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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 3, 2011 9:14:47 GMT -6
Thanks William for informative posts and for some real life improvements. I introduced your PACE at our law enforcement program supervisors meeting. The timing was very good because we were updating procedures and guidelines.
We PACEd decoy operations and weren't to far off to begin with at least each element addressed but realized a real benefit when we PACEd service of a search warrant. The former planning method had great details on "the plan" but did not have the details to the same degree for alternates, contingency, and emergency.
Thanks
Steve
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Post by montrose on Mar 4, 2011 8:55:01 GMT -6
Steve,
I make no claim to ownership of PACE planning. Special Forces have been using it since before I was born.
The advantage of PACE planning is letting all team members know a general reaction to a change of circumstances. Say you and I are serving a warrant on a probable armed suspect who is a gang member. Another gang member shows up while we are at the door. Since we had this as an contingency plan, we know that you watch the first suspect, while I deal with the other man.
Of course, in your world you may be thinking arrest order, I am thinking kill order.
PACE planning increases reaction time, and gives members a cognitive framework. You can see the connection to Blink. Folks know what to look for, and how to react.
The problem with a primary plan without a PACE is that members get very focused on primary plan. They think through all the things that can happen and what they will do. For example, when I get to first corridor, gunman can come out of one door to left, and 3 to right. But let's say there is a window at far end of corridor, and another building directly across with another window. A gunman shooting from the next building over could ruin my day. I am so focused on the target building and what could happen in it, that I disregarded everything outside the target.
But if something unexpected happens, units fall into decision shock: a short period of uncertainty. As a collective group, members can act independently and counter productively. Actions of two members may cancel each other out.
As a collective entity, there is a pause in decion making and action, that can be fatal. PACE planning is designed to close this window.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 4, 2011 9:58:11 GMT -6
William although you don't claim PACE as yours alone you brought it to my attention and it seemed usable for us. We did some planning better than others depending the situation but this will help in developing plans.
Thanks again
Steve
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 5, 2011 11:18:45 GMT -6
Although I don't have experience with ANY of this, in my readings what is apparent is how, recently, the learning curve in military and related fields of action has gone WAY up. Just hearing about PACE makes one wonder why this sort of thing took so long to get established. It seems like an obvious need.
It's sort of shocking to read the level of preparation (which includes research about and some remote cultural understanding of an enemy's fueling motivations) that the Japanese and American military labored under. By today's standards, it seems medieval, and in some cases WAS medieval. Seventy years ago? Not long, really.
For example, the Japanese, Army and Navy (who barely spoke to each other, and the Army ended up with its own Navy and the Navy with its own soldiers...) favored, for their elegance on paper, very complicated plans over extended periods with dubious sustained logistics. If at any time - which in the real world was ALL the time - anything went wrong, the plan was to continue with the original plan and force it to work, with predictable results. That makes the stupid and ineffective banzai charges understandable to a degree. The Americans learned this early about them, helped by code breaking.
During WWI, the operating French plan was 'cran', courage, and attack. Always. That was Plan 17. There was no backup plan to speak of. They wore bright red pants and deep blue jackets in the age of the machine gun. Attacked in lines. Only 100 yeas ago almost. The big proponent was Foch, who learned quickly and adapted. Others, like Joffre, not so much.
Hitler, as his world dissolved, went to reliving the Stormtrooper assaults of the last gasp 1918 to relive it and get it right this time. Or something. The Bulge was a repeat, and would have worked except for airpower.
The American military learned relatively quick and changed markedly during the war. Fossils like Halsey, who on one hand favored carrier warfare but used as his flag vessel a new battleship, was put in the position of denying protection to our escort carriers because to do so would mean he and his flagship would be away from the great carrier fight up north, which he didn't yet realize was a decoy, and if it were not for one sane Japanese admiral, a much bigger disaster for us and them was averted. Other admirals in his position used cruisers for flagships, so there would be small tension between a battle line and carrier work.
Regarding Custer, though, it seems there was little schooling in Indian warfare whatever, and referencing CW activity was not helpful, neither in the actual fight or in explaining these actions to the civvies. Talking about flanks and prissy maneuvers and procedures in colorful uniform gives a thrill to some, but it bore little relation to what fighting the Sioux or Apache was like, and not helpful.
It is in this area I think the Miniver Cheevies, in the military and not, do GREAT damage, and protecting the civvies from what war is like creates, for temporary public relief and PC complaint, long term issues. For example, our military is being used more and more like a police force, while domestically our urban police like more and more to operate like assault troops in the big cities with swat teams and armored vehicles. There are predictable issues with all that.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 6, 2011 7:07:47 GMT -6
Very true DC. The house searches are very similar in tactic. There is a big difference in the rules of engagement. The use of deadly force standards need to be and are different. So civilians seem to make the techniques and tactics converge. We have to sort out the good from the bad civilians. So a building search is similar. If its all full of enemy troops the tactic could be way different with no entry at all.
In the type of police work we do we operate mostly in contingency and emergency elements of PACE. We have always encouraged officers to think about the circumstances they may soon be involved in and that would include the elements of plan and alternate.
The bottom line is that it easier to remember PACE then it is each element of it being addressed separately with varying degrees. I have always taught that tactical means you have a choice. If you have none such as your gun went dry and you need to fire it again then you have an emergency reload situation and the technique is different than a tactical reload where you have some bullets left that you may want to use later.
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Mar 6, 2011 17:26:34 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
Let's look at how the Army responded after certain wars.
Vietnam. After Vietnam the Army reorganized in the FM 100-5 Revolution in Military Affairs reforms. The Army design itself to fight a conventional war in Europe against the USSR.
This was good for the army in creating a coherent goal. It was good for the military industrial complex in that a mech army cost billions.
It was bad for the nation in that in no way would or could there be a conventional war in Europe. We knew then, confirmed when wall came down, that the USSR intended to use nukes instantly.
To show you that the USA is insane: the Navy From The Sea plan, was to nuke east Russia from the onset of war. So the USA planned to fight a conventional war to Russia's west wile fighting a simultaneous nuclear war to Russia's east.
So the USA built a very good Army to fight a war that was never going to happen.
GWOT Post 2006 Army. The war on terrorism started badly for the Army. Conventional generals in the first 3-4 years used excessive force, and ignored the civil, social, and economic aspects of fighting internal wars.
And then the Army started getting it right. Tactics changed. Equipment was bought for the wars that we were fighting, not the wars we wanted to fight.
Post Civil War. Even though the Union won the ACW, the early volunteer Army was a recognized mess. Reforms started after LBH. However, the intent was to design a European type Army that could play a role in Imperialism, grabbing a few colonies on the way.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 7, 2011 10:27:21 GMT -6
Well, I had zero clue about much of that. I do know that organizations tend to become beings of their own, whether unions or Armies or cheerleader teams, and that individuals start to fulfill roles needed without knowing it, and the being acts to protect itself with individuals acting like white blood cells. In that regard, the military isn't unique, absent the power it holds.
Also, there is truth that a 'lost' small war is far more valuable than endless victory, whether Imperial Britain or ourselves. We learn from it.
I'm not so sure there could not be a conventional war in Europe, given that the period since WWII is the longest known period of actual major peace in history there, and that solely because of nuclear fear. It was an actual 'damned fool thing in the Balkans in 1914 and nearly one again when Yugoslavia went under, with - unbelievably - the same damned ancient issues still festering. The Battle of Kosovo? Move on, Serbs. It says something when the Muslim population in that section of Europe seemed the most pacific and sane.
I still think that our willing civvy ignorance is a major and unnecessary factor in complicating discussion of military matters, and I say that as a proud civvy proclaiming my ignorance. I'm not, however, given to surrendering power or even admission of superior knowledge or understanding to uniforms or their implied experience, which in some cases is non existent. But it's the Miniver Cheevies as abound in Custerland drive me bat guano insane.
I agree about the MI Complex and all, but there were and are reasons that it arose, primarily the FUBARs of the Villa and Philippine slaughters and WWI in particular. We weren't remotely ready and people died for foolish reasons. The Bonus Army and the shifts of public attitude towards the military called attention to the issues of a standing army in a democracy, especially one that came to be in opposition to the very concept. An armed socialist organization living within a supposed capitalist society it is to protect - although it illustrates issues we're supposed to be against - is an inescapable dichotomy.
Demanding people go from one to the other and back again without more than the Hearty Handshake and best wishes and notional thanks is a major, major issue in this nation, in any democratic society. I blame most on willing ignorance by civvies.
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Post by montrose on Mar 21, 2011 8:42:08 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss Indian command and control.
2. Organization design. There is a design theory based on mechanistic and organic organizational designs.
A mechanistic design is like US Army, major US corporations in 1950s/1960s. A strict hierarchy with designated leaders. Supplements are task organized, standard procedures lead to fast and efficient acts by units.
An organic design is very loose. Leadership is divided, subordinate elements may act independently.
3. Indian organization. Indians had an organic organizational design. It is not as simple as Sioux and Cheyenne.
a. Circles. The six camp circles formed their basic organization. No one person was in charge of all the circles. No one person commanded the individual circles. Command was executed through a council of leaders.
b. Stragglers. Even six circles is too simple. The Indians had a variety of stragglers in camp. These included many non Sioux, non Cheyenne. It also included the agency warriors. Some of these attached themselves to a related circle, many stayed and fought in their own small bands.
c. Warrior societies. The warrior societies helped provide a measure of control. The societies policed thee camps, provided sentinels, and scouted outside the camps. In battle, they formed a nucleus to informally guide Indians from their tribe to battle.
d. Informal structures. The Suicide Boys formed shortly before the battle. The celebrations over their establishment meant that they were widely known. They formed a nucleus that helped inspire and control actions of many nearby Indians.
4. Command. The concept of command would not be recognizable by the Indians. Indians developed a common plan in their councils. From this they established a concept of the operation. Within this concept, junior leaders had considerable freedom in how they implemented the overall "commander's" intent.
a. This technique does not mean chaos. The Fetterman fight, Rosebud and LBH all show large bodies of Indians working together. The Indians as a whole clearly saw tactical developments on the battlefield and reacted to it.
b. Inspirational leaders. Indian leaders had little command authority. Their ability to lead was based on previous reputation, leadership within a society, and primarily inspirational. It was definitely 'do as I do' leadership.
c. Tactical ability. Note that the techniques used to inspire troops for a charge showed great tactical ability. Bravery runs in both Keough and LSH areas clearly identified seams between companies, dead ground, assembly areas, and undefended avenues of approach.
5. Control. Even though the Indians seem to operate in chaos, there is evidence they had control measures.
a. Deep security. The Indians kept patrols watching the Gibbon and Crooke columns. They were not watching the Rosebud, assuming it was clear since they had just been their.
b. Close security. The societies established guards in the camps and on the perimeter. Wolf Tooth and crew had to sneak past these guards the night before the battle.
c. Reaction plan. The Indians had a plan in place for a surprise attack. The pony herds were driven in. Messengers were rapidly sent throughout the camps, and out into the surrounding country. Wolf Tooth was recalled by one of these messengers. AN interesting aspect of control is that guards and messengers remained in place in the circles, even as the main body reacted to the primary threat.
d. Example. So when Custer showed up in the north there were sufficient designated guards to defend his approach. Designated messengers rapidly went out, bringing in uncommitted warriors and recalling the Indians in the south. The LACK of a hierarchy gave the Indians a faster response time than US forces. The Indians understood the concept of defend the village. When Custer became the closest target to the village he became the main threat, and everyone acted accordingly.
e. Security and Reserve.. Note that the Indians always maintained sufficient forces in the valley to react to a renewed Reno/Benteen advance. They would have plenty of time to warn the village three miles away of another attack. Whether by accident or design, there were hundreds of Indians in the village who fought neither Reno nor Custer.
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Post by montrose on Mar 21, 2011 16:40:47 GMT -6
I had another "ghost" post. See previous post on this thread. The post does not appear on the recent posts function, nor if you check the Battle theories section. If you check the thread itself, and scroll to end, it appears.
This is the first of three planned posts on Indian C2. I am not as solid on Indian testimony, nor a deep knowledge of Indian customs and society for the 1870s Plains Indians. I am going to open the culture box, and would appreciate help from smart folks on the various disciplines I will touch.
As an example of something I will explore later, the Plains Indians grew from a horseless warrior society. The horse came in with the Spanish, and reached these tribes about 150ish years ago. The Plains Indians had numerous cultural standards and procedures that follow from their horseless past.
For example, one tradition of the Sioux was for a warrior to wear a sash on his waist that had a ten foot trail. In battle the end of the sash was staked into the ground. The warrior was expected to hold his position, unless a fellow warrior hit him with a quirt. He had to be symbolically "whipped" to retreat.
This tradition makes sense in a dismounted society. It makes no sense in a horse based society.
As an additional note, the Sioux were originally from farther east, Bears country (NFL Bears). SO they also had traditions that made sense in forests. The forced shift west and the addition of horses caused a massive change in the norms and procedures of Sioux (and Cheyenne) society.
This is really the story of the Sioux/Cheyenne Revolution of Military Affairs. They were forced into terrain very different from what their ancestors had faced over the previous 5000 years. Then they had to adapt to an animal, the horse, that was a recent addition to their continent. Now add in boomsticks.
They had an ability to adapt and improvise. They clobbered the tribes that had previously owned this area. When is the earliest Sioux known occupancy of the Black Hills? 1800?
I think the Sioux and Cheyenne had an ability to adapt, react, and overcome that is lost in the historical tradition of savages. The problem is that they were catching up with technology a century behind the West. But compared to their Native American peers, the Sioux and Cheyenne were much more capable of responding to new technology.
I have a few accounts of tribal social and cultural influences. I plan to state my findings, rather than repeat numerous accounts. I know we have folks smart on tribal history, culture, traditions, etc. If I get something wrong, call me a knucklehead, and tell me where to go look. I will not get this right the first time. (Probably not the second, either).
Can someone do me a favor? Please tell me if you can see my post before this one. It is post 37 on this thread.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 21, 2011 17:39:25 GMT -6
I've had the same problem, where you hit 'post' and it freezes, and after entire species of insects evolve, flourish and die out, it either FINALLY takes to the next screen or you kill it and start again, resulting in double entries. Or not. It doesn't want to lull you into a false sense of security. I blame Merkel, because she's a girl and unreliable. (Reference: FEDEX restraining order regarding tarantulas and decomposing armadillo, numbers 45-49. Oh, let's not go there....)
My solution.....I'll wait while you get a pen.
My solution is, when you finish a post, any post, highlight and copy it. Hit post. If it does not post, or freezes, get out of your browser, re-enter, get back to here and just past and post it again. At that time, look above and see if it posted the first time. If so, it doesn't mean squat, or that anyone other than you will ever see it, or it could mean everyone sees it, but rather that worry about it, delete it. You've just posted it again and that works on all counts.
Back slowly away from the keyboard, intoning Minoan chants of praise to the principalities of the cosmos. Steve and Edna, especially.
I can see the post before this, which appears to be a repeat of your opening post.
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Post by fred on Mar 21, 2011 19:17:37 GMT -6
I think what is happening is that it appears on the other boards.
I haven't "lost" any, but I have had dupes show up. Then, if you eliminate one of the dupes, the post doesn't show up in the "30 most wanted" list. Tsk, tsk!
I do like the "copy-and-save" techniques, however. I have lost no additional hair because of it.
And of course there is never any trouble with the shorter, more mindless posts. It only happens to those where you're trying to make a point.
Hey! I have a great idea! Maybe Diane should invite Conz to return. Maybe all this insanity will drive him sane. You never know.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by zekesgirl on Mar 21, 2011 19:21:32 GMT -6
If this would drive conz insane, would we notice?
(tacky, rude, and impolite, but......)
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 22, 2011 6:58:37 GMT -6
So where do we start on the Indian C&C. Great post William. I can see #37
My observation is that in regards to tactics the Indians emulate a lot of wildlife and especially predators. Predators pick and chose when they will expend energy and stop attacking at a certain point. A pack or individual animal may give up depending on how much fight the prey species exhibits.
Sometimes the Indians take on prey species characteristics. Most prey that run away calm down after the run and go back to a normal life. The animals do not assume the predator would constantly be following them.
So my suggestion is that without formal training the Indians lived and observed tactics of wildlife and deployed them. I understand the Indian structure is more complicated because humans do things that we don't see in wildlife but some of the trigger points for a predator to attack and wildlife in general can be observed at LBH.
Reno running at high speed is similar to prey fleeing.
Custer dividing into smaller size units which is what a predator would try to do to a larger group.
Attacking the family in general will find out how many will fight and not just the warriors.
The dominant animal in a pack to attacks. The rest follow the leader.
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Post by Diane Merkel on Mar 22, 2011 8:19:51 GMT -6
If this would drive conz insane, would we notice? (tacky, rude, and impolite, but......) True!
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 22, 2011 8:44:36 GMT -6
I don't think they could have a Command and Control and still be Indians. Such would be against their culture, the sublimation of will and personal connection to the spirit world.
It's been mentioned before, but this isn't just an Indian issue. The side that is organized for war, as opposed to just a series of battles for horses and macho displays, has deep cultural organizations, communication and record keeping abilities and industry and mind sets in place. The colonies had them in place and utilized them against the British, who were distracted, disdainful, delusional and so lost.
The Irish and Scots and the Confederacy were of the same problem mind sets. They did not grasp the significance of central power till too late if at all, and this is what led to their chronic defeats. The Scots, though, admitted defeat, and they became the warriors of the enemy British Empire through World War Two. The British officer corps sometimes read like a Scottish registry, western Canada is named for everything Scot, and in that regard they were like the Indians, who even today have a huge percentage of military vets in service to their former oppressors. The Scots also understood how the Indians felt and emotionally were with them, which is what Sitting Bull felt and what the Mounties often operated under.
I don't think we appreciate how insightful, brilliant, and alone Osceola, Tecumseh, Metacom all felt in their lifetime when the people they were trying to protect wouldn't shape up and get it together. They accurately sensed the issues and understood at first contact what the whites were about. Other Indians, Scots, Irish were more interested in cuddling up to the big powers to side with them against their own people of different tribes and families, whom they hated far more than the white folk with all these nifty weapons.
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