|
Post by Mike Powell on Feb 24, 2011 10:08:20 GMT -6
(3) Command versus scout leader. Custer's move north shows he was thinking like a scout, not a commander. As he kept moving north he showed less and less regard for what was behind him. This may make sense as you approach an enemy force. But he was no longer approaching, he was bypassing the enemy. His follow on units would have to deal with the enemy main body, and he did not warn them that they would have to fight the enemy to reach him.
(4) Custer did not act like a commander on 25 June. At first I thought that LBH was an aberration. It seems totally out of touch with his LBH performance. But then you have to consider that he faced a very different enemy and ACW was 11 years ago. He showed a pattern of behavior that set the conditions for LBH. Not just for himself, but for his unit.
I've read little, call it nil, on Custer and the ACW. I find this thread very provocative and it leads me:
(1) To ask if there were instances during the Civil War when he functioned as a commander in a manner completely different from that manner at LBH, as proposed above? That is, did he ever perform successfully as a commander, under circumstances as uncertain and difficult as he found in Montana? And:
(2) To ask if his actions at LBH were an aberration or had the man benefited solely from his personal bravery and good fortune for an entire career?
|
|
|
Post by locoweed on Feb 24, 2011 10:51:18 GMT -6
Benteen and Dark Cloud,
1. I agree with Benteen that dismounting a cavalryman does not produce a trained infantry soldier or officer.
2. As I stated, the definition of dragoon, cavalry troop and mounted infantry unit changed throughout the 1800's -- both as regards to tactics and weaponry. Indeed, during the northern plains Indian wars several companies in Crook's and Miles commands were called mounted infantry.
3. Many changes occurred during the Civil War. Name change from dragoon to cavalry to be sure. The real Civil War change was tactical as cavalry evolved from a support function to a major attack unit. Custer was course a major beneficiary of this change.
4. The main issue for me is not how a unit is named but how it is used. If primary weaponry cannot be easily used on horseback, then the function devolves to a dismounted engagement -- an very inefficient use of horse soldiers. So I guess one could say there could be dragoons, mounted infantry and dismounted cavalry.
5. Remember, the single shot Springfield carbines were not easily used on horseback. They were were meant for dismounted use, which was mitigated by longer range accuracy.
6. Dark Cloud mentioned Washita. The weaponry here is different that Little Big Horn. At Washita, Custer's men were largely armed with the reasonably reliable, 1860 Civil War Colt (with a few having Remingtons), a very small number of sabers, and the repeating Spencer carbines. The key is that their primary weapons, the Spencer carbine, was easily usable from horseback.
7. The saber issue is odd. Plains commanders disliked the weapon because it was noisy and cumbersome. Some officers defied orders by modifying (really, mutilating) the scabbards and other tact to reduce noise. Thus, swords may not be a major clue as to the tactical use of the troops.
8. The sage remark that cavalry has little defensive function is highlighted when one observes that the 7th's primary weapon was designed to be used on foot.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 24, 2011 13:03:25 GMT -6
I'm at sea here. I'm not sure weaponry means squat in this instance, but I say that as a civvy. By this I mean insufficiently trained soldiers/marines with stone knives or auto weapons like chain guns against experienced warriors with whatever they used may not achieve much different results, given they'd waste ammo and any advantage early on, and experienced enemies adapt quick.
I think AZ and others have pointed out that not only was the 7th equipped with better weapons for the mission at the Washita, but the 7th itself was better with young(er), enthused, and competent officers and some CW vets in the ranks, at least more than the percentage at LBH. Also, better horse training and perhaps better horses. Although it seems rather sad and pathetic, if the Sioux didn't bolt and run, there was no less than hilarious Plan B, or second serve, or chance in hell.
And, I recall Fussell's point that after 250 days of combat (not service), soldiers were so cautious if not traumatized that it nearly mandated all the unit's future casualties were its enthused/scared newbies, and progress would be slow, and an unspoken mission was the preservation of the nucleus of vets. That made sense to me. I can imagine such a group with unenthused snowbirds plus newbies and all insufficiently trained with no common actions together would be a problem at something like LBH.
Again, I'm pretty sure that Buford and his ilk, like Keogh, were of the impression that weaponry mandated dragoon tactics for the mounted troopers, and that cavalry charges were dangerous, rarely beneficial, and passe. When combat becomes a melee as opposed to controlled lines, firearms become less beneficial and the more advanced and even the more numerous side loses advantage or gains risk, however phrased.
This comes down to the realization that personal bravery, honor, and combat victory could be counterproductive to winning the war, and the goals of knights/hussars/cavalry had departed from national goals, which was peace for trade and wealth.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 24, 2011 18:13:27 GMT -6
The carbine by design is 10 inches shorter in the barrel in order facilitate firing from horseback so I disagree that it would be difficult to use the carbine horseback if they trained properly. The 1874 United States Army Tactics teaches how to fire the carbine mounted.
The commands in the Manual of Carbine, Mounted
Advance Carbine, Load Carbine, Ready, Aim, Fire, start over from Advance Carbine if continuing to shooting
Drop Carbine to put the Carbine away
The firing is done while mounted with alternate odd and even number firing from the halt (636)and while advancing (637).
The revolver was used at the charge or the saber if available.
I think the advancing carbine fired alternately would be very effective and at much greater distances then the revolver with only slightly less firing each time as compared to dismounted troopers since all 4 in a set remained mounted.
There is a different story if the troops have not been trained and practiced sufficient to be combat ready.
Some officers and NCOs brought rifles and they were not much harder to carry. The mounted rifles would be an example of troops trained to use a horse for transportation then dismount and fight on foot as infantry.
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Feb 25, 2011 14:36:59 GMT -6
1. Command and control. Command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done, and sees to it that appropriate action is taken. Command is the exercise of authority. Control is feedback of the action taken, allowing adjustments to take place to focus on attaining goal.
2. Command. Previous discussions have examined many aspects of command. This includes location of commander, delegation to subordinates, number and type of command posts etc.
3.Control. The purpose of this post is to look at controlling measures.
4. Orders. Clear and decisive orders are the starting place for establishing control. Orders establish task organization, missions of subordinate units, communications procedures, and alternate and contingency plans. The official records of the ACW have some well written orders, in particular Lee and Grant.
a. Alternate and contingency plans are particularly important . By giving guidance in advance, subordinates do not have to go back to the commander for guidance. They already have orders on what to do.
b. Fragmentary Order (FRAGO). A FRAGO is a shorthand method to rapidly change existing orders. The Martini note is a FRAGO.
5. LBH. Custer faced an awkward situation on 25 Jun.
a. Enemy. He was seeing small Indian elements as he approached the village. He believed he had been detected and Indian sentries were en route to the village. He was under time pressure and did not know exact location of the village and its defenders.
b. Task organization and synchronization.. Custer established the Bns with Cooke. A meeting with the BN CDRs would have immensely helped synchronize the unit.
c. Communication of orders to subordinate units was a problem. Benteen was sent on a separate mission, but Reno and McDougall were not informed of his orders. When Reno was committed to an attack, no notification was sent to McDougall and Benteen. When Custer left Keough and went north, Reno, Benteen, and McDougall had no way of knowing this.
d. Deferred decision. Custer was winging his attack plan. He lacked the basic information on village and warriors required for an attack plan before 3411.
e. Benteen and Reno were both sent on a movement to contact. They did not know location of the village when they were committed. Reno's attack order was based on a fleeing band of Indians.
f. Critical decision point. The decision to launch Reno was a crucial decision. An officer's call would be natural to explain to key leader's what the plan was. Instead Custer sent Cooke with the attack order.
Confusion was introduced immediately. Reno and others thought that he was an advance guard. This means the Regiment follows Reno down the valley, and responds to any contact developed by Reno.
However, Custer instantly moved north, showing he intended some type of flank attack from the east side of the river.
No notification was sent to the Benteen and McDougall battalions.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 26, 2011 9:18:49 GMT -6
I am following you so far William. It also seems to me that if Custer knew how many Indians were willing to fight Crook it might have changed (Blink)his decision making.
My question is what did he ignore at critical decision making points? I see the sending of someone to Benteen and I have commented in the past that it would have sped up Benteen's return.
For McDougall would he tighten up the pack train and move some of his company in the advance?
(For those interested in speeds of the pack train if the lead mules are 2 miles ahead of the rear when they first stop at the morass the overall speed is higher for the lead mules but if they tighten up the overall speed becomes that of the slower animals)
I think there is more missing such as William is bringing up on control. When Custer sent Reno why not give him information that he might move down the other side of the river?
Steve
|
|
|
Post by fred on Feb 26, 2011 12:22:23 GMT -6
It also seems to me that if Custer knew how many Indians were willing to fight Crook it might have changed (Blink) his decision making. Will's posts are really thought - provoking and challenging. I have not had the time to look into this "Blink" thing, so I don't know what it all refers to and I have not even managed to read all of Will's work yet. I wonder, however, if Custer would have done anything differently had he known of the Crook fight. I know we do not want to get into an "obey - disobey" battle again, but I have been reading and re-reading a number of accounts written by or told by the enlisted men, and they all seem to agree that Custer disobeyed his orders. Rather than get embroiled in that controversy, however, it seems to me that regardless, this was Custer's mind-set. I have speculated in the past that Custer-- ensconced in his tent during much of the afternoon of the 24th-- was mulling over his option of joining up with Terry and that he may have been misleading his officers as to his true intent, i. e., attack ASAP or wait for a joint action. I am, as I said, speculating here, but it is interesting nonetheless... did Custer finally decide that once he crossed the divide he really had to hide out and await Terry's advance? It seems to me that he jumped at the suggestion from his scouts-- who he has been largely ignoring up to this point-- that surprise had been lost and he had to attack as he did. Maybe his decision-making process was moving from the ambivalent to the firm and back again, finally reversing a decision he had made to himself some time on the 24th. It is widely believed that some 1,000 to 1,200 warriors attacked Crook. Custer believed he might meet as many as 1,500, though he seemed to rely more on the original fable of some 800. If my speculation is anywhere near correct, 1,200 would have only spurred him on. I think, everything, Steve. There are too many red herrings thrown at us by the "glory-seekers" and I think they cloud our understanding. Kanipe, for example. Take what I call the "Phantom 100," those Indians we hear no more about other than through Kanipe's musings... and maybe that other paradigm, Martini's parroting. (This post - 5-year - after - the - battle - testimony so many rely on [check out the Kanipe spillage on the other board] drives me crazy! This is your fault, Darkcloud!) Is that what changed Custer's mind from supporting Reno directly to staging an end-run to the Styx? Or is it-- as I believe-- Gerard's-- and Herendeen's reports of Sioux coming up the valley to meet Reno, i. e., the classic issue of a screen setting up to protect fleeing families? This smacks of anxiousness... not anxiety, but anxiousness. A difference. The itch! The scent! It was this kind of thing that knocked Custer off his game... or was he always like that and the LBH was just too big a bite? This is also one of the main reasons I believe this whole fracas was over and done with so quickly. Three hours, start to finish; 4 1/2 if you want to count the divide separation. And is this all why Custer never communicated his intentions to anyone? Are you referring to Martini here? Or something earlier? Earlier would have been useless, for I see Custer moving too quickly and having too much faith in Benteen's savvy... no quarry, no more wasted effort. I think he did, certainly along Reno Creek once he extricated the stuck mules and caught up with Mathey. Plus, despite Benteen's later ire at Mathey, old Frenchie did a very commendable job with that train. Another thing... as he mounted the bluffs, McDougall split his company into platoons-- the only known use of that formation during the entire battle-- placing one in the advance and one to protect the rear of the trains. I don't think he had it at the time, though that doesn't excuse Custer's not sending a message back to Reno that the support would be lacking. That business of a so-called "flank" attack as support is nothing more than rationalization [see the RCOI and Moylan's testimony] and an attempt to vindicate Custer along with Reno. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Feb 26, 2011 12:26:22 GMT -6
By the way, Diane... these Pro-boards guys really need your help. This is an on-going issue. Long posts are just being bounced, then duplicated constantly. This shorty should take at first click and will show up in the "recent 30," but the post before it won't.
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by bc on Feb 26, 2011 15:06:07 GMT -6
There was a point where Reno and Custer rode along together at talked. They also may have talked at the first village/lone tepee site. There is also the issue of other messengers such as Goldin and Thompson's crow scout. I still think that Reno knew more about Custer's plans than he later let on. After he lost his cool and retreated, Reno was defending himself. Probably a courtmartial for sure if he said he was supposed to attack and fix the NAs.
I think they were chasing a small vill/group of NAs down Reno creek who were a couple miles ahead. I think Custer knew where the main village was at the Crow's nest as well. Problems would arise if this group moved south at the river or if there were more in the coulees to the south of Reno creek, hence the necessity to send Benteen to the left.
Why do you think Benteen was so mad for being sent to the left? It's because they knew and talked about the main vill being north of Reno Creek. He was also mad cause he wanted the advance to pursue the NAs ahead of them down Reno Creek.
bc
|
|
|
Post by fred on Feb 26, 2011 17:47:07 GMT -6
BC, I think for the very first time I have known you, I do not agree with a word in your post... or at least I disagree with most of it. There was a point where Reno and Custer rode along together at talked. They also may have talked at the first village/lone tepee site. This is untrue... in general. Eye-witness accounts say the two never really spoke, though one participant said they met very briefly, which I believe but which I interpret as mere moments and certainly not long enough for Custer to convey any detailed plans... had he had any, which I do not believe he did. Then... or ever.
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 26, 2011 22:34:23 GMT -6
What Fred said, but:
"I still think that Reno knew more about Custer's plans than he later let on." That says more about you than Reno. There's no evidence. None.
"After he lost his cool and retreated, Reno was defending himself." Virtually everyone there says the decision to retreat/charge out was a good one. What level of 'cool' would be appropriate, and would it be sufficient to get the numbers he did out? Again, if anyone can show a method utilizing only what Reno could have known at the time which would result in fewer casualties, show it. Otherwise, you have no standing to condemn him. None.
"Probably a courtmartial for sure if he said he was supposed to attack and fix the NAs." Based on what? He did attack and fix the NA's. There's a window of opportunity, not a perpetual status of opportunity, that such affords any supporting force. Custer didn't know the size or exact location of his enemy, could not have known, so that's a bs charge of the first water.
"I think....." is valueless, especially when jonesing up a courtmartial for a combat officer. You have to prove it or have a shred of evidence for it. You have none. They could not have known exactly where the village was, since the geography blocked it and the pony herd only suggested its existence somewhere in the vicinty.
"Why do you think Benteen was so mad for being sent to the left?" What coldly objective source says he was? And when did that tale appear?
|
|
|
Post by fred on Feb 27, 2011 6:29:15 GMT -6
At the urging of "blaque," I have been re-reading-- or maybe even reading fully for the first time!-- some of the narratives left behind by enlisted personnel.
I am sorry, but I have my own little personal prejudices and usually when I read stories of EM being all buddy-buddy with officers or enlisted men pontificating about tactics, I glaze over. Officers go through all sorts of tactical training, whether it be classroom work or field exercises and while I have always maintained that tactics consist of a very strong dose of common sense-- maybe an area where enlisted guys are more adept-- this is an area of expertise where people look to officers more than EM.
Having bloviated enough, I have always led my life realizing I cannot be the best at everything and when I have other assets I damn well better use them. With that in mind, I never eschewed the advice of any of my enlisted men. So while I would rely on Fred Benteen's judgment about such things more than PVT Slaper's or PVT Sivertsen's, I would never rule out completely the opinions of the latter... especially if and when they confirm what I believe to be the truth and there are no blatantly contradictory challenges.
So... look at what William Slaper had to say:
1. Slaper felt that had Reno not moved out of the timber when he did they would have all met the same fate as Custer. 2. Slaper said he admired Reno and that “he did not seem to be at all ruffled.” Slaper said he saw Reno twice in the river bottom. [That probably meant during the valley fighting, not during the retreat.] 3. He saw Reno several times during the night of the 25th, walking about, keeping the men awake. 4. Slaper said he had read several articles written after the battle claiming that Reno was drunk. “This I brand as a lie. At no time did I observe the least indication of drunkenness on the man, nor see him use any liquor.” 5. Slaper did not recall Peter Thompson, per se, and said that Thompson’s “story of his wandering about from place to place after he got back with Reno is beyond my belief. He would not have been allowed to wander around as he says he did…. What he tells of seeing Custer’s men fighting is beyond credence, and what he has to say about Major Reno are flat lies.”
Some of this contradicts other's memories, tales, narratives, etc. William O. Taylor's little story comes to mind: Reno was behind the line as they moved down the valley [the only such memory recall]; Reno drank a brown liquid from a flask... wowzie! Great eye-sight!... and other stuff.
Of course Slaper's saying "leave the timber" versus other's saying "stay" is a horserace, but since Slaper's falls more in line with the tactical doctrine of men like Callwell and von Clausewitz, I might tend to believe them before I believed the spittle of people like Conz.
I am not sure when Slaper or Sivertsen wrote these narratives, but I found both of them extraordinary and chock full of great information.
If anyone wants, I can post both the profiles on their own threads over in that other section.
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 27, 2011 7:39:42 GMT -6
Will's posts are really thought - provoking and challenging. I have not had the time to look into this "Blink" thing, so I don't know what it all refers to and I have not even managed to read all of Will's work yet. I wonder, however, if Custer would have done anything differently had he known of the Crook fight.Fred I am sure William knows more about the subject than just the book Blink. In the book it talks about - decisions made vary quickly can be every bit as good as decisions made cautiously and deliberately
- When should you trust your instincts and when should you be wary of them
- snap judgments can be educated and controlled
Custer's luck may have not have been luck at all just a good read in an instant. Now if you change players, attitudes toward them, and/or conditions then your snap judgments can lead to wrong decision making. This is done unconscious in the brain which gives it the speed. I know I am not doing the book justice in a short discussion but maybe it is clue. For me as a trainer, which means old officer, getting officers to make accurate snap judgments is a good thing. Being able to help them identify when to be wary of their instincts sometimes and how to educate and control even better. So I believe the Crook information could fit into the "educate snap judgment" and maybe cause Custer to be wary of his instincts. I don't know and it doesn't matter what I think. It does explain to me how one continues to reach decision points and not know it or make wrong decisions. Steve
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Mar 1, 2011 8:12:38 GMT -6
Since Steve raised the issue, let us look at Custer's decision making.
1.Haste. Custer's decision were rapid. He did not form an orders group. His orders were brief.
2. Reno's attack. The target of Reno's attack was a group of fleeing Indians. The order reached Reno second hand, though Cooke. It is significant that Custer did not take time to brief Reno and his officers.
Reno's attack ran into the main body of the warriors, and approached the main village itself. Custer would not have known location of village when he launched Reno.
Reno's orders do not seem to have covered hitting the enemy main body. Reno's force was far too small to fight this force. Reno's move out of the valley was not elegant, but it was move or die.
Custer should have taken a few minutes to brief Reno and the three company commander's on his plan. It is a certainty that these officers would want to know what Benteen and McDougall were doing, and how Custer intended to support their attack. Order groups are a two way process.
The reason leaders 2 levels down are included in orders group is to understand commander's intent. This is a time saving measure, a crtical task when haste is desired. Otherwise Reno would have to convene his own orders group, repeating much of what was just ordered.
Five minutes of thinking right here could have prevented the disaster that followed to both commands.
3. 3411. Custer saw the valley fight from 3411. He had been notified by 4 messengers that the Indians were in front of Reno in force.
Now we can see Custer's behavior. He did not regard the Indian action as a threat to his regiment. He saw it as an opportunity for action. He moved north, leaving Reno to his own resources. He assumed Reno could manage against the Indian main body.
It would be interesting to know what would have happened if Custer left an observation post on the bluffs. Would his behavior change if he knew Reno was defeated?
4. Ford B. I hold to the theory that Custer conducted a reconnaissance of Ford B with the Yates BN, with the Keough Bn staying on Nye/Cartwright to hold off small force of Indians to their east and southwest. If these small Indian elements were not present, Custer may have gone on a leader's recon by himself, or with just a runner.
What he saw was a small defense force at the ford area, with an emptying village. Many were moving north, others west. Of course the folks going west were getting their ponies, but he could have interpreted this as flight.
5. Calhoun Hill. Custer moved to Calhoun Hill, where he had Keough join him. Keough's move appears to be pre arranged. Custer had probably told him in advance, based on some signal from Custer.
Custer's move to ford D makes no sense if there was any threat from the village. This indicates a time gap as Indians were slow to react to the new threat. And in this low threat time gap, Custer made a bad decision: go scout ford D.
6. The lethal pause. Custer waited an estimated 20 minutes at the north end of Battle Ridge after returning from Ford D. During these 20 minutes the Keough Bn was defeated. Custer thought everything was under control. He had met minimal opposition at Ford D, and was seeing minimal opposition in his area. This was because Indian main body was in the Keough sector.
7. Custer's bad luck. At each decision point, Custer saw tactical weakness and opportunity. He kept moving away before the Indians counter actions to his moves. But this is not really an accident. Custer's instincts loom large here. He kept taking a peak at the enemy, backing off, and taking another peak while steadily circling north.
His effort to seek a better opening for an attack strung his regiment all over the battlefield. His plan was at risk if the Indians could interfere with the widely separated piece behind him, which is what happened.
The whole point of this thread has been that weak command and control procedures by the regiment materially contributed to the disaster. This aspect of Custer is very consistent with his ACW record.
If the commander is not available to make a decision, then command and control processes help subordinates make decisions. As Custer kept splitting his force into smaller and smaller pieces, he created a problem. Since Custer kept scouting what information was developed was known to less and less people. Changes to regimental plans were not transmitted to the rest of the force.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Mar 2, 2011 11:42:23 GMT -6
You may want to check previous post. It is not showing on recent posts, for whatever reason.
1. Terrain control features. Terrain can be used to set control on movements.
a. Limit of Advance. A terrain feature can be used to set the distance a unit moves. This prevents a unit from out running its support. AT the Fetterman fight, Lodge TRail Ridge was designated as a limit, beyond which no pursuit was allowed. (At least, according to Carrington and his supporters).
Reno's objective was not based on terrain. He was ordered to chase a band of Indians. What order did Custer give Reno if this chase led to the Indian village? Custer failed to follow Reno's attack, and therefore Custer was in no position to react to developments.
b. Axis of advance. The valley formed a natural avenue of advance for Reno. There were bluffs on both sides of the valley, channelling his attack. Reno used the river itself to protect his right flank.
The tactical error was that Reno's force could not cover the valley, and the left flank was hanging in the air. This was compounded when Custer moved to the right, which was protected by bluffs and river, and posed no threat.
The Indians took advantage of Reno's exposed left flank to swing down behind him. He was cut off from Ford A, and Indians were trying to reach the river behind him to trap his force.
Respectfully,
William
|
|