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Post by Dark Cloud on Dec 29, 2010 11:26:08 GMT -6
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/28/AR2010122804334.html?hpid=topnewsCannot help myself. AZ, benteeneast over at the other board, is - yet again - demolishing 'keogh' and 'conz' who are simply making stuff up and deliberately editing quotes when they don't say what they want, which is an attitude of 'keogh's' carried over to his edits of posters, I read. Yet again, new posters with experience and of an honest nature are just shredding them. Good, good, good to see. But at some point such records of falsehood, deliberate distortion, and lies - there's no other word - have to be subjected to valuation.
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Post by Melani on Dec 29, 2010 23:16:40 GMT -6
You know, it's not actually a contest...
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 2, 2011 13:25:20 GMT -6
On the other board, it's fun to watch the sadder elements of the past try to reinvent themselves, ala Wiggs, and under new names suddenly find courage to take on fred, benteeneast, and others from what they hope is safety. (Confusing Kanipe with Keogh is just an added element of entertainment.) Just like those new posters who emerge here and there both to be nothing but shills for someone.
A recent post illustrates the historical ignorance of those vectored in on detail and truth.
It was was written by a Major Timothy Karcher, US Army, called “Understanding the Victory Disease from the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond.” He states in his preface: “The disease, by definition, brings defeat to a previously victorious Nation or military due to three basic symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and the habit of using established patterns to solve military problems.”
I find it more than interesting that he used the LBH to help develop his thesis on his three key points: arrogance, complacency, and using established patterns. All three seem to apply to GAC on this particular day in June.
I would really appreciate hearing what the military veterans think about this, as it makes a lot of sense to me.
This is from sfchemist, who is apparently a pharmacist as he says he was in the military.
What bothers me is that he seems to find the concept of Victory Disease new to himself, unaware of its weathered and ancient use. It was used widely by the Japanese themselves to describe their overreach in WWII, and was applied to Napoleon and in variations way back.
He says he finds it 'interesting' that LBH was utilized. I do as well, and although I have not read the paper he references, I do so for the opposite reason he finds it so. And this, because victory disease is not illustrated by battle but by war.
I think the LBH was chosen because it is easy to use for the ill informed by the ill informed, as the term as applied to a mind set does not exclude the possibility of loss in battle, and it surely does it reference individual battles but war. The Japanese were rebuked at Wake for a bit, and then clobbered it. Kursk and Stalingrad, the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan and loss at sea did not alter the German strain of victory disease. Battle losses are entertained by those suffering from this disease. It bothers me that the soldier who is quoted seems to think he's inventing a term and applying it to individual battles without knowing it's an old term long in use to describe the strategic blunders of nations at war.
In fact, such illness is often only felt as a form of racism or extreme cultural delusion, something the Nazis and Imperial Japanese were surely guilty of. They're just smarter and better in their own minds and, like 'class' in the cliche, this will tell out. Somehow. But, it doesn't. At all. This why the Schlieffen Plan of the Kaiser, based upon the heroic Hannibal's brilliance at Cannae, didn't seem to reflect that while he won the battle, he really lost the war badly due to that win.
The US Army had lost not a few of the small skirmishes often elevated to the term 'battle' with the Native Americans. The Seminole War, Red Cloud, and the Minnesotta campaign all had bad moments, but the inevitability of 'victory' never left our collective minds. This made the fiascos in the Philippines and chasing Villa hard to take or understand, and why did not impress the Europeans in WWI as much as ourselves. "We won the War!" was a religion and totally nonsensical in the hard reality of history.
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Post by hiswillingshill on Jan 2, 2011 13:28:36 GMT -6
You're just so brilliant and insightful. And everyone here is so intuitive! I'm going to send a semaphore signal (I WATCH FOX NEWS!!!! I WATCH FOX NEWS!!!!!) so that we can continue to feel safe. I don't know that seven moderators are enough.......
Wait. Where am I?
But, really, just brilliant!!!!!!!!!!! The more exclamation points, the better, right?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 2, 2011 14:45:54 GMT -6
So, I went to the paper and read it. As with previous papers offered up by the military, it is full of error and certainty where none COULD exist, and even though he draws valuable conclusions I again call attention to the habit of providing detail as intimidation rather than fact. He has a fair amount wrong, and since it's an official paper that should not be tolerated.
1. "Thus, the winter roamers were believed to be composed of only 800 warriors spread across a variety of smaller villages since feeding a large village was difficult during the winter." Page 8. Is that remotely true? I remember 1500 being tossed about a lot. Is this just referencing the pre-Reynolds mindset?
2. "Although this engagement was not extremely consequential, Crook failed significantly by not informing Terry and Gibbon of his battle, the aggressiveness of the Indians, or of the large force of warriors encountered."
How? Why? That it wasn't expected is shown by the fact Terry did not immediately attempt to inform Crook - whose status could not be known - of Custer's defeat except by the same roundabout method. The land between the two was the object of the campaign and not likely to allow communication.
3. "Custer, with the 7th Cavalry, was to move south up Rosebud Creek, cut west to the headwaters of the Little Bighorn River, and then move north down the river to strike the village from the south."
I don't think cutting west brings you to the headwaters of the LBH, but going way the hell southwest into Wyoming does. I understand what he means, but he exhibits the same breezy attitude of knowledge of which his very paper is supposed to warn.
4. "Again controversy arises since accounts vary about whether Custer’s Indian scouts actually saw the village or simply identified indicators of a village (a pony herd, or smoke from cooking fires)."
There can be no such controversy. We know where exactly the village was and it is physically impossible for it to have been seen virtually anywhere from the Wolf Mountains. They are not remotely visible to this day from the campsite. The bluffs block them.
5. "At approximately noon on Sunday, 25 June 1876, the 7th Cavalry crossed the divide and started the opening stages of the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Just west of the divide, Custer halted the command and gave orders for the upcoming battle’s troop dispositions. Since Custer did not know the exact location and disposition of the enemy, he assembled his forces in a dispersed formation that would allow him to identify the enemy force and then maneuver his element against the village. This formation would also allow the 7th Cavalry to strike the village from more than one direction simultaneously, another commonly believed recipe for success when attacking an Indian encampment."
No, he did not. Reno had no such clue until way after Benteen had left what his command was, if anything. Benteen was not given instructions for an attack on the village, nor was Reno, nor any officer. Custer may have formulated a plan, but he did not share it at that time and it is wrong to imply he had.
6. "Since Custer did not know the exact location and disposition of the enemy, he assembled his forces in a dispersed formation that would allow him to identify the enemy force and then maneuver his element against the village. This formation would also allow the 7th Cavalry to strike the village from more than one direction simultaneously, another commonly believed recipe for success when attacking an Indian encampment."
It did? He sent Benteen well away disregarding the scout's reading of the herd and the smoke as solid indicators of where the village would lie, but that was better than sending Reno to attack it without a clue as to its size or his own ability to support Reno.
7. "Company B and the regimental supply trains were to follow approximately 20 minutes behind the main body. As the mule train was slow and difficult to move, Custer must have known that this 20-minute separation would increase over the necessary 15-mile movement to the Little Bighorn valley. Thus, with his forces divided and limited orders given to his subordinates, Custer moved toward the Indian village."
The train was 'to follow.....20 minutes behind the main body....?' As in it was ordered to do so?
8. "Instead of following Reno’s advance, however, Custer maneuvered his larger battalion along the eastern bank of the Little Bighorn, concealing his movement by traveling along the bluffs east of the river."
Okay, you do not conceal by travelling "along the bluffs", being high ground. You do not conceal by waving to the valley or leading cheers, either, but he doesn't mention those.
9. "Along his route of march, Custer sent two messages back to the pack trains and Benteen’s command to quickly move up and reinforce him."
One, anyway.
10. "During the destruction of Custer’s command, members of Reno’s command attempted to aid their commander. Captain Thomas Weir led his Company D toward the “sound of the guns” and out of the defensive perimeter Reno had established on the bluffs east of the Little Bighorn River."
Again, Reno Hill had not been decided upon as their residence, and Weir may just as likely been hoping to get in on the action and reward as much as 'saving' his commander with the larger force. In any case, Weir's enthusiasm went away, and Custer's command gone by that time.
11. "The surviving two other 7th Cavalry companies spent a fitful night on a hilltop (Reno Hill) east of the Little Bighorn."
Understandable. There had been 7 companies just a bit ago.
12. "In the case of the Little Bighorn, arrogance was evident across all levels of war. A feeling of invincibility that existed at the national level filtered down to the ranks of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and created disdain for its Indian adversary."
Starting with Whitaker, that wasn't true. The soldiers were scared of the Indians. The command was described as morose alternating with enthusiams before the battle. People gave away stuff, wrote wills, did not display surety of victory.
13, "At the tactical level, the 7th Cavalry displayed remarkable overconfidence, clearly demonstrated by how Custer viewed his Indian adversary."
How Custer SAID he viewed it and how he and his men actually did so are not guaranteed the same.
14. "Typically, if the Indians believed the Army was attempting to bring them to battle they would disperse and lead US forces on a fruitless, drawn-out pursuit. This time, instead of following their normal pattern the Indians united, forming an enormous village for protection. At the tactical level, Custer dispersed his forces for two reasons that were grounded in already established patterns of combat formed on previous battlefields, such as the Washita and the Powder River."
First, the battle of Killdeer Mt. exhibited exactly the same mindset, being much the same Indians, as at LBH. He may have based his plan on far too few previous battles and deliberately ignored the one most likely to occur. That's the arrogance, but it's also willing stupidity.
That this was produced by the Army will give it pizazz with those like conz who credit it with all good things. conz himself is the illustrative example for the thesis. It's depressing that something this iffy is issued as authoritative. It isn't.
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Post by markland on Jan 2, 2011 14:47:26 GMT -6
On the other board, it's fun to watch the sadder elements of the past try to reinvent themselves, ala Wiggs, and under new names suddenly find courage to take on fred, benteeneast, and others from what they hope is safety. (Confusing Kanipe with Keogh is just an added element of entertainment.) Just like those new posters who emerge here and there both to be nothing but shills for someone. A recent post illustrates the historical ignorance of those vectored in on detail and truth. It was was written by a Major Timothy Karcher, US Army, called “Understanding the Victory Disease from the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond.” He states in his preface: “The disease, by definition, brings defeat to a previously victorious Nation or military due to three basic symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and the habit of using established patterns to solve military problems.”
I find it more than interesting that he used the LBH to help develop his thesis on his three key points: arrogance, complacency, and using established patterns. All three seem to apply to GAC on this particular day in June.
I would really appreciate hearing what the military veterans think about this, as it makes a lot of sense to me.This is from sfchemist, who is apparently a pharmacist as he says he was in the military. What bothers me is that he seems to find the concept of Victory Disease new to himself, unaware of its weathered and ancient use. It was used widely by the Japanese themselves to describe their overreach in WWII, and was applied to Napoleon and in variations way back. He says he finds it 'interesting' that LBH was utilized. I do as well, and although I have not read the paper he references, I do so for the opposite reason he finds it so. And this, because victory disease is not illustrated by battle but by war. I think the LBH was chosen because it is easy to use for the ill informed by the ill informed, as the term as applied to a mind set does not exclude the possibility of loss in battle, and it surely does it reference individual battles but war. The Japanese were rebuked at Wake for a bit, and then clobbered it. Kursk and Stalingrad, the collapse of the Schlieffen Plan and loss at sea did not alter the German strain of victory disease. Battle losses are entertained by those suffering from this disease. It bothers me that the soldier who is quoted seems to think he's inventing a term and applying it to individual battles without knowing it's an old term long in use to describe the strategic blunders of nations at war. In fact, such illness is often only felt as a form of racism or extreme cultural delusion, something the Nazis and Imperial Japanese were surely guilty of. They're just smarter and better in their own minds and, like 'class' in the cliche, this will tell out. Somehow. But, it doesn't. At all. This why the Schlieffen Plan of the Kaiser, based upon the heroic Hannibal's brilliance at Cannae, didn't seem to reflect that while he won the battle, he really lost the war badly due to that win. The US Army had lost not a few of the small skirmishes often elevated to the term 'battle' with the Native Americans. The Seminole War, Red Cloud, and the Minnesotta campaign all had bad moments, but the inevitability of 'victory' never left our collective minds. This made the fiascos in the Philippines and chasing Villa hard to take or understand, and why did not impress the Europeans in WWI as much as ourselves. "We won the War!" was a religion and totally nonsensical in the hard reality of history. Didn't have your morning Starbucks & tequila did you? Karcher's article can be found at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/csi_karcher_victory.pdfBy my recollection, he is not stating he has defined a new term but was writing a paper on the known problem. The LBH is a valid example of laziness, i.e., building your plans based upon past enemy actions, not capabilities. There is a very good book about Midway from the Japanese perspective, whose plans, while based upon sea warfare, would mirror a certain land battle on June 25, 1876. When I get home, I'll add the name of that book as it is a very good one. Billy
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Post by Melani on Jan 2, 2011 15:01:39 GMT -6
What bothers me is that he seems to find the concept of Victory Disease new to himself, unaware of its weathered and ancient use. Why should it bother you that somebody says he has learned something new? sfchemist is a new member, and has not been trying to say that he is an expert.
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Post by Melani on Jan 2, 2011 15:11:03 GMT -6
5. "At approximately noon on Sunday, 25 June 1876, the 7th Cavalry crossed the divide and started the opening stages of the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Just west of the divide, Custer halted the command and gave orders for the upcoming battle’s troop dispositions. Since Custer did not know the exact location and disposition of the enemy, he assembled his forces in a dispersed formation that would allow him to identify the enemy force and then maneuver his element against the village. This formation would also allow the 7th Cavalry to strike the village from more than one direction simultaneously, another commonly believed recipe for success when attacking an Indian encampment." No, he did not. Reno had no such clue until way after Benteen had left what his command was, if anything. Benteen was not given instructions for an attack on the village, nor was Reno, nor any officer. Custer may have formulated a plan, but he did not share it at that time and it is wrong to imply he had. I don't think the author is implying that Custer explained the reasons for his dispositions; I think he is implying that HE knows the reasons for the division of the command. He may be right, but as you pointed out, Custer did not explain at the time. I think that Custer certainly displayed that sort of arrogance, but you're right about the making of wills, etc. by the lower ranks. Yup. Yup.
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Post by montrose on Jan 2, 2011 20:08:11 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
Your post is one of those "wow" posts that has been on my mind all day.
I am referring to where you state that there could have been different people at different times on the bluffs. Waving hats or not. Observers therfore may have made different sightings of different people at different times. Later analysts assumed only one group on bluffs at one time, and therefore made logic errors in trying to fit testimony into theory.
Totally brilliant.
I may not end up agreeing with you, but I never considered the possibility. So thanks for making me think.
Sfchemist is a good guy. He is new, and trying to learn. I think he would be open to advice from others.
The victory disease thing is from a thesis from Tim. In the transition from CPT to MAJ you have to write a thesis. Because of multiple programs, many have to write two. The point of a thesis is to teach how to think. You lay out a theory and test it. So Tim's theory is kinda thin, but he demonstrated his ability to develop a theory and analyze. He was a very successful officer until wounded. I think Tim is also a stand up guy.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 2, 2011 20:44:24 GMT -6
Assuming you're not being sarcastic, that was kind, but I don't think I'm the first by a long shot of thinking that. Suspect nothing I think happened originated with me. I think Boston hauled his butt north to his brother, did not meet either of the two messengers, and if activity in the valley caught his eye, a brief stop for his horse and a pointless but enthusiastic wave to add command confusion to Reno's horrors, and then he's off. He's a brother, could resemble Custer from afar.
I've always had trouble with these assurances of Custer's concern for keeping dust down and all that when he allowed bugles at certain points, cheers, and marches in full view of the Indians on the flat. If he were that concerned, especially when speed over stealth was an issue after committing Reno, there were other routes and standing tall in the saddle on high points isn't a subtle approach, with pennants and men behind you. But Boston might have thought a hardy wave was something, anyway. Seems like something he might do while taking a breather and satisfying curiosity as to the valley firing.
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Post by montrose on Jan 3, 2011 9:12:12 GMT -6
No, I am not being sarcastic.
The Indian testimony contains similar events that actually took place at different times and places. For example, there were mounted charges in both Keough and Custer sectors. In addition, there were US charges from both sectors.
So one of the challenges in analyzing Indian testimony is lining up which Indian or US charge an Indian witnessed.
One Indian described a hand to hand fight with a US officer (White Bull? Too lazy to look it up right now). I have read in various books that this took place in the Keough and Custer sectors.
So when you raised the point that there could be duplicative events within US testimony, it opened my eyes. It is all about empiricism, how you know what you know.
Since I have had 2 days to think it over, I think Boston on the bluffs is a low probability event. The main body of the regiment never appeared on the bluffs. He was following the main body and was in a hurry.
But it can not be ruled out.
Between you and Fred I am trying to think through Boston's sequencing. I think you are right in that he arrived before any messenger was sent back.
For the record, I am suspicious of Kanipe. I don't think he told the full story of why he went back. In pure speculation, I wonder if he was claiming his horse was worn out, and he wanted to go to the trains for a fresh mount. His company already had 4 stragglers drop out. Since he was going back anyway, he was told to tell the trains to hurry up.
I have seen this type of behavior in Special Forces Assessment and Selection, the Q course, and various operations. Quitters look for a convenient excuse. My other observation is that courage and intestinal fortitude are not a constant. Soldiers have good and bads days with respect to both.
v/r William
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Post by fred on Jan 3, 2011 11:06:15 GMT -6
We have less reason to doubt Martini's story about meeting Boston Custer than we have in doubting Kanipe's "messenger" tale.
In addition, other testimonies, e. g., Edgerly at the morass, McDougall with the packs, along with the attendant timing exercises, support Martini. Also, the trail of the command as it passed near where Custer viewed the valley is not that wide, so it would almost stand to reason that Boston would have viewed the valley, simply because of the noise generated down there.
Again, all these actions involved very fast speeds, which in turn led to equally fast decisions. I doubt Boston and Martini spent more than 30 - 60 seconds together, but I believe the meeting took place and it was certainly after Kanipe and Martini left the main command.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 3, 2011 11:30:06 GMT -6
I'm unaware of any mention by Martini about meeting Boston Custer till years after the fact. Decades.
He changed his story through the years and added to it; we know that from his own mutually exclusive words. He needed to keep the tale fresh and interesting so that he'd get hired to tell it, reasonably. But his testimony, and the reactive followup by Recorder Lee, suggest strongly that the brotherS and the nephew were with Custer in Martini's eyes and memory. That's my evidence, so called, for my belief. But other than late arriving embellishment, what is the proof that it DID happen? While other stories can be more easily ignored that appeared long after, nobody wants to let go of this one.
Fred, I think you're sensing how important that supposed meeting is if, in fact, it did not happen. The speeds are linked to it. And: what happens if, for the giggle, you pretend it didn't happen and do the timing? I understand it's really annoying. Really, I do.
It became immediately part of the canon without much question because it filled in a glurge template that the tale needed, but I think there is much room for question. Mostly, because such a tale would be red meat to the media and it would pressure the tribunal to damn Reno, Whitaker's goal and Lee's. But......nothing. How probable is it that such a tale would not be blared about by Lee if anyone knew of it? If his 'innocent' younger brother could heroically make it through the Indians, why not the rest of the 7th? And, etc.
It burns and pisses me off, but I cannot believe it any more, and I did for a long time. Even so, it's as from the Temple Mount compared to Kanipe's or Thompson's tales.
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Post by fred on Jan 3, 2011 13:20:20 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
I need to get a couple of issues off my chest, so here goes. At the risk of sounding like a pandering "shill," I will be forever grateful to you for your incessant harping on the "nearness" of testimony to the event. Between that and your brow-beating me into reading the RCOI when I did, my entire perspective changed... or at least became more fluid.
While I always felt so many keys to this thing lay in "times" and "timing," it was your rowel that jarred me into activity. So... if this blows up in your face, it will be your own fault. Having said that, you have not put much more on the line than a gut feeling, so I wouldn't expect to see any powder residue and we can have a good laugh over the whole thing.
Incidentally, your "reward"-- such as a hack can make it-- will be forthcoming. I am sure, that with that "reward" and a $5 bill, you can buy an egg-nog latte at Starbuck's... but it is about all I can give.
You are correct; I just double-checked my notes and nowhere does Martini mention Boston until his interview with Walter Camp in 1909-1910. Of course, the line of questioning at the RCOI was not conducive for the issue to be raised and with Martini's obvious lack of ESL skills, still, I am able to cut him a little slack. The lack of those skills-- or a certain nervousness-- is apparent clearly in his bungling of the "1 1/2-mile vs. 1 1/2 hour" issue.
While I like to prick the balloon as much as the next guy, the timing business mitigates against it. Throughout this time-line business I have tried to use reasonable speeds and fit numbing testimonies into slots that make sense and do not distort or radicalize an event. As it is with Boston and his elder brothers, the speeds already come under paroxysms of derision from the likes of "keogh" and "Conz" and while their opinions mean a little less than nothing to me, increasing speeds beyond what I have them would only lead to my own self-doubt.
As it is, starting out where I believe Boston began and coupling that with Edgerly's observations and George Custer's own harried movements, I cannot get Boston Custer to his brothers before Luce Ridge. In addition, Martini claimed to have seen Reno still on a skirmish line, which fits like a hand in a glove with my timing schemes.
As you suggested, I ran a couple of other scenarios without the meeting and it puts Martini too deeply into Cedar Coulee or even into MTC. The problem with that is it would extend Reno's valley fight much too long (I am already convinced completely and without a doubt that Reno was in that valley not for the gratuitous 10 minutes normally allotted him, but for some 33 minutes, dismount to the beginning of the pullback). Martini saw that... fighting in the valley... and if he had been given the note in deep Cedar or MTC, it would have meant Reno was in the valley for an hour or better, and that didn't happen.
Another issue... and this is indicative of what I mean when I say so many of these events are tied in to one another... and further infuriates me when some clowns talk about their "models" and "their timing"... uh-huh!... there were too many Indians... at least 24 that I can account for by name... to let a single rider slip by. Tenuous? Yeah, I'll give you that... but too damn lucky for my liking.
And yet another issue... again, timing is everything!... Martini made no mention of seeing Ree scouts on the hills as he headed back. He mentioned the stragglers, but not the Rees. Yet the Rees were there clearly. They had to be. They had already seen Kanipe and had already been fired on, probably by stragglers. While some of them headed back to Reno Creek, others moved north to Reno Hill and watched the retreat. And none of them mentioned a lone rider heading north.
So, all in all, while harboring similar, though not as sharp, doubts as you, I have not been able to prove it. The Kanipe business rings to me like a foghorn on a foggy night, but I have the ammunition to prove doubt-- not certainty, but doubt-- yet with Martini/Boston Custer, the timing evidence makes it virtually certain they passed one another. Of course, Martini may have embellished the whole meeting business and they may have passed one another by 100 yards or so, but they had to have passed.
By the way, you never answered that other question on the Martini thread.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 3, 2011 13:21:04 GMT -6
Darkcloud,
I need to get a couple of issues off my chest, so here goes. At the risk of sounding like a pandering "shill," I will be forever grateful to you for your incessant harping on the "nearness" of testimony to the event. Between that and your brow-beating me into reading the RCOI when I did, my entire perspective changed... or at least became more fluid.
While I always felt so many keys to this thing lay in "times" and "timing," it was your rowel that jarred me into activity. So... if this blows up in your face, it will be your own fault. Having said that, you have not put much more on the line than a gut feeling, so I wouldn't expect to see any powder residue and we can have a good laugh over the whole thing.
Incidentally, your "reward"-- such as a hack can make it-- will be forthcoming. I am sure, that with that "reward" and a $5 bill, you can buy an egg-nog latte at Starbuck's... but it is about all I can give.
You are correct; I just double-checked my notes and nowhere does Martini mention Boston until his interview with Walter Camp in 1909-1910. Of course, the line of questioning at the RCOI was not conducive for the issue to be raised and with Martini's obvious lack of ESL skills, still, I am able to cut him a little slack. The lack of those skills-- or a certain nervousness-- is apparent clearly in his bungling of the "1 1/2-mile vs. 1 1/2 hour" issue.
While I like to prick the balloon as much as the next guy, the timing business mitigates against it. Throughout this time-line business I have tried to use reasonable speeds and fit numbing testimonies into slots that make sense and do not distort or radicalize an event. As it is with Boston and his elder brothers, the speeds already come under paroxysms of derision from the likes of "keogh" and "Conz" and while their opinions mean a little less than nothing to me, increasing speeds beyond what I have them would only lead to my own self-doubt.
As it is, starting out where I believe Boston began and coupling that with Edgerly's observations and George Custer's own harried movements, I cannot get Boston Custer to his brothers before Luce Ridge. In addition, Martini claimed to have seen Reno still on a skirmish line, which fits like a hand in a glove with my timing schemes.
As you suggested, I ran a couple of other scenarios without the meeting and it puts Martini too deeply into Cedar Coulee or even into MTC. The problem with that is it would extend Reno's valley fight much too long (I am already convinced completely and without a doubt that Reno was in that valley not for the gratuitous 10 minutes normally allotted him, but for some 33 minutes, dismount to the beginning of the pullback). Martini saw that... fighting in the valley... and if he had been given the note in deep Cedar or MTC, it would have meant Reno was in the valley for an hour or better, and that didn't happen.
Another issue... and this is indicative of what I mean when I say so many of these events are tied in to one another... and further infuriates me when some clowns talk about their "models" and "their timing"... uh-huh!... there were too many Indians... at least 24 that I can account for by name... to let a single rider slip by. Tenuous? Yeah, I'll give you that... but too damn lucky for my liking.
And yet another issue... again, timing is everything!... Martini made no mention of seeing Ree scouts on the hills as he headed back. He mentioned the stragglers, but not the Rees. Yet the Rees were there clearly. They had to be. They had already seen Kanipe and had already been fired on, probably by stragglers. While some of them headed back to Reno Creek, others moved north to Reno Hill and watched the retreat. And none of them mentioned a lone rider heading north.
So, all in all, while harboring similar, though not as sharp, doubts as you, I have not been able to prove it. The Kanipe business rings to me like a foghorn on a foggy night, but I have the ammunition to prove doubt-- not certainty, but doubt-- yet with Martini/Boston Custer, the timing evidence makes it virtually certain they passed one another. Of course, Martini may have embellished the whole meeting business and they may have passed one another by 100 yards or so, but they had to have passed.
By the way, you never answered that other question on the Martini thread.
Best wishes, Fred.
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