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Post by crzhrs on Nov 26, 2010 13:51:37 GMT -6
Custer was not the first or last commanding officer with a big ego who felt everything centered around him and his "commentary". All we have to do is look at some of the commanders of WWII and into the Korean War . . . Patton & MacArthur . . . vainglorious men whose comments got them into hot water. Patton's role was reduced to a "decoy" for D-Day and MacArthur eventually got booted out of the military by Truman for one-upping him over policy during the Korean War.
Both Patton & MacArthur had "glorious" military records (especially in there own minds) but eventually were reduced to bit players. If Custer had survived who know where he would have ended up . . .but big egos and big mouths as a military man usually leads you to the trash can of history.
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Reddirt
Full Member
Life is But a Dream...
Posts: 208
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Post by Reddirt on Nov 27, 2010 16:20:27 GMT -6
Please identify an commanding officer of any genre who did or does not have an elevated "ego." Extreme confidence and the ability to toot one's own horn is an intricate part of command. Only in the current "PC" era of warfare does ego and a cavernous mouth take second place to political liberalism that causes the enemy to scoff at our weaknesses.
The "trash can" of history is abundant with losers regardless of how much "garbage" they do or do not utter.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 27, 2010 17:26:57 GMT -6
1) Perhaps because I put in parenthesis it was easy to miss, but I did state the reason Custer did not take the Gatling's 2) As to the first, love him or hate him, I don't think Custer's main concern was ever how tired his troops were. Perhaps its because he had such physical prowess himself that he could go a day with just a nap and still be at peak performance 3) As to the second,I don't believe a General makes "Good Will" gestures to his subordinates. If he told Custer he could have the Cavalry he meant it. If Custer wanted those troops he would have had them Then again I may have misread the intent in your statement and that would not be the first time Ive done that.If I have I assure you that it would be my inability to interpret rather than your ability to explain it Be Well and have a Happy, Healthy, and Safe Thanksgiving Dan 1) We are at cross purposes here Dan. By explanation, I meant WHY the Gatlings would have slowed him down as one of them did Reno. Anyway, we do not really have a disagreement with this matter. 2) Custer was indeed a hard driving commander as some of his 1867 exploits testify too. From the Yellowstone to the Divide however, he marched within the usual parameters for cavalry and in accordance with the 30 mile daily rate he had given to Terry. On 22nd June the 7th marched from 12 noon to 4 p.m., averaging therefore, 3mph. On June 23rd they marched from 5a.m. to 4.30 p.m. covering 33 miles with one brief stop and one longer one, averaging less than 3mph. On June 24th they marched from 5a.m. to reach the Busby bend at 7.45p.m., with stops of one half hour at the sun dance campsite, and a 'noon' halt at 1p.m. (by which time they had covered 16 miles in 8 hours) that lasted 4 hours, which meant that to the Busby bend they had covered 28 miles at less than 2mph. I do not think that anyone can call the march up the Rosebud a drain on men and horses. Of course all the men and horses had marched from Fort Abraham Lincoln and half the regiment had been on Reno's scout, but this was normal for cavalry at that time, so I cannot see how Custer can be singled out for being indifferent to the state of his men and horses. 3) I think you are mistaken here Dan. In his January 1892 letter to Godfrey, Brisbin says as follows: "For it was I who suggested to Terry the putting of all of the cavalry together and going himself in command."After relating the conversation that followed he then quotes Terry as saying to him, "I'll tell you general, what you may do. Go to Custer and offer him your cavalry, and if he says so, we will put the Montana Battalion of the 2nd, and the 7th together."He then relates further conversation then says "This is how Custer came to be offered the battalion of the Second Cavalry." He then related how, in the evening, after Custer had returned to the Far West he (Brisbin) said to Custer, "General, do you feel quite strong enough with your Seventh Cavalry to handle all the Indians you may meet? If not, myself and my officers will be most happy to take service with you. "Custer then said that the 7th could handle anything it meets, thus refusing the offer. At no point did Terry make the offer and at no point does Brisbin say to Custer that Terry is making the offer or that, if the offer was accepted, Terry would go in overall command. I think it is safe to say that Terry made no gesture, offer or order to Custer regarding joining the 2nd cavalry to the 7th. Brisbin made the offer, Custer refused it and Terry was content with the outcome otherwise he would have countermanded Custer's refusal. It is highly probable that Terry was relieved by Custer's refusal as it enabled him to stick to his plan. It is a pleasure to debate with you Dan as courtesy and common sense prevail. One thing though, we do not celebrate Thanksgiving this side of the pond, it would only rub in the fact that we lost the colonies! Never mind, we can all celebrate Christmas together. "Hunk"
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 27, 2010 17:59:19 GMT -6
Custer was not the first or last commanding officer with a big ego who felt everything centered around him and his "commentary". All we have to do is look at some of the commanders of WWII and into the Korean War . . . Patton & MacArthur . . . vainglorious men whose comments got them into hot water. Patton's role was reduced to a "decoy" for D-Day and MacArthur eventually got booted out of the military by Truman for one-upping him over policy during the Korean War. Both Patton & MacArthur had "glorious" military records (especially in there own minds) but eventually were reduced to bit players. If Custer had survived who know where he would have ended up . . .but big egos and big mouths as a military man usually leads you to the trash can of history. I am not quite sure what point you are trying to make here. Egos, both large and inflated, abound in all walks of life and can even be seen on these boards. Certainly Custer had a high opinion of himself, but then so did Benteen as his correspondence demonstrates. The question is, did Custer's ego get in the way of sensible military thinking? Taking into account what that thinking was in 1876, I have not found any hard evidence to prove that it did. If you have found such evidence, as opposed to self-serving accusations, then perhaps ytou will cite it, as it would go a long way to proving your point.
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 28, 2010 12:57:49 GMT -6
Is there something wrong with self-serving accusations? We known some of what happened and a lot of not knowing what happened.
Just my opinion . . . sometimes an opinion can be backed up . . . other times it's just a gut feeling from reading/discussion/movies/documentaries.
Did Custer's ego get in the way of military thinking? Well, what he tried to do at the LBH was basically the same as what he did at the Washita . . . however, it wasn't winter, it wasn't a dawn attack, and it wasn't the hapless Black Kettle he was attacking.
Instead of thinking through what a mid-afternoon attack could result him he assumed the Sioux/Northern Cheyenne would do the same as Black Kettle . . . sleep through an attack and run instead of fighting. After spending years on the plains and fighting Indians . . . did Custer really learn anything about them or was he assuming whatever he did would work, regardless whether the Indians were the hardcore hostiles or another band of hapless a la Black Kettle Indians?
Again what we discuss here is a lot of facts we can back up, but in the end it's the gut feeling of years of reading.
Maybe Custer had that gut feeling too . . .
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 28, 2010 15:40:42 GMT -6
1) Is there something wrong with self-serving accusations? We known some of what happened and a lot of not knowing what happened. Just my opinion . . . sometimes an opinion can be backed up . . . other times it's just a gut feeling from reading/discussion/movies/documentaries. 2) Did Custer's ego get in the way of military thinking? Well, what he tried to do at the LBH was basically the same as what he did at the Washita . . . however, it wasn't winter, it wasn't a dawn attack, and it wasn't the hapless Black Kettle he was attacking. Instead of thinking through what a mid-afternoon attack could result him he assumed the Sioux/Northern Cheyenne would do the same as Black Kettle . . . sleep through an attack and run instead of fighting. After spending years on the plains and fighting Indians . . . did Custer really learn anything about them or was he assuming whatever he did would work, regardless whether the Indians were the hardcore hostiles or another band of hapless a la Black Kettle Indians? 3) Again what we discuss here is a lot of facts we can back up, but in the end it's the gut feeling of years of reading. Maybe Custer had that gut feeling too . . . 1) Horse, firstly my reference to self-serving accusations was not directed at your good self but at those who, in the aftermath of the LBH battle, took every opportunity to deflect attention from their own errors of judgement and failures by accusing Custer of just about every character flaw they could think up. Those red herrings are still misleading people today. That being said, you are naturally entitled to your own opinion, though it would be good to know what sources have formed that opinion. 2) I cannot agree that the Washita and the LBH had any similarities. The Washita was a fought in winter against a small, sleeping and surrounded Cheyenne village, attacked as dawn broke by a numerically superior force of cavalry. Going into the 1876 military offensive to force the free-roamers on to reservations, the concern of the whole of military command was that the Indians would scatter and flee. No one even considered the possibility that they would stand and fight, hence Crook's astonishment at the Rosebud, yet nobody accused him of poor military thinking even though he was seeking to find and attack the village. Once Custer believed the 7th had been seen what options did he have? He could have stayed where he was and let the Indians flee, he could have retreated and let the Indians flee, he could have moved south, lost contact and let the Indians flee or he could attack. It is important therefore, not to lose sight of the 1876 military mind set when considering what Custer needed to do, because any other cavalry commander of the time would not have done things much differently. One more thing. Neither Custer nor the 7th had spent years on the plains or fighting Indians. Apart from the Washita in 1868 and the Yellowstone long range engagements of 1873, only small skirmishes by by various segments of the 7th had taken place. From 1869 to 1873 the regiment was split up undertaking various police style duties. Nothing in any of these duties prepared them for the LBH, nothing experienced anywhere on the plains would have prepared any other regiment for the LBH. That battle was unique, the huge gathering of Indians was unique. There was nothing like it before and nothing like it again, yet Custer seems to be expected by some to have understood exactly what he was going to face. That is Monday morning quarterbacking because Custer did the only thing he could do in the circumstances he faced. To blame him because he was defeated is a post-event reaction by those who are privy to information not available to him. 3) Gut feelings from years of reading are fine, so long as what we have read to reach that gut feeling is cited in endorsement. Custer did not have the luxury of reading about the force he faced or their mood, he simply had to react to the information available to him - a pity he couldn't Google the outcome....
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Post by crzhrs on Nov 30, 2010 8:55:21 GMT -6
Hunk:
No offense taken.
While the Washita & LBH were different battles . . . Custer's attack plan was basically the same, divide the command and attack a village that was not fully scouted and turned out not to be just a sleepy small village . . . but one of many along the Washita River. Custer's main advantage there was a dawn attack that caught the camp by surprise . . . but once roused the outlaying villages responded rapidly and resulting in Custer falling back.
Crook was chastised by a number of military commanders . . . Sherman/Sheridan? said his victory was barren of any results. A number of western newspapers criticized his performance and the Crows/Shoshonis were so disgusted they left.
There several other commanding officers that had very good success against the Plains Indians. MacKenzie comes to mind . . . his tactics/skill/intelligence forced the last of the Comanches to give up (excellent new book out regarding that by the way, Empire of the Summer Sun, Sam Gwynne) and MacKenzie's destruction of Dull Knife's village was a huge success. MacKenzie's victories over the Comanche should have been required reading by the rest of the military.
Intelligence prior to the LBH stated there would be a large force of Indians to fight . . . as the command advanced scouts advised Custer of the size which appears to be even larger than thought and the type of fighting to be expected.
Custer had enough info yet his "ego" didn't allow him to be swayed from the warnings . . . nothing wong with being confident but I would have listened to the scouts (Indian AND White) . . . still haven't figured out why Custer didn't inform Benteen of the further separation of command and the Reno attack order and the imminent threat of battle.
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Post by benteen on Nov 30, 2010 13:52:32 GMT -6
It is a pleasure to debate with you Dan as courtesy and common sense prevail. One thing though, we do not celebrate Thanksgiving this side of the pond, it would only rub in the fact that we lost the colonies!
Never mind, we can all celebrate Christmas together.
"Hunk"[/quote]
Hunk,
Thanks for the kind words, I assure you the feeling is completely mutual. As for the Thanksgiving greeting I apologize, I certainly didn't mean any disrespect,as a matter of fact the way this country is being run I sometimes wish King Georges men would have tried a little harder <G>
As to Gen George I think his comment to Ludlow was glanced over a little too lightly. I cant think of any reason an officer would be planning to cut loose from his commander and the main command before he even goes in the field, other than he wants to win the battle on his own and gain all the credit and glory
As to pushing the horses to hard,I have read accounts by authors, researchers, and opinions by yourself and others(Who I believe are more knowledgeable than many of the afore mentioned)that there are as many opinions that he didn't push to hard as there are that he did.So I don't push the argument to hard. If I were an expert horseman like AZ Ranger I might, but my extent of horse knowledge is that they eat apples. I don't mind getting clobbered but I don't want to make it too easy <G>
I believe it was you Hunk, that alluded to using Libbie's letters from Custer as a yardstick.Just as a general rule I wouldn't put too much faith in a husbands letters to his wife.Husbands have a way of telling their wives what they want them to know, not necessarily the truth. One soldier that was in a hell of a fight may write home that it was just another dull day. Where some other soldier, perhaps a cook who was 50 miles from a battle may tell of his fierce hand to hand struggle.
In Libbie's case you have the addition that this lady spent the remainder of her life protecting Custer's legacy. Certainly out of affection, but also because she needed a few quid, Custer left her $8000 in debt..It may be that letters that showed him in a good light, made their way to public viewing, others that may have show a darker side about his ambitions, may have found their way to the fire place.
In any event we can share some Christmas greetings together and we shall, my friend, we shall
Be Well Dan
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Dec 2, 2010 16:23:52 GMT -6
Hunk: No offense taken. 1) While the Washita & LBH were different battles . . . Custer's attack plan was basically the same, divide the command and attack a village that was not fully scouted and turned out not to be just a sleepy small village . . . but one of many along the Washita River. Custer's main advantage there was a dawn attack that caught the camp by surprise . . . but once roused the outlaying villages responded rapidly and resulting in Custer falling back. 2) Crook was chastised by a number of military commanders . . . Sherman/Sheridan? said his victory was barren of any results. A number of western newspapers criticized his performance and the Crows/Shoshonis were so disgusted they left. 3) There several other commanding officers that had very good success against the Plains Indians. MacKenzie comes to mind . . . his tactics/skill/intelligence forced the last of the Comanches to give up (excellent new book out regarding that by the way, Empire of the Summer Sun, Sam Gwynne) and MacKenzie's destruction of Dull Knife's village was a huge success. MacKenzie's victories over the Comanche should have been required reading by the rest of the military. 4) Intelligence prior to the LBH stated there would be a large force of Indians to fight . . . as the command advanced scouts advised Custer of the size which appears to be even larger than thought and the type of fighting to be expected. Custer had enough info yet his "ego" didn't allow him to be swayed from the warnings . . . nothing wong with being confident but I would have listened to the scouts (Indian AND White) . . . still haven't figured out why Custer didn't inform Benteen of the further separation of command and the Reno attack order and the imminent threat of battle. Thanks Horse, 1) Custer was led to Black Kettle's camp on the Washita by his Osage scouts who followed the trail in the snow of a raiding party right to it. There was no mention then or since of any other trails and the Osage did not sense the presence of other camps. I do not find that surprising as I have been there, the river meanders in long curves and is heavily wooded. Short of smoke from fires, unlikely as it was night time, it would have taken clairvoyance to know other camps were relatively nearby. If any more widespread scouting had taken place there could have been only two possible outcomes, either retreat because the odds were too great or be discovered by one of the scouting parties stumbling into one of the sleeping camps in the dark when chaos would have ensued. 2) Yes, Crook WAS chastised, not for retreating but for not pressing on with an attack. In other words because the Indians were not held in high esteem as a fighting force, but were expected to try and scatter, Crook should have found them and attacked them. Custer did both and was roundly criticised for doing so. Heads you lose, tails you lose then. 3) Certainly there were successes against Plains indian tribes, the Washita being one. You cite Mackenzie but let us look closely at his record:- The Battle of Blanco Canyon October 10 1871. Mackezie took between 800-900 men of the 4th Cavalry against about 150 Comanche warriors and their families. Army casualties 1 killed, 2 wounded. Indian casualties 3 reportedly killed. The rest of the Indians scattered and fled. The Battle of the North Fork of Red River September 28 1872. Mackenzie took 284 men of the 4th Cavalry plus 20 Indian scouts against about 60 warriors and their families, killing about 30, with 6 badly wounded and the rest captured, at a cost of 2 of his own men killed and two wounded. The Battle of Palo Duro Canyon September 28 1874. Mackenzie took about 800-900 men of the 4th Cavalry plus scouts against a gathering of about 500 Cheyenne, Comanche and Kiowa warriors and their families strung out in camps along the length of the canyon. The entire Indian gathering was sleeping after experiencing very bad weather and were therefore surprised. 4 Indians and 1 soldier were killed and Mackenzie captured 1,400 horses plus all their winter supplies as the Indians fled. The Dull Knife Fight November 25 1876. Mackenzie took 1,000 men of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Cavalry Regiments plus Pawnee and Lakota scouts against 400 Cheyenne and their families. Sleeping after a late night celebration the Indians were surprised and routed. The Army suffered 9 killed and 26 wounded, the Indians 25 killed and an unknown number wounded. The village and its contents were destroyed and 500 horses captured. In all of these engagements Mackenzie had superior numbers and the element of surprise, much as Custer did against Black Kettle in 1868, so perhaps Mackenzie learned something from GAC. In every case, the Indians fled, either after initial resistance or immediately. Could Custer have learned from this that flight followed initial resistance hence his belief that the warriors coming out against Reno would sooner or later flee? 4) There were various estimates of the number of warriors that would be found in the village, from 500 to 1,500 with the trail being followed from the Rosebud indicating increasing numbers. The scouts did bring this to Custer's attention but it is important to bear in mind the difference in mind set between the military and the scouts. ALL the military commanders, including Sherman and Sheridan expected the Indians to flee rather than fight. The Crows and the Rees were both afraid of the Lakota so their counsel was to be cautious. Custer held the military viewpoint plus he knew that the whole campaign would be a huge failure and a great embarrassment to the Army if the Indians did elude him. As he saw it, he had no option but to attack once he was convinced the 7th had been seen. That his attempted attack on the village failed should not be criticised simply because it failed. It should be seen for what it was, a unique situation better judged in hindsight. Why did Custer not inform Benteen about his separation from Reno? Who says he didn't? Benteen, who also said that Custer did not believe there were Indians or a village in the LBH valley, yet Custer, a successful Civil War commander, still took the regiment into that valley. Against what or who if he did not believe there was anything there? In my opinion you place too much weight on what Benteen and others said didn't happen and not enough on the logic of what would have happened militarily in the circumstances. I can say that the Moon is made of blue cheese but it doesn't make it so. Neverthless, if you are convinced that Custer's ego got in the way of good military sense, then nothing I can say will alter your opinion.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Dec 3, 2010 8:58:49 GMT -6
1) Thanks for the kind words, I assure you the feeling is completely mutual. As for the Thanksgiving greeting I apologize, I certainly didn't mean any disrespect,as a matter of fact the way this country is being run I sometimes wish King Georges men would have tried a little harder <G> 2) As to Gen George I think his comment to Ludlow was glanced over a little too lightly. I cant think of any reason an officer would be planning to cut loose from his commander and the main command before he even goes in the field, other than he wants to win the battle on his own and gain all the credit and glory 3) As to pushing the horses to hard,I have read accounts by authors, researchers, and opinions by yourself and others(Who I believe are more knowledgeable than many of the afore mentioned)that there are as many opinions that he didn't push to hard as there are that he did.So I don't push the argument to hard. If I were an expert horseman like AZ Ranger I might, but my extent of horse knowledge is that they eat apples. I don't mind getting clobbered but I don't want to make it too easy <G> 4) I believe it was you Hunk, that alluded to using Libbie's letters from Custer as a yardstick.Just as a general rule I wouldn't put too much faith in a husbands letters to his wife.Husbands have a way of telling their wives what they want them to know, not necessarily the truth. One soldier that was in a hell of a fight may write home that it was just another dull day. Where some other soldier, perhaps a cook who was 50 miles from a battle may tell of his fierce hand to hand struggle. In Libbie's case you have the addition that this lady spent the remainder of her life protecting Custer's legacy. Certainly out of affection, but also because she needed a few quid, Custer left her $8000 in debt..It may be that letters that showed him in a good light, made their way to public viewing, others that may have show a darker side about his ambitions, may have found their way to the fire place. 5) In any event we can share some Christmas greetings together and we shall, my friend, we shall Be Well Dan 1) Apology unnecessary as my comment was not critical, merely wistful! Would a Christmas Day toast with mulled wine suit your taste? 2) I agree that whatever Custer said to Ludlow will always be used against him, just as his comment to Carland on the Far West following his rejection of Brisbin's offer of the 2nd Cavalry is also used as evidence of his 'glory' hunt. The point surely however, is that these were words not deeds and there is nothing in his behaviour from June 22nd to June 24th that is either not militarily prudent or evidence of unnecessary haste. Custer may well have had thoughts of being in command of a victorious regiment on what he realised was likely be the last serious warfare on the Northern Plains, but to me, he did nothing to be condemned for on that basis. Even going into attack on the 25th is justified by the hard tack box incident causing him to believe he had been seen as that was not his original intention. Indeed, prior to that event, on the Crow's Nest, he argued with the Crows that the regiment had not been seen, "I say again we have not been seen. That camp has not seen us, I am going ahead to carry out what I think. I want to wait until it is dark and then we will march, we will place our army around the Sioux camp." If he was out for glory they had given him the perfect justification for plunging into the attack yet he argued against them. Glory hunter? I don't think so. 3) The available information on the condition of the horses is from the RCOI. Wallace testified that the horses were worn out, but then he also testified that he was next to Reno when the Major received his orders from Cooke and that was a lie. Other testimony: Gerard, "I did not notice that the horses were in any way fatigued." Dr. Porter, "The horses of the command I should consider in pretty good condition." Davern, "They were in tolerable good condition." Godfrey, "The general condition of the horses was good." and Frett, "They seemed in pretty good condition."The idea that men and horses had been overworked comes from Benteen's lie to Terry of the mileage covered on June 24th. That can be found in Terry's 'Confidential' Report of July 2nd, "I learn from Capt. Benteen that on......the 24th (the 7th cavalry marched) 45 miles etc.," I have already cited the correct mileage of 28 miles so Terry would have calculated that Custer had pushed his command hard to make the fictional addition of 17 miles in the same time as the actual mileage. From this spiteful misinformation, which also ignored all the halts that were made, has developed the belief of some that Custer was rushing to get to the Indian village to begin the battle before the Montana Column could get into position. The facts do not support such a view. 4) Whilst your point is well taken, GAC did like to brag to Libbie in his letters to her during the Civil War, "Suffice to say that our brigade has far surpassed all its previous exploits, and that you Boy was never before the object of such attention.."Compare that with his last letter of June 22nd, a day on which he should have been very boastful if the accusations of glory hunting are true, "Do not be anxious about me. You would be surprised how closely I obey your instructions about keeping with the column. I hope to have a good report to send you by the next mail." There is no trace of ego in those words and Custer was never slow in promoting himself. It was not Libbie that destroyed some of Custer's letters, but Margaret Merrington after the publication of "The Custer Story" but I have never come across any reference to any suppression of his campaign correspondence. 5) Sorry Dan, I just had to sample some mulled wine early. Hic! Merry Chrisshmush. Hunk
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Post by Dark Cloud on Dec 3, 2010 9:44:23 GMT -6
Merkel elsewhere wants to get the Glossary of terms down, and here are good examples of the need.
Technically speaking, Custer didn't ever enter the 'valley' of the LBH proper at all, unless he did at some point get into the village or come to the river. Reno/Ash Creek is a drainage, yes, but the 'valley' of the LBH is solely between the bluffs of the river's east bank and the high bench lands on the west on the other side of the village.
This is in no way important, per se, but someone given to specificity in such matters would get confused if Custer is presented as in the valley of the LBH. Because he was not. I'm not sure but that continually saying he was in the valley, as some have, gives underpinnings to the river fight/crossing as in Thompson.
It's also a good example of how powerful the literary templates were and remain. People WANT Custer to have entered the valley, of Despond (from Pilgrim's Progress) and of Death (Tennyson, Bible). But while Reno entered it, Benteen and Custer never did. Technically. They remained on the valley lip and high ground east of it.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Dec 3, 2010 16:03:16 GMT -6
Merkel elsewhere wants to get the Glossary of terms down, and here are good examples of the need. Technically speaking, Custer didn't ever enter the 'valley' of the LBH proper at all, unless he did at some point get into the village or come to the river. Reno/Ash Creek is a drainage, yes, but the 'valley' of the LBH is solely between the bluffs of the river's east bank and the high bench lands on the west on the other side of the village. This is in no way important, per se, but someone given to specificity in such matters would get confused if Custer is presented as in the valley of the LBH. Because he was not. I'm not sure but that continually saying he was in the valley, as some have, gives underpinnings to the river fight/crossing as in Thompson. It's also a good example of how powerful the literary templates were and remain. People WANT Custer to have entered the valley, of Despond (from Pilgrim's Progress) and of Death (Tennyson, Bible). But while Reno entered it, Benteen and Custer never did. Technically. They remained on the valley lip and high ground east of it. Oooh Daddy-O all that, well, language, hit me with it one more time. Man, you are so cool and, what's the word that's just so rite 4 U? Yeah, captious.
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Post by clw on Dec 8, 2010 14:05:23 GMT -6
Ah, Hunk. Wandered back here for the first time in months to find myself reading this thread with the ol' excitment stirring once more -- thanks to you. You have no idea how many times I thumped my desk and said.... "Exactly!"
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Dec 8, 2010 17:57:47 GMT -6
Ah, Hunk. Wandered back here for the first time in months to find myself reading this thread with the ol' excitment stirring once more -- thanks to you. You have no idea how many times I thumped my desk and said.... "Exactly!" Sadee, I am truly overjoyed that you have dropped in on this forum again. Many thanks for your plaudits, very much more appreciated because they come from someone for whom I have the greatest respect. You have been sorely missed so don't be a stranger. I have sent you a PM to update you on a personal matter. Shall we gird our loins and go forth to smite the Midianites? ;D ;D Warmest regards. "Hunk"
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 9, 2010 7:24:35 GMT -6
Welcome back clw
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