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Post by montrose on Jul 1, 2011 6:24:01 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss Custer's adjustments to his decision to move north, based on new intelligence received at benchmark 3411.
2. Situation. Custer and the crows had moved up the ridge about the time Reno had crossed Ford A. Custer signaled the main body to follow him, and not his advance guard. Custer did not wait for main body. He continued to move to seek a position where he could see into the valley. He moved past the Crow scouts and arrived vicinity benchmark 3411, where he could see into the valley for the first time.
It should be noted that the scouts said Custer was stopping and starting, and in their eyes was wasting time. It is more likely he was moving around the ridge seeking the best vantage point to gain information. Since he was ahead of his column, he had time to spare until they caught up to him. When Custer passed the scouts, he was going so fast their ponies could not keep up.
Custer is doing a leader's reconnaissance, a standard procedure. He use of time seems prudent.
3. New Intelligence. I have previously stated that Custer was operating on assumptions when he moved right. Now that he could see the valley, Reno, Indians, and village, assumptions become facts, new assumptions arise, and the commander adjusts his plans.
a. Village disposition. The villages are close together, forming a contiguos mass along the river. There is no outlying village to attack.
b. Village location. The village is further downstream than he assumed when he sent Reno to attack. I believe Custer thought he could use the bluffs to hide his movement to a ford behind the Indian village, so that he and Reno would have Indians trapped between them.
c. Size of enemy force. From 3411 he would be able to see the pony herd being run in, Indians moving to Reno, going to ponies, still in village, women and children fleeing north. Dust and distance means he can't count individuals. He has to use indicators and make an estimate of the situation. His estimate of 24 Jun 76 of 1500 warriors should now be confirmed. He was facing at least 1500 Indian fighters. ( I think more, as do most, but my focus is on what Custer knew and thought).
d. Activity of enemy force. Warriors were reacting to Reno's advance in strength. Soon, Custer's estimated 1500 warriors would be counterattacking Reno's 112 troopers.
e. Terrain. Both the village and the ford were much farther downstream. Custer had the bluffs and the river blocking him from supporting Reno. To support Reno he would have to counter march to Ford A and then head down river 2 miles, which means he was 30 minutes or more away from being able to help his own advance guard.
I believe Custer assumed the ford and village was closer to Reno than it was. So he had assumptions fail.
f. Enemy forces east of river. As I will go into later, Custer made decisions based on enemy forces east of river, which I believe is Wolf Tooth and assorted friends. Something I find very interesting is that the Crows seem oblivious to these elements. US survivor reports seem to show a few scattered Indians (Kanipe, Martini, Thompson, Boston, stragglers).
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Post by montrose on Jul 1, 2011 6:59:36 GMT -6
Continuation of previous post.
4. Custer's options.
a. Option One. Backtrack to Ford A and reinforce Reno. From 3411 it was obvious that Reno's left flank was badly exposed. In fact, Indian counterattack here destroyed the advance guard.
It is highly likely that Custer realized he made a bad call going right, he should have gone left. But backtracking means 30 minutes at a minimum. It is a defensive move. Custer understood the concept of too little, and too late.
b. Option Two. Move down the bluffs, occupy terrain between river and bluffs and move north. This protects 2/3rds of Reno's position, and allows the two columns mutual fire support, but not maneuver. A move north threatens enemy flank, and lowers pressure on Reno's right. Reno still faces destruction due to the massive attack on his left/rear; but Reno could fall back on Custer by abandoning horses and wounded and swimming the river.
c. Option Three. Move north to next available ford, cross river, and swing south to support advance guard. This would put him in the rear of enemy force attacking Reno. It would also overrun village for future destruction. However, it allows women, children, and old men to flee with no food, shelter, or supplies to the north, towards Terry.
d. Option Four. Move regiment center of gravity to north fords. Leave Reno as an economy of force in valley. Move Benteen/McDougall Bns to a yet to be determined assembly area.
This plan is to let warrior force attack Reno, and allow Regiment to attack undefended village, or noncombatants.
e. Option Five. There is insufficient data to make a decision. Respond to Indian threat east of river with 60% of your combat power. Scout north with remainder to see ford locations at end of bluffs, plus enemy village, warrior, and noncombatant activities. Assume Reno can hold off entire enemy force while you develop the situation.
Order Benteen Bn and trains Bn to come to your location, before conducting any recon. This means you know you will conduct your main attack in the north, before you have seen terrain or enemy.
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Post by montrose on Jul 2, 2011 6:13:32 GMT -6
5. 3411 Decision. Custer continues to move north after 3422. He split his force, placing the Keough BN on the ridge to hie east, while taking his HQ and Yates BN down to the river.
a. Messengers. It was only here, very late in the game, that he chose to send messengers to inform the regiment of his plans and movements. Messengers were sent to Benteen and McDougall to come forward to Custer.
Since this was well after Custer had diverged from Reno's trail, he was working to ensure these elements followed him, and stayed out of the valley.
b. Reno was on his own. He would have to fight in the valley alone wile Custer developed an attack in the north. It is critical to note that Custer sent no messenger to inform Reno of this new plan. It is likely that Indian infiltrators already blocked access to Reno.
The Crows reported seeing Indians massing on Reno. What is interesting is what the Crows did not see. They make no mention of Keough on L/C/N ridge, nor did they see or hear firing from there. This implies the Crows left prior to this engagement, and that the Crows were unaware of Wolf Tooth's force.
c. Eastern threat. Custer likely went to L/C/N ridge when posting Keough there. It is likely he wanted an estimate of how large the Indian force was to his east, since they would be in his rear as he approached the river.
d. Cautious moves. Scouting the ridge and posting 3 of 5 companies before approaching the river took time. The lack of urgency and dispersion of forces show that time was not essential.
From this, Custer's actions are consistent with N/C ridge as the intended assembly area for Benteen and the trains.
e. The actions at the river are consistent with a reconnaissance and not an attack. The Yates and Keough Bns were a mile apart, out of support range.
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Post by montrose on Jan 27, 2015 7:08:45 GMT -6
I started this thread to examine the decision to move up the bluffs from Ash Creek.
The next decision point is at 3411. LTC Custer gains new information about friendly and enemy locations and activities.
Normally I look at all information to the commander to frame his decision making environment.
Maybe I should try a new tack, look at the actions taken to help determine the commander's decision.
The actions after 3411 include moving to Nye/cartwright/Blummer ridge, a very small movement to Ford B, another shift to Calhoun Hill and then the Ford D extravaganza.
Whatever he was doing he did not intend to provide any help to Reno's valley force. He either felt the Indians were not fighting, or he wrote Reno off.
I have trouble with the 3411 decision. I just don't see how a competent officer could make such a call.
William
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 27, 2015 7:20:24 GMT -6
In my humble opinion, Custer wrote the first script for "They Were Expendable" this version staring Marc Reno.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 27, 2015 7:42:54 GMT -6
Montrose, I too share your beliefs over what he may have seen at 3411, he must have saw Reno in some sort of control, either advancing or in skirmish line, Custer would have gauged the distance that Benteen would have to travel, maybe the packs too, Bouyer should have given him an estimated guess at the distance he would need to travel get beyond the village, so he must have realised that he was working in a time frame of up to an hour for support and to reach the north end of the village, so I don’t think he would have left Reno floundering and in danger of being out flanked, whilst he took his battalion out of the battle for 60 minutes or more, a routed Reno was no good to anybody.
Ian.
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Post by Colt45 on Jan 27, 2015 8:33:57 GMT -6
I tend to think that what Custer saw from 3411 was Reno at the start of his skirmish line fight, before the hostiles had begun to come around his left flank. He didn't stay at 3411 long enough to really get a feel for what was developing. He probably thought Reno was doing fine and just what Custer wanted, and spurred on by his bad assumption that the hostile resistance was a screen to buy time for the village to flee, he felt his move north to envelop the village or capture non-coms was going to be a winner. This decision would also bolster the previous decision which was to go up onto the bluffs in the first place, a decision made based on the assumption the hostiles coming out to meet Reno were merely a screening force and not a full-fledged attack. 3411 probably just confirmed the first decision. I also believe Custer by this time had become fixated on what he wanted to do and most likely ignored any warning signs he might have picked up while at 3411.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 27, 2015 9:03:13 GMT -6
The pony herd was located on the benches so why not realize the Indians would use the same benches to flank a line in the valley bottom?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 27, 2015 9:16:42 GMT -6
The only answer to that Steve, would be that he thought the Indians would mass against Reno, block him and only try and counter any advances, any idea that the warriors would put a determined counter stroke through these benches may not have crossed his mind, maybe even the thought of any advance towards the skirmish line may seem unlikely, but to rule out any counter stroke by any enemy is in my mind foolish.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 27, 2015 9:42:58 GMT -6
Would it occur to you(if you were Custer) that the enemy might do what you would do under the same circumstances. As you say he may not have hung around long enough to think it through.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 27, 2015 9:57:55 GMT -6
Well Tom I am no officer, hell I am no soldier to boot, but if Custer who was by the way fully trained in these matters, saw Reno in skirmish with a huge tract of open land on one of his flanks, then it should have held some concern, so the only notion I conjure up is that he expected them to keep their distance and not simply ride into the muzzles of Reno’s carbines.
Ian.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 27, 2015 10:17:32 GMT -6
I think the horse herd draws anyone's attention even if the Indians hadn't reached them yet. How much discerning must one to do consider the Indians might ride from the horses along the higher ground of the benchlands and flank Reno. They could even move from the edge and become harder to observe. Custer would have had a vantage point to this into consideration of what to do next.
If you constantly wait to see what the Indians will do before taking action you end up on LSH.
Regards
Steve
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 27, 2015 10:43:23 GMT -6
That sounds right to me Steve. Custer had by the looks of it one of the best vantage points along the bluffs, and he must have seen the Indians mobility grazing right there in front of his very eye's.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 27, 2015 10:58:08 GMT -6
This all goes back to one of those old tactical adages I am so fond of. Fond, because failure to heed them always come back to bite you in the butt.
In pre battle planning, and the orchestration during battle you concentrate your efforts on what capability the enemy has, not what YOU think they will do.
Pony herd, open flank, covered avenues of approach to that flank. all suggest that the enemy had the capability of assailing and turning that flank, attaining Reno's rear and cutting him off from retreat, and insuring that any follow on force has to fight through to relieve him.
Thinking that the enemy was just forming a screen is a wish away also. What would make anyone think that if that enemy would gain the upper hand, they would stop. SOMEWHAT RELATED speaking to the same cherry picking of testimony we see here
Last night Donovan and Hutton were on TV talking about the Alamo
Donovan says that Travis drew the line, meat and drink of Texas myth and he buys into it. That story did not surface until 40 years after the event, a tale told twice removed from the original teller. Donovan bases his acceptance of the "fact" of this first told tale. on Mrs. Dickensen an illiterate in her advanced years, saying that Travis called the men together. Even the man who first published the story states that he added something "without which the story would seem incomplete". DC would be proud of me.
Hutton states there were seven stories regarding David Crockett's demise. He believes the execution story told by de La Pena a man who would not know Crockett if he fell over him. Of those seven Francisco Ruiz, the Alcalde (Mayor) of San Antonio de Bexar, the only man, who knew Crockett personally, and who was charged with burying all of them says his body, weapon beside him, was found in a small lunette positioned outside the west wall, near the present Alamo Plaza entrance to River Walk. Since when to men being executed have access to their weapons and since when are they executed in their fighting positions. Double dose of DC's love for that one.
FOR FRED
Next time you see or talk to Donovan ask him to call me. Give him my phone number so I may introduce him to the original documents, that tarnish his Daughter's agenda.
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Post by fred on Jan 27, 2015 11:10:37 GMT -6
Next time you see or talk to Donovan ask him to call me. You see, this is my issue with Donovan... and Hutton, for that matter. To me, it's more serious with Hutton, because of his forum: a college professor. Donovan is simply playing hobby, much like me. The difference is that now, Donovan is spreading himself too thin and trying to be the grand expert in multiple fields, both of which show no signs of resolution (the participants on one side were all killed). That gives people license and the fools who run the various TV channels buy into it because of convenience, viewership, "names," and of course, money. Ask Dark Cloud what he thinks of Donovan. If we are lucky we will get on helluva erudite and lengthy dissertation of how not to write a book. I am neither as smart nor as discriminating as DC. Best wishes, Fred.
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