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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 8, 2009 9:09:15 GMT -6
Because it isn't allowed to argue on the Independent Research Thread, that can happen here.
To recap:
1. herosrest claims a photo of LSH is really of Calhoun Hill. This despite clear photographic evidence he provides matches the topographical map of LSH's west flank.
2. he claims a ravine wall is really a building, man made, a structure hundreds of feet long by the LBH in the years right after the battle.
3. he claims Gray.....well, here's what he said last.
You are playing - not sure what at, though. What have the last several decades of reclassification and abysmal attempts to regulate (what was perfectly well understood 130+ years ago), got to do with my topic. Stop ramming your gospel down my throat.
Gray's work is more than flawed.. he was too bright, seriously clever to make the errors he made. The disciplines he instilled are techniques, to study and analyse, to provide concrete and repeatable tests for experiment. Provide a theory and here are the tools to test it. What he then did, was take a completely preposterous outline, that had been put forward previously and offered it as an example to test upon. He was a seriously clever guy trying to show people interested in the fact of what happened, how to deal with the matter themselves, rather than rely on the partisan schisms which mean you cant believe one if the other says something different. It's about people and the layer upon layer of doings they did. Science is schmaltz, a tool, and look what rigor brings to the field......... mortis. Get off my case. Gray made the error of thinking all of us think as he did - it is blatantly obvious from the mess that flowed from his novels that that is not the case. The people who lived there and mixed and existed as the local population knew what happened and that was 133 years ago. The rest is.............. put it into your own vocabulary.
I contend the paragraph above suggest he hasn't read Gray, because he cannot describe the book, and either relies on a scan of Utley's intro or someone else's summation.
He was asked for this "completely preposterous outline", but he failed to provide it or a description of it, or an author of it. He also says Gray wrote novels. Instead, he hopes to shield his ignorances by over praising Gray as if familiar with him, and he does this to others in hopes that it implies the confidence in his absurdities of proof to come. Children do this trying to scam adults.
This, by the way, is the sort of stuff you'd run across far more often before Gray, because there was no logic structure to hold theories to reality, whatever they were. It's that confinement to structure that annoys the frauds and the disturbed, the children and the Custerphiles desperate for a construct to damn Reno and Benteen.
Addendum:
I'd also point out that the tactic of throwing up graphics isn't to illuminate and sometimes bears no resemblance at all to what the text references. It's to impart the idea of great substance, when there is none. It's why conz loves Google earth, because it impresses people who don't know how easy it is, and they thank him as if it were hand colored. An additional benefit is that Google Earth fails big time to demonstrate how awful the land is on both the Benteen scout and the battlefield.
In his immediate response back under Independent Research, herosrest now says:
The time scheme and conclusions were published previously to Gray's work. He was aware of the study undertaken by an army officer and Grays published work mimics the military assessment. l am aware you are critical of aspects of Gray's work. He did not invent the techniques he uses or develops. What he does provide is learned insight and considerable research. He did not produce a reliable or defensible time & motion analysis. For a work dealing with Mitch Bouyer, he glossed over some mighty big holes. You, agree with some of what l have just posted. l know that.
Writing down time of action and comparing it to another's claim is ancient and didn't need to be invented. Gray certainly doesn't claim it as his own. What he did was apply time-motion study (which may actually be claimed to have been 'invented' by Frank Gilbreth -sp- who was the original subject of Cheaper by the Dozen) to the LBH for the first time, set up charts and distinguish possibilities from impossibilities. You say a military officer did this previous? Who. When.
Your description of Gray makes him seem like a con man: smart, but applied his smarts to falsehood and fabrication. He was a highly esteemed medical doctor and amateur historian, and well regarded in that field as well.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 8, 2009 9:48:11 GMT -6
From Independent Research. It seems like several people write under the name herosrest:
Unable to answer the questions of substance, we get this glurge:
l'll argue the matter here, it is part of the topic and moving discussion makes no sense. The advance and arrival are fundamental to discussion of the topic - Ford C. Gray, timing and interpretations of events by battle students are relevant here. eos.
There are schisms within study of the battle. Many within the military at the time considered that Custer had let the side down becoming embroiled in matters that did not concern him. That was a widely held view. Custer embarrassed some important people who were well regardd. Reno and Benteen will have held little regard for the shenanigans in Washington and were perfectly happy with GAC, out of the way.
Much study and analysis of LBH falls into camps of opinion for and against the various players. It is ridiculous for historians to participate, students and hobbyists and media, angling the thing fine, that is not though dispassionate assessment.
The amount of first hand detail, simply ignored or passed over or discredited to various ends is astounding and again, is, a matter you fully comprehend. Parties were at work with axes to grind.
Again:
What officer predated Gray in a time-motion study of the battle? Is this the result of the same blindness that claims dirt as an improbable building? Or is this just the usual smokescreen because you're making stuff up?
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 8, 2009 11:22:28 GMT -6
Because the group posing as herosrest is totally on the ropes, caught in lies and fabrications, they change the subject yet again. As well, they now junk the "no argument" instructions on the section header.
Still cannot answer what should be simple questions as to the competence behind this.
So now, 'he' changes the subject to Benteen to cover for the fact he's been fabricating an issue.
7th Cavalry conducted an assault upon an identified target in the lower valley of the Little BigHorn valley during the forenoon and early afternoon of June 25th, 1876. At morning officers call the CO imparted his decision and ordered his regiment forward to battle. All officer testimony agrees this as fact, a target was identified, an objective set and the attack underway. All subsequent cavalry activity and process is subject the fact of an advance to battle against a force known to signicantly outnumber 7th Cavalry, if it was able to concentrate force against them.
That the regiments scouting force were ordered forward into attack, indicates clearly that scouting was completed and had ceased. Over to the Capt '/' F. Benteen. Well, Fred............. what happened?
We think Custer tried to cross the river......... possibly to get into the valley. Can't think why, though.......... why do that? It was a job for the Marines.
"All officer testimony agrees this as fact, a target was identified, an objective set and the attack underway." No officer testimony says an objective was set at officer's call, and in fact no objective had been set. If it had, Benteen's scout would not have been made. Second, Custer didn't know exactly where his target was and may not have believed the size of the enemy suggested by his scouts. He didn't fear 1500, but it was more than that. He seems to have thought Indians would always run when attacked.
There was no 'scouting force' to order to attack, only the Indian scouts whose obligations were to find the camp, accomplished, and as compensation to steal horses if they wanted, win-win. Reno wasn't a scouting force.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 9, 2009 3:16:53 GMT -6
Hi darkcloud.
l'll take the easy one first. The scouts were ordered or sent if you prefer to attack the camp, l usually refer to village or settlement, camp is fine, unusual. They were sent ahead of the column to take ponies which involved attacking the camp. There were some snags because the Arikara understood the odds they were up against. My read of Custer's intention is a probe, ahead of his approach. He wasn't going to tell them that though. That's my read of Custer's play with the pony stealers. As the valley fight got underway they did a good job, the running for the hills tales from troopers and officers wasn't really anything of the truth at all. That band of Arikara gave stirling service supporting the Reno battalion.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 9, 2009 3:19:46 GMT -6
We were admiring J.S. Gray's work.www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~nalakota/wotw/military/tacticalstudy_wotw033034.htm A tactical study of Battle Of The Little Big Horn by By COLONEL T. M. COUGHLAN, U. S. A., Retired. It is from THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, January-February, 1934 Amongst conclusions drawn is the following - Causes of the Disaster. The disaster of the Little Big Horn was the legitimate result, not only of the great superior strength and armament of the enemy, but of a planless battle - in many places, badly fought. The Indian triumph was not due so much to the general superiority of the red man as to the lack of generalship on the part of the whites. The victory was handed to the Indian on a silver platter.[/b] The report views matters in ways which seem rather familiar. An issue l find with the second novel, is.................... time. The data he produces is rubbish. Gray was a very bright guy, understood facets of the battle intimately and produced rubbish. No one questioned it or why. The book is a terrific read, it carries you away. From reality and is one of those works where skipping a single sentence can completely throw away serious issues or his causes for conclusions. It requires intense attention, constantly, cover to cover, read three times over. It is that enjoyable. It is though much easier to read COUGHLAN. I'm pretty sure Gray did, while he enjoyed himself and made a point. All anyone was interested in was the times Gray produced and his justifications of them. No one actually thought about how he produced them, the reasoning that produced his data. No one tested it, unfortunately. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I'd like to try an experiment. It's painless and will cause no harm. If your viewing, just reply. No tricks or silly stuff on my part and there is a simple and honest point to it. Most everyone knows this answer of the top of their head.
At What time of the morning did G.A. Custer order his column to advance after the night halt.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 9, 2009 7:44:47 GMT -6
He didn't
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 9, 2009 7:56:37 GMT -6
Does anyone recognize this picture taken from Calhoun Hill or something like that?
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 9, 2009 7:59:03 GMT -6
Hi darkcloud.
l'll take the easy one first. The scouts were ordered or sent if you prefer to attack the camp, l usually refer to village or settlement, camp is fine, unusual. They were sent ahead of the column to take ponies which involved attacking the camp. There were some snags because the Arikara understood the odds they were up against. My read of Custer's intention is a probe, ahead of his approach. He wasn't going to tell them that though. That's my read of Custer's play with the pony stealers. As the valley fight got underway they did a good job, the running for the hills tales from troopers and officers wasn't really anything of the truth at all. That band of Arikara gave stirling service supporting the Reno battalion. The scouts were not ordered or sent on an attack mission.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 9, 2009 8:18:58 GMT -6
We were admiring J.S. Gray's work.www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~nalakota/wotw/military/tacticalstudy_wotw033034.htm A tactical study of Battle Of The Little Big Horn by By COLONEL T. M. COUGHLAN, U. S. A., Retired. It is from THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, January-February, 1934 Amongst conclusions drawn is the following - Causes of the Disaster. The disaster of the Little Big Horn was the legitimate result, not only of the great superior strength and armament of the enemy, but of a planless battle - in many places, badly fought. The Indian triumph was not due so much to the general superiority of the red man as to the lack of generalship on the part of the whites. The victory was handed to the Indian on a silver platter. [/b] The report views matters in ways which seem rather familiar. An issue l find with the second novel, is.................... time. The data he produces is rubbish. Gray was a very bright guy, understood facets of the battle intimately and produced rubbish. No one questioned it or why. The book is a terrific read, it carries you away. From reality and is one of those works where skipping a single sentence can completely throw away serious issues or his causes for conclusions. It requires intense attention, constantly, cover to cover, read three times over. It is that enjoyable. It is though much easier to read COUGHLAN. I'm pretty sure Gray did, while he enjoyed himself and made a point. All anyone was interested in was the times Gray produced and his justifications of them. No one actually thought about how he produced them, the reasoning that produced his data. No one tested it, unfortunately. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I'd like to try an experiment. It's painless and will cause no harm. If your viewing, just reply. No tricks or silly stuff on my part and there is a simple and honest point to it. Most everyone knows this answer of the top of their head.
At What time of the morning did G.A. Custer order his column to advance after the night halt.[/quote] Battle Of The Little Big Horn A TACTICAL STUDY By COLONEL T. M. COUGHLAN, U. S. A., Retired From THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, January-February, 1934 Let’s check the facts of the following statement by the Col. “In all history, there is no such record of savage victory over trained troops.” "But history better remembers him for something ominous — the nation's largest military defeat by the Indians near what is now Fort Recovery, Ohio, in Mercer County. About 1,500 officers and regulars marched north from Fort Washington (now Cincinnati), and on Nov. 4 clashed with Indians near the Wabash River in Indiana. Miami Chief Little Turtle's warriors — numbering only about 1,000 — surprised the federal troops, who panicked and ran. About 700 federal soldiers died. Little Turtle reportedly lost fewer than 40 warriors. Though ill, St. Clair stood his ground and had three horses shot from under him. Eight bullets ripped his uniform and one grazed his hair. " Not so good. AZ Ranger
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 9, 2009 8:23:54 GMT -6
Again, you have not read Gray's work, and it's time to stop pretending you have. Further, people have been testing Gray's times since it came out near twenty years ago, right when he died. Some agree, some not, but they can't ignore it. Coughlin is not relevant. Nor historically literate.
1. You still don't know what a novel is.
2. You still try to cover up your ignorance with irrelevant graphics and what must be called text.
3. You cannot provide the name of the officer who supposedly did all Gray did years before; that's partially because you don't understand what Gray did to this moment, not having read the book nor here exhibited sufficient intelligence to understand it but primarily because you just made that up in hopes of cowing us.
4. You've failed at all your contentions, starting with not knowing a wall of dirt from a building.
Regarding Coughlin, his historical ignorance - a shared quality with the herosrest gang - seems to extend beyond the US. In "all" history? The British against the Zulu and further, up north, Gordon might beg to differ; the Romans against the rest of the world lost many battles against 'savages.' MANY trained troops lost against motivated and skilled "savages." The French in Haiti. It's a long list.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 9, 2009 9:33:20 GMT -6
We were admiring J.S. Gray's work.______________________________________________________ At What time of the morning did G.A. Custer order his column to advance after the night halt. Custer ordered an advance for 08:00, do you agree that, darkcloud. I'd like to develop a matter stemming from that order, if we agree that it as fact.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 9, 2009 9:54:02 GMT -6
No doubt you'd like to talk about anything rather than defend what you've already posted.
Custer ordered the regiment to be ready to go at 8AM, something distinct from ordering it to advance at that time.
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Post by herosrest on Sept 9, 2009 10:01:16 GMT -6
AZ Ranger - I didnt offer an opinion on COLONEL T. M. COUGHLAN's study or the man. The report indicates that Gray's study was not original and falls into a camp, or attitude towards the battle that derives from a factional approach to events. After november 1876 and publication of the Whittaker book, serious factional interpretations of events occur. Either or, for against, good and bad........ arguments developed in favor of factions with concerns and interests in perceptions of the battle. Pro Custer, anti Custer, fatalists, angels........... etc.
The scouts were addressed by Custer after the officers call, told what was expected of them and advised what to do in the event of setbacks, Custer advised an escape route and place of reunion if his attack failed. Custer thoroughly addressed the Arikara and Lacota scouts mission. They braved up and understood they would be leading the attack. Had they not lingered at the Lone tipi, the response to their taking ponies would have tipped off Custer to problems he had not planned to encounter.
dakcloud - John Gray was perfectly aware of this important aspect of battle study and used his book to illustrate how data is manipulated to favour a specific interest. He showed how confusions are introduced to study of the battle and how it is misportrayed and significant aspects brushed over or ignored. He showed how easy it is to mislead an audience through scientific schmaltz and befuddlery. Once people find themselves carrying three, four, five strains of convoluted analysis through a topic, they become confused and simply give in in admiration. He provided students with the tools to go and work it out for themselves and expected that is what would occur. It didn't.
Hi eightball ;D I understand that picture now, it didn't make sense to me and that was the case for a good period of time. Reaction here helped me, provoked & inspired considerably. That is a surprising picture. I understand it fully now and that is fine. The world isn't ready. I'm thinking of asking for some advice...........
RCoI - Lt. Wallace - " Where we found the first horse was a ravine, making a little valley running into the river. On a knoll was the first man, and then another ravine running into the first ravine; then on a ridge and over to a second ridge. It was on this second ridge the last stand was made. There was one ravine running in a southeastern direction, the side of it forming a ridge in one direction, then striking another in front of the position. There was a second ravine running into the river, back of that another ravine running in another direction, making Gen. Custer's last stand on a 'T" shaped ridge. It was not the highest point, there was a higher point between it and the river, and back of that about 200 yards was a still higher ridge. "
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Post by herosrest on Sept 9, 2009 10:22:34 GMT -6
re: Custer ordered the regiment to be ready to go at 8AM, something distinct from ordering it to advance at that time.
l agree with you. Specific. Spot on.
Reno's initial reports as CO, the 27th and some stuff afterpost indicate early times for advance and attack. in the 12:30 ballpark and onto Reno Hill by 14:00 met by Benteen a little later then.
No one believes it or it is dismissed. There is no direct first hand record from Custer himself and yet 08:00 is simply accepted, where a written report by Reno on Reno Hill is just brushed aside and ignored. _______________________________________________________
I agree thoroughly with the thrust of your insight as quoted "Regarding Coughlin, his historical ignorance - a shared quality with the herosrest gang - seems to extend beyond the US. In "all" history? The British against the Zulu and further, up north, Gordon might beg to differ; the Romans against the rest of the world lost many battles against 'savages.' MANY trained troops lost against motivated and skilled "savages." The French in Haiti. It's a long list. You asked for details of the officer. His T&M is part of the report. Gray's conclusions were not unique, nor his assessment revolutionary in matters assessing the battle. It had been done before. The very first T&M could, be considered as Whittakers. Realistically it was actually Miles. E.S Curtis then thoroughly addressed T&M is his work. _______________________________________________________
Here's one for fun - Below is a LBH map. It is tiny and very simple.
Custer's troops were wiped out and the warriors began returning to camp - they engaged cavalry whom they met whilst crossing into Medicine Tail Coulee from the Custer Battlefield. The red circle is diameter 500 m. Somewhere within that range, there were dismounted cavalry who engaged warriors and then retreated. This was after the Custer battle. These troops were part of the advance to support Custer and were some 1500 Meters at least, down river from Weir Point.
Or a whole bunch of Lacota & Cheyenne are telling lies, which is something they had no need to do. Perhap's the entire warrior force was armed with Barrett 50's otherwise. It may be that the warriors rode a mile or so up MTC to fight. That is not how they read, they were heading back to their lodges with loot from the battlefield and to get food, riding 15 abreast. After 'Cheyenne 'Two Moons' led his band out to fight, 'Roan Bear' and a handful of warriors defended the Ford from an attack. Bands of warriors returned from another fight to support them.[/color][/color]
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 9, 2009 12:52:55 GMT -6
Horse hockey.
You've not read Gray, don't understand what he accomplished, you're lying about an Army officer (least of all Miles) having done what Gray did before. If you claim it, where is it to be found? Jerome Green, Hedren, Utley, Dunlay, LA Time Book Review, all emphasize the totally unique application on the book jacket, which apparently you didn't read either.
Whitaker, who you also have not read, wouldn't know and wasn't remotely qualified to have done a time-motion study and, in any case, did not. If you disagree, what page might this be found on?
You don't understand what time-motion study is and no, nobody at all did it before Gilbreth in the early 20th century in the manner under consideration and no, nobody applied it to LBH before Gray. And they could not without something remotely approaching an accurate map, years in the future.
You're not covering for your ignorances, you're underlining them pretending to knowledge you don't have. Remember: this is up forever, your name(s) will eventually be known, you won't be able to pretend you didn't post this crap.
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