indians are not going to send out hunting party's to hunt the land they already hunted, they would send hunting party's in the direction the village was going to move.

Thats how they spotted Crook. If they go down the Little Big Horn , the hunters will spot Terry and Gibbon long before they are a threat to the village. I would guess they would do the same with Terry as they did with Crook.

I see nothing that would lead me to believe the Indians did anything special or different that wasn't in line with the tactics used before the LBH or after the LBH.

Village size was probably the only variable that was a change.

[rosebud]

yantaylor....Combination of both.

Indians tell many different stories.

Example

Many say that the village was getting ready to move on the 25th but the women wanted to stay the rest of the day to finish the hides and process the meat they had. So they decided to stay one more day.

Some say they had spotted Buffalo or Antelope on the flats West of the Big Horn and were going to go there later in the day.

Some say they know the soldiers are coming and they are in the spot they wanted to be so they could fight the soldiers.

All we know for sure is that Custer and his troops were able to get to the village when no one else was able to. I guess anyone can spin it any way they want.

I do agree with JAG.. I don't think Custer wanted to attack on the 25th. I think he would have preferred to do a daylight attack on the 26th but he didn't have much choice when Indians were spotted on the divide.

So, did Custer really make any mistakes? Or was he a victim of circumstance?

[AZ Ranger]

The route he took had a high risk of discovery so whether he had to take that route or follow the direction of Terry once you decide to follow a travel corridor used by the Indians that you are interested in contacting it would have to be a consideration. Wouldn't it be likely that they used this route often?

AZ Ranger

[rosebud]

Don't understand what you are getting at.

I would say that the route he took worked out well. Unless you are saying he should have kept going up the Rosebud.

[walsh]

The worst error was sending Benteen to scout into the middle of no where. He should of charged with Reno. Maybe with three extra companies, Reno's skirmish line would of held out. Than Custer would be safe to attack the north part of the village with most of the warriors occupied against Reno.

[fred]

Oct 22, 2011 19:28:15 GMT -6 walsh said:

The worst error was sending Benteen to scout into the middle of no where. He should of charged with Reno. Maybe with three extra companies, Reno's skirmish line would of held out. Than Custer would be safe to attack the north part of the village with most of the warriors occupied against Reno.

Walsh,

You are way off base here. Way off!

Benteen's scout was a legitimate military operation with a specific goal in mind. It couldn't be accomplished with a handful of troops or a half-dozen scouts. The terrain was unknown; the views were indecipherable; the LBH valley too far away. Experience dictated Custer's decision; it was a sound military decision, and if you are reading the opinions of authors and historians who say otherwise, they are idiots.

As for Reno's skirmish line... Reno halted for a specific reason. It was a halt any good commander would have imitated. There was a ravine to his front and it was loaded with gathering Indians. If you go to the field today, you can still see it. If you don't believe me, I can post a picture of it as it looks today.

In addition to the ravine, the Indians were raising all sorts of dust. The ground was chewed up by 20,000 grazing horses; travois trails; riding Indians; and 100 degree heat. In addition, Indians were wildly firing their weapons and that produced smoke. Remember, these were still the days of black-powder gunfire-- mucho smoke; no cordite, yet.

And while many of us here disagree about the Indians' overall strength, I doubt anyone would disagree with a number of 2,000 warriors. So tell me... Reno had about 135 uniformed effectives-- 25% fewer, if you deduct the horse-holders-- and Benteen would have added another 115 or so, again, 25% fewer with horse-holders. That is about 188 troops, including officers. How does that compute with 900 Indians and another 1,100 or so waiting in the "wings"?

As for "most" of the warriors occupied by Reno, this is another falsehood. From my perspective, I have done enough work on this to conclude that less than 45% of the Indians confronting Reno were able to get into the Custer fight. If I am correct-- and I believe I am, especially since I got my methodology from widely accepted academic sources-- then Custer's smaller force (smaller than the combined Reno-Benteen commands... 158 men, having deducted horse-holders) was confronted by considerably more Indians than what confronted Reno. And Reno couldn't hold his position in the valley! (And we won't discuss the timber here, please!)

Best wishes,
Fred.

[walsh]

From my understanding, Reno was only beaten because the Indians got in behind him from the left flank forcing his retreat. Apparently, he had only taken one casualty up to the point of the retreat. Is this true?

[fred]

Oct 23, 2011 10:00:59 GMT -6 walsh said:

From my understanding, Reno was only beaten because the Indians got in behind him from the left flank forcing his retreat. Apparently, he had only taken one casualty up to the point of the retreat. Is this true?

Yes... if understood properly. You do not need to take casualties to find yourself in an untenable situation.

Remember, the Indians had not closed... the troops were advancing and spreading out, thereby thinning their ranks and falling away from mutual support-- the key element in Custer's entire defeat. In addition, the Indians were moving back and forth, rapidly, presenting little in the way of targets... though I suspect their casualties were greater at this point than Reno's... and they were raising tremendous amounts of dust, thereby masking their movements even more. Let us also not forget that as the troops fired more and more, the smoke from their firing contributed to the lack of visibility-- on both sides.

The one casualty-- SGT Miles O'Harra-- came on the skirmish line; there were several more casualties in the timber.

Now put yourself in a commander's shoes:

You have a long, stretched-out skirmish line, one that I put at some 8/10 of a mile-- though others, less informed, will disagree with me-- vociferously, I might add-- you have only about 78 or 79 men on it; they are separated, one company from another (another bone of contention, you will find!); you have increasing numbers of Indians, more and more of whom are mounted; your troops are dismounted (though it is my opinion one company retained their horses); you have dismounted Indians (their numbers also growing) tying down your men to the front while mounted warriors begin to move around your flank and into your rear....

What would you do?

Best wishes,
Fred.

[walsh]

Lets say Reno had 80 men on the skirmish line, with each man 5 yards apart. That's 400 yards to cover. It seems unreasonable for one man to command that whole line. There were company commanders but I'm assuming communication would of been difficult. I propose that one company could of been deployed facing the left flank of the other two. An L shaped deployment. Or this company could of wheeled to the left once the Indians were massing to attack the left flank. It's easier said than done but still possible with skilled commanders.

[Yan Taylor]

80 men or not, it certainly looked like the Indians showed no fear of Reno and his Troopers, there numbers grew as time went on, so it was only a matter of time before there skirmish lines became untenable and Reno would have to address the situation as the threat became worse.