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Post by fred on Jun 15, 2011 18:07:02 GMT -6
I my self dont think either Reno or Benteen had any notion of searching for Custer and only the fact that Weir's act of trying to make contact forced there hand and they did a small jesture of at laest having a go, and it would act in there defence at any later inquiry. Why would you think this? There is absolutely no definitive evidence-- narrative-- that would support this line of thought. No comments were ever "heard" that would support you, yet most of the actions taken by Benteen would support the opposite view. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by benteen on Jun 15, 2011 21:23:12 GMT -6
yantaylor,
My friend not that Capt Fred needs any support in his opinion, but Reno/Benteen had no idea where Custer was or what he was doing. The last thing on their minds was worrying about some court, they were concerned about saving their commands
Be well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Jun 15, 2011 22:38:43 GMT -6
Ian: To support Dan and Fred that certainly do not require it I would call you attention to a modified version of something one of your countrymen said:
THERE IS NOTHING LIKE AN IMPENDING MASACRE BY 2000 HOSTILES TO GET YOUR FULL AND UNDIVIDED ATTENTION
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 16, 2011 9:29:01 GMT -6
I remeber reading a book called Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed. (the local Library had a copy but some one has nicked it I think) and he gives a good acount of the time lines for the battle, but I cannot get hold of it to post any quotes from it. I know what I said was all conjecture, but a lot of stuff on the final parts of the battle are open to reason, I just thought I would add my thoughts, but maybe I should have done more reseach first, I am just scratching about my self with being a rookie on this site. Sorry, and regards Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 16, 2011 13:36:40 GMT -6
Ian: No need to be sorry. You are asking good questions in an effort to find truth. The finding of truth though is a journey not a destination.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 17, 2011 4:06:31 GMT -6
Thanks Quincannon, I think I should of worded it different, I should have said, do you think if Weir had not been so adamant and went back to his Company and stayed put would either Reno or Benteen have suggested sending out a unit to see were Custer was. Going back to Benteen, he had to go through an Inquiry and explain his conduct of the Battle, But we also had a similar type of Battle, The Battle of Isandlwana in January 1879, Lord Chelmsford (the commander) left his Infantry (1200 men) on an exposed field and they were cut to peices while he was having dinner a few miles back, and when he retured home they gave him the Order of the Bath (Award of Chivalry) and he ended up Constable of the Tower of London. He did a similar thing to Benteen, when Benteen was commended for the defence on Reno hill, he defeated the Zulus at the Battle of Ulundi in July 1879 (he had two Gattling Guns, the same that Custer refused). sorry to take you off the trail with this story. Regards Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 17, 2011 9:11:51 GMT -6
Ian: My personal opinion is that they would have moved forward at some point. Just what the timing of that move, in what strength, and the wisdom of such a move is what would be in question.
My gut tells me that even at the point where Weir made his move it was already to late to help Custer. A lot of folks with disagree with this, and that is OK. I have been trying to figure out in my own mind at just what point Custer reached the point of no return for fifty years. Just when I think I might have the answer, something comes along to make me hesitate. Understanding the man I think is vital to the understanding of the battle. With that in mind I currently suspect that this point was reached the moment Custer turned right and onto the bluffs. He was determined to go forward and attack come what may. This is not, in my view a display of tactical prowless, only that of personal arrogance.
I have stated on the other board, and unlike a few that haunt that house, that I am not in anyones corner. Therefore I am an equal opportunity blamer. I think everyone made mistakes that day, but I find that Custer made the one that would make the battle unwinnable. It was not only the division of the command, It was also how widely he dispersed them. The importance of placing two major terrain features between Custer and his nearest supports in the early stages of the battle can not be overlooked, nor can that fact's importance be underestimated.
There was an incident at Marengo, where one of Napoleon's subordinates told him (the words are mine based upon bad memory) - This morning's battle is lost we still have the afternoon. I don't think Reno and Benteen had the same mental attitude, but at the same time do not believe they were cowards either.
Isandwana, like LBH, was a battle where intentions were looked at rather than capabilities. This is always a mistake, as commander's have discovered to their sorrow thoughout the pages of military history.
Gatling Guns - I would have sooner had soldiers who were trained marksmen (Fifteen rounds a month for training is an insult). The Gatlings were much to immobile to be useful in this terrain in my view. A belt fed 1919A6 would have been nice.
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Post by fred on Jun 17, 2011 17:40:26 GMT -6
My gut tells me that even at the point where Weir made his move it was already to late to help Custer. A lot of folks with disagree with this, and that is OK. Your gut serves you well. By the time Weir left the area of Reno Hill Custer was well on his way to Ford D and Keogh was setting up his positions along Battle Ridge and on Calhoun Hill. If you believe Gall was involved in the fighting-- and most of my work shows he was-- then he was already reaching the vicinity of what we today call Henryville. Indians were within bow and arrow distance of Battle Ridge By the time Weir reached the northernmost peak, Harrington was already routed and the remains of C Company were struggling up Finley - Finckle Ridge and Custer has already left the Ford D area. According to Indian narratives, the dust and smoke, even in this sector, were terrible. By the time Edgerly arrived at the peaks-- he backtracked a bit-- Custer has been forced up Cemetery Ridge and is on LSH, the remainder of E Company struggling up to the hill. By this time, Benteen, at the head of three companies, was very close to Weir. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Jun 17, 2011 17:42:17 GMT -6
Quinny I have been trying to figure out in my own mind at just what point Custer reached the point of no return for fifty years.
That point was in his head. If he had been an airline pilot of a crashed plane in which 210 people had lost their lives and the crash investigaters looked at his recent emotional history they would have looked no further. It is believed that Captain Scott remained in his tent with his comrades and died rather than face humiliation.The same might be said of Custer.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 17, 2011 21:35:59 GMT -6
Fred: And Harrington being routed at or before the time Weir reaches the peak, blows one of our friends on the other boards theories of how at least part of C on FF Ridge got there in the first place. Without that his whole scenario falls apart, which means his timeline is in shambles.
Richard: Yes, I do believe that Custer had the attitude that he will show "them" if it kills him. He got his wish.
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Post by fred on Jun 18, 2011 8:28:43 GMT -6
Fred: And Harrinton being routed at or before the time Weir reaches the peak, blows one of our friends on the other boards theories of how at least part of C on FF Ridge got there in the first place. Without that his whole scenario falls apart, which means his timeline is in shambles. The problem I have with his "model" nonsense is multifold. First of all, he picks the testimonies and narratives he wants because he has an agenda. Second, his grasp of tactics is non-existent and because he dons an old-time uniform he thinks he's Napoleon Junior. Anyone who thinks that "fortifying" Finley-Finckle Ridge under those circumstances is a fool and has no clue regarding simple, basic tactics. Occupation would have strung out your command and would have made it susceptible to attack from three sides, especially that late in the event. You would have concentrated NO firepower at the western end-- which was the most dangerous-- and if you had, then that position would have been established with absolutely no supporting fire behind it. Distances were too great. Pure and simple, he has no clue and that doesn't even account for his silly timing discrepancies. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 18, 2011 9:20:16 GMT -6
Fred: The only reason that I can see Company C (all or part) on FF is to delay to enable I and L to have some little time to get eastablished in the Keogh sector. Of course that is not the only reason they would be there, but it seems to me the most logical.
All this stuff coming out of some people on the other board is simple hero worship. How could our hero have been caught in such a fix? Simple the others let him down, or so goes their reasoning.
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Post by fred on Jun 18, 2011 10:26:02 GMT -6
Fred: The only reason that I can see Company C (all or part) on FF is to delay to enable I and L to have some little time to get eastablished in the Keogh sector. Of course that is not the only reason they would be there, but it seems to me the most logical. Quincannon, I agree with you and your rationale here is highly plausible. I have no issue with C Company troops being on Finley - Finckle, but to my way of thinking, only after they were routed out of Calhoun Coulee. The higher ridge represented safety and was the more plausible of the two ridge choices confronting panicking men. When that higher ground failed to provide the necessary safety, those men retreated toward the additional perceived safety of Calhoun Hill. I have no issue with someone disagreeing with me, but I do ask for some modicum of "historical" support before being bombarded with "theory," proclaimed as fact. And while we are at it, if one wants to play soldier or theoretician, then please, enter the arena with some idea of what one is talking about or express a willingness to learn. This is why I have come over so far to Dark Cloud's side... and I must mention "Wild," too, for he and I have not always had a good relationship. What I like so much about both of them is that even though they are always at one another's throats, they are able to back up their arguments with well thought-out ripostes and their knowledge is extraordinary. There may never be a DC-Wild Love Fest to Save the Historical World, but these guys would make sterling pub partners. It couldn't get any better. If I could get those two guys, Bob Anderson (also of Colorado), Will "Montrose," and a retired colonel I know of in Kansas (he used to go by the name "RA-O" on the other boards), we would have a time of it. Throw in a few others-- "RCH" and Steve come to mind-- add "benteen" for flavor... and wow! The issue I have with those two clowns next door is their continued coloring of everything in the shade of "custer." Benteen is a perfect example. John Gray skewed the Benteen arrival on Reno Hill by digging for any innuendo he could attach that would portray Benteen as a malingerer. He succeeded by twisting Godfrey's obscure 4:20 time reference and the continued cajoling of Godfrey by W. A. Graham until finally, some 50+ years after the fact, the old worn-out K Company CO flipped the dog a bone and said, "Yes, OK, Benteen arrived at that 4:20 time." Hardly the stuff of judicially vetted evidence. Once Benteen arrived on Reno Hill, however, the detractors shift from that timing exercise to a hesitancy of Benteen to move forward and sacrifice himself and the remaining seven companies for the greater glory and good of America's Golden Boy. What people fail to realize and refuse to accept-- though the military amongst us see otherwise-- was that the "horns of a dilemma" Benteen referred to earlier, should have been the dilemma that greeted him once atop the hills. First of all, Benteen was greeted by a broken command whose men were not all up on the hilltop yet. Then, there were some Indians up the as well, a little farther downstream, and Benteen sent out a foray to dispatch those guys. Next, he distributed ammo from his men and sent Hare back to the packs to cut out a couple of ammo mules. Next, he had to check on his wounded. Then, Reno deserted him for several minutes. At this time, Benteen is still cognizant of Cooke's note, and while I believe Benteen fulfilled part of that order-- "come quick"-- by hustling ahead to Reno on the hilltop, there was now the second part that trumped the first-- "bring packs." The dichotomy-- if not recognized at first, or ignored by "coming quickly"-- was now clearly apparent and urgent. The situation as Benteen originally thought, i. e., and as portrayed by Kanipe and Martini, was different and his initial impressions were wrong. What made Benteen's actions on Reno Hill so imponderable to the idiots who condemn him, is the action of Tom Weir in heading downstream. This is further compounded by a diversity of opinion as to what occurred between Benteen, Reno, and Weir. The Reno and Benteen detractors all hop on the "loud disagreement" between the three men, yet Weir himself told Edgerly he had not spoken to either Benteen or Reno, and when Weir moved downstream he made no effort to signal or tell Edgerly to follow, taking only his striker with him. Of course, the detractors counter that by saying Edgerly claimed Weir often allowed Edgerly to command the troops, but it is my opinion that does not apply to this situation because the conditions at the time would have clearly dictated a commander to either stop or signal his troops to move forward. Weir did neither. Based on the studies I have done, Weir took some 28 minutes from the time they heard the volley firing to when he began his move downstream. And he went on his own hook. It took Benteen 53 minutes to move and only then, after he saw the packs within a mile of reaching Reno Hill. I would estimate that it took some 6 minutes from the time the commanders deemed the packs safe or close enough, to organize the movement downstream. That is reasonable considering the number of wounded, the lack of materials to transport those wounded, the screwed-up organization of some commands, e. g., Wallace's G Company, and the fact that there were still men missing, and others-- namely Varnum and his burial/retrieval party-- part way down the bluffs. The detractors, of course-- and they number many of my best friends, not some of the fly-by-nights over yonder-- don't want to hear any of this or will cherry-pick the testimonies to fit their own so-called "models." There is no convincing anyone. My dear friend, "RCH," claimed to "detest" Benteen, though for the life of me, I cannot understand his degree of hatred. These men have become historical figures, all of them fighting for our country. I can understand why someone who is Jewish, or someone who survived the Holocaust would "detest" Hitler, Himmler, and their gang-- or for that matter, as I do, detest those guys simply because they were the personification of evil-- but "detest" Benteen? C'mon! Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 18, 2011 12:21:36 GMT -6
Fred: I agree. I can see no good in rushing to the aid of Custer when, as you say, Benteen/Reno had to get their commands sorted out and prepared for what lay ahead.
Taking sides in this debate, one against the other, serves only to cloud the search for truth.
Something that ammuses me is the on-going debate about Reno in the timber on the other site. It is evident to me that none of these guys know B from a bull's ass about establishing a defensive position. Primary, alternate and suplemental positions, counterattack plans, field of interlocking fire, and finally rally points if things go very wrong do not seem to enter these folks minds. Some of them say the timber could be held for (fill in the blank) hours. They never stop to ask themselves what if you choose to do so and you are wrong. What is Plan B? Was a Plan B possible to execute? No, they assume that all would go their way. That is not realistic, nor would it be to the commander charged with such a defense. Case in point, the retreat from the timber was bad enough. Could you envision that retreat if it had been tried by survivors flushed from the timber that was being over run?
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Post by benteen on Jun 18, 2011 13:25:50 GMT -6
Sgt Quincannon/ Capt fred,
Excellent posts I agree with all of it. Just to add my 2 cents worth, I think another reason for some to say that Reno should have and could have held out is that they are are basing it on what they know now, not what Reno knew then. Reno had held the warriors on point for 30-40 minutes and there was no support I don't pretend to think I know what was going through Reno's mind, but it would be reasonable to assume he thought Custer was in the same mess he was in. neck deep in warriors and couldn't support him. He didn't know Benteens orders, where he was or when to expect him back, so he couldn't count on support from Benteen. The mission was over, there were far more warriors than they thought and they were certainly not running, he may well have thought it is time to save my command. To retreat or fall back is no disgrace. You can fight again another day.
Be Well Dan
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