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Post by montrose on Jun 28, 2011 8:28:16 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss LTC Custer's decision to abandon his regimental movement to contact in the valley and conduct an independent attack to the right.
2. Custer's estimate of the situation. LTC Custer briefed his officer's that he estimated an enemy warrior force of 1500. This number is realistic, and in the ballpark of later estimates. I personally believe number was approximately 2000, but that is a future discussion.
a. Custer was not certain whether the Indians were in loosely scattered villages or a tight cluster. The normal disposition was scattered, as at Washita. This would create an opportunity to catch and destroy an isolated village.
b. It is ironic to note that the Indians traditional weakness was having their villages outside of mutual support. For this campaign, the Indians fixed that error, and had an integrated defense plan. On the US side, it was Custer who scattered his command out of mutual support, which is out of character for US military operations of this period. (Compare Rosebud command and control to LBH).
c. Custer was gaining additional information as he moved down Ash Creek. He or his scouts could see they were following a fairly fresh trail, a few days old. They reached a previous Indian camp site, which showed the Indian villages were massed.
d. Custer's next Information Requirement was to know whether the village was north or south of the junction of LBH river. He was hedging against this risk by launching Benteen's movement to contact. Again, Custer shows sound judgement. The initial Indian campsite in the LBH valley was south of Ash Creek. The village moved north of Ash Creek about 23 Jun in response to location of antelope herds.
3. The Decision. From the location of the old Indian campsite on Ash Creek, Custer ordered a regimental advance to and across the LBH river. Reno was ordered to lead the regimental advance guard. The Indian scouts were ordered to accompany him. Custer retained the Crows, because he still wanted their local knowledge of the terrain.
a. Information started reaching Custer that showed that the Indians were north of Ash creek, and close. Varnum and the Indian scouts reported signs, the column saw Indians running to Ford A and going north, elements were finding outlying Indians, the boy Deeds, and a group of women and children scounging turnips. There was likely signs of smoke /dust to the north, 10,000 pones had to crate some type of signature.
b. The advance guard saw Indian force massing into their north after crossing Ford A. Reno sent 2 messengers to Custer reporting this data. In addition, Cooke and Keough had moved forward from the main body and were right behind Reno. They could also see all the signs to the north.
c. The Indian interpreter Gerard saw the strength of the Indians. He abandoned his appointed place of duty and fled back towards the main body. Cooke intercepted him, and ordered him to return to his post.
d. The indications are a clear sign that the Indian response was large, larger than Reno's force. Conditions were developing for a regimental fight against the large Indian force in the valley.
e. And at this point, Custer made the decision to not support his advance guard, but move the main body to the right. It should be noted, this move would be after Reno's messengers reached him. He was not ignoring the advance guard's reports, but was reacting to them.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 28, 2011 9:02:14 GMT -6
William: Thoughtful piece as always.
I can only conclude based upon what you have presented, that the only thing that has any ring of logic to it about the move to the right, is that Custer though he might be in a position to pick off one circle. While he must have seen the signs of mass, by virtue of the trail, that did not necessarily mean that they were all camped in such close proximity. I suppose you could come back and say they did earlier, but that does not mean they would again. It was after all, and as you pointed out, against the norm.
Now if this assumption of mine is true, he may have moved right with the idea of crossing down river at Ford B, coming in behind as the hammer to Reno's anvil. One could certainly assume that the big village message was at the time he became aware of his mistake.
Still the idea of an northward movement to the east of the river would not be a bad one if he had a lot more combat power, both with Reno and his own.
Chesty Puller once remarked that fancy tactics at the regimental level and below were worthless. It has always seemed to me that Custer's moves more resembled those that would be chosen by a period division commander, rather than a guy who had about 450 men in his teeth elements.
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Post by montrose on Jun 28, 2011 10:13:53 GMT -6
4. Discussion. Custer's decision to move north was made before his force had any direct intelligence on the location, size, and disposition of the enemy camp.
a. Trust in scouts. The traditional argument is that LTC Custer did not trust his Indian scouts. Yet his decision to move north showed that he was willing to bet the entire battle in blind trust on Bouyer and the Crows. I am certain (opinion, based on assumptions) that he believed the move north would put him on the far side of the village/villages that Reno was attacking. His force was not in position to see Ford B. ford D, and village location when he made his decision. He was either nuts, or making a decision based on information from his Crows.
b. Tendency. Custer showed a tendency to go right before his reports of enemy activity from advance guard and scouts. The crows say that they were ordered up the bluffs early, with Custer following. Custer waved his hat at main body in Ash Creek, and then they followed him.
c. This implies Custer decided to go right without knowing what Reno's messengers and Cooke/Keough had discovered. I my opinion, Cooke sending Goldin as messenger is very telling. Goldin was a 17 year old admin assistant to Cooke. The regimental HQ had several available messengers, plus Reno's two. Cooke sending Goldin indicates to me that Custer was not with HW. Cooke did not want to use messengers that by right belonged to his commander. He used his own initiative to send his gofer, and preserve the silver bullets owned by the commander. I believe this was a solid call by Cooke.
d. I believe the critical factor in The Decision, was Custer trusting his Indian scouts.
b. T
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Post by montrose on Jun 28, 2011 10:18:45 GMT -6
4. Discussion. Custer's decision to move north was made before his force had any direct intelligence on the location, size, and disposition of the enemy camp.
a. Trust in scouts. The traditional argument is that LTC Custer did not trust his Indian scouts. Yet his decision to move north showed that he was willing to bet the entire battle in blind trust on Bouyer and the Crows. I am certain (opinion, based on assumptions) that he believed the move north would put him on the far side of the village/villages that Reno was attacking. His force was not in position to see Ford B. ford D, and village location when he made his decision. He was either nuts, or making a decision based on information from his Crows.
b. Tendency. Custer showed a tendency to go right before his reports of enemy activity from advance guard and scouts. The crows say that they were ordered up the bluffs early, with Custer following. Custer waved his hat at main body in Ash Creek, and then they followed him.
c. This implies Custer decided to go right without knowing what Reno's messengers and Cooke/Keough had discovered. I my opinion, Cooke sending Goldin as messenger is very telling. Goldin was a 17 year old admin assistant to Cooke. The regimental HQ had several available messengers, plus Reno's two. Cooke sending Goldin indicates to me that Custer was not with HW. Cooke did not want to use messengers that by right belonged to his commander. He used his own initiative to send his gofer, and preserve the silver bullets owned by the commander. I believe this was a solid call by Cooke.
d. I believe the critical factor in The Decision, was Custer trusting his Indian scouts.
Numerous issues with proboards, may have double post
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 28, 2011 11:20:39 GMT -6
Montrose,
With all due respect, I disagree with some of the assumptions here, and I'm unclear on some of the terminology.
For example, in 1. there was certainly a decision to go north, but was it to conduct an "independent attack" or to get just beyond the bluffs for a crossing in time to be support? At some point, he knew he'd gone too far for support and it would have to be independent. Further, was a three company unit indicative of a "regimental movement" given he had the larger group with headquarters?
2.a) I would venture normal disposition in winter was more scattered, because they couldn't move easily if at all and there were hygiene issues. In summer, they could putter about and coagulate. That would be known, I think. All the circles would want to be by the water, or not far.
2.b) With that in mind, I don't know if the coincidental grouping made possible by season was a sign of a defensive weakness being fixed, or that Indians ever had it so together for an integrated defense plan.
c. The camp on Ash Creek, wherever and however large, was not all that awaited them on LBH, because another as large or larger group hand joined coming down the LBH.
d. I don't get how the minimal move from Ash Creek to LBH was because of mobile antelope herds, although I've read that as well. I also find it hard to believe that such a huge village group didn't have enough smoke and dust to indicate its existence north of Ash Creek early on. Although, there could be others to the south.
3. 2000 warriors alone might have 10k ponies. Then, women and others. Suspect the pony herd was way larger.
4. "Custer's decision to move north was made before his force had any direct intelligence on the location, size, and disposition of the enemy camp." That is an issue, surely.
a. Not sure we have any rock solid evidence that Custer was following Boyeur and the Crows so much beyond the rational assumption they informed him of a crossing a ways up, but it was further than they recalled or he expected and before he got there he had a good whiff of the village that may have caused a hesitation or further change of plan or led, as Curly says, to them hurtling down Cedar to MTC and towards the village after a saddle tightening.
Just saying it may have been a simple error by them that he assumed would work out. Today, it did not.
c. Cannot believe for a moment that Goldin was a messenger; Goldin is the sole source for this tale and it appears late and changed often and he DID lie and got his stories confused. Is HW headquarters?
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Post by wild on Jun 28, 2011 16:37:59 GMT -6
and had an integrated defense plan. Possible tightening up following Rosebud engagement.They would have enough sense not to leave isolated satalite villages ,Southern flank of village also protected by river loop.
Reno's orders to attack may have been a recce by "fire"with Custer in what he thought was an ideal place in which exploit developments.
I think that if the Indians were to run it would have been across the river and into Custer's awaiting arms.
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Post by montrose on Jun 28, 2011 18:39:36 GMT -6
DC,
I would like to respond to your post. Ohhh, and HW is a typo, I meant HQ.
1. Advance Guard. An advance guard does not exist without a main body. The 7th moved as unit from the old Indian camp on Ash creek to Ford A. Reno was on left of creek, Custer right, but Custer was following Reno'z advance. Custer deliberately, and appropriately, waited so Reno could get ahead.
After Reno crossed the river terrain and vegetation masked his view of main body. The dust of Reno's advance would further obscure vision. It is not Reno's job to track main body, his focus needs to be and was to the enemy on his front.
2. Village disposition. My point is that historically when the Indians did their annual summer massing, they deployed villages well separated, generally up and down a water source. Now my wekest knowledge is on details of Plains Indian history and culture. I have read this disposition from secondary authors who have studied this area. I have seen you flay some of these people and views in previous posts.
My bottom line is that the massing of Indians in 1876 was regarded as very rare and unusual by all participants, US and Indian.
3. Ash Creek Camp. I agree that the LBH camp was larger than the SH reek camp. But useful intelligence can still be gained from seeing the Ash Creek camp site. The tribes were not widely scattered, but close together, as they were on LBH. So Custer could gain useful knowledge on expected enemy village deployment.
4. Smoke and dust signature. Ok, now I add a bit of my own experience. I understand an argument you have made that some folks claim experience to support fallacious arguments. SO feel free to take this with a grain of salt. My specialty in regular Army and Special Forces was scouting. I have a lot of field experience and training in this field.
Smoke and dust signatures are not constant. They vary with terrain and include factors such as time of day, vegetation, moisture content of air, wind direction, wind speed, temperature, vertical wind speeds (wind direction and speed often varies at different altitudes, which is why so many parachutists end up in the trees), and other factors.
From years of experience, I believe, though cannot prove, that I became a god judge of using smoke/dusk signatures to develop accurate intelligence. But sometimes you get it wrong. Say wind factors create appearance of a column moving eat when it is actually going north.
The factors that I regard relevant at LBH is high heat, dry air and the enormous wind that sweeps the great plains. Has anyone been to LBH and observed no or calm winds? Still air or less than 3 MPH? My experience in trying to conduct airborne operations out there is winds in 20-40 MPH range. These factors would keep dust close to the ground, meaning more of a problem if you are right there, but hard to see at a distance.
Bottom line. Smoke and dust signatures are not a constant. What was available, and when on 25 Jun 76 is subject to complexity. We can not be certain what signatures could be seen when or where, or whether available signatures could lead to false or misleading analysis.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 28, 2011 19:10:44 GMT -6
I agree with your bottom line that "the massing of Indians in 1876 was regarded as very rare and unusual by all participants, US and Indian." But, I do think that conflicts with "My point is that historically when the Indians did their annual summer massing, they deployed villages well separated...." Because if it were an annual thing - and I don't think it was - it wouldn't be that rare. Anyone know if there were annual massings? Villages a mile or so apart don't really relieve the stress on the game at all.
The big gatherings that we know of were for the treaty signings and to deal with the Army, as at Kildeer Mt. and LBH. A couple of tribes might get together for a Sun Dance, but this grouping was at Sitting Bull's request and it was imagined to be big enough to fight if need be. The Sun Dance he held was for a diminished number on the Rosebud than the big group. It was hard to feed big gatherings so there weren't many. Indians were not really adequately structured or organized for large gatherings.
I've been at the LBH when it was too bloody hot and still for clothing and when the wind made conversation difficult. Since I primarily talk to myself, it was windy.
Like you and others, I think Custer was fine and logical (and there's nothing mutually inconsistent with "logical and wrong") till he crossed MTC and did whatever he did, which clearly failed to impress the crowd. When he crossed MTC, there was no reuniting the regiment and bright kiss goodbye to communication with it. Because of that, I do not think he was in charge, or that a 7th officer would lead them to where they were found. I wish Fred would devote his life to finding that photo for my benefit. It really shows the complete horror to the trained eye, which I don't have.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 29, 2011 4:46:45 GMT -6
I know this has been said before, but if Custer wanted to attack the village, why did he only send one Company down towards the river, was it to just check on how good the crossing point was, it seems crazy thinking now about the kind of tactics Custer employed, going on his record in the ACW, he would have attacked with the whole of his Battalion, not leave three Companies isolated on the hills behind, I know it makes sense to also have a reserve and maybe a flank guard, but if the unit stayed together and kept moving surly the Indians would have to try and keep pace with the Soldiers, and if Custer had kept on the move he would have been one step ahead of them, people say that the crossing point was too muddy for Cavalry, so when it was made clear that a crossing was not possible, the whole Battalion should have moved back up the bluffs and continued to the next crossing, there should have been plenty because the Indians didn't have any trouble in finding them. Regards Ian.
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Post by fred on Jun 29, 2011 5:12:45 GMT -6
I must apologize for not jumping all over this marvelous new thread by "montrose," but I have been consumed by this new job of mine trying to develop retirement and portfolio strategies. Great work, but tough, challenging, and time-consuming. I shall be back on the weekend! DC, I hope you do not mind, but I have taken your post out of sequence here. I wish Fred would devote his life to finding that photo for my benefit. It really shows the complete horror to the trained eye, which I don't have. First of all, your position of Custer being shot at Ford B is very upsetting to me and unless you change your stance I am not going to provide that photo. Furthermore-- and I was not going to release this information yet, but you have forced my hand-- on a trip to the Pine Ridge Reservation, I was fortunate enough to help out a young man who rewarded me by giving me several video clips taken by one of his ancestors during the battle. They are torn, grainy and difficult to view, but they clearly show troops moving away from Ford B, no Indians of any strength tailing them, and Keogh moving across high ground, clearly Luce Ridge. Furthermore, one can make out Custer, issuing orders-- it has to be him-- and a slumped-over man in buckskin pants, riding a light-colored horse (these are in B&W) and being assisted by two or three other men on similarly-colored horses. Now unless you eat crow and apologize to me for doubting my work, I will not bring these out there when we meet next month. It will be your loss, DC, and you will forever regret it. Now... I doubt there were "annual" meetings; the LBH was rare, and I do not believe one type of setting, i. e., a Washita set-up; conflicts with what was seen at the LBH. I do believe the LBH was the rule's exception, however, and completely mis-read by Custer, Godfrey, et al.I agree with this. Also, don't forget that the size of the camps along the Rosebud increased almost exponentially near Busby. That is where many of the summer roamers came in and it appears to have been totally ignored by Custer. When Crook was attacked, the Indians were camped along Reno/Ash and were only at some 50% or so of what they would be on the LBH, more Indians joining the encampment from down the LBH valley. I agree with this as well, up until the last sentence. The situation-- circumstances-- dictated action and that is what you are either missing or ignoring here. The necessary elements for success were continued speed, lack of pressure (for Custer, a great misunderstanding and misreading of the situation and its attendant elements), re-unification of command, i. e., Benteen; and not a little luck. The only thing that worked-- and ironically, to Custer's detriment because of the failure of the others-- was speed. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jun 29, 2011 5:16:32 GMT -6
I know this has been said before, but if Custer wanted to attack the village, why did he only send one Company down towards the river... Ian, He didn't want to attack the village here because he found himself in the upper end of it... it extended farther north. Plus, he sent two companies to the ford, not one. He kept three back, about one mile. The valley was full of dust and retreating Indians and Custer needed to get closer for a better look and to try to see where they were all headed. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 29, 2011 5:20:56 GMT -6
Hi Fred, did he send the full two Companies and any HQ unit to cross at this point or did he leave one in reserve and try to cross with only one Company. Regards Ian.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 29, 2011 6:01:50 GMT -6
Here, in short, is my problem with theories that have Custer divide and divide again in the face of the enemy, and after calling clear attention to his intention, puts his majority far away to, essentially, await developments. That, to me, is a Custer not found in history or, for that matter, nature.
If the village was moving or the 7th thought the men gone, then MTCF brought them into the relatively abandoned center of fleeing civvies and provided the shortest and safest route to collect hostages, attack the pony herd, do a dressage performance, whatever. For EVERYthing that's been postulated as Custer's intent, this was the thing to do. He didn't do it.
That is the only 'mystery' here, and I think Occam's Razor again offers the simplest explanation for a well chronicled officer departing from script and inclination and training. He wasn't at the helm, something had happened to him or clique/family member early enough they thought they could address that and continue 'soon/later.'
Fred, Obey the Calling! Find-that-photo. I think it's yours.
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Post by wild on Jun 29, 2011 6:35:52 GMT -6
He wasn't at the helm, This will never gain traction because it is just not sexy enough.A perforated Custer v a double gobackwards feint.No contest. Prompted by DC's appeal for a terrain photograph I checked out Google earth.It shows hell in lumps.The only thing wrong with DC's theory is that it is out by about 4 miles. The blunder was going anywhere near the bluffs. Weir Point confirms the mess he is in but to withdraw spells humiliation and end of career.Going forward preserves the notion of being on the offensve while he awaits Benteen's arrival.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 29, 2011 6:54:42 GMT -6
I don't think forming skirmish lines was a very good idea, troops had to keep mobile in this battle, if you keep on the move your enemy has to try and counter your movements and making him do that must give you an advantage. I wonder if Custer's men could have took the Indians on a merry dance over this terrain, leading them further away from the non-combatants, I wonder how far the main Indian body of warriors would have gone before they realized they were being drawn away from the village, they did not know if there was a third column of Cavalry just waiting to hit the non-Com's. Regards Ian.
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