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Post by quincannon on Jun 29, 2011 8:07:24 GMT -6
Ian: Cavalry is ordinarily weak on the defense. It is the Arm of Decision. When you go over to defense you surrender iniatitive. So in that sense you are correct.
A quadrille you suggest. In that event Custer would have to be both dancing and calling the tune, and the surprise, Reno and perhaps Benteen was already out of the bag. My personal view is that they would not allow Custer to draw them very far, but who knows
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 29, 2011 8:18:38 GMT -6
Hi Quincannon. Do you go along with the theory that he was only engaged on three sides and still had a open area to his rear. Regards Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 29, 2011 8:39:22 GMT -6
No. Initially perhaps, but I think that quickly changed. It only makes sense that the hostiles would probe and probe until they found an opening, then it was game, set, match.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 29, 2011 9:12:05 GMT -6
Going on the what I have read and seen, most Officers from that period had this belief of not losing face, maybe Custer was the same, he might have thought (and I quote) I am darned if I am letting these hostiles drive me of this battle field, I am here to stay till Benteen gets here, a bad decision (if true of course), if he could have kept the Indians at a distance of 100 yards and moving away when they seem to get to close, well he might off lost face but still kept his command. I might add that me and the missus, went to the states for our 50th Birthdays, we started off in New York, went on to Las Vegas and Finished up in San Francisco, we loved it, but the two places (well three if Bunker hill was still there) I wanted to visit was the Alamo and the LBH, but Sue was having none of it, she said if you want to go to the LBH, go and I will stay in the Hotel (ha ha), I checked on flights and hotels and to go to the LBH would have been too much to fit in, who knows one day I might get there. Regards Ian.
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Post by wild on Jun 29, 2011 9:18:20 GMT -6
In practice the cavalry could only hope to catch a village,hopefully asleep.This is where it did it's best work in among the non coms. A cavalry charge is a shock weapon which requires a target preferable stationary and in disarray.The Indians would never provide such an opportunity.In the event of the action deteriorating into a fire fight you do not want to be taking care of horses. As Quincannon points out cavary are weak on the defensive.Their one defensive tactic is the skirmish line the purpose of which is to assist in allowing the cavalry to withdraw.Many posters resident here abouts think it is a battle line. The retreat of Brevet Col. Tony Durford late of the Natal Native Horse at Isandalwana is wortH a look if interested in the workings of the skirmish line .His gallant efforts warranted a better result. A rule of tumb for cavalry.Cavalry should be either advancing or withdrawing never stationery and never involved in a gunfight.
Meanwhile back at the ranch. Custer in his efforts along the LBH was centre stage.He was the man.Uncle Sam expects and all that.And then Weir Point his garden of Gethsemane he sees the enevitable horror into which he has led the regiment.He Custer,the main man,has forgotton his lines in the full glare of history. There is just no going back like, to face that septic fart [Fred's field handbook on military communications]Benteen.Let him drag his smug ass here.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 29, 2011 9:33:54 GMT -6
Thanks Wild, Didn't Burt Lancaster play the role of Durford in Zulu dawn ?, if so the film dose a great job of that valiant fight. I wonder what Custer's Troopers thought of him when they seen the predicament they had been caught in, I don't think they had him at the top of there Christmas card list. (sorry about having to modify my posts my spelling is carp). Regards Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 29, 2011 9:52:44 GMT -6
Ian: As my good friend from the Emerald Isle suggests the skirmish line is a battle line with no popcorn. Mobility, always mobility. This is why I have great heartburn on the other board with the defense of the timber. It is not the defense. It is the loss of the freedom of action, that mobilty provides. Cavalry should adhere to their own unofficial motto - Death Before Dismount.
When you missed San Antonio, you missed in my view one of the great treasures in these United States. Wonderful place. If you ever get a chance again write me and I will direct you toward the best Mexican Restaurant on the planet, very near where they dumped the Mexican Army dead after the Alamo. How is that for an appetite builder? LBH, you cant get there from here, but trying flying to Denver, renting a car, and driving to Sheridan,WY. You can pick up three for the price of one in two days, LBH, Rosebud and Fetterman.
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Post by wild on Jun 29, 2011 16:40:13 GMT -6
Purpose. Discuss LTC Custer's decision to abandon his regimental movement to contact in the valley and conduct an independent attack to the right. Did he conduct or at least attempt an independent attack to the right? I have been of the opinion that he was acting in concert with Reno. Independent would indicate that none of his actions were influenced by Reno. Independent would suggest that he had jettisoned Reno and proceeded as if he had been removed from the sandtable. And yet he calls for Benteen. I think rather than making a decision to act independently he simply lost touch with Reno.
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Post by montrose on Jun 29, 2011 17:28:52 GMT -6
1. Custer was operating on assumptions. He did now know the location of the village, except all indications pointed north of Ford A. He knew the Indians were coming out to meet Reno in force.
He did not know the terrain in the valley. He did not know how the terrain would affect the valley fight, and the advantages/disadvantages this would offer for Reno's attack.
This is unusual behavior for LTC Custer. His historical record shows that he likes to get far forward and make an early assessment.
2. This implies the move right was both an effort to gain exploit a supposed tactical opportunity, as well as a chance to find high ground to get a look into the valley.
There was some confusion on Custer's intent with his scouts. Two scouts he had intended to scale the bluffs followed Reno instead. Mitch Bouyer led the remaining Crows, followed by GAC himself. Reno was still advancing down the valley and wasn't in contact.
3. The problem is that Custer was putting two terrain features between him and his own designated advance guard. He failed to inform his advance guard and other 2 separate Bns what he was doing. Ouiji board leadership is not generally recommended.
If he did plan to go right, then it was essential to move quickly to reestablish contact with Reno. This means moving along the bluffs until he finds a ford, then crossing and heading south to reach Reno.
During this period Reno is totally on his own, facing Custer's estimated 1,500 Indians.
4. Reno's dilemma. Reno's job was to find and develop enemy situation. He most certainly did. He found a massive pny herd on his left, and the south edge of village to his front. Hundreds of Indians were boiling out to meet him. He sent 2 messengers back to CUster informing him of the situation.
It was now the responsibility of the main body to react to enemy activity. Reno's force was too small to control the valley and he needed support on his right. Custer should have moved forward to right behind Reno to establish a command post, while sending a battalion to extend the regimental line to the left, holding his last Bn in reserve.
Manuals at the time spent extensive time on the orders and movements to shift a movement to contact into a battle line.
Reno was stuck by Custer's action. He had met the enemy and deployed. He had sent 2 messengers back. Custer should appear momentarily. Custer owed him a response, since Reno had completed his advance guard mission.
And Custer did not show. Reno's hesitation in the valley has a significant causal factor by the failure of the main body to show up.
5. Why was no messenger sent? Custer had left the main body and went up the bluffs. He signaled the main body to follow by waving his hat , according to surviving Crows. SO the responsibility to send messengers was with his staff, meaning Lt Cooke and CPT Custer.
And they didn't do it. Custer did not tolerate independent decision making from his subordinates. He had chewed out Tom for moving the column that morning. When messengers were finally launched, it was after linking up with LTC Custer vicinity 3411.
Time matters in these battles, and the clock was ticking.
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Post by montrose on Jun 29, 2011 17:39:45 GMT -6
1. Custer was operating on assumptions. He did now know the location of the village, except all indications pointed north of Ford A. He knew the Indians were coming out to meet Reno in force.
He did not know the terrain in the valley. He did not know how the terrain would affect the valley fight, and the advantages/disadvantages this would offer for Reno's attack.
This is unusual behavior for LTC Custer. His historical record shows that he likes to get far forward and make an early assessment.
2. This implies the move right was both an effort to gain exploit a supposed tactical opportunity, as well as a chance to find high ground to get a look into the valley. There was some confusion on Custer's intent with his scouts. Two scouts he had intended to scale the bluffs followed Reno instead. Mitch Bouyer led the remaining Crows, followed by GAC himself. Reno was still advancing down the valley and wasn't in contact.
3. The problem is that Custer was putting two terrain features between him and his own designated advance guard. He failed to inform his advance guard and other 2 separate Bns what he was doing. Ouiji board leadership is not generally recommended. If he did plan to go right, then it was essential to move quickly to reestablish contact with Reno. This means moving along the bluffs until he finds a ford, then crossing and heading south to reach Reno.
During this period Reno is totally on his own, facing Custer's estimated 1,500 Indians.
4. Reno's dilemma. Reno's job was to find and develop enemy situation. He most certainly did. He found a massive pny herd on his left, and the south edge of village to his front. Hundreds of Indians were boiling out to meet him. He sent 2 messengers back to CUster informing him of the situation. It was now the responsibility of the main body to react to enemy activity. Reno's force was too small to control the valley and he needed support on his right. Custer should have moved forward to right behind Reno to establish a command post, while sending a battalion to extend the regimental line to the left, holding his last Bn in reserve.
Manuals at the time spent extensive time on the orders and movements to shift a movement to contact into a battle line.
Reno was stuck by Custer's action. He had met the enemy and deployed. He had sent 2 messengers back. Custer should appear momentarily. Custer owed him a response, since Reno had completed his advance guard mission.
And Custer did not show. Reno's hesitation in the valley has a significant causal factor by the failure of the main body to show up.
5. Why was no messenger sent? Custer had left the main body and went up the bluffs. He signaled the main body to follow by waving his hat , according to surviving Crows. SO the responsibility to send messengers was with his staff, meaning Lt Cooke and CPT Custer.And they didn't do it. Custer did not tolerate independent decision making from his subordinates. He had chewed out Tom for moving the column that morning. When messengers were finally launched, it was after linking up with LTC Custer vicinity 3411.
Time matters in these battles, and the clock was ticking.
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Post by wild on Jun 29, 2011 18:05:36 GMT -6
The orders given to Reno are not those that would be given to an advance guard. His orders were to attack and that he would be supported. When does an attack become an advance guard action? An attack requires committing the attacking unit 100% to close combat.It does not allow for first contact to be down graded to a defensive action. I feel that this advance guard business is misleading.Rather we should regard Reno's action as a stalled attack. A stalled attack V a vanguard action.Would it make a difference to Custer's decision making?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 30, 2011 9:07:58 GMT -6
Thanks Quincannon, I would love to go back to the States again, that Mexican Restaurant sounds good, I watch Man v Food today on cable, and the portions they serve up over are huge, there goes my cholesterol, Regards Ian.
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Post by El Crab on Jun 30, 2011 17:29:01 GMT -6
Colonel Anthony Durnford. His name was Durnford. With an N. Having read up a little on Isandlwana and sharing the same birthday with the Colonel, I can't let the misspelling slide any longer.
Carry on.
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Post by wild on Jul 1, 2011 0:23:10 GMT -6
Custer's decision making was influenced by considerations other than military. The expedition would either make or break him. He could not allow the Indians to escape.He had to find them and bring them to battle.Thus he cast the net wide [too wide]. Custer opened up a gap of an hour between Benteen and himself he might have done the same thing with Reno just the village was close at hand. His advance along the bluffs might not have been a flanking attack but rather one part of a wide flung net.
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Post by fred on Jul 1, 2011 4:55:33 GMT -6
Custer's decision making was influenced by considerations other than military. The expedition would either make or break him. I tend to agree with this; nothing definitive, but not unreasonable at all. That is for sure. I have never viewed it as a "flanking attack," though maybe that phrase is only semantics. I completely agree with your categorization of it being "part of a wide-flung net." Entirely too wide. Best wishes, Fred.
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